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ABSTRACT 
The problem addressed is the evaluation of a school and the study 
conducts a philosophical analysis of the normative and political pre-
suppositions of educational evaluation. 
This involves the articulation of a comprehensive theory of educa-
tion, integrating social and political philosophy and a vision of the 
good for man. 
This integration is achieved through an examination of the related 
ideas of an existential perspective on the good of the individual, the 
grounding of normative judgments in the human existential predicament, 
the primacy of practice and the importance of "democratic" communications 
and power relations. 
It is argued that educational evaluation should be grounded in a 
conception of man's good - in both individual and social terms, and 
Chapter I addresses the individual aspect. 
Chapter II analyses the social perspective and articUlates a 
democratic social principle based on equal consideration of the good 
of all individuals. 
Chapter III argues that power relations and communications processes 
are crucial for individuals and groups realizing their good. 
Chapter IV articulates principles for the shaping of power relations 
and communications by the basic structure of society; it addresses the 
reconciliation of popular political accountability, worker autonomy and 
cultural pluralism. 
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Chapter V uses the preceding analyses to articulate two basic aims 
for education, one existential, the other social. It is argued that 
these aims should be elaborated in terms of the power relations and 
communications processes of the participants before considering specific 
educational objectives, curriculum,pedagogy or evaluation procedures. 
The overarching importance of the system of political control over 
education is stressed. 
Throughout, and especially in Chapter VI, the thesis addresses 
major policy issues in the political control of education, e.g., 
educational evaluation, curriculum control, teacher accountability, 
local versus central control. It also raises basic questions concern-
ing the research programme of educational theorists and philosophers 
of education. 
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PREFACE 
In its final form the thesis reports the analyses and findings of 
only a part of the educational and research activity. The writing of 
this thesis has been a deeply satisfying experience, as much for the 
opportunity to straighten out my own thinking on a number of important 
matters, as for the experience of creative work. Indeed the aspects of 
self-transformation and of scholarly research go very much together. 
Because this sort of intellectual activity is a co-operative venture it 
is fitting to acknowledge the contribution of others to the thesis and 
to the total educational experience associated with its writing. 
I have had many excellent teachers spanning my elementary, secondary 
and university studies. Rather than try to recognize them all I will 
mention three from my graduating year at King Edward High School - Sadie 
Boyles, James Moore and Miss Robinson. 
At the University of London Institute of Education I have been 
fortunate to have teachers such as Joan Cooper, Ray Elliott, Graham Haydon, 
Richard Peters and John White in the Philosophy of Education Department 
and Basil Bernstein in the Sociology of Education Department. I have also 
benefited from the comments of research students and visiting scholars in 
seminar discussions and informal conversation. 
I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for the 
doctoral fellowship and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
of the Universities of the United Kingdom for the fee rebate award. 
The British Columbia Teachers' Federation has been extremely helpful 
in several ways: by granting me educational leave for one year and leave 
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without pay for a second; by providing me with inside experience regarding 
the politics of education over a ten-year period; by the intellectual 
stimulation of staff and teacher colleagues. 
Pat White deserves my gratitude for her assistance in so many ways, 
e.g. programme and course selection, her seminars in social and political 
philosophy related to education, suggested readings, tutorials, thesis 
supervision and other necessary tasks. Her advice concerning drafts of 
the thesis has been invaluable. 
My "extended family" of parents, brothers, sister, aunts, uncles, 
cousins, nephews, nieces and in-laws has been extremely supportive. So 
also have been my four children, Janet, Karen, Sarah and Stephen, and my 
wife Linda, who have come with me for two years, leaving home and dear 
friends 6,000 miles away. Without Linda's help and encouragement the 
thesis and the wonderful educational experience that went with it would 
not have been. 
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NOTES ON USAGE 
1. At this point I should make clear the plan followed regarding 
gender distinctions in the thesis. I am sensitive to the need 
to reduce sexism in literature and scholarly work. However, I 
find expressions such as "he/she", "his/her", etc. awkward. 
Accordingly I alternate between the feminine form in the odd 
numbered chapters and the masculine in the even. 
2. Let me at this point explain my use of quotation marks and 
inverted commas. 
In referring to a concept or a foreign or technical expression 
I use single quotes, e.g. 'justice'. 
In expressing an odd expression or unusual usage, I use 
double quotation marks, e.g. "justice". 
In reporting a direct quotation of a sentence fragment, 
sentence, paragraph, etc. I use double quotation marks (except 
for quotations within quotations). 
Interestingly these are not exclusive categories and so I 
have sometimes to choose according to the greater emphasis I 
want to put on the expression. 
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I N T ROD U C T ION 
What is the problem with education today? It is striking that there 
is a variety of perspectives on this question, depending, in part, on 
whether one is a teacher, student, parent, taxpayer or politician, in 
part on one's geographic locality, cUltural circumstances, gender, class 
position, own educational experiences and so on. The ways people describe, 
categorize and theorize about educational problems are also extremely 
divergent. Some see the problem as a matter of technique or concrete 
aids, some in terms of power relations, some in terms of conceptions of 
the good life or justice or other broad purposes. Hence the major 
problems in education are seen or not seen as due to poor teaching, poor 
administration, lack of accountability, powerful teacher unions, lack of 
resources, lack of professional status and too little autonomy for teachers, 
social relations in a class society, the decline of morality and social 
solidarity, the economic and social changes arising in advanced industrial 
society, the predominance of a technological - scientific orientation in 
our culture, ••• depending on one's perspective. 
How are we to establish public policies for education given this 
diversity in perspective? How are persons engaged in serious research 
and scholarship concerning education to justify their perspective or the 
focus of their study? How does one justify one's omissions? Clearly one 
cannot even mention all the concerns that might have been considered but 
this is different from not providing an ethical grounding for one's 
analysis, and not mentioning why. On the other hand how does one justify 
taking the time to go into ethical questions? How far does one go into 
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the ethical foundations of one's educational analysis? We can ask the 
same sorts of questions concerning pedagogy, social theory, justice, 
politics and other disciplines or fields that might illuminate our 
understanding of education. 
Is it reasonable to expect scholars and policy makers to justify 
their perspectives or focus? Or does rationality only become relevant 
to educational research and policy once a perspective is chosen, 
arbitrarily, from among the many possibilities? This study brings to 
light some findings which are important not only for educational theory 
and policy but also for social and political theory; and these findings 
are reached through particular approaches and perspectives; but I face 
the issue of perspective and focus, attempt to justify the perspective 
taken and I argue that the choice of inquiry and perspective taken in 
the thesis is not arbitrary. 
Indeed I am struck by the interconnections between the concerns and 
issues inherent in the various perspectives and will reveal a number of 
these connections during the study. I argue that we can make sense of 
many of these apparently arbitrary differences in perspective through the 
articulation of a sound foundation for educational policy and theory which 
involves a theorization of human agency, social co-operation, social 
justice, culture and politics. Hence I offer a theory of education 
involving a wide-ranging inquiry into the above-mentioned fields and I 
justify the perspectives taken in articulating this theory. I will 
develop findings and conclusions which are relevant to the everyday 
evaluation of educational processes and also to the governance of education. 
To do this the study provides a theorization of human agency to a greater 
extent than is the practice in political or educational philosophy, 
develops some original findings concerning democratic social life and 
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offers a general strategy for the transformation of both education and 
society towards a way of life which is good, just and feasible. This is 
both a philosophical analysis, a study in educational, social and 
political philosophy, and a practical study: it addresses issues of 
central significance to concerns as varied as the improvement of the 
quality of education for students or the working lives of teachers, of 
the basic structures of a just and democratic society, and of principles 
for educational research and philosophy of education. While a philosophical 
analysis it touches on the territory of other disciplines such as sociology, 
economics and organization theory without adopting their methods of inquiry. 
Naturally this sort of study poses extremely difficult challenges: 
the scope is vast and the space little; the disciplines involved are many; 
it has to produce generalized findings and yet be practical. And so I 
will need some devices which allow an efficient development of the topic. 
But what is the topic? In all this talk about perspectives I have not 
said what our theme or topic is. It is better that I deal with the device 
first. I initiate this study with a device: the task is to conduct an 
evaluation of a school. How did this task get assigned? There are 
many possibilities: e.g. officials in a government educational bureaucracy 
assigned it; the local community demanded it; the local teachers' associ-
ation initiated it; the teachers in the school decided to do it. While 
the nature of the assignment is important to the partiCipants it will not 
matter to us, initially. What does matter is tha~ a group of teachers in 
the school is conducting the evaluation of their own school. The only 
constraint on these teachers is that they are to submit a report in 
wri ting wi thin eighteen months of the assignment being made. They may 
bring such advisers and consultants into their evaluation team as they 
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see fit, use whatever criteria of evaluation they choose and conduct 
their inquiry in any way that does not upset the current functioning 
of the school during the eValuation period. Moreover they have the 
resources they need in terms of books, journals, materials, time off 
through relieving teachers and expense money for consultants or advisers. 
In fact the teachers enlist the participation of parents in the 
community, local academics and an officer of the teachers' union to join 
their evaluation team. The composition of the evaluation team will not 
be identified by occupation although it may be of interest that there is 
a variety of different experiences - union organization, political, 
academic and an assortment of industrial work experience in addition to 
teaching; there is a diversity of social, political, religious and 
philosophical perspectives within the group; the members are all well 
educated, articulate and experienced in group work. 
My study is both an account of the work of this group and of their 
deliberations over about a fourteen-month period and a philosophical 
inquiry into social, political and educational theory. More accurately 
the account of the deliberation of this school evaluation team is a device 
which I use in the philosophical inquiry, a device which economically 
facilitates the articulation of a theory and a set of findings that are 
practical at a number of levels, e.g., the problems of everyday classroom 
practice, the policies for governing the educational system, general social 
theory, and the requirements for democracy. 
In following through their task of school evaluation they come to 
appreciate that principles for good education can only be satisfactorily 
articulated with respect to a set of principles for a just and democratic 
society. Accordingly they pursue an inquiry into principles for the just 
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and democratic organization of social, cultural and political relations 
as the foundation for the subsequent formulation of educational aims and 
principles of evaluation. 
So what is our topic? School evaluation? Educational governance? 
Educational theory? Democratic theory? Social justice? Social trans-
formation? Professionalization? While all of these issues are addressed 
none of them is the topic. The topic is the social and political philosophy 
of education and the wide-ranging arguments in the thesis reflect the broad 
scope implied by this topic. Within this broad scope there is a focus on 
the political presuppositions of educational evaluation. 
The school evaluation team is a fiction and the "characters", in 
the dialogic reports of their deliberations, are imaginary agents used to 
articulate various strands in the arguments through which the analysis of 
the topic is pursued. Generally the names of the characters indicate 
their general orientation or perspective although they are not intended 
to be radical stereotypes - they are each capable of flexible and logical 
thinking, and their views are modified during the deliberations. The 
orientations of Action-Man, Liberal, Precise, Scholar, Solidarity and 
Teleologist should be easy to discern. Heart has a special concern with 
the "lived experience" of individuals and with the quality of interpersonal 
relations. 
These dialogues express a number of different considerations in the 
analysis of the issues and sometimes the analyses do not lead to a clear-
cut resolution of a particular matter under discussion. This is right and 
proper because in certain instances the validity of the conclusion depends 
upon a number of diffuse factors which are difficult to specify. Never-
theless a natural question regarding the dialogues is, "Where does the 
thesis writer stand? What are the author's conclusions?" If any argument 
15 
is not challenged by any of the characters it expresses the author's 
position; if it is challenged but the challenger subsequently withdraws 
her objection, this also asserts the author's position. Whenever 
Facilitator, who has a special function of facilitating the agenda and 
identifying consensus, reports agreements or conclusions she expresses 
the author's position. Finally, all commentaries are in the voice of the 
thesis writer. 
The speakers are ready. Let us begin. 
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C HAP T E R I 
EVALUATION, AGENCY. AUTHENTICITY AND AUTONOMY 
1. How do you evaluate a school? 
The first problems facing our school evaluation team (SET) are those 
of method and agenda. How do you go about evaluating a school? In what 
order should you proceed? Are these merely technical questions or do 
they involve one in taking normative, ethical or political positions? 
These are difficult issues for the SET who take some time coming to closure 
on them. Several meetings of often frustrating and inconclusive discussions 
have already taken place when we join the SET with Facilitator summing up 
the earlier discussion and suggesting an approach to the agenda. 
FACILITATOR: We are experiencing a lot of frustration trying to get 
under way on our task but perhaps, initially, we were too impatient 
and unrealistic concerning the difficulties of and the time required 
for a school evaluation. With your permission I would like to review 
our discussions with a view to clarifying and improving our agenda 
and our methodology. An early suggestion was to set up a schedule 
of interviews with teachers, students and parents and of observations 
of lessons and school activities. However it was pointed out that we 
do not have any agreed principles to guide our collection, inter-
pretation and evaluation of data. To this it was asked, "Why not 
simply report the facts and leave the interpretation and evaluation 
of those facts to those who read the report?" However Scholar argues 
that we do not have that option because the number of potential 
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"facts" is unlimited and practically speaking reporting facts involves 
taking positions on what is both important and true. In any case our 
task is to prepare an evaluation of the school and not simply an 
encyclopaedic report. We are forced to be selective in the facts we 
report; moreover we want our selection of facts to be justifiable and 
not simply an arbitrary choice. Therefore we require some justifiable 
principles and criteria to guide our inquiries, our data collection, 
our deliberations and the writing of our summary report. 
As several of you have remarked, this is a pretty obvious conclu-
sion, but it is important nevertheless. Having agreed on the need for 
justifiable principles and criteria for evaluation, we all immediately 
proceeded to advocate our own views about good education and our dis-
cussion, lacking consistent use of categories and terminology or any 
systematic approach, ranged allover the map and produced little 
closure. Some wanted to start by establishing aims for education, 
curriculum principles, pedagogical principles and the like; others 
argued for a social and political perspective in terms of democratic 
values; others called for a focus on interpersonal relations and 
decision processes. It seems that our frustration arises not so 
much from straightforward disagreements over the particular principles 
advocated, although there are such disagreements, as from the concern 
that we are not talking in the same terms because our categories do 
not mesh and because we have no sense of method or order in our agenda. 
I recommend that we discontinue our attempts to persuade one 
another of the merits of our various principles or criteria or 
philosophies of education and try to put our discussion on a much 
more fundamental level, at least for a while, because if we can get 
clear on the basic categories for discussing our task and on the 
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appropriate methods for exploring it, then we will make better progress 
later in terms of both validity and speed. So I ask the members of the 
committee to focus on the kind of principles and criteria we are seek-
ing, i.e. on their general nature, and to ignore, for now, their 
specific content. 
TELEOLOGIST: I agree with Facilitator's proposal and have a suggestion in 
accordance with it. If we are going to evaluate the quality of educa-
tion in our school we will be concerned with ideas about 'good education' 
or 'good schooling' (which is not necessarily the same thing); we will 
talk of the various respects in which education is good or bad, effec-
tive or ineffective, helpful or harmful, or something of this sort. 
So we will need some conception(s) of the good or of various "goods". 
Whatever else it may be a good school is good for human beings and so 
we should articulate principles for the good of human beings. This 
is still too vague. A good school is good for human beings but which 
ones? Students? Teachers? Parents? Everyone in the community? 
\Which community?) Everyone? Do these categories imply different 
conceptions of the good? Or do they all point to a single idea of 
the good for man? Do they refer to groups in a fundamental conflict 
of interests? Or, is there a good common to everyone? If so, what 
is it? 
LIBERAL: While Teleologist has focused the discussion at a fundamental 
level, her approach alarms me. I take the position that the 
individual has the right to define her own good and to live freely 
and autonomously according to her own values within the constraints 
required for others to have the same rights. If. in accordance with 
Teleologist's programme, we try to define 'the good for man' and use 
this as a basis for educational evaluation we introduce an 
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authoritarian bias which may lead us into totalitarian commitments. 
TELEOLOGIST: Like you I am opposed to authoritarianism and I appreciate 
your concern that a particular definition of man's good might have 
authoritarian implications but does not this depend on the definition? 
You justify your concerns in terms of autonomy and freedom, suggesting 
that you consider autonomy and freedom to be crucial features of man's 
good. If they are not, your rejection of authoritarianism is not 
justified, is it? 
LIBERAL: No, but I thought you planned to be more specific and to 
elaborate on man's good beyond 'autonomy' and 'freedom'. 
TELEOLOGIST: I do, although not to the point or in a way that represents 
authoritarian imposition. However my main concern at this point is 
to establish that, at the most fundamental level, the kind of 
principles we seek are concerned with the good of human beings. While 
liberals often argue against such a programme as authoritarian or 
totalitarian they are wrong. Any normative position, including the 
defence of liberal values, requires justification of its values as 
advancing the good of human beings. John Rawls, who argues as you 
do against grounding justice in terms of man's good is nevertheless 
led to articulate a "Thin Theory of the Good" because one cannot 
rationally defend an ethical or political theory except on a founda-
. 1 t~on of man's good. 
LIBERAL: I am prepared to carryon the discussion in terms of principles 
for the good of human beings but I will oppose any authoritarian 
imposition of values or any attempt to pass off particular value 
commitments as representing timan's good ll or "universal human needs". 
PRECISE: Wi th so much dispute among scholars about what is good for man, 
about human nature, or whether man has a nature I am not hopeful of 
our reaching closure. However, as we seem to be stalemated, let 
us proceed on this agenda, unless someone has a better idea. 
HEART: I agree with Teleologist's programme of pursuing an inquiry into 
man's good, and also that we need a great deal of knowledge about 
human beings but we should be more optimistic of success because 
all of us have a great deal of experience concerning the human 
predicament which we can draw on during our deliberations. 
FACILITATOR: Do we agree to an inquiry into the good for human beings 
along the lines Teleologist suggests? 
SET: Agreed. 
2. Concepts of human agency 
HEART: Let us take a few minutes to get clearer on what human beings are 
like. Some scholars have proceeded to discuss education, social 
principles or political theory without an explicit articulation of 
their position on human agency.2 There are a number of reasons why 
we should take the time and care to provide an explicit conceptual-
ization of human agency: if one does not there is a danger, as in 
certain types of utilitarianism, of entirely losing sight of the 
agency of the human being; there are many competing conceptions of 
the human agent suggested by terms such as 'person', 'individual', 
'self', 'character', etc., which, although often loosely treated as 
synonymous, have distinguishable meanings;3 there are certain 
fundamental issues at stake concerning the subject/object separation, 
an appropriate appreciation of an existential perspective on the 
human predicament, and collective versus individual agency. Explicit 
conceptualization of human agency with respect to these fundamental 
issues reduces our chances of drifting into a serious error or 
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imbalance in our understanding of man; moreover, the errors we do 
make can be readily related to the conclusions we draw concerning 
social justice, educational evaluation and other matters. 
ACTION-MAN: I barely understand you~ What do you mean by lithe subject/ 
object separation", "an appropriate appreciation of an existential 
perspective" and "collective versus individual agency"? 
HEART: The 'subject/object separation' refers to our understanding of 
consciousness in relation to the world and of the knowing, acting 
subject in so far as she knows, acts and is in the world. As Lucien 
Goldmann writes: 
In an immediate way all reflection of consciousness 
upon itself and its status first of all affirms the 
separation of the subject and the object, the self 
and the world. I think about a world which, as an 
object of my thought, has another epistemological 
status than my own consciousness. Likewise, I act 
upon a world which, as the object of my action, has 
a practical status different from myself, being one 
of the poles of a global structure of which I am the 
complementary pole. 
Yet, as soon as reflection advances even a little, one 
perceives that it is difficult to accept this duality 
as such. Already pre-dialectical discussions between 
rationalism and idealism, before any reflection upon 
development, have shown us the existence of two 
opposed, complementary, and on the static level, 
equally founded positions; one which, by reducing the 
object to the subject, made the external world a simple 
modification of consciousness, and the other which, by 
reducing the subject to the object, makes consciousness 
a simple intramundane object analogous to all those 
considered by reflection. 4 
FACILITATOR: What about the existential perspective? 
HEART: A crucial "fact" about man is that she exists and experiences her 
existence in an utterly different way from the existence of objects 
or things that are present to us or are "real". Existential 
philosophers have important insights into the human condition that 
we need to understand and appreciate. For example, Heidegger 
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distinguishes the study of man's being in this existential sense, 
which he calls 'ontological' inquiry from the study of objects and 
things which is 'ontical' (corresponding roughly to positivistic 
. ) 5 sc~ence • Ontical inquiry, which provides theoretical explanations 
involving causes, forces, trends, probabilities and the like, cannot 
reveal the existential features of our lives. 6 
On the other hand, the existential perspective is not sufficient 
because there is also a place for scientific/theoretical inquiries in 
understanding man's good. Hence by "an appropriate appreciation of an 
existential perspective" I mean recognizing and including both 
existential and scientific/theoretical methods of inquiry into man 
and her good. 
ACTION-MAN: How do you propose to achieve an appropriate balance between 
these two types of analysis? 
HEART: My suggestion is that we start with Heidegger's concept of Dasein 
(in Being and Time) because Heidegger is correct in maintaining an 
inseparable relation between subject and object and because it is 
a highly satisfactory and profound articulation of the existential 
perspective. Then we need to criticize Heidegger's account, supple-
ment and "correct" it with certain non-existential perspectives. 
Based on these analyses we should be able to articulate our own 
position on the human agent which will facilitate our discussion 
of man's good. 
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3. Heidegger's Dasein 
This section is a summary of a presentation by Heart. 
'Dasein' or 'being-there' is Heidegger's term for the human agent 
Dasein is the "entity" which each of us is. 7 Dasein exists and or man. 
so in some sense stands outside the world of things. Man, as Dasein, has 
a relation to herself, i.e. she is at once subject and object to herself. 
Dasein exists as possibility in the sense that her being is never complete 
at any given moment and therefore she has no essence as an object has. 8 
Dasein is in-the-world and exists in no other way. The subject, for 
Heidegger, is never detached from her world. This "world" consists of 
things for Dasein's use which Heidegger calls 'ready-to-hand'; other things 
that are just there or 'present-at-hand'j and co-agents, i.e. others who 
are also Dasein in-the-world. 9 'Being-in-the world' expresses both 
spatiality, i.e. a relationship of being alongside entities in the world, 
and also a caring or concernful relationship to those entities and to 
10 
other persons. In being-in-the-world Dasein is not dependent on some 
privileged subject for meaning and significance but experiences them 
directly and immediately. She always finds herself already under way in 
a project or a continuous flow of actions. Hence she experiences 
temporality directly in that her project has a past and a future in 
addition to her present action. In her project Dasein engages in projection 
or purpose as implicitly present in the flow of actions and the projecting 
of meaning or significance onto things in the world, as 'pragmata' or 
instruments in her praxis. For example, hammers, telephones, books, 
scalpels and typewriters are meaningful in terms of the human activities 
and projects which they instrumentally serve. Through her praxis Dasein 
transforms her world, and instruments ready-to-hand are meaningful and 
11 
significant in relation to this trans formative action. 
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The concept of 'project' connects the ideas of 'self' and 'world'. 
For Heidegger the 'I' or the 'self' is, " ••• what maintains itself as some-
thing identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways of behaviour, 
and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so dOingll • 12 
This illustrates that there is an historical sense embedded within the 
experience of being 'I' or 'self' expressed in the maintenance of identity 
through change. Selfhood is more than the differentiation of lime from 
not lime. Indeed we generally experience others as selves like us. In 
any case the central idea of selfhood is not the distinction between a 
single isolated individual and everything else but of an historically 
continuing sense of identity. On this view there is no sceptism concern-
ing the multiplicity of selves. 
There is a very important point concerning the self which I want 
to note in Heidegger's analysis and which I will apply in the subsequent 
analyses. The self is not primarily or fundamentally inward looking and 
is not to be seen as some essence of interiority • 
••• one's own Dasein becomes something that it Can itself 
proximally 'come across' only when it looks away from 
'Experiences' and the 'centre of its actions', or does not 
as yet 'see' them at all. Dasein finds 'itself' proximally 
in what it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things 
environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally 
concerned, 
"I" does not refer to Ita certain privileged point - that of an I-Thing -
but is to be understood as Being-in in terms of the "yonder" of the world 
that is ready-to-hand - the "yondertl which is the dwelling-place of Dasein 
13 
as concern". I want to stress that selfhood is concerned with the 
project, with Dasein's praxis and with her concernful thought and action 
toward her world. 
In the 'here', the Dasein which is absorbed in its world 
speaks not towards itself but away from itself towards 
the 'yonder' of something circumspectively ready-to-hand; 14 
yet it still has itself in view in its existential spatiality. 
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It follows from this perspective that an understanding of self and 
an understanding of one's world go together. 
Thus Dasein's understanding of being pertains with equal 
primordiality both to an understanding of something like 
a 'world', and to the understanding of the Being of those 
entities which become accessible within the world •••• 
Dasein also possesses - as constitutive for its under-
standing of existence - an understanding of the Being of 
all entities of a character other than its own. 15 
Dasein, as an inquiring being is able to conduct her inquiries in 
different modes and to conceive being in radically divergent ways. 
Heidegger says that we understand the self as a sort of substance, as 
present-at-hand like entities we encounter in the world: "Dasein is 
16 tacitly conceived in advance as something present-at-hand ll • Later we 
will want to consider the question, "Under what conditions does Dasein 
understand herself as a kind of thing or substance?!! Now we want to note 
that the way in which Dasein conducts her various inquiries has a crucial 
bearing on the way she conceives and experiences her being. There are a 
number of ways in which Dasein can misperceive her circumstances: by 
seeing the ready-to-hand as present-at-hand, i.e. seeing instruments in 
her praxis as external, given "reality"; by seeing others as either 
ready-to-hand (instrumentally) or as present-at-hand (as things); by 
seeing oneself as present-at-hand. In any of these ways of misperceiving 
being there is a form of Dasein's existence that goes with it, which 
Heidegger calls 'inauthentic existence' or 'inauthenticity' .17 In other 
words the way Dasein understands her own existence and her world (which 
are not separate but a connected structure) is related to how she 
experiences her life. Initially then 'authenticity'. i.e. 'authentic 
existence', goes with a way of understanding one's being-in-the-world 
which in some sense is "true ll • We have more to say on authenticity in 
section 6. 
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We have mentioned that being-in-the-world gets at the caring 
relationship that Dasein has to her world and its immediate meaning and 
significance to her. 'Care' is not to be identified with 'will', 'wish', 
'addiction' or 'urge'. "Care cannot be derived from these, since they 
themselves are founded upon it. nlS Concepts such as 'will', 'wish' and 
'urge' seem to presuppose an ontical understanding of being. This is not 
to say that they have no place but to the extent that they are treated as 
forces, causes or links in causal chains or factors in probabilistic 
explanations of behaviour then they miss Dasein's sort of existence. 
Heidegger writes of 'fallenness' - the tendency of Dasein to 'lose' 
herself in the world which I interpret as losing sight of her own exist-
ence in her fascination with things. 'Conscience' is a contrary feature 
which summons or calls Dasein toward authenticity. For Heidegger 'care' 
is a unity constituted by existentiality, facticity andfallenness. 
'Facticity' refers to the fact that although Dasein has the possibility 
of choices and decisions she must be herself in her world, i.e. that 
Dasein is bounded or limited and as we will elaborate later her range 
of possibilities is determined. 
The concept of "facti"City" implies that an entity 'within-
the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it 
can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with 
the Being of those entities which it encounters within 
its own world.19 
Much is said about 'possibility' and 'potentiality'. Dasein has 
the possibility of existing in basically different ways and for Heidegger 
there is a crucial polarity between authentic and inauthentic existence. 
Methodologically, Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein is not an 
attempt to describe universal properties of Dasein. (such a study, were 
it attempted, would be ontical not ontological) which is impossible for 
a being that exists (as opposed to the being of entities) but to show 
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the horizons of possibility within which the concrete possibilities of 
every individual Dasein must fall. 20 
I can only touch on Heidegger's account of 'knowing,.2l He criticizes 
a superficial manner of interpreting knowing the world by setting up a 
relation between subject and object. "But subject and object do not 
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coincide with Dasein and the world." How could they for Dasein, who 
is encountered by others in the world, is also IIwor ld,,?23 
If knowing 'is' at all, it belongs solely to those entities 
which know. But even in those entities, human-Things, 
knowing is not present-at-hand as, let us say, bodily 
properties are. Now, inasmuch as knowing belongs to these 
entities and is not some external characteristic, it must 
be 'inside' .24 
How then is this "being inside" which knowing possesses grounded in the 
kind of being which belongs to the subject? Heidegger responds that 
"knowing is a Kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world", and 
he anticipates the objection that this formulation nullifies the problem 
of knowledge; "for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that 
knowing is already 'alongside' its world, when it is not supposed to 
reach that world except in the transcending of the subject?" To this 
objection Heidegger points out that the "constructivist standpoint" 
underlying this objection has not been phenomenally demonstrated and he 
additionally asks, "what higher court is to decide whether and in what 
sense there is to be any problem of knowledge other than that of the 
phenomenon of knowing as such and the kind of Being which belongs to 
the knower?,,25 
When our concernful encounter with the world holds us back from 
praxis, i.e. from producing, working with and manipulating things etc., 
the sole remaining way of being in the world is a type of "just tarrying 
alongside" in which we "encounter entities within-the-world purely in the 
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way they lookl1. Hence knowing is taking a viewpoint in which Dasein 
refrains from manipulation or utilization to perceive the entities as 
present-at-hand. 
Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to 
something as something and discusses it as such. This 
amounts to interpretation in the broadest sense; and on 
the basis of such interpretation, perception becomes an 
act of making determinate. What is thus perceived and 
made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and 
can be retained and preserved as what has thus been 
asserted. 26 
In this fashion Heidegger can show that formulations which portray 
knowledge as being concerned with propositional statements, their truth 
values and grounds are understandable as partial derivation~from his more 
profound and correct interpretation. 27 
Before leaving this discussion of Heidegger's concept of Dasein we 
should contrast it with the thoughts of Descartes and of Kant. With his 
"Cogito ergo sum" (I think therefore I am) Descartes claimed to put 
philosophy on a new and firm footing and to answer the sceptic's doubt 
but Heidegger argues that Descartes left the 'sum' (I am) completely 
d . 28 un ~scussed. Moreover, because Descartes posits the human subject 
as a substance or created 'ens' his subject can be apprehended in isolation, 
i.e. 29 without a world. 
Kant is criticized for interpreting consciousness of my Dasein as 
consciousness of my being-present-at-hand in the same way as things are 
present-at-hand. Hence for Kant there is a 'Being-present-at-hand-
together' of the physical and the psychical but this is completely different 
from Heidegger's idea of 'Being-in-the world,.30 
I want to stress that this inquiry, whilst drawing extensively on 
Heidegger's work, does not use it in any wholesale way as a foundation 
because there are differences in research interests and methodology, and 
29 
at times I have freely interpreted his expressions - I do not want 
attention diverted from the substantive points I make, which can stand 
independently of whatever authority Heidegger can give them, onto questions 
of the fidelity of my analyses with Heidegger's standpoint. 31 
4. Criticisms and methodology 
In this session the SET agrees that an existential perspective, such 
as Heidegger's, is crucial for understanding aspects of human agency. 
Specifically they concur with Heidegger's articulation of being-in-the-
world, the care structure and its connection to the projective understand-
ing of world and self, and of the self as more than interiority and as 
inescapably connected to the world. Concerning Heidegger's definition 
of philosophy as 'universal phenomenological ontology', several members 
disagree that this is the definition of philosophy but see it rather as 
a particular way of doing philosophy.32 Also the SET has a somewhat 
different research interest from Heidegger. 
TELEOLOGIST: We share an interest with Heidegger in ontologically 
clarifying some "wholl and "what" questions: who is the agent who 
knows, thinks, speaks and acts? Ontologically what are 'existence', 
'knowing' and 'caring'? However our task also directs us to pose 
some Itwhy", "how" and "under what conditionslt questions. Why, 
how and under what conditions do we: perceive ourselves as substance?; 
tend to live authentically or inauthentically? These sorts of 
questions are seeking conceptual clarity or empirical, causal or 
. lIt" 33 quas~-causa exp ana ~ons. Because they are formulated causally 
rather than ontologically an existentialist of a pure sort may object 
that they reflect inauthenticity by presupposing forces, causes and 
tendencies and thereby denying existential freedom. However our 
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concern must be as much directed to understanding man's factical 
determinations as his existential freedom. 
This suggests that whereas Heidegger uses the method of 
phenomenology we should use both existential and non-existential 
perspectives and move back and forth between existential and causal 
analyses. This method is appropriate for a being who wants not only 
to understand being and to grasp the most authentic possibility of 
those available to her but who also insists on altering the range 
of possibilities available. Hence we should combine both types of 
analysis not as a random, unconsidered eclecticism but as an 
integration of two vital types of inquiry into a unified study of 
aspects of the human condition. Whether inquiry into laws, 
principles and tendencies is authentic or inauthentic turns on how 
they are conceived; whether as aids to praxis or as explanations 
for a given spectacle beyond human control and responsibility. 
For Heidegger Dasein is always free to choose authentic 
existence: even when ensnared with things in the world and existing 
inauthentically Dasein Can always choose authentic existence and 
hence inauthentic existence, despite being deficient always holds 
open the possibility of a future decision for authenticity.34 
However, I argue that whether and to what degree a human agent has 
the capacity to choose authenticity depends upon various social 
conditions. If I am right on this there are important implications 
for our agenda. 
While existentially I do not quarrel with Heidegger's description 
of facticity as the experience of givenness - of having to be myself 
in my world - I want to look into the ways in which human social 
action reconstructs facticity, i.e. the determinations which men 
31 
and women encounter as fixing their possibilities. More specifically 
how and under what conditions can human beings consciously alter 
their own determinations? What principles should guide their praxis 
in this endeavour? 
SOLIDARITY: I agree with Teleologist's points about methodology and I 
want to raise a different sort of criticism to the effect that 
Heidegger's articulation of 'authenticity' is too individualistic. 
Heidegger portrays authenticity as not only opposed to the "they" -
the impersonal, colle ctivised , everyday, reified social relations 
of modern industrialized societies - but as opposed to social 
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solidarity and fraternity as well and to society as such. 
FACILITATOR: We appear to agree on these points and so we can address 
our own conception of human agency at our next session. 
5. Agency and I-self 
SCHOLAR: We have already implicitly suggested some features of human 
agency in discussing the structure of the project and praxis. Agents 
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are beings who perform act10ns or do acts. 
Action can be thought of as intervention in events in the world 
which produces definite outcomes or as the application of means to 
achieve ends. In acting the agent manifests power which is latently 
present whenever action is a possibility in the sense that the agent 
could have 'acted otherwise' and if he had then events in the world 
would have unfolded otherwise. 37 
There are two matters we wish to discuss which each in a way 
presupposes a position with respect to the other: whether agency 
is to be conceived as individual or collective; what status purpose 
and intention have concerning action. For Heidegger, while Dasein 
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experiences 'being-with-others' and has a special relation of care 
toward them which Heidegger calls 'solicitude' the agent is always 
the individual Dasein. 38 However Marx, Lukacs and Goldmannlay the 
stress on a plural, historical subject as the manifestation of 
39 human agency. The agent who actually accomplishes social trans-
formation and establishes many of the major possibilities of human 
existence is not an individual but a collective subject. For Marx 
and Luk'cs this collective, historical subject is a socio-economic 
1 40, 41 c ass. Therefore a commitment to some form of democratic 
control over the factical determination of existential possibilities 
suggests that our agenda should give substantial attention to 
collective agency. 
LIBERAL: What do you mean by 'collective agency'? Is it a group of people 
coming to undertake some action through joint deliberation? Do you 
include a social class as an example of a collective agent? If the 
latter it seems that intentionality is absent. 
SCHOLAR: Intention or purpose is relevant to the description of action 
although this requires elaboration and qualification. We describe 
actions by expressions such as 'firing a gun', 'shooting a man' or 
'making a promise' in which intention or purpose is implicit in the 
description. 42 At least actions have the possibility of having 
intentions associated with them, although the agent may not be 
conscious of having an intention or his action may produce consequences 
which he does not intend. While logically 'intention' presupposes 
actions the reverse is not true. As Giddens writes, 
••• reasons and intentions are not definite 'presences' 
which lurk behind human social activity, but are 
routinely and chronically (in the durae of day to day 
existence) instantiated in that activity.43 
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Despite the fact that agents do not necessarily have conscious 
intentions or purposes with respect to any particular action I agree 
with Liberal that we should not use the term 'collective agent' to 
refer to collectivities that have no possibility of conscious purpose 
or intention. 44 Nevertheless actions can be more or less intentional 
or purposive and agents can vary greatly in their capacities to under-
stand both their intentions and the consequences of their actions. 
By monitoring their own actions and reflecting upon their purposes, 
intentions and consequences actors can achieve a more or less trans-
parent understanding. By 'transparency' we refer not only to an 
understanding of causal connections, i.e. the "penetration" of the 
consequences of action, but equally to a knowledge of self which 
the reflexive monitoring of purpose, intention and mood reveal. 45 
HEART: So there are basically three distinctions we need to make among 
human agents: collective agency is distinguished from individual; 
among portrayals of individual agents we should be able to distinguish 
an existential perspective from among various other perspectives. 
Ordinary language is satisfactory for distinguishing collective from 
individual agency but I suggest we use the coined term 'I-self' to 
refer to the existential perspective on individual human agency. 
I-self is a human individual who: experiences her existence as 
personal; in existing as being-in-the-world has a caring relationship 
to the world; understands the world and herself through the structure 
of the project; exists as possibility and hence lacks any essence of 
the sort possessed by things; experiences states of mind and moods; 
can deliberate, engage in discourse, work with tools or instruments 
and imagine. 
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'I-self' is a way of referring to the subjective pole in a 
subject/object polarization which is inseparable (just as the north 
and south poles of a magnet are inseparable). In other words I-self 
points to the existential experience of caring which underlies 
significance, action, interaction and knowing. When we wish to 
stress the ontological significance or an existential perspective 
we can use'I-self ' whereas when we wish to make an ontical, scientific, 
nomothetic, theoretical or common-sense reference we may use whatever 
term seems appropriate in the circumstances. e.g. 'man, human being, 
social agent, actor, person, individual .•.• ' 
COMMENTARY: The SET agrees to this formulation as a provisional basis 
for continuing the inquiry into authenticity, autonomy and man's good. 
6. Authentici ty 
HEART: Basic to our understanding of I-self is the idea of authenticity; 
an existential possibility characterized by her seeing self/world 
"truly" and acting in accordance with this true vision. When she 
is authentic I-self sees her project, a meaningful, sustained flow 
of action, as harmoniously connecting her future vision of self 
in-the-world to her present being-in-the-world. She is under wgv 
in a transformation of her self/world and she sees her praxis as 
efficacious and the end, direction or purpose of the project as true, 
right or good. Additionally she experiences self-esteem. 
PRECISE: Under the single idea of authenticity Heart has included a number 
of apparently distinct criteria. What is the justification for this 
particular assortment? In what sense do they belong together? Is 
it not possible for I-self to see the purpose of her project as good 
but her action as ineffective or vice versa? Also should authenticity 
not be seen as a matter of degree? 
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HEART: While Heidegger tends to treat authenticity/inauthenticity as a 
dichotomy I agree with Precise that it is more satisfactorily por-
trayed as a matter of degree with respect to the several dimensions. 
On Precise's other point, the criteria which constitute authenticity 
are not arbitrarily thrown together but comprise a structured whole. 
I will not take the time to develop the connections which do exist 
except for one case which can illustrate the type of argument that 
could be elaborated with respect to various connections. 
I have included both understanding one's project and acting in 
accordance with this understanding among the criteria for authenticity. 
While understanding and action are conceptually distinct they are 
existentially connected. If I-self misunderstands her agency and/or 
her world the logical possibility of stumbling upon authentic action 
is remote at best and more aptly considered paradoxical, for the 
criterion of acting in accordance with one's project presupposes an 
understanding of that project. Conversely if, for whatever reasons, 
I-self does not act in accordance with a true understanding of her 
project then she will tend to develop a distorted or false conception 
of her self/world. The idea that one needs a sound understanding to 
carry out appropriate action fits with common sense while the idea 
that one's understanding becomes distorted by false action does not, 
presumably because we have had experiences in which we fail to act 
as our understanding suggests. Hence it seems that concerning any 
particular act the act does not transform our understanding of our 
project. However if we focus on the major project\s) defining 
self/world as unfolding over an extended time we can explore the 
effects of action on understanding. 
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Let us now reflect on the hypothetical Case of an I-self who 
understands self/world but acts contrary to, i.e. not in accordance 
with, her understanding. Indeed this is a bizarre possibility because 
we are to imagine an agent who understands herself and her circum-
stances, who has a vision of a possibility for self/world which is 
most true to her understanding, and yet who acts contrary to that 
understanding and understands she is doing this as she does it. 
While we cannot rule out the possibility of such an agent logically 
we would never expect to meet one. Nevertheless we cannot be satis-
fied with this merely formal demonstration and must push on to see 
if we can grasp how "inauthentic" action "produces" inauthentic 
understanding and further how such a relationship between action 
and understanding can be concealed from a "common-sense" view. 
We can explore this "howll question through an analysis of 
reification resulting from inefficacious praxis and deficient modes 
of being-with-others. In reification I-self sees self or other 
selves as a thing or sees the consequences of her praxis as a merely 
external "realityll governed by laws emanating from a centre of 
significance and meaning independent of human agency. We can readily 
see how this leads to passivity concerning aspects of I-self's life 
that she would change if she perceived them as resulting from her 
own action. But the reverse is also true: to the extent that I-self 
becomes detached from praxis and acts as a mere observer of events 
and actions the world truly will appear as a spectacle. 46 However 
a particular I-self may become detached from praxis this mode of 
relating to the world has the unintended consequence of reifying 
her consciousness and so her mode of acting on the world brings 
about an unintentional self-deception. 
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However this "how" analysis raises a "why" question. Why does 
an I-self withdraw from praxis or take a detached attitude toward the 
world? In part we can answer, "Because she has a reified conscious-
ness". To a degree the circularity in "Reified consciousness produces 
detachment" and "Detachment produces reified consciousness ll describes 
the reciprocal reinforcement in the relationship between the two, but 
this cannot be the whole story. I-self, to the extent she understands 
(or misunderstands) self/world has reasons for her actions and dis-
positions whereas to the extent she lacks consciousness of self/world 
her action is subject to causes. In the next section we argue that 
power is a crucial factor in determining I-self's stance (whether 
active praxis or detached passivity) toward her project. 
In addition to detachment from praxis deficient modes of 
being-with-others are a source of reification. Mention has been made 
of 'solicitude' as Heidegger's term for the caring encounter of Dasein 
with other Daseins. Heidegger writes of "deficient and indifferent 
modes" of being-with-others, e.g. being for, against or without one 
another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another. 47 
He also refers to two positive modes but one of these is only positive 
in a certain sense and certainly leads us away from authenticity. He 
writes of Dasein "leaping in" for the other, taking away her 'care' 
and putting herself in her position of concern. This is paternalism 
and it results in the other becoming dominated and dependent - whether 
the domination is hidden or open. 48 
On the other hand it is possible to "leap ahead tl of the other 
rather than "leap inn for her, not to "take away her 'care' but 
rather to give it back to her authentically as such for the first 
time". This is an authentic relationship with another I-self which 
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"helps the Other to become transparent to herself in her care and 
to become free for itll.49 Of course interpersonal relations can 
take many intermediate forms between extreme paternalism and authentic 
and fraternal being-with-one-another. 
For Heidegger Dasein has two fundamental possibilities for 
being-with others: in the authentic mode she helps another to her 
freedom to attain a true understanding of self/world but in an 
inauthentic mode she dominates the other, or depersonalizes her 
or treats her with indifference. 50 
In brief I define 'authentic being-with-one-another' as an 
existential state in which I-selves see each other as jointly 
engaged in a mutual project as co-agents. In their authentic being-
with-one-another the fraternal I-selves form a community. 
PRECISE: What is the "mutual project" and how does it relate to a 
person's own project? 
HEART: In I-self's grasp of her own project other I-selves are 
experienced in various possible ways, i.e. the world in which 
I-self dwells is a social world populated by others. But how are 
these social relationships experienced? In an authentic relationship 
with others, I-self finds that there is a good degree of mutuality. 
In terms of diagram 1 on p.44 two or more persons will find that 
their personal projects are linked to a substantial degree; they 
are under way from a common situation, along a shared path, toward 
a mutual vision. I have referred to 'mutual project' to capture 
this sense of a common and shared engagement in which interpersonal 
relations are neither of indifference nor of domination/dependence. 
The foregoing arguments show that as in the case of praxis the 
way we understand social and interpersonal relations affects our 
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actions. Again we want to demonstrate that our social actions 
affect our understanding and this is very simple. If I trust you, 
acknowledge you, help you and love you this is one "reality"; if I 
lie to you, betray you, attack and hurt you that is another. Here 
the way we act toward one another is the social "reality" we are 
trying to understand. Not only do different patterns of actions 
represent different "realities" to be apprehended as true of the 
present time but they radically change our vision of the future 
possibilities of existence and hence our actions crucially determine 
the limits within which we may conceive our projects, our selves 
and our world. 
PRECISE: While we have established that our actions with respect to both 
things and our relations with other people do affect our understand-
ing we have not yet explained how or in what sense an action can be 
authentic or inauthentic or how one would know whether or not it was. 
HEART: The test of whether a particular action is authentic or 
inauthentic depends upon the action being monitored or assessed by 
I-self with respect to rules, principles or criteria which are 
themselves grounded, explicitly or implicitly, in I-self's authentic 
project. 
PRECISE: But how does one know if one's project is authentic? Does 
I-self have an immediate intuitive sense of authenticity? 
HEART: Yes, a consideration of the criteria for authenticity confirms 
that if authenticity is experienced it is experienced directly and 
immediately by the I-self concerned. However not in such a way 
that the assessment of one's project and existence cannot be altered 
on reassessment. Suppose that at this moment my assessment shows 
that my project is authentic, i.e. that I am living authentically. 
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Then tomorrow as a result of some problem - a dilemma in my conception 
of my project, a discussion or confrontation with others, or a failure 
of praxis (in being unable to carry out aspects of my project), I 
radically reassess my project and conclude that I had it wrong. 
Either my vision of myself in-the-world as a caring structuration 
of ends and intentions is wrong in some way or the implementation of 
my project, i.e. my praxis, is off course and I have not really been 
under way on my project or not fully so. Whether in terms of ends 
or means or both I can come to see at one time as inauthentic a 
project that on another occasion I see as authentic. 
Authenticity is a way of being but it makes no reference to any 
sort of essence or reified "true self" because we deny that the self 
51 has any essence. Because we do not acknowledge any privileged 
standpoint other than I-self for experiencing her existence and for 
ascertaining whether her project conforms to that collection of 
criteria which we have called 'authenticity' there is no problem 
in a reassessment of one's life and project resulting in a verdict 
of "authentic" yesterday but "inauthentic" today. 
Indeed authenticity is an unstable existential state: we may 
simply drift into inauthenticity by not being aware of much of what 
we are about; we may through our interaction with others or through 
failures of praxis, etc. be provoked to a radical reassessment of 
our project. In the latter case we undergo a crisis of self-
perception and self-esteem - a crisis which opens possibilities for 
an authentic transformation of our project directed to a worthy 
vision of self in the world or various inauthentic responses such 
"f· t" "d· d . 52 as re~ ~ca ~on, escap~sm, epress~on or espa~r. 
FACILITATOR: We have demonstrated that reification can result from 
inefficacious praxis and from deficient modes of being-with-others 
and have examined both the "howl! and "why" of reification and the 
general grounds for claims to know whether a project is authentic. 
HEART: However we must not leave the impression that inefficacious praxis 
and deficiencies in our ways of being-with-one-another are totally 
separate. One simply cannot gain an authentic understanding of one's 
praxis by oneself. In a system of social co-operation 
characterized by a complex division of labour and social activity 
I-self cannot know what she is about except through understanding 
the social projects of which she is a participating member and this 
requires that she understand the intentions, commitments, concerns 
and beliefs of others. As I shall argue in subsequent sections we 
cannot gain a "true" understanding of these matters except through 
an authentic being-with-one-another. 
FACILITATOR: In our next session we can pursue a more profound analysis 
of reflexive monitoring. 
7. Autonomy. responsibility and reflexive monitoring 
HEART: In the previous session we asserted that I-self can assess the 
authenticity of any particular action by applying rules, principles 
or criteria which are grounded in her authentic project; but this 
requires that I-self be able to have an authentic understanding of 
her project and we argued that if authenticity is experienced it 
is experienced directly and immediately. 53 
In arguing for a direct perception of practical, normative and 
evaluative matters I am not suggesting a mysterious intuition or 
arguing that we perceive without presuppositions, without theory 
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or independently of social influence; I am not saying that we 
perceive incorrigibly or that we can always "see" what is there. 
On the contrary: I cannot see the stars if my eyes are focused on 
the ground or if there is dense cloud cover; I cannot judge a 
gymnastics performance competently without training nor can I do 
it fairly if I am biased for or against a certain competitor. All 
of this is compatible with our assertion that if authenticity is 
experienced it is experienced directly and immediately by the I-self 
concerned. The fact that we may not be able to assess our circum-
stances or that we may do so incorrectly is also important because 
it suggests an inquiry into the conditions that support I-self in 
assessing her project and that increase the transparency of her 
understanding of it. 
LIBERAL: What is the justification for asserting that the rules, 
principles or criteria for evaluating courses of action must be 
grounded in I-self's authentic project? 
HEART: In a causal sense I-self is not bound by this principle but can 
base her reflexive monitoring on some other foundation. However if 
she does so she will go wrong in some way. Because I-self is in-the-
world any principles to guide her thought and action must be grounded 
in-the-world, i.e. in her predicament, if she is to understand, 
discuss and justify them. If we can agree on this we can proceed 
to defend the grounding in terms of I-self's authentic project. 54 
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DIAGRAM I I-SELF'S PROJECT 
v 
p 
Path of actions 
_______ I~ 
and commitments 1/ 
Diagram I is a greatly oversimplified portrayal of an authentic 
project. I-self has a (relatively) true or correct understanding of 
her situation (8) and of her possibilities and she has chosen the 
most genuine of these as her "vision" (V) or aim. She is under way 
along a path (p) of actions and commitments which is bringing her 
situation into accord with her vision; she is transforming self/world 
to bring it more in line with her vision. 
FACILITATOR: So 'vision' represents I-self's purposes, ends or goals 
while 'path' points to the means she uses to pursue them. 
HEART: To a degree the project can be understood as a means/end relation 
but this is not completely accurate. The conception of my vision is 
constantly altered as I move along my path. Moreover I-self's path 
of actions and commitments is not merely instrumental to the vision 
but rather the vision gives meaning and significance to a path to 
which she already has an inarticulate commitment. 
DIAGRAM 2 EXAMPLES OF INAUTHENTIC PROJECTS 
Note: Dotted figures show incorrect or distorted perceptions whereas solid 
figures show what would be perceived under unreified and "honest" 
evaluation. 
x P 
\ 
y 
s 
\ 
z 
v 
In 2.1 X thinks she is authentic; everything seems "0 K" and she 
finds her perception of situation, path and vision to be congruent. 
The distortions in her perceptions conceal the fact that she is off 
course. 
In 2.2 Y understands her project accurately but she is not 
authentic because her action is out of kilter with her vision. 
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She is off course and she knows it. This is a crisis in that her 
project is unstable - it cannot stay like this. The question is 
which way will a degree of equilibrium be achieved - by getting her 
path orientated to her vision or by distortion in her understanding. 
Poor Z in 2.3 misunderstands situation, path and vision and yet 
she knows she is off course. In a way she is closer to the truth 
than X but until she can understand her own action she cannot get 
on course. 
Now it is not possible for I-self to be without a project; 
having a project is part of being I-self. The authentic project 
contains within its structure a correct understanding of the 
situation and a worthy vision feasibly connected to it. To base 
one's evaluations on the authentic project is to combine correct 
understanding, worthy intentions, feasibility and the likelihood 
of a desirable outcome. 
COMMENTARY: During the discussion Precise raises four objections to 
Heart's demonstration but after hearing Heart's reply the SET, 
including Precise, agree that the principles I-self uses in reflexive 
monitoring of action should be grounded in her authentic project. 
The discussion of these objections follows. 
The four objections are: 
ta) that the account is circular; 
(b) that frequently or generally I-selves will not have access to 
any authentic project and therefore will have no basis for 
reflexive monitoring; 
\c) that it is not practical for any society to base its norms of 
conduct and its morality on a foundation of individual perception 
and circumstance; 
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(d) that it is not desirable for society to base its norms of conduct 
and its morality on the limi~ed foundation of individual circumstance. 
Is there circularity in assessing our project according to 
principles derived from the project? By elaborating on the procedures 
of reflexive monitoring it is revealed that the charge of circularity 
does not hold. In determining what to do I-self has to make judgments 
about a great many actions, possible actions and commitments. A 
convenient and efficient way of doing this will be to use principles, 
rules or criteria as guidelines. These principles, rules or criteria 
require grounding themselves; sometimes they will not cover or apply 
to a situation; sometimes they need to be altered as conditions change; 
often they are unnecessary because we "see" immediately what to do. 
The most defensible approach to reflexive monitoring is to ground 
one's evaluations in an honest and resolute perception or "seeing" 
of our self in-the-world which is what the authentic project describes. 
There is a danger that we may use changing or special circumstances 
as excuses or rationalizations for failing to live by our principles 
but on the other hand there is a comparable danger of reifying the 
principles (i.e. forgetting or misunderstanding their origin and 
justification) and applying them when they do not suit the circum-
stances. One thinks of Gilbert and Sullivan's "Pirates of Penzance" 
parody of Victorian duty ethics in which characters act against both 
common sense and personal and common interests under the grip of a 
reified conception of duty. Rather than being circular, grounding 
in the authentic project, starts from an existential grasp of 
experience. 
The second objection (b) I take very seriously. It is true that 
many persons do not have an authentic project accessible to their 
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understanding and that generally we all have some degree of 
inauthenticity in our projects but what are we to make of this? Do 
we take steps to create conditions under which people have progress-
ively more authentic projects and develop more transparent understand-
ings of their self/world? Or do we find an elite group to work out 
rules and principles to be used heteronomously by inauthentic agents? 
As we proceed through this and subsequent sections I develop arguments 
for a fundamental commitment to authenticity and show that there are 
concrete practical steps to bring about social transformations 
incorporating progressively greater authenticity. 
Both (c) and (d) represent a misunderstanding of the position 
advocated and/or the status of the inquiry. I am not arguing that 
there is no need for social rules and laws - on the contrary I shall 
argue for positive laws. Ideally such laws reflect the authentic 
evaluations of the citizens who are bound by them but in any case 
they are part of the situation. We are not ready at this point, 
however, to discuss social norms, rules and laws because we have not 
yet analysed social co-operation. But I-self, as an agent, must have 
a basis for her own reflexive monitoring. In saying that this basis 
lies in her authentic project I am not suggesting some private world 
which is to be contrasted to a public, social existence - that would 
be an inauthentic project. Hence (c) and (d) miss the mark - they 
do not apply to this account. 
FACILITATOR: Our concern is now with procedures and conditions for 
increasing the correctness, i.e. transparency, of I-self's understand-
ing of her project. 
HEART: The process which I-self uses to scrutinize her action and 
evaluate her project is called reflexive monitoring: it is always 
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conscious (which is not saying that I-self is always conscious of 
her action) and involves scrutiny not only of the situation, the 
action or path of actions and the vision of self/world but also of 
the intentions, moods and dispositions of I-self; hence it is 
'reflexive' in "returning" to the subject as well as 'reflective' 
as in 'thought' or 'thinking'. 
Because she cares I-self has a tendency to take responsibility 
for her self/world; in taking responsibility she must engage in 
reflexive monitoring. When reflexive monitoring is resQlutely and 
honestly conducted it is called critical reflection; it is critical 
in at least two ways: 
(1) it subjects action and/or project to review and criticism; 
(2) it places I-self in a position of vulnerability not only in 
that she may find herself guilty regarding a particular action 
but also, and more critically, she may discover that her whole 
project is inauthentic and that she is faced with the choice 
of radical self-transformation versus some form of inauthentic 
response. 
We say that I-self "has a tendency to ~ake responsibility for 
her actionl1 rather than "takes responsibility ••• " because there are 
contrary tendencies which we will discuss momentarily. To articulate 
the connections between 'responsibility' and 'reflexive monitoring' 
it will be helpful to consider the latter as a continuum stretching 
from minimal "ownership", caring and responsibility at one end to 
full autonomy at the other as depicted in diagram 3. 
DIAGRAM 3 - DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY IN REFLEXIVE MONITORING 
--------------------------------------------------~ Minimal Responsible Autonomy 
Responsibility Agency 
The responsible agent has principles, rules or criteria with 
which to monitor her actions, is prepared to have a conscience and 
agrees to be held accountable. She acknowledges her freedom to apply 
her principles in the "evaluation of her actions and project. In being 
prepared to have a conscience she accepts the applicability of judg-
ments concerning her agency, e.g. foolish, prudent, innocent, guilty. 
Autonomy includes all the features of responsible agency and 
in addition the autonomous agent: chooses and acknowledges that she 
chooses the principles, rules or criteria used in her reflexive 
monitoring, not just of particular actions but also of her project 
as a whole, honestly and resolutely. 
While both responsible agency and autonomy refer to features 
of character and disposition of the agent and while both report that 
the agent is prepared to live in accordance with her principles, the 
autonomous agent, in contrast to the heteronomous responsible agent, 
puts her principles to the test in terms of their truth or rightness 
as grounded in her project. 55 
I-self's understanding of her project is at best more or less 
adequate, more or less truthful, more or less transparent and, as 
such, can be improved by re-evaluation. As Charles Taylor says, 
The question can always be posed: ought I to re-evaluate 
my most basic evaluations? Have I really understood what 
is essential to my identity? Have I truly determined 
what I sense to be the highest mode of life? This kind 
of re-evaluation will be radical, not in the sense of 
radical choice, however, that we choose without criteria, 
but rather in the sense that our looking again can be so 
undertaken that in principle no formulations are con-
sidered unrevisable. 56 
We are now in a position to examine a number of connections 
between autonomy and authenticity, to examine factors which oppose 
responsibility and to disclose some of the conditions supportive of 
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autonomous evaluation, more transparent understanding and more 
authentic existence. In its concern for both true understanding 
of I-self's project and action in accordance with that understanding, 
authenticity points to an integrity or congruence between understanding 
and action, whereas autonomy is concerned with the integrity of 
I-self's reflexive monitoring. Although closely connected, 
authenticity and autonomy are also in tension. 
Pertinent to our present inquiry are three types of homeostatic 
tension. By 'homeostatic tension' we mean a sort of congruence or 
equilibrium which is sought between two elements or features. In 
the previous section we discussed the homeostatic tension between 
understanding and action: faced with incongruence between action and 
understanding I-self seeks to resolve the disequilibrium through 
changes in her praxis and/or her understanding. She tries to 
change I1realityl1 so it will match her understanding or she accom-
modates her understanding to "reality" or some combination of both. 
A second homeostatic tension exists between autonomy and 
authenticity. Autonomy, as a disposition toward a highly competent, 
honest and resolute assessment of one's project, is necessary to 
provide the true understanding that is required for authenticity 
but it also tends to alter I-self's conception of her project and 
to upset the equilibrium she has previously achieved between under-
standing and action. Autonomy poses a "threat" to I-self which we 
tried to portray in diagram 2.2 through its revelation of the often 
unpalatable choice of radical transformation of self/world versus a 
"sell-out" to inauthenticity. 
Generally I-self does not have a simple straightforward task 
to re-evaluate and re-define her project and get under way on it 
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because there is a third homeostatic tension - that between power 
and responsibility. In brief I-self seeks a degree of congruence 
between her responsibilities and her powers. Here we are using 
'power' in the capacity or "can do" sense which includes personal 
powers such as knowledge and skills, various social powers, rights 
and freedoms, access to resources, etc. 
COMMENTARY: Action-Man requests some concrete examples to illustrate 
what use can be made of these concepts of homeostatic tension while 
Precise asks for some elaboration on the justification for them. 
Both concerns are pursued in Appendix A. 
FACILITATOR: We have analysed autonomy with a view to situating it within 
a structure involving authenticity, reflexive monitoring, responsibility 
and power. In the next section part of this analysis will be used in 
articulating and defending a conception of I-self's good while other 
aspects will be incorporated in subsequent analyses of social, 
political and educational principles. 
8. I-self's good 
TELEOLOGIST: What do we mean by 'I-self's good' and what kind of an 
inquiry do we intend to conduct? 'I-self' refers to the existential 
possibilities which are conceivably present to us; 'I-self's good' 
refers to a selection from among these existential possibilities 
which it would be rational to choose or which an I-self with an 
unreified, transparent understanding would be called to take. This 
is a different although related inquiry to1nat which I-self uses 
in critically reflecting on her project because in this present 
exercise we can take some liberties with the factical conditions 
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and imagine them otherwise. We are not asking what is good for 
slaves or workers or capitalists or psychopaths or citizens of this 
country or that, or persons of this character or that disposition; 
because this would be already to have taken a position on the matter 
we are investigating; but rather, "In the best of all conceivable 
worlds: what kind of person would I be? What kind of life would I 
lead? What kind of impact would I have on the world?" In asking 
this question we are searching for a description of a general way 
of being-in-the-world that is to be preferred to other possibilities 
and within our question is the issue of our own character and basic 
dispositions. 
PRECISE: It is incredibly difficult even to see what categories are 
appropriate for such an inquiry. 
TELEOLOGIST: Yes. Among many possible categories we might consider are 
four that are consistent with our purpose and previous analyses: 
(1) welfare; 
(2) self-realization; 
\3) self-development; 
,4) being-with-one-another. 
By 'I-self's good' we mean the realization of "positive states fl 
of each of welfare, self-realization, self-development and being-
with-one-another. Goodness, for I-self, is living in such a way 
that each of these criteria is in a "positive state" for her. This 
study is not concerned with standards or specific measures for the 
criteria and because of the generality of our articulation of the 
criteria a great many matters concerning "the good" will be left 
open and undiscussed. Nevertheless the implications for social, 
political and educational theory of a commitment to these general 
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criteria of I-self's good should be profound. During the elaboration 
and justification we can clarify 'positive state', to a degree, 
although exactness is neither necessary nor practicable. 
Welfare refers to survival, health, comfort and pleasure and 
can range over states from death, illness, pain and suffering to 
vitality, satisfaction and joy. Clearly life itself is required 
if I-self is to enjoy any other values whatsoever and this is all 
that is required to establish some sort of welfare criterion. But 
it is also reasonable for a degree of health, comfort and pleasure 
to support instrumentally the other criteria as we shall see. 
However it is no less true that there could be an excess of certain 
welfare features. Bouts of affliction may strengthen I-self's 
resolution and reveal her existential situation more clearly to her 
whereas a surfeit of pleasure and comfort is a sign of falling into 
the world, reification or idolatry. Yet welfare is to be seen as 
more than instrumental, i.e. as good in itself and hence the optimal 
state of welfare would be as much as is compatible with positive 
states of the other criteria. 
By self-realization we mean the way in which I-self manages 
the homeostatic tension between authenticity and autonomy. In a 
positive state of self-realization I-self has both authenticity and 
autonomy as values which she pursues and achieves: she seeks 
authenticity and seeks it authentically through an autonomous scrutiny 
of her project and actions; she maintains a suitable balance between 
understanding and action and between re-examining the bases of her 
evaluations and "getting on withll her project. The 'self' in 'self-
realization' refers to 'self/world' in terms of the agent's praxis 
and yet also picks out personality, personal accountability and 
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responsibility. Our previous discussions indicate that negative 
states will involve various forms of inauthenticity and heteronomy, 
e.g. self-deceptions, guilt, frustration, alienation, despair, 
emptiness. 
By self-development we refer to I-self's engagement in thought, 
action or discourse which increases her understanding of self/world 
or which develops new or stronger powers or capacities to monitor 
reflexively her actions or project or to plan, organize and implement 
actions as part of her project. To some degree self-development is 
to be justified with respect to self-realization. Time spent in 
self-development during one period increases I-self's prospects for 
authenticity and autonomy at a later period. Generally self-
development can be expected instrumentally to support positive states 
for each of the other three criteria although it is more than instru-
mental in this sense because, over a lifetime the development of new 
powers and capacities (even, or perhaps especially, when offset by 
declining powers in certain respects) becomes a form of personal/ 
historical self-realization. As in the case of welfare an excess 
of self-development is a possibility: a person might give such undue 
attention to self-development that the attainment of the other 
criteria might suffer. Positive states for self-development idll 
range between "enough to managell the changing course of one I slife 
to as much as is compatible with the other criteria also being positive. 
By being-with-one-another we mean the way that I-self (i.e. each 
I-self in turn) experiences other I-selves in social and interpersonal 
relationships. 'Positive states' here refers to authentic being-with-
one-another, a condition in which I-selves see each other as co-agents 
engaged in a mutual project. There are degrees of fraternity, 
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friendship, community and love and our most positive state will be 
the most authentic compatible with positive states for the other 
th ·t· 57 ree cr~ er~a. 
Turning now to justification, we have already established the 
validity of some welfare criterion but there may be objections of 
two opposed types. Some people, mistakenly, conflate all values 
to welfare, deny the other criteria any independent standing and 
only recognize them to the extent to which they advance welfare. 
Others may argue that welfare has no independent value and is only 
good to the extent that it is instrumental for other values. Keeping 
in mind the qualifications concerning recognition of the other three 
criteria; vitality, satisfaction and joy are to be preferred over 
illness, pain and death and this should be plain to see under critical 
reflexion. This is a very different claim from one that argues for 
ever increasing material wealth or consumption and soft or lavish 
life styles over more modest wealth and possessions or more challeng-
ing circumstances. 
What kind of objections can be made to self-realization? 
Fundamentally objections to self-realization will be based on a 
different conception of agency than we have argued for. The welfare 
reductionist, for example, rejects the structure of care, project, 
responsibility, etc. in favour of a 'summum bonum' defined in terms 
of the direct experiencing of a maximum of vitality, satisfaction 
and joy and a minimum of suffering, illness and pain. In doing so 
she articulates I-self's good purely passively but actually she is 
not concerned with I-self's good because she fails to recognize 
being an agent as of any independent value and so is working with 
some conception other than I-self, e.g. the subject as a centre of 
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sensation. 
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ACTION-MAN: Let's leave the objections and focus on the independent 
arguments in favour of the principle of self-realization. 
TELEOLOGIST: The argument depends basically on the validity of the 
constitutive features of authenticity and autonomy. We have defined 
'self-realization' as the maintenance of homeostatic tension between 
authenticity and autonomy such that both sets of "values" are pursued 
and achieved. Assuming that the analysis of homeostatic tension is 
agreed the justification of self-realization involves the justifica-
tion of all of the following states, experiences or dispositions for 
I-self: 
li) to have a true understanding of her project; 
(ii) to act in accordance with her understanding; 
(iii) to experience self-esteem; 
(iv) to have a conscience and be held accountable; 
\v) to choose and acknowledge her choice of her principles; 
(vi) to conduct reflexive monitoring honestly and resolutely. 
Note: (i), (ii). (iii) define authenticity and liv), (v), (vi) 
define autonomy. 
It is inconceivable that a rational person who cares about 
herself will, in the best of all worlds, reject either (i) or (ii) 
because such a course subverts her prospects for a worthy life ~ 
her terms. 59 If one accepts \i) then \vi) is justified as instru-
mentally required for true understanding. 
The justification of (iv) is more complex. To reject (iv) is 
to reject a conscious awareness of the project structure (i.e. caring, 
responsibility etc.); this can only be done by either not wanting 
a project or by wanting to be unconscious of the project one wants 
to have; but to want to be unconscious ••• is contrary to (vi). 
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Therefore the rejection of (iv) entails the rejection of the 
relationship of care, the project structure, responsibility, etc.; 
and to reject this is to reject wanting anything at all. If this 
position is actually held by anyone, which I doubt, that person is 
still faced with one last difficulty: it appears that the project 
structure simply "goes withll I-self and is not to be avoided or 
eliminated as long as I-self remains a living, conscious being. 
To manage her reflexive monitoring efficiently it is advantageous 
and probably necessary for I-self to have rules, principles or criteria. 
In sections 6 and 7 we argued that she can achieve a true understanding 
of her project only by grounding these rules, principles or criteria 
in her understanding of her authentic project. Therefore (v) is 
required for (i). 
Self-esteem is compatible with the project structure of caring, 
responsibility, conscience, etc. whereas for I-self not to want self-
esteem is inconsistent with the care structure; not to find oneself 
worthy is to find one's self/world not worthy (because 'self' is 
'self/world' on our analysis), i.e. not worth carrying out. We are 
not saying that a person whose project has gone off course or who 
has fallen short of her own expectations and is suffering from guilt 
should rationally believe that she deserves to experience self-esteem 
but only that in having a worthy vision I-self rationally wants to 
advance efficaciously toward it through her own actions and when she 
does this she experiences self-esteem. John Rawls, using a conception 
similar to ours, argues that self-respect is perhaps the most important 
"primary good" of al1. 60 Hence (iii) is justified. 
Also if one accepts self-esteem as a good for I-self through 
direct perception we can, by connecting it to worthy aims and 
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efficacious praxis as part of the project structure, justify the 
other aspects of self-realization as instrumentally supporting self-
esteem. This concludes our justification of self-realization. 
We have already discussed the instrumental function of self-
development in addressing the homeostatic tension between power and 
responsibility. To contribute most effectively to I-self's overall 
good, self-development and self-realization need to be synchronized 
or integrated. Self-development, to be optimally concerned with 
I-self's good is not aimed at simply gaining powers that might be 
useful but crucially of safeguarding I-self's responsibility and her 
advance toward more autonomous states from the regressive accommoda-
tions she must otherwise make if she lacks the power for efficacious 
praxis on her authentic project. The threat to I-self (concerning 
power) generally comes from a lack of powers or resources to do 
specific things required by her project and so self-development must 
focus on these urgent demands of praxis. 
HEART: This is a point of critical importance for educational theory and 
evaluation. "Good education" must be good for someone. Without 
holding that the good of the student is the only good we can agree 
that it is at least a basic consideration. To be supportive of the 
student's good, education must relate the student's self-development 
to her own authentic project, i.e. it must simultaneously advance 
both her self-development and self-realization. Under good teaching 
the student advances in her understanding of her project, in 
efficacious praxis and in self-esteem at the same time as she 
develops new powers and capacities. It is not enough to teach young 
people facts, concepts, attitudes etc. that they will need in the 
future if the principle of the integration of self-development and 
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self-realization is violated. The all too common practice of teaching 
new powers at the expense of diminished self-esteem, reified conscious-
ness or a detachment from praxis cannot be justified on the basis of 
the student's good. 
FACILITATOR: Heart's observation will be important in Chapter V. So far 
Teleologist has provided a justification for all the criteria except 
being-with-one-another. 
TELEOLOGIST: Authentic being-among-one-another instrumentally supports 
the other criteria. Because we are all part of a system of social 
co-operation involving collective forms of agency we need authentic 
relations with others to understand that collective agency and our 
part in it. Later we will explore the ways in which authentic 
being-with-one-another advances self-development. However being-
with-one-another has more than an instrumental justification and 
can be independently justified on the IIself-evident" value of 
experiences of authentic relationships of love, friendship and 
fraternity. 
SOLIDARITY: Without being-with-one-another as a fundamental criterion 
our conception of man's good would be excessively individualistic. 
Nevertheless I have my doubts whether I-self's good is a sufficient 
basis for educational evaluation. I think we need some specifically 
social principles. 
PRECISE: I am afraid that 'I-self's good' looks rather idealistic and 
impractical. 
FACILITATOR: Perhaps we should keep an open mind on the feasibility of 
'I-self's good' as a basis for educational evaluation until we discuss 
social co-operation and social relations in the next chapter. Mean-
while it is important to stress that I-self's good is not a particular 
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idiosyncratic conception of man's good and that its criteria have 
been justified on the basis of the kinds of judgments and assessments 
that are rational for persons to make when they reflect deeply and 
transparently on their circumstances. 
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C HAP T E R I I 
SOCIAL CO-OPERATION, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY 
In Chapter I the SET established criteria for I-self's good as a 
preliminary step in articulating principles for educational evaluation. 
They are now discussing the next step in their inquiry. 
9. Social co-operation 
SOLIDARITY: The existential perspective on human agency is very important 
and I am pleased that we have built a concept of fraternity, i.e. 
authentic being-among-one-another, into our criteria for I-self's 
good. However we need to develop a comprehensive social perspective 
before we will be ready to consider principles for educational 
evaluation. Human beings are social, not contingently but necessarily; 
a member of the biological category 'homo sapiens' stripped of language, 
culture and social relations is not human and not I-self. Each 
individual is enmeshed within a system of social co-operation involv-
ing social practices and conventions, various institutions, inter-
personal relations, and a division of labour and other forms of social 
and political activity. Some form of social co-operation, i.e. sharing 
and division of work and social and cultural activities, is absolutely 
. 1 
essential to human 11fe. 
However our criterion of being-with-one-another points to man's 
enjoyment of certain forms of social co-operation, not merely as a 
means of survival, but also and crucially as a way to realize and 
celebrate his good. Among the types of social activity in which 
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human agents co-operatively engage is education and the criteria 
for good education, at least in part, and I believe to a very 
substantial degree, achieve their validity from the general purposes 
and values of social life. 2 
ACTION-MAN: You mean that we require a perspective on the good society 
before we can formulate our educational principles. 
SOLIDARITY: Yes, we need to articulate a normative position concerning 
social co-operation but equally we need to understand social facts 
and relationships as they are. 
To a significant extent, education, as a form of social activity, 
has its point in relation to the totality of social relations and 
activity_ I am not arguing for a merely instrumental conception 
of education but rather making the point that, as part of a totality 
of social co-operation and activity, education should be evaluated 
in relation to that totality. 
ACTION-MAN: I do not understand. 
SOLIDARITY: Imagine we are Athenians in classical times. Probably less 
than ten per cent of individuals are citizens of the polis and the 
primary economic relation is slavery. Consider the education of 
boys and girls. Whatever curriculum might be proposed or Whatever 
pedagogy applied, an inescapable issue is whether there is one 
conception of education for all these boys and girls or whether 
different forms of education are to apply to different classes and 
to the sexes. To argue for one conception of education for all is 
to presuppose a criticism of the basic system of social relations 
in the polis. To accept slavery and sexism is, at the same time, 
to commit oneself to different forms of education for slaves and 
females. 3 
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Moreover, not only does education gain point and purpose from 
its relation to the social totality but it also contributes to the 
reproduction of the total system of social co-operation. Depending 
on circumstances, education can tend to maintain the system of social 
co-operation or to transform it in particular ways. That is, while 
itself limited and shaped by the system of overall social relations, 
education has the capacity to influence the direction, pace and 
extent of social change. For example, A wants the sons and daughters 
of workers to become compliant, diligent and productive workers, and 
loyal and obedient subjects. B, while agreeing concerning diligence 
and productivity, disagrees with compliancy and obedience, rejects 
the very idea of 'subject', and advocates a form of education that 
develops powers of analysis, criticism and verbal fluency; she wants 
these children to become intellectuals with such dignity, self-esteem 
and sense of justice that they refuse to accept or impose a dominated 
status in work, politics or cultural activity. A and B have different 
social perspectives, not contingently but because any minimally 
rational person seeks consistency between his educational and social/ 
political principles. 
Because education has a formative effect on character the 
connection between educational principles and social/political 
perspective is at the most basic level. What kind of character, 
virtues, dispositions and powers do we want in the educated person? 
How can we even address this question without taking particular 
positions on social co-operation? 
Accordingly I suggest that our agenda should be directed toward 
establishing general principles for social co-operation that are 
consistent with our analysis of I-self's good. From this foundation 
we can develop the educational principles we seek. 
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10. Rawls and categorial power 
LIBERAL: The major concern with social co-operation is social justice 
and Rawls' A Theory of Justice can provide relevant and useful 
. . ht 4 J.nsJ.g s. 
Rawls correctly argues that social justice arises from concerns 
with social co-operation. 5 Nozick disputes this point but his 
objections are based on too narrow an interpretation of 'social 
co-operation,.6 Rawls points out that social co-operation produces 
both an identity of interests and conflict of interests. Therefore 
principles of social justice are required for choosing among various 
social arrangements to determine the division of advantages and the 
distribution of shares. 7 Accordingly he defines 'social justice' as 
the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
co-operation. 
Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions 
define men's rights and duties and influence their 
life-prospects, what they can expect to be and how 
well they can hope to do. The basic structure is 
the primary subject of justice because its effects 
are so profound and present from the start. The 
intuitive notion here is that this structure con-
tains various social positions and that men born 
into different positions have different expectations 
of life determined, in part, by the political system 
as well as by economic and social circumstances. 8 
Rawls follows the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau 
and Kant and uses the idea of the social contract as an expository 
device for an original agreement concerning the principles of social 
justice for the basic structure of society. "They are the principles 
that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the 
fundamental terms of their association. fl9 These principles are 
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chosen behind a "veil of ignorance" which establishes limitations 
on the kinds of considerations which agents can use as justifications 
or reasons for their arguments in the deliberations concerning the 
original agreement. This device is designed to achieve impartiality 
and to ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice 
of principles by the outcome of natural chance or by the contingency 
f . l' t 10 o SOCla clrcums ances. After choosing a conception of justice 
these rational moral persons choose a constitution and a legislature 
to enact laws etc. in accordance with the principles of justice 
11 
originally agreed upon. 
Rawls argues that, given these conditions, the participants 
would choose two principles: 
(1) equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties; 
(2) social and economic inequalities are just only if they 
result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in 
particular for the least advantaged members of society.12 
PRECISE: Will you please explain 'the basic structure of society'? 
LIBERAL: In a slave society there are: slave-owners, slaves, free men 
without slaves, women and various sub-groups within these; the rights 
and powers which each of these positions carries; rules governing all 
these positions and their interactions; rules establishing how 
particular individuals come to fill these positions and to have 
these rights and powers. All of these features establish the basic 
structure of the slave society. Similarly feudalism, capitalism, 
the variations of each and other social forms have their basic 
structure. Depending on this basic structure I may find that my 
position or status in the social order is slave, serf, freeman, 
King, citizen, •..• This position is not one I earn but one which 
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the system of social co-operation assigns to me and which is the 
basis for my rights to education, political and civil action, control 
over various resources, etc. 
PRECISE: But under liberal capitalism no one is assigned to a particular 
position, is he? 
COMMENTARY: Scholar's next speech is not an exegesis of Rawls but my 
own analysis. 
SCHOLAR: It depends on how we define 'position'. As an infant and child 
I do not decide on the kind of society I will be initiated into but 
I have a particular status and place in a general scheme that has 
already been worked out, i.e. I experience facticity. The subjects 
in a system of social co-operation are human agents who engage in 
a variety of different types of social action including work, cultural 
activity (including education) and political action. They carry out 
these social actions through resources and powers available to them 
and they enjoy or suffer various outcomes in terms of I-self's good, 
i.e. welfare, self-development, self-realization and being-with-one-
another. (Scholar illustrates these ideas using diagrams 4 and 5.) 
In the sense I am using, to have a position in a system of social 
co-operation is the destiny of everyone - it is not necessarily to 
be stuck in a particular caste, estate or job but to have a certain 
range of possibilities and a certain set of limitations. 
To be born into capitalism is to be initiated into a particular 
way of determining the social actions engaged in by the community; a 
particular way of dividing those actions to form social positions; a 
particular way of assigning people to those positions; and a 
particular way of directing resources and powers to the incumbents 
in various positions. To be born into capitalism is to have open 
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various possibilities for becoming a capitalist, a worker, a middle 
class professional or whatever but it is to have closed off the 
possibilities for becoming a slave, a slave-owner, a feudal lord 
or any number of other possibilities, including that of being an 
autonomous agent whose relations with all other agents are free, 
equal and fraternal. 
LIBERAL: There are several points in Rawls' analysis that I support. 
Rawls stresses the importance of self-esteem to the well-being of 
each person and he defines self-esteem as having two aspects: 
a person's sense of his own value, his secure con-
viction that his conception of his good, his plan 
of life, is worth carrying out; 
secondly, 
self-respect implies a confidence in one's ability, 
so far as it is within one's power to fulfil one's 
intentions. When we feel that our plans are of 
little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure 
or take delight in their execution. Nor plagued by 
failure and self-doubt can we continue in our 
endeavors. 13 
This reinforces the points we made in the previous sections. Rawls 
is also correct in seeing society as a co-operative venture for 
14 
mutual advantage. I also agree with him that social justice 
demands that the distribution of natural talents be regarded as a 
t f th . . t 15 common asse , which follows rom e preV10US p01n • 
TELEOLOGIST: In addition to these points of agreement we may benefit 
from exploring some points of disagreement. 
RaWls' conception of the human agent is based on Kant's idea 
of moral personality, an impressive account and one which is correct 
in many respects, but our conception of I-self provides a more 
. 16 
adequate bas1s. While Rawls thinks he has corrected the defects 
of Kant's conception through the device of the original position he 
69 
does not succeed in overcoming the most fundamental flaw, which is 
the failure to make the distinction Heidegger draws between Dasein's 
existence and the being-present-at-hand of objects. I believe that 
it is because of this defect that Rawls finds it necessary to intro-
duce his ItAristotelian Principle", which appears rather incongruous 
17 in the context of his liberal, anti-teleological stance. 
Rawls is opposed, in principle, to a teleological foundation 
for social justice. He defines a teleological theory as one in 
which the good is defined independently from the right and then the 
right ~in this case, social justice) is defined as that which 
19 
maximizes the good. I disagree with Rawls on this point. We 
have already articulated I-self's good and we should consider 
20 
'justice' in terms of realizing that conception of the good. 
I have other disagreements as well, e.g. concerning consent 
and the nation-state, but I want now to consider Rawls' device of 
t .. ·t· 21 W R he or~g~nal pos~ ~on. hile I concur with awls that we are 
looking for principles to govern the basic structure of society 
and with Scholar's analysis of that basic structure, I challenge 
Rawls' time perspective. He seeks principles that are to establish 
the basic structure of society in perpetuity;22 and his articulation 
of the original position is based on his quest for an enduring charter 
t . t t· 23 . d t . th 1 d or cons ~ u 1on. Without ~n any way eroga ~ng e mora an 
political insights that can be achieved through his method I 
criticize its implications and presuppositions. 
The implication of Rawls' programme is that the basic structure 
of social relations should be set in perpetuity. On Scholar's inter-
pretation of the basic structure this means that the system of rules 
for creating positions and assigning people to them should remain 
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unchanged. I object to this on fundamental epistemological and 
moral grounds, but I will need some time to justify my position. 
What are Rawls' presuppositions? Firstly he holds that imaginary 
agents in the original position can know and understand principles for 
social justice that will endure forever. Presumably imaginary agents 
can do anything but Rawls argues for two basic principles and a 
constitution based upon them which he says these imaginary agents 
would agree to and this is because he presupposes that he and at 
least some of his readers, i.e. actual agents, can know and understand 
principles of justice that will hold in perpetuity. I am extremely 
sceptical of this. 
Who does Rawls see as the actual agents who are to implement 
his principles of social justice? He does not tell us; his principles 
are set down on a "To whom it may concern" basis and he does not 
elaborate on the concept of agency applicable to the agents who are 
to bring about the realization of social justice. We understand 
them to be Kantian moral agents and yet there is a curious ambiguity 
here because Rawls says that the original position shows which 
principles free, equal and rational persons would choose, and he 
says these principles must be applicable in practice. But in practice, 
according to Rawls, we, as actual persons, display our nature as free, 
equal and rational by choosing these principles. "Thus men exhibit 
their freedom, their independence from the contingencies of nature 
and society, by acting in ways they would acknowledge in the original 
"to ,,24 pOSl. l.on. So, for Rawls, at the point where actual agents establish 
a system of social justice they abolish their own facticity! But this 
is invalid reasoning - simply by making the same choice as free, equal 
and rational beings does not make one free, equal and rational any 
more than monkeys typing for an indefinite time and eventually 
producing a copy of Romeo and Juliet become Shakespeare. More 
fundamentally man is never free of natural contingencies and social 
structuration - he cannot escape facticity. The agents who actually 
bring about social justice will not stand in a relation of freedom, 
equality and rationality to one another because they have been 
initiated into conditions contrary to these. The real issue is how 
can we move from a system in which agents have unequal powers and 
freedoms and some, at least, are not perfectly autonomous, authentic 
and rational to one in which RaWls' conditions apply? 
LIBERAL: Your last comment suggests that ultimately you agree with Rawls 
that in a just system of social co-operation, persons are free, equal 
and rational. Moreover I am not convinced that we are not free to 
choose Rawls' principles. 
TELEOLOGIST: Like you I am aiming for a world in which everyone becomes 
free, equal and autonomously rational. Perhaps if Scholar does not 
mind elaborating on 'social structuration' we can address your points 
about the degree of freedom of actual agents. 
SCHOLAR: There are two opposite sorts of errors we can make concerning 
human agency: on the one hand to assume that we are, !lin the nature 
of things", free and rational; on the other to interpret all human 
activity as determined by forces or laws which are beyond our power 
to alter. I doubt that Rawls assumes that all human beings have the 
degree of freedom and rationality postulated for the agents in the 
original position but his theory does not face the discrepancy 
between the facti city of human beings and the freedom, equality and 
rationality of idealized moral agents. A more correct account in 
this respect is provided by Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration, 
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which essentially holds that social structure determines man's 
facti city and constrains his possibilities of action, without deter-
mining his specific actions. 25 What is 'social structure'? Giddens 
refers to the structuring properties of social systems and argues 
that they "can be understood as rules and resources, recursively 
implicated in the reproduction of social systems ll • He sees structure 
as recognizing the existence of: 
(a) knowledge of how things are to be done by social agents; 
(b) social practices applying that knowledge; 
(c) powers and capacities of the social agents presupposed by 
th t o 26 ose prac J.ces. 
Clearly power relations between and among individuals and groups 
are present in all social structures. 
Actions need to be seen not as discrete and separate occurrences 
but as flowing through time. 27 At any particular point in time 
I-self is thrown into a situation which has been "historically 
determined"; he finds himself within a structured social system 
embodying language, routine practices, institutions, rules, 
expectations, patterns of interaction, distributions of resources, 
power relations and the like. Without a facti cally given social 
situation embodying the elements listed there can be no I-self. 
It is in this sense that I-self is I1produced" by the social structure. 
The social structure determines his possibilities and so always limits 
the possibilities of existence but to the extent that the social agents 
are autonomous then the future reproduction of social structure is not 
uniquely determined. 
I think it is important to discuss the question of power in 
human practices because this idea is basic to the critique of Rawls' 
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programme. Let me illustrate my claim that agents within a system 
of social co-operation carry out their social actions through 
resources and powers available to them, with a few examples. 
X decides to pass a new law concerning abortion; Y plans to 
develop a coal field into a productive mine; Z wants to take a 
holiday in Paris. In each case whether, to what extent, and with 
what consequences the agent can carry out his intended action depends 
upon his powers and resources. If X is an absolute monarch he has 
the authority to pass his law whereas if he is a member of a legis-
lative assembly he has the authority to propose a new law but the 
decision is reached by majority vote. In this case the efficacy of 
his action depends in part on the wishes and predispositions of 
others and in part on his powers of influence. His powers of 
influence depend in part on his personal powers - character, person-
ality, knowledge and skills - and in part on the resources at his 
command - is he rich and able to bribe other legislators? Does he 
exercise control over appointments to offices and positions, or lack 
such powers, or have others? 
Y's prospects for developing his coal field also depend in 
part on his personal powers but crucially on his social powers, 
e.g. because he has property, i.e. an enforceable claim to the use 
of the coal field or authority, e.g. he is chief executive officer 
of a public corporation that can make use of the coal field. 
Z, who lives outside France, requires the social freedom to 
leave his own country and enter France and he needs the resources 
to pay the costs of his journey and holiday. 
PRECISE: You are saying that some sort of power is manifested in all 
human action; but how are you defining 'power'? 
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SCHOLAR: Many sociologists and political theorists define 'power' ~ 
relation between agents, groups or classes, i.e. essentially as 
28 
'power over' • However we should not let go of the existential 
sense of 'power' as the ability to act or do, which I contend is 
basic. While relations of power are generally present we want to 
retain both existential and social dimensions in our analysis. 
We distinguish personal from social powers. Within 'social 
powers' are included the categories of: social freedom, in which an 
agent is not constrained from doing a class of actions by any other 
agent, group or institution; authority (or rights of recipience) in 
which a particular agent (or position) is entitled to calIon the 
co-operation of others and the others are obligated to perform 
specific types of co-operation;29 and property as an enforceable 
claim to the use of resources. 30 All of these social powers are 
clearly relational in that to say that R has such and such social 
freedoms, authority or property is to give a type of shorthand report 
about the relations between agents, groups and institutions. Subject 
to a qualification I will make shortly, the social powers possessed 
by a particular agent are produced by the social structure. 31 
What about personal powers, i.e. the character, personality, 
disposi tions, knowledge, understandings, skills, II gifts'~ talents, 
etc. of the individual? Personal powers are less directly relational 
than social powers because the social practice, rule or institution 
is manifest in the exercise of the social power. For example, I 
have property in the form of a lot and house; the relational content 
of this social power is revealed not only in my right to order off a 
trespasser but especially in the support which my claim receives 
from the jUdicial and law enforcement institutions of my society. 
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Personal powers do not reveal social structuration in this direct 
fashion but it is incorrect to interpret them as independent of 
social structure; rather they are subject to social structuration, 
genetic endowment and natural environmental influences. This is not 
to say that I have no personal responsibility for my own personal 
powers but rather that whether and to what degree I am responsible 
are functions of natural contingency and social structure. 32 
TELEOLOGIST: In answer to Liberal's question of whether we are free to 
choose Rawls' principles of justice, if the system of social 
co-operation is so organized that many persons do not develop 
autonomous agency those persons cannot choose Rawls' principles 
in the autonomous spirit, i.e. as Kantian moral agents, that he 
clearly wants them to. Because these agents lack the capacity for 
autonomous agency their possibilities are limited to heteronOmous 
decisions. When power relations are highly asymmetrical, i.e. when 
some persons or groups are dominated by others, social structure 
limits the development of autonomy.33 In brief, a society marked by 
highly unequal distributions of powers and resources is not only 
unjust on a prima facie basis but lacks the free, equal and autonomous 
agents to bring about a system of social justice on Rawls' terms. 
SOLIDARITY: Teleologist is sceptical concerning our ability to understand 
principles of social justice holding in perpetuity and, while concern-
ing detail and specific application I concur, with respect to basic 
principle, I disagree. Indeed I am prepared to offer a general 
formulation of a principle of social justice that stands up at all 
times and places. It follows from our analysis of I-self's good 
that, from the perspective of any particular member, social 
co-operation should be so organized as to promote the good of that 
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member and of others with whom he has fraternal relations. The 
only principle meeting this criterion is one directed to the good 
of everyone. This is not a complete or sufficient articulation of 
social justice but it is a beginning. 
PRECISE: Assuming you are right it establishes only a very weak condition. 
A particular system of slavery may advance the good of the slaves in 
terms of security, food, clothes, shelter, worthwhile work to do, 
etc., and yet we consider slavery fundamentally unjust. 
SOLIDARITY: We can strengthen the conditions demanded by our principle 
by including the equal consideration of all members •..• 
FACILITATOR: Before you elaborate on your principle Teleologist should 
tell us why she thinks broad general principles of justice, applicable 
in perpetuity, are unknowable. 
TELEOLOGIST: Because our character and dispositions, which are shaped 
by social structuration, affect what we can understand by 'justice', 
the basic structure of society limits our ability to understand 
'justice'. Take Precise's example of slavery - not even Aristotle, 
a thinker of immense power, subtlety and integrity, could see the 
injustice of slavery. When Solidarity eventually refines her 
principle, if it rules out slavery it is a principle that Aristotle 
and other great thinkers did not know or understand. Aristotle 
could not escape the facti cal determinations caused by his society 
and we cannot evade those set by ours. 
LIBERAL: What a terribly depressing conclusion! Also the fact that 
Aristotle did not understand the injustice of slavery does not prove 
that he could not. 
TELEOLOGIST: The example of Aristotle does not prove my point - it only 
illustrates it. If our interpretation of social structuration is 
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correct we are unable to establish principles of social justice in 
perpetuity and Rawls' programme is flawed. Why should we be depressed 
at the prospect of improving on Aristotle or Rawls? There are moral 
as well as epistemological objections to Rawls' programme. If the 
rules for organizing the division of labour and other social actions 
into positions, assigning persons to these positions and allocating 
powers and resources to positions or persons are in fact applied by 
a particular generation, according to Rawls' principles, then one 
generation has a preferred status and responsibility regarding the 
determination of social justice. 
SOLIDARITY: Why does that matter? Are we concerned with who first 
establishes a system of social justice or only that it be established 
and maintained? 
SCHOLAR: With your permission I think this is a good time to elaborate 
on 'categorial power'. The point of Teleologist's analysis is that 
power relations and power behaviour are basic to I-self's realization 
of his good, both in the sense that I-self needs power to carry out 
his actions and to conduct his project and also that the way he 
experiences power relations contributes to his realization of his 
good. For example, in domination, i.e. a form of asymmetrical power 
relations, persons cannot realize authentic being-among-one-another. 
Generally asymmetries in power result in unequal welfare, self-
development and self-realization. Moreover, the way one experiences 
power relations has a direct bearing on self-esteem. 
Because agency and the experience of agency are so important 
to I-self a satisfactory conception of social justice must address 
the distribution of powers and resources supportive of agency. Our 
rejection of slavery is based on its unacceptable asymmetry in the 
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distribution of social freedom, authority and property between slave-
owners and slaves. Likewise capitalism establishes unacceptable 
asymmetries between capitalists and workers. 
SOLIDARITY: Our principles for social justice have to confront the 
distribution of powers and resources but how does this bear on who 
establishes the basic constitution of a society and when? 
SCHOLAR: If a group of agents at some particular time change the basic 
structure of a society, do they exercise power? 
SOLIDARITY: Yes. 
SCHOLAR: What kind of power do they exert? 
PRECISE: It does not seem to fit any of the categories - not personal 
power, social freedom or property. It is a bit like authority. 
SCHOLAR: Authority, property, personal powers and social freedom may 
affect the agent's categorial power but none of them is it. These 
powers flow from the way the basic structure of society is organized 
whereas categorial power is the capacity to determine the basic 
34 
structure. An "absolute" monarch has vast authority and scope 
of freedom but he does not necessarily have the power to change his 
absolute monarchy into a fundamentally different kind of society. 
Likewise the powers of slave-owners or company presidents arise from 
the way the basic institutions of their society are organized. In 
changing the basic structure of society agents change the categorization 
of positions within that structure, e.g. King/subject, slave-owner/ 
slave, capitalist/worker, professional/client, teacher/parent/child, 
etc. When agents act to change the categories of the basic organiza-
tion of a society and of the principles and rules for assigning 
persons to these categories and governing relations among the positions, 
they exercise categorial power. Existentially, to have categorial 
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"t· "b"l"t f d t" 35 power ~s 0 exper~ence respons~ ~ ~ y or a es ~ny. 
Now, is the distribution of categorial power a matter of social 
justice? If, say, only ten per cent of the population has some 
significant power to determine the basic structure of society, can 
there possibly be social justice? 
SOLIDARITY: Certainly not~ Categorial power is one of the most important 
IIgoods" in society. Unless some special reason is offered there 
should be an equal distribution. 
SCHOLAR: Therefore it matters greatly who determines the basic structure. 
If justice demands some sort of egalitarian distribution of categorial 
power then principles for the basic structure of society cannot be 
determined at some particular time, in perpetuity, because this 
denies future generations categorial power. 
Moreover, as we live together, even according to the best 
principles of justice we can conceive, our social praxis will put 
new possibilities and new problems before us - requiring further 
changes in the basic structure. 
FACILITATOR: There appears to be a rather reluctant agreement that 
Teleologist and Scholar are right in their criticisms of Rawls' 
programme but what does this suggest for our own approach to social 
justice? 
TELEOLOGIST: While we cannot establish principles governing the basic 
structure in perpetuity, Solidarity is right that we can articulate 
some general principles which point us in the right direction. 
Also, because categorial power must be included within the scope 
of social justice, our programme should be directed toward an 
indefinitely extended series of social transformations designed to 
make society more just in relation to criteria which also change. 
FACILITATOR: In our next session we can explore general principles for 
social justice that "point us in the right direction" for social 
transformation. 
11. Justice and democracy 
FACILITATOR: Solidarity will elaborate on her principle concerning 
advancing the good of every member of society. 
SOLIDARITY: Yes, let us build in an equality condition so it reads, 
"social eo-operation should be so organized that it advances the 
good of every person. considered equally and impartially". 
This articulation needs further elaboration regarding powers 
and resources but before that do we agree on the basic idea? 
(A number of objections to this principle are discussed in Appendix B.) 
ACTION-MAN: Is such a basis for social justice practical? Can we really 
manage a system of social co-operation in which millions of people 
engage in self-realization of their own authentic projects? 
HEART: If I-self's authentic project and hence his good were essences 
or present-at-hand things to be discovered rather than the construc-
tions of social praxis they are, then Solidarity's principle would 
be hopelessly impractical. In subsequent discussions we can explore 
how individual self-realization is not only compatible with but also 
an integral part of the common interest of groUps.36 For now let us 
keep an open mind on feasibility and focus on the normative issues. 
PRECISE: There is still the question of whether it is right to allow 
persons who are cruel, selfish, dishonest, depraved and the like 
to engage in self-realization. 
SOLIDARITY: During our discussion of H. L. A. Hart's arguments for 
certain principles of law we found that man needs standing laws 
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backed with coercive sanctions. ,See Appendix C for a summary.) 
I think it is consistent with that analysis to argue that individuals 
can and will be constrained by law, and because there is no single 
pre-given way for an individual to realize an authentic project, 
the society can use legal means to prevent or punish cruelty, 
dishonesty, etc., without denying individuals the rights of self-
realization. 37 
TELEOLOGIST: This formulation is still open to authoritarian and 
paternalistic interpretations, although in other respects I agree 
with it. 
FACILITATOR: Because 'good' in the principle refers to the four criteria 
of I-self's good, do you not agree that authoritarian interpretations 
are ruled out? 
TELEOLOGIST: You are right that our articulation of I-self's good points 
to a non-authoritarian, non-paternalistic interpretation of social 
justice but until we incorporate our concerns about power into the 
formulation of our principle(s) there is the danger of failing to 
exclude interpretations condoning the decisive action and power of 
groups believing or claiming they have a privileged insight into 
their fellows' good or a special right to exercise categorial power. 
SCHOLAR: Equal and impartial consideration of the good of everyone suggests, 
at least on a prima facie basis, that there should be an ~galitarian 
distribution of categorial power. 
PRECISE: Determining principles for social justice is extremely difficult 
and it would be both foolish and wrong for dull, disinterested, dis-
honest or selfish persons to have as much say as someone like Rawls. 
HEART: We need to incorporate Scholar's idea of an equality of categorial 
power into our principle of social justice if it is explicitly to 
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express our rejection of authoritarianism and paternalism in 
favour of democracy. By 'democracy' I do not mean the emasculated 
revisionist accounts which try to re-define it in narrowly political 
terms, i.e. by treating much of economic, social or cultural life as 
outside the scope of popular political control and/or which envisage 
only a minimal level of participation by most citizens in political 
38 processes. Rather, I refer to a conception which is authentic in 
two senses: 
(a) it fosters I-self's authentic existence; 
(b) it is faithful to a core of values in the classical tradition 
of democracy. 
While catchwords such as 'equality', 'freedom' and 'fraternity' 
are too ambiguous and too cryptic to convey precisely these democratic 
values they are suggestive of the equal and impartial consideration 
of everyone's good and of the participation of everyone, on the 
basis of equal civil and political rights. in the life and government 
of the community and society. 'Freedom', in this classical tradition. 
can be essentially understood as 'autonomy' in our terms. In the 
classical tradition of democracy the people control their government, 
which means they exercise power over the basic structure of society. 
Hence in its ancient traditions democracy is understood as a form 
of social life in which citizens have an equality of categorial power. 
There are both positive and negative reasons supporting equality 
of categorial power. Negatively, if categorial power is unequally 
distributed the corruption of government, i.e. rule in the interests 
of sectoral groups to the general disadvantage, is virtually assured. 
Many have commented on the corrupting effects of power but more 
accurately it is not the possession or exercise of power but 
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asymmetries in power relations that corrupt. Positively how can we, 
as autonomous I-selves, have authentic communal relations? Only when, 
as citizens, we all have and take responsibility for our social 
relations, including the organization of the basic structure of our 
39 
society. 
Is this authentic conception of democracy utopian? We are 
certainly many generations from realizing it. Precise is concerned 
about sharing categorial power with people who are "poor citizensll 
but this is one of the great challenges of authentic democracy - to 
develop the character and personal powers of young people so they 
become good citizens, and come to share in the exercise of categorial 
power. The end we are aiming for is a society in which, as Solidarity 
says, "Social co-operation is so organized that it advances the good 
of every person, considered equally and impartiallyll. Moreover, I 
want to add, "and so that categorial power concerning the basic 
structure of society is shared equally among all its citizens ll • 40 
LIBERAL: This is good. Until now I have felt most uncomfortable about 
engaging in a series of social transformations without having at 
least a criterion of justice already agreed. While we lack a set 
of rules for establishing a constitution or for organizing the basic 
structure of society, we have criteria for assessing the state of 
social justice at any particular time and for judging "the right 
direction ll concerning social transformation. If every citizen is 
autonomous and authentic; if categorial power is equally shared by 
all citizens; and if, on these bases, the citizens have together 
chosen the basic structure of social co-operation and, individually, 
their own positions in it, then we have social justice. These criteria 
provide stringent tests for what constitutes "the right direction l1 
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with respect to democratic social transformation. 
FACILITATOR: From your nods we agree on this principle and Liberal's 
elaboration but we will have problems in future discussions unless 
we have a shorthand reference to it. In full, it reads: 
Social co-operation should be so organized that it 
advances the good of every person, considered 
equally and impartially and so that categorial 
power concerning the basic structure of society is 
shared equally among all its citizens. 
It is understood that 'good' refers to our particular articula-
tion of I-self's good in terms of welfare, self-realization, self-
development and being-with-one-another. Moreover there are no 
exclusions from citizenship, except children on a temporary basis. 41 
Let us call our principle for social justice 'the fundamental 
principle for social co-operation', the 'FPSC' for short. 
COMMENTARY: Given that actual agents engage in critical reflexion 
together to find a mutually beneficial, mutually agreed principle 
for social co-operation, under conditions of equal categorial power, 
the FPSC is that principle. There is more that needs to be said 
about rationality and the conditions of deliberation but these issues 
are dealt with in Chapter III. 
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12. Class. capitalism and meritocracy 
COMMENTARY: In this section, because I have to summarize so much discussion 
into a short report, I focus on the main findings. The issues concerning 
the SET are: whether the FPSC is valid regarding intergenerational justice; 
how racism, sexism, "ageism!! and social classes are related to the 
categorization of the basic structure of society and to the division of 
social actions within it. 
Rawls formulates a "just savings principle" as part of his theory 
of justice to safeguard the rights of future generations but we have 
articulated the FPSC in terms of the good and interests of actual agents 
living, working and deliberating together. Does our FPSC ignore the 
interests of future generations? Not at all. Any actual society factually 
is multi-generational, consisting of individuals varying from newborn to 
ninety or more years, with new entrants constantly joining through birth 
and old veterans leaving as they die off. Provided the communities in 
which people live are characterized by love, fraternal feeling and 
authentic being-among-one-another, citizens will want to maintain the 
community which they love, and to bear and raise children. Without this 
condition, which transcends justice, no system of intergenerational justice 
is possible. 
Moreover, if, as new citizens are initiated into society and old ones 
leave, there is a continuous process of social transformation resulting in 
ever more adequate and complete identification and realization of the 
common interests of all those living together, then the interests of 
future generations are safeguarded in the best way possible because on 
this basis, self-love and altruism are integrated and there is no It sacrifice II 
by one generation for its descendants. 42 
Indeed the approaches of Rawls, and also Ackerman, to intergenerational 
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justice, can be criticized for assuming that a just distribution of 
resources can be established independently of the deliberations concerning 
the good of particular individuals and that this distribution can be 
expressed as a one dimensional scalar quantity such as money or IImanna".43 
I dispute both of these ideas: reasons for my position on the former are 
offered in Chapter III, especially sections 15 and 16; and for the latter 
in Appendix D. 
The SET concludes that the FPSC is adequate intergenerationally, 
provided our communities are characterized by authentic being-among-one-
another. Whether these conditions pertain depends crucially on the 
division of social actions. By 'division of social actions' we refer 
to the division of labour, cultural and political activity and to the 
arrangement and relation of sites where these activities occur. The 
division of social actions corresponds to the positions which agents 
occupy in society. Because we require some form of social co-operation 
there is no question of abolishing the division of social actions; but 
there are two main approaches to its organization. We call a simple 
division in which all actors carry out the same or similar functions 
'replication by function'. For example, if each of five workers building 
a fence performs the same functions: digging the holes; setting the posts; 
nailing on the rails; nailing on the pickets; and painting the fence, we 
have division by replication of function. If, on the other hand, the 
workers specialize the tasks we have division by 'differentiation of 
function', or 'functional differentiation'. Because functional differ-
entiation creates and extends interdependencies it can be described as 
an organic system. It is possible to combine both approaches as in the 
assembly line. 44 
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Ever since the industrial revolution the trend has been toward 
differentiation of function. Accordingly social co-operation has been 
marked by ever greater specialization and complexity. As well the inter-
dependencies are elaborated on a larger scale, e.g. world markets, high 
degrees of international economic interdependence, large units of economic 
and productive organization. 
In Appendix E we consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
functional differentiation and conclude that we face the challenging task 
of finding an appropriate blend of replication and differentiation, although 
strict limits have to be placed on the degree and range of functional 
differentiation, especially in the sphere of politics. 
There is a type of dialectical relation here - a just and democratic 
organization of social co-operation is one which all citizens determine 
through deliberations carried out in circumstances of equal categorial 
power and authentic being-among-one-another. However the categorial power 
which agents have and the state of their inter-relations are determined by 
the historically changing system of social co-operation. 45 
Next the SET considers three bases for categorizing agents in 
positions - age, sex and race/ethnicity, and one possible consequence -
social classes. Concerning age, there must be a significant differentiation 
between adults and children because children are either incapable or less 
capable than adults in political deliberation and most kinds of work. 
What starts out as virtually total incapacity in infancy progressively 
becomes a matter of degree until the child reaches a stage of maturity 
when full citizenship rights should apply. Because everyone in an authentic 
democracy has an equal say in determining the basic structure of society 
we should reject out of hand any system in which political participation is 
differentiated by age, sex or race (or any number of other irrelevant 
88 
considerations).46 However differentiation in work or cultural activities 
may be satisfactory to a certain extent. Certain types of work that are 
extremely strenuous may be restricted to age groups that can manage them; 
old age pensions can be paid and retirement rights based on age and service 
can be provided - such differentiations are supportive of the FPSC and not 
contrary to it.47 Nevertheless there should be significant areas of inter-
generational participation in work, cultural and social activity to foster 
authentic relations among persons of all ages and to ensure that the FPSC 
applies intergenerationally. 
Concerning gender differentiations the biological fact that only 
women bear children has undoubtedly been the basis of much of the division 
of labour in a wide variety of different societies. Sex-related differences 
in size, strength, temperament and various capacities are, at most, matters 
of tendency and do not in themselves warrant any formal regulations concern-
ing opportunities available to girls and boys, women and men. I basically 
skip over most of the empirical findings on gender differentiation with 
the exception of a point by Mary Midgley who argues that the empirical 
evidence suggests that innate biological differences between men and women 
are best accommodated by a degree of differentiation of roles according to 
sex.
48 While Midgley is probably right, at least to a degree, we need to 
be cautious concerning the implications. There are great variations among 
the members of the same sex, variations that, with the exception of the 
capacity to bear children, are much greater than the differences between 
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the averages for the two sexes. If Midgley is right about the biological 
facts then it is contrary to the FPSC to forbid or discourage differentiation 
by sex; but equally it would be wrong to mandate or encourage sharp sex role 
differentiation. 
What is in any case clear is that women now have not only a different 
but also an inferior status to men and one not justified by biological 
differences. Work is important to everyone and the work, rewards and 
recognition that women do and receive in an authentic democracy must be 
equal, in terms of I-self's good with those of men. Practically, to put 
the career opportunities for women on a par with men's there must be both 
an immense change in the status, conditions and economic returns for the 
"traditional" women's work of child care, family maintenance and housework, 
and also special provisions in terms of maternity leave, professional child 
care and other conditions to support the participation of women in work 
outside the home. There must also be changes in the education of girls 
and boys, with a particular vigilance to root out both implicit and 
explicit ideologies and practices which reinforce or assume an inferior 
status for females. 
Concerning racism we need to distinguish two forms: one involving 
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic origin, colour, body-type, 
accent or other such characteristics; the other manifesting cultural 
domination. A society that establishes special rights regarding language 
and culture in which certain ethnic, religious or national traditions 
have a privileged status in relation to others which are dominated can 
have "clean hands ll regarding the first form. Racism can arise as much 
from treating everyone alike as from arbitrary discriminations if by 
'treating everyone alike' we mean requiring minority groups to speak 
the language of the majority (or vice versa), establishing qualifications 
for jobs or organizing the school curriculum arbitrarily to privilege 
certain cultural traditions. 49 The general finding of the SET regarding 
this extremely complex and sensitive matter is that only a culturally 
pluralistic society, which decentralizes substantial political authority 
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to neighbourhood communities can ensure that members of different cultural 
traditions have equal categorial power. 
The SET defines a 'social class' as "a group of social agents who 
share the same relation to the division of social actions and who have, 
with respect to one or more other groups who share a different relation-
ship: 
(a) different resources and powers; 
(b) different outcomes in terms of I-self's good." 
There are three objectionable possibilities regarding classes: 
,1) when the differences clearly favour one class over another;50 
(2) when individuals are formally or legally assigned to a particular 
class on the basis of their parents' status; 
(3) when the structural principles of the social system indirectly 
establish class membership according to parental status. 
I skip the arguments justifying these findings although readers should 
have little difficulty in demonstrating that each of these possibilities is 
contrary to the FPSC. Moreover, practically speaking, class systems per se 
are contrary to the FPSC and therefore the issue is not how to ensure that 
members of different classes receive justice but rather how to organize a 
just, democratic and classless society. 
The members of the SET live in a liberal capitalist society, 'liberal' 
in that it has a limited set of constitutional democratic features, and 
'capitalist' in that major sectors of work are governed by a labour contract 
which mediates the relations between free but relatively propertyless 
workers and capitalists who own the means of production, and in possessing 
51 
certain other features we discuss below. The labour relation between 
capitalists and workers produces a class system which is objectionable 
in the first and third ways above. However the class structure in liberal 
91 
capitalism is considerably more complex than a capitalist/worker dichotomy. 
The key features of liberal capitalism for the SET's concerns are: 
(1) the limited form of democratic political participation effectively 
puts the workplace under the primary control of capitalists, managers 
and/or a bureaucratic hierarchy; 
(2) the employer/employee relation establishes an asymmetry in power, 
i.e. domination of the employee; 
(3) the laws governing the inheritance of property reproduce class 
1 t o °nh °t d b 0 52 re a 10ns on an 1 er1 e aS1S; 
(4) the "free market", based on a high degree of convertibility among 
various resources and powers, tends to convert inequalities in one 
h Ot 0 0 1 0 1 0 t 53 sp ere 1n 0 pervaS1ve SOC1a 1nequa 1 y; 
54 the state structure of centralized control; 
the economic power and leverage of corporations;55 
the existence of many complex tensions between classes and sectors 
rather than a unified ruling class hegemony. One of the more 
significant is the struggle between the capitalist class and what 
Alvin Gouldner calls the 'New Class' or is sometimes flatteringly 
referred to as the 'meritocracy'. Some members of the New Class 
are employed in influential and prestigious positions while others 
are self-employed; as a class they are characterized by high levels 
of education, executive and administrative expertise and useful 
n connections" . While there is a degree of compromise and accommo-
dation between capitalists and the New Class they tend to be in 
opposition concerning the basic principles of social organization, 
with the former committed to the idea that the owner of the means 
of production is entitled to do whatever he wants with his productive 
property - to hire whomever he likes on whatever criteria he chooses, 
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to pay whatever he desires or feels the "market!! requires, to 
promote, demote or fire persons on whatever grounds catch his fancy, 
and to possess a vast number of prerogatives concerning the manage-
ment of his enterprise; while the latter hold that principles of 
justice should apply to many of the foregoing considerations, more 
specifically that merit and/or seniority should be the basis for 
preferring one person over another in the competition for jobs, 
"to to ffO 56 pos~ ~ons, promo ~ons or 0 ~ces. 
Importantly the SET, while committed to the abolition of capitalist 
relations, opposes a clear cut victory for the New Class and its meritocratic 
principles. The arguments against meritocracy are of two sorts: against 
merit as a principle for organizing the basic structure of society; and 
concerning the dangers of inherited privilege. Regarding the former and 
more fundamental issue we need to distinguish two very different 
interpretations: 
\a) where social agents within a particular form of social organization 
and having certain obligations related to a set of rights fulfil 
their obligations and thereby are entitled to or deserve their 
benefits; 
lb) merit as an underlying principle of the system of social co-operation. 
Rawls points out that (a) pre-supposes some system of social 
co-operation and so merit in the sense of (a) does not provide the principle 
for organizing the basic structure. 57 
Therefore our concern is with (b). As Rawls says a person cannot be 
said to deserve greater natural endowments, or his starting position in 
society or even a superior character which depends largely upon fortunate 
hi h h I " dot 58 family and social circumstances for w c e can c a~m no cre ~ • 
He writes, IIFor a society to organize itself with the aim of rewarding 
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moral desert as a first principle would be like having the institution 
of property to punish thieves. n59 
Although the FPSC has a teleological grounding in terms of I-self's 
good it is incompatible with any system of "rewards" extrinsic to that 
good and cannot be matched with a fundamental merit principle. To pro-
vide advantages through the ways in which the major social institutions 
distribute rights and duties and organize the system of social co-operation 
to persons whose existence is more authentic or whose self-development is 
more comprehensive or advanced or rapid would be utterly contrary to our 
fundamental principle of social justice. 
Concerning the inheritance of privilege there is ample empirical 
evidence showing the extent to which children of members of the meritocracy 
are in fact advantaged in educational achievement and occupational status. 60 
But how does meritocracy as the organizing principle for the basic 
structure of society causally produce inherited class privileges? The 
gist of Scholar's analysis is that families initiate their children into 
somewhat different cultures reflecting the parents' position within the 
system of social co-operation. In a meritocratic system parents holding 
privileged positions introduce their children to cultural practices, 
including patterns of language use, dialects and manners that are radically 
different from the corresponding cultural practices of parents in dis-
d t d °to 61 a van age POS1 10ns. The children of parents assigned to disadvantaged 
positions within the basic division of labour and other social actions 
are disadvantaged in a competitive struggle with children of privileged 
parents for educational achievement. It is a matter of debate to what 
extent they are "disadvantaged" because they have less capacity to meet 
the actual requirements for performance in privileged positions, e.g. 
doctor or lawyer, and to what extent arbitrary and technically 
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inconsequential differences in dialect, speech codes, manners, etc. are 
the basis for discrimination within educational institutions. 62 
In any case the combination of a meritocracy in the division of 
labour and a competitive educational system directed to assign young people 
to their places within the social structure on merit produces an inherited 
system of class privilege. The rejection of the meritocratic programme 
entails not only a different approach to education but also a different 
basis for organizing cultural and political activity and work. 63 To the 
extent that the basic structure of a society is organized on meritocratic 
principles, schools are placed under irresistible pressures to serve a 
selective function. 
13. Democratic social transformation 
The SET's aim is to establish an authentic democratic society, i.e. 
one in which the FPSC is the organizing principle, and they see the 
constitution, laws and other features establishing the basic structure 
being instituted through an indefinite sequence of transformative social 
actions (political, cultural and educational) by groups of I-selves in 
the various factica1 positions in which they find themselves. They agree 
with Marx and Lukacs that social transformation is accomplished through 
collective agency and that purely individual agency lacks efficacy but 
disagree that the collective agents of social transformation are social 
classes, in particular they disagree that the working class is a 
t b 1 " h "t 1" 64 "universal class" destined 0 a 0 1S cap1 a 1sm. 
The main basis of disagreement is that the working class is not an 
actual agent and cannot be expected to become one. However, human beings 
can organize themselves into associations of various types capable of 
collective agency, e.g. business corporations, labour unions, political 
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parties, churches and organized special interest groups. If not the 
organized working class, what type of organization can bring about democratic 
social transformations?65 
PRECISE: In what sense are we using 'transformative action'? 
TELEOLOGIST: While it is impossible for I-self to escape factical deter-
mination of his possibilities of existence he can change some of his 
determination into new determinations. It is in I-self's interests 
to transform his factical conditions so that he has greater autonomy 
and authenticity. But there is another sense which is concerned with 
each I-self choosing, pursuing and realizing his authentic project. 
The first sense captures the transformation of the conditions of 
existence to alter I-self's possibilities whereas the second is 
concerned with grasping, from among the existing possibilities, 
that which is most authentic. The first is concerned with 
revolutionary social and political action while the second is 
concerned with the quality of one's existence in the here and now. 
What is being transformed in the second sense? Nothing less than 
I-self's existence which becomes increasingly authentic as I-self 
66 becomes more autonomous. 
In diagram 6 we have tried to portray this double sense of 
transformative action and it should be apparent that both types of 
transformative action are connected. In the first sense the test 
of success and effectiveness is the degree to which categorial power 
relations are altered in accordance with the FPSC. However, in so 
far as the I-selves belonging to a group in the facti cal position 
are increasingly resolute and authentic in their reflexive monitoring 
of their transformative action, advance in self-development, celebrate 
their successes together and support one another in times of stress, 
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trouble or affliction then they have succeeded in transformative 
action of the second type. To the extent that such a group can 
function in this fashion there are prima facie grounds for thinking 
that it will advance our FPSC (depending on its relationships with 
other groups and individuals). 
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PRECISE: What do you mean by a 'group in the facti cal position'? 
TELEOLOGIST: Rawls speaks of free, equal and rational persons in the 
original position, i.e. moral agents who can "bracket out" their 
social world and imagine themselves creating a new social structure 
"from the ground up". 'Factical position' describes the status of 
actual agents who organize groups to monitor social conditions and 
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to transform their social relationships and structure. Unlike the 
free, rational and equal persons who deliberate in ,Rawls' original 
position the I-selves in the factical position vary widely in their 
experience of authenticity, manifest widely different degrees of 
responsibility and autonomy, and experience social relations of 
domination and dependence in important spheres of their lives. 
Whereas in the original position the participants in deliberation 
have hypothetically severed their connections to the social world 
and are free of the determinations of any particular system of social 
co-operation, in the factical position I-selves are enmeshed within a 
system which has formed their characters, determined their possibilities, 
limited their rationality, their vision and their goodness and which 
twists and distorts their communications and deliberation. 
SCHOLAR: Does it not also follow that in their method of inquiry a trans-
formative action group should lay great stress on philosophical 
analysis? By 'transformative action group' I mean a group of I-selves 
in the facti cal position working for democratic social transformations. 
ACTION-MAN: Why is philosophical analysis particularly important? 
SCHOLAR: Philosophical analysis of social, political and educational 
issues and of theories and principles about such issues can improve 
the efficacy of the transformative action of I-selves in the facti cal 
position by: 
(a) revealing formerly concealed conceptual connections between 
social phenomena; 
(b) assisting in the conversion of practical consciousness of self 
d "lIt" "t d"" . 67 an SOCla re a lons ln 0 lscurslve conSClousness; 
(c) stimulating more profound and true self-understanding and 
otherwise fostering self-development. 
By 'philosophizing' I mean activities involving conceptual and 
logical analysis of terms, ideas and theories, the examination of 
reasons and justifications for actions, and ontological, epistemo-
logical or metaphysical inquiries that yield I-selves a more profound 
or a more accurate conception of their individual and collective 
projects. Philosophical activity has a unique contribution to make 
to transformative action and this is particularly true concerning 
reflexive mOnitoring. It follows from our analysis of responsible 
agency that I-self must do his own reflexive monitoring and hence 
his own philosophizing and this has a crucial bearing on the form 
and methodology of studies of social and political philosophy.68 
FACILITATOR: We find that we can only create the possibilities for good 
education for everyone within a just, democratic and classless society. 
We are committed to social justice, specifically to the FPSC, and we 
appreciate that this commitment calls for ongoing processes of 
democratic social transformation. Furthermore we envisage this 
transformative action being carried out by trans formative action 
groups or "TAGs", for short. which have two basic tasks: 
(1) to transform categorial power relations and the basic structure 
of society in the wider society in accordance with the FPSC; 
(2) to foster the good of the members of the TAG in the here and now. 
As a task the first is obvious while the second is concerned with 
providing an internally democratic climate within the TAG. In the next 
chapter we explore both the need for internal democracy within a TAG and 
the general conditions for its realization. 
99 
CHAPTER I I I 
INTERNAL DEMOCRACY IN THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE ACTION GROUP 
COMMENTARY: This chapter is mostly about interests, communications and 
power relations and how they are related to the question of internal 
democracy. The reasons for this agenda are as follows: in the discussion 
in Chapter II it was argued that the FPSC is the principle that social 
agents would agree to under various conditions and we noted that more 
needs saying concerning rationality and the conditions of deliberation; 
in this chapter we address these concerns in terms of the processes of 
communication and the power relations among the members of the TAG. 
During these arguments we establish the intimate connection between internal 
democracy in terms of communication processes and power relations and the 
realization of the individual and common interests of the members. In 
this discussion we begin to address the question, '~hat are defensible 
institutional structures for dealing with power relations in society?" 
The other but related concern of the chapter is the articulation of 
strategic principles for social transformation. What kinds of people in 
what kinds of setting can accomplish democratic social transformation? 
What kinds of strategies are legitimate? For example, is it right to 
use undemocratic means to democratic ends? Or does 'democratic social 
transformation' imply democratic means? In this usage 'strategy' has a 
philosophical application. We are concerned with principles, indeed with 
principles grounded in man's good; but because we are concerned with a 
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dynamic rather than static conception of social justice we need, at 
times, to elaborate social justice in terms of strategic principles 
rather than static formulations. 
14. The trans formative action group 
FACILITATOR: In this chapter our primary concern is with the appropriate 
principles for operating a TAG. 
PRECISE: What kind of an organization is a TAG? 
TELEOLOGIST: Provisionally it could be a political party, a labour 
union, a co-operative, a church, a transnational organization, 
a local or regional chapter of a national organization, a discussion 
group, a neighbourhood association, etc. Generally a TAG provides 
for face-to-face deliberations among its members. 
The central purpose that defines a group as a TAG is the 
commitment to democratic social transformation. Because of the 
pervasive effects of the basic structure of society and the way 
it distributes categorial power among individuals one basic task 
of the TAG is the alteration of categorial power relations in the 
wider society in accordance with the FPSO. I believe this task 
has been adequately justified in Chapter II but what about the 
other basic task of fostering the good of the members in the here 
and now? Olearly this task has something to do with internal 
democracy because 'democracy' refers to social relations which are 
designed to give equal consideration to the good of all members. 
How is the second task related to the first? Is it necessary 
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for the TAG to conduct its internal operations democratically to 
accomplish its first task? Or, alternatively, can an undemocratic TAG 
help to bring about a democratic transformation of society as a whole? 
Secondly, is it possible for a TAG to operate democratically 
when its members belong to an undemocratic society? If so under 
what conditions? These are fundamental questions because the subse-
quent course of our inquiry and even whether there is any point in 
continuing depend upon the answers. 
ACTION-~~N: I do not know whether internal democracy in the TAG is 
necessary for the democratic alteration of categorial power relations 
in society but clearly the two tasks are related because the TAG is 
a part of the wider society and to the extent that the TAG becomes 
more democratic the society as a whole becomes more democratic, other 
factors being equal. 
HEART: It is apparent that only a democratic TAG can advance the FPSC 
in the wider society. I-self requires congruence between her word, 
thought and action. Anyone who commits herself to our first mission 
will give a major proportion of the time of her life to that calling. 
Additionally she faces risks of hardship, discrimination, hurt or 
even death. If she is really committed to democracy, i.e. to the 
FPSC, and not to the pursuit of privileged power or some fantasy 
then democracy must be terribly important and immensely valuable 
to her. It is inconceivable that a group of persons who so cherished 
democracy would not insist on democratic relations with each other. 
SOLIDARITY: Oh how I wish that it were so simple! I would like to believe 
that our TAG could be democratic and still succeed in our first 
mission but we have seen that the fundamental structure of society 
and the categorial power relations which that social structure 
embodies determine our possibilities of existence. We can never have 
a democratic society until we change the existing categorial power 
relations and we cannot change categorial power relations 
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democratically. The rich and powerful will never agree to it while 
the poor and weak lack the power and the understanding to transform 
society through democratic processes. If, in the future, the 
dominated classes were ever on the verge of asserting themselves 
you can be sure their oppressors would use force, violence and terror 
to hold them down. It seems to me that only a disciplined, task-
orientated and dedicated political organization could in fact carry 
out such a task. While our TAG should have certain democratic 
features such as majority decision procedures, certain freedoms 
would have to be constrained in the interests of discipline and 
single-minded attention to the mission. Now it not only appears that 
there is no necessity for a TAG to be fully democratic in its internal 
functioning but that there is no way for it to succeed unless it 
rejects certain attributes of internal democracy in the interests 
of the primary mission. 
PRECISE: Both Heart and Solidarity make a good deal of sense but I am 
not sure that they each mean the same thing by 'democracy'. How 
can we decide the question until we are clearer concerning the 
meaning of 'internal democracy'? 
LIBERAL. I think that our previous discussions have implied what a 
democratic TAG is. 
In so far as it is a miniature society and to whatever extent 
it can, a democratic TAG conducts its own affairs in accordance with 
the FPSC. All members of the TAG are accorded equal respect and 
receive equal consideration regarding their good. Their interactions 
and policy discussions are conducted on the basis of symmetrical 
relations of social power. It follows that members of a democratic 
TAG will evaluate alternative policy proposals on their merits and 
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not on a presumption that some members have a privileged or expert 
access to the truth or to worthwhile political insights. 
SOLIDARITY: I agree with that as far as it goes but it seems to me that 
'democracy' means more than that. Ordinarily we think of all sorts 
of freedoms and rights to dissent that would not be workable. 
There are two specific points you have not mentioned and I want to 
be clear on whether they are or are not included before I can decide 
whether I support internal democracy or whether internal democracy 
is required to carry out successfully the first mission. Who is 
entitled to join the TAG? For example, are fascists, aristocrats, 
capitalists and, in general, persons who do not support the FPSC 
allowed to join the TAG? Secondly, what disciplinary powers does 
a democratic TAG have with respect to individuals who may disregard 
majority decisions or undermine the primary task? 
LIBERAL: Solidarity has drawn a serious omission to our attention. In 
section 11 we discussed and agreed to principles concerning a sphere 
of social justice and it seems clear that our democratic TAG must 
embody rules and procedures, determined by the members, administered 
impartially and backed by sanctions including the power to expel a 
member. I do not believe that we established guidelines to ensure 
that this institutional sphere does not get out of hand and threaten 
our fraternity. In principle however a democratic TAG would be 
capable of disciplining its members. My views concerning membership 
are that no one should be compelled to join but I am uncomfortable 
about refusing membership to persons on the basis of their background, 
social position or beliefs. 
Also while a TAG has two basic tasks I do not agree that the 
alteration of categorial power relations, etc., has any sort of 
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precedence over the immediate good and interests of the members. 
Therefore Solidarity's expression "primary task" is contrary to our 
understanding of the purpose of a TAG. 
SOLIDARITY: I agree with Liberal concerning the need for a formal system 
of rules and sanctions and that satisfies my concern about discipline. 
I am not satisfied with our development of the issue of membership, 
which requires discussion. Liberal is correct concerning his last 
point: it is true that as a group we have not established a preference 
order for the two tasks of a TAG. However I argue that the first 
should be preferred to the second and my opening statement provides 
reasons in support of this position. 
FACILITATOR: It seems that we have come to at least a provisional under-
standing of linternal democracyl. We will be in a better position to 
address the issue of a preference order between the two tasks after 
we have completed our discussion of the two questions on our agenda 
for this session. 
PRECISE: Now that we have a definition of linternal democracy' where do 
we stand on the substantive issue? Solidarity seems content with 
running a TAG according to our agreed conception of internal democracy 
(Solidarity nods assent) but no one has answered her point that in 
fact an undemocratic TAG could advance a democratic transformation 
of categorial power relations. Not that I agree with this but I 
have heard no answer to her argument. 
SCHOLAR: The strongest point in Solidarity's argument is that a TAG must 
be disciplined, dedicated and task-orientated. All this is consistent 
with internal democracy. But there is another condition that study 
of politics teaches us is also required - the TAG must not become 
corrupted! If we pick up on Solidarity's scenario of a transformation 
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of categorial power relations in accordance with the FPSC but 
implemented dictatorially then we will see that this logical possi-
bility is inconceivable in fact. Presumably the TAG would at some 
stage participate in a dictatorship over a broad sector of society -
how else could it dictatorially alter categorial power relations? 
But ex hypothesi the power figures in the dictatorship have the 
categorial power. One cannot have the power to alter categorial 
power relations without having categorial power. The power figures 
in the dictatorship dominate other persons in terms of categorial 
power, which is contrary to the FPSC. 
The successful conduct of this vanguard strategy depends on 
the wisdom and benevolence of the power figures. Both Locke and 
Rousseau have shown the folly of this policy. When rulers have 
interests separate from the people we have, on the face of it, 
conditions contrary to the FPSC and when rulers exercise power 
without accountability to the people they inevitably come to have 
separate interests and to abuse their power. As Rousseau argues, 
by attempting to retain their power in perpetuity, " ••• all the 
governments of the world, once armed with the public force, sooner 
. 1 
or later usurp the public author~tyll. The long sad history of 
government should alert us to the probability that the asymmetries 
of dictatorial power are deeply corrupting. Not only do we have 
the arguments of Locke and Rousseau but we need only follow through 
our own discussions to see that we cannot rely on the benevolence of 
dictators. 2 
Solidarity's argument requires that a TAG participate in a 
dictatorship over a society without becoming corrupted by its 
dominant power position. This is most unlikely but when you allow 
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the TAG itself to be undemocratic in its internal operation then 
there is no hope of avoiding corruption. The absence of internal 
democracy within the TAG means the failure to provide the conditions 
for authentic existence even of the power figures who, if they do 
not succumb to cynicism, will deceive themselves that they are 
acting in the common good when they in fact pursue private or 
sectoral interests. Even if they remain committed to the democratic 
ideal the power figures in their inauthentic being will be unable to 
imagine and plan what the democratic vision calls for. 
Even if Locke, Rousseau and so many others are wrong about the 
inevitable tendency toward corruption of the power figures there is 
still the problem that the process of social transformation is being 
carried out without the autonomous participation of most of the 
citizens and many of the members of the TAG. We have already 
demonstrated the close connection between autonomy and authenticity. 
Our FPSC requires that each I-self should have the right to autonomous 
participation in the process of social transformation. 
HEART: I want to support everything Scholar has said. We have agreed 
that part of I-self's good is her autonomous participation in the 
process of social transformation and therefore there must be internal 
democracy (in the TAG) to ensure her autonomous participation. 
Presumably Solidarity is concerned with some special, one-shot 
situation (although I think she is treading on thin ice even to 
contemplate such a deviation from democratic principles). We all 
agree, however, that because our aim is to make the processes of 
social transformation democratically determined the internal processes 
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of the TAG must be democratic. This is the general principle - any 
exceptions to it will need justification in terms of special circumstances. 
PRECISE: I am satisfied that we have answered the first question - at 
least for now but I find we have been tossing around references to 
"interests" and I am not sure that we have any precise idea of the 
meaning of this term which nevertheless played a big part in 
Scholar's argument. 
FACILITATOR: Internal democracy within the TAG is necessary and this 
follows from our argument that democratic ends can only be achieved 
through democratic means. In the discussion our arguments have been 
partly based on conceptual analysis and partly on empirical generali-
zations. It is a conceptual fact that the imposition of any change 
in the basic social structure involves unequal categorial power whereas 
it is a long established empirical fact regarding the responses of 
human beings to asymmetries in power relations that those in a 
dominating position generally do not ever voluntarily relinquish 
their power - and yet conceptually they must relinquish their advantage 
in categorial power to achieve a democratic society; furthermore, we 
can have no confidence that a particular social vision shared by the 
power figures - even the grandest utopia or most inspiring conception 
of justice - exempts them from this corruption of dominating power. 
In our next session we can address Precise's concern regarding 
'interests' • 
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15. I-self's interest 
CO~rnENTARY: At a subsequent meeting the TAG has discussed their agenda 
and have concluded that, because the internal operations of a TAG must be 
democratic, if it turns out that it is impossible for a TAG to operate 
democratically when its members belong to an undemocratic society, the 
only rational alternative would be either to reformulate the purpose and 
mission of the TAG or to disband. However, before directly addressing 
the question of whether or under what conditions it is indeed possible 
for a TAG embedded within an undemocratic society to operate democratically 
they agree that they need a more adequate understanding of internal 
democracy and the conditions required for a democratic TAG. They believe 
that an analysis of interests would be relevant to their understanding of 
internal democracy. 
FACILITATOR: We have set our agenda for this session on a single concern 
the analysis of I-self's interest. I k-~ow that several of you have 
done some research on this. Liberal, for one, has an analysis he 
would like to share with us. 
LIBERAL: Thank you, Facilitator. I really do not have anything original 
but I think Brian Barry's analysis is a good starting point and may 
help us in understanding the logical structure of a statement of the 
form "x is in A's interest ll • Barry points out that 'x' is a policy 
3 
and not an outcome or consequence. While it would be conceptually 
(although not necessarily factually) correct to say, "Compulsory 
conscription is not in A's interest" it would be incorrect to say, 
"Getting killed is against A's interest". A policy is the result 
of deliberation and decision - I think this is especially clear in 
a political context. Policies can be expressed by resolutions, laws, 
regulations or, I suppose, by regular social practices, whether or 
not they have been codified. The point is that a policy can be made 
or altered by political deliberation. In our context 'A' represents 
a particular I-self. 
Barry's formulation alerts us to the distinction between what 
I-self wants and a policy, rule or regulation which is a means to 
what she wants or which increases her opportunities to get what she 
wants. 
TELEOLOGIST: I find your analysis helpful and I agree with it up to the 
point where you mention 'wants'. While many people would have no 
objection to this want formulation does not our commitment to I-self's 
good suggest relating interests to what is good for A rather than 
what A wants? Pat White, for example, disagrees with Barry that 
what is in a person's interests can be defined purely in terms of 
wants. She argues for a welfare rather than want basis and accord-
ingly writes, "x is in A's interest if it is a means to something 
which is good for A, or which he ought to have". 4 While Barry is 
correct in classifying 'x' as a policy, White is correct in saying 
'x' makes a reference toward what is good for A rather than what A 
happens to want. Although what A wants and what is good for her may 
frequently coincide we need to be clear that in the case of a 
difference it is the "good notion" which prevails. 
LIBERAL: My concern with Teleologist's position is its authoritarian 
implication. Surely we reject experts overruling a particular person 
concerning what is good for her and it looks like that is a real 
possibility if we replace Barry's want basis for interests with 
White's welfare concept. 
SCHOLAR: First we should find out if there is an actual difference between 
Teleologist and Liberal here. Teleologist argues for a good basis 
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but we have already agreed that the good for I-self is not some 
essence separate from her predicament and her project but what she 
herself would want when, as an autonomous agent, she reflects 
critically, authentically and deeply on her circumstances. 
While I prefer the "good" rather than "want" formulation 
because 'wants' is generally associated with quite immediate urges 
and desires and does not necessarily involve the qualification of 
critical reflexion and transparent understanding, if I understand 
Liberal correctly there is no fundamental disagreement here. 
LIBERAL: I thank Scholar for clearing up my concerns about authoritarianism. 
I agree that we should use the conception based on I-self's good 
rather than her wants. There is also another point which Barry 
makes and I think it stands up even after our substitution of a 
conception of good for a want notion. He argues that the statement 
!Ix is in A's interest is necessarily comparative" .••. But if you ask 
whether a certain policy would be in someone's interest (etc.) this 
does require expansion into 'Is this policy more in his interests 
than that policy?' 'Being in someone's interests' is at least a 
t . d" 1 t" b t d tIt t 1" ,5 rla lC re a lon e ween a person an a eas wo po lCles. 
Therefore we might find that x is in A's interest with respect to 
policy y but not with respect to policy z. This simply means that 
x is a better means to what is good for A than y is although z is 
better than x. 
TELEOLOGIST: There is one additional point I would like to add to what 
Liberal has said. It may seem obvious but often the obvio~s gets 
missed. It follows from our analysis that, in so far as she can, 
and other things being equal, a person ought to choose policies in 
her interests. If x is a better means than y to what is good for 
A then she should choose x over y. By 'ought' I simply mean action 
in accordance with what is good. By 'other things being equal' I 
refer to a situation where x and yare equal concerning their effects 
on other persons or other areas of care. My point here is that the 
idea of I-self's interest has normative force; it points to grotL~ds 
for a choice. 
FACILITATOR: By the nodding of heads I see that we have reached closure 
on the analysis of I-self's interests. 
16. Common interest 
COMMENTARY: Just as the SET previously moved from consideration of 
I-self's good to the FPSC, i.e. from the individual to the social perspec-
tive, they now address common interests. This is a part of their plan to 
complete the analysis of internal democracy before addressing the question 
of whether internal democracy is possible within a TAG embedded in a 
society with an unjust or incompletely democratic basic structure. 
LIBERAL: With some misgivings arising from the want rather than good 
basis of his analysis I refer you to Barry's study again. I like 
his idea of simplifying the discussion by starting it with reference 
to two individuals. After analysing what we mean by a statement of 
the form "A and B have a common interest in x" or alternatively 
llX is a common interest of A and B" we should be able to generalize 
to the common interest of a TAG. 
Barry writes, 
To say that two people have a common interest is to say 
that there are two policies x and y such that each of 
them prefers x to y from the point of view of his own 
interest. On this definition it is safe to say that 
any two people have a common interest as between ~ 
two policies and any two people have a divergent 
interest as between ~ two policies; ... 6 
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Rejecting as we do Barry's want formulation we could say that, 
lI ••• such that x is better for each of them than yll. 
SOLIDARITY: You have good cause for your misgivings. By simply replacing 
wants or preferences by I-self's good we cannot overcome the excessive 
individualism in Barry's formulation. Also the resulting formulation 
lacks the normative force that is a feature of I-self's interest. 
LIBERAL: Could you explain your point about normative force? Are you 
saying that, "If x is the best means to the good of each of A and B 
there is no presumption that they ought to choose x"? 
SOLIDARITY: No, I agree with you that if x were the best means to the 
good of A and B then A and B ought to choose policy x. However my 
concern is that there will be relatively few instances of common 
interests on this formulation. Assume, for example, that there are 
six alternative policies Cu, v, w, x, y, z] under consideration by 
A and B. The descending rank order of these policies in promoting 
A's good is u, v, w, x, y, z whereas for B's good it is z, v, y, x, 
w, u. Hence there is no policy which is the best for each of them. 
While v is the second best for each it does not qualify as a common 
interest on the amended version of Barry's analysis. Generally, 
according to this view, as the number of individuals and of alter-
native policies increase the chance of finding a common interest 
decreases towards zero. Hence there is no normative force to such 
a conception of common interest because the concept is either 
inapplicable or redundant. Where x is the best means to the good 
of A and also the best means to the good of B then A and B just 
happen to choose x and the idea of 'common interest' is otiose. 
PRECISE: Your objections are well taken, Solidarity. Now, what positive 
suggestions do you have? 
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SOLIDARITY: Provisionally I suggest that !Ix is a common interest of 
A and Bn means that policy x is the best means to the good of A 
and B "taken together". Let me elaborate on my admittedly vague 
expression Iltaken together". Our conception of 'democracy' involves 
the identification and pursuit of policies that advance the good of 
each I-self. We see each I-self as equally entitled to consideration 
of her good. Does this not imply that in evaluating alternative 
policies we ought to choose the one that treats the good of each 
I-self as equally worthy? Since we agreed that the concept of common 
interests should have normative force we want to build the ideas of 
equal consideration and impartiality into our definition of common 
interests. 
Just for the sake of the argument assume that in our example 
of the six policies v is the best means to the good of A and B 
ntaken together ll • On Liberal's amended version of Barry's analysis 
v is not a common interest and A and B are not obligated to select v 
but on a democratic conception A and B have a prima facie obligation 
to choose v which is their common interest. 
PRECISE: That elaboration makes your position much clearer to me, 
Solidarity, and I could support it myself if I could be assured of 
two things: 
(1) that we can derive practical operational guidelines for the 
conduct of a TAG from your proposed analysis; 
(2) that there are no authoritarian consequences. 
Specifically. who has the authority to determine which policy 
is the best means to the good of A and B lItaken together"? 
SOLIDARITY: We certainly want to avoid authoritarianism. If A and B 
together decide and if their decision processes are rational and 
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impartial then there should be no problem with authoritarianism. 
However I do not want to suggest that any policy a TAG determines 
will necessarily be in their common interest. Often, for whatever 
sorts of reasons, an association of I-selves fails to act in accord-
ance with its common interest. While I do not see any external 
"authority" sitting in judgment of a TAG's deliberations, the members 
of the TAG have a criterion that serves as one of the fundamental 
grounds of their reflexive monitoring of their actions and choices -
namely, "Have we determined the policy which is the best means to 
the good of all members taken together?". 
Our formulation of common interest has normative force, is not 
authoritarian and has practical application to the conduct of a TAG. 
TELEOLOGIST: I think we have reached a very significant point in our 
deliberations. It is apparent that any system of morality presupposes 
responsible agency but until now we have not given any content to a 
democratic conception of morality. Now, through our analyses of 
I-self, responsibility, authenticity, autonomy, social co-operation, 
etc. we have given some content to a democratic morality, i.e. we 
have established obligations for I-self. 
FACILITATOR: Yes, we have made a great deal of progress in this session. 
Might we not achieve an even more useful understanding if we follow 
up on Precise's question about making the determination of common 
interests operational? This part of Solidarity's answer can be 
improved. Solidarity has said that her formulation of common interests 
provides a criterion for the reflexive monitoring engaged in by the 
members and this is true. However the criterion is very general and 
I understand Precise to be requesting more specific criteria that 
could serve as indicators for the general criterion of the policy 
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"which is the best means to the good of all members taken together". 
We need an elaboration on 'taken together'. How would a TAG know 
whether or not it had found and chosen the common interest? If a 
TAG fails to act on its common interest has it necessarily operated 
undemocratically? Is it always, in principle, possible to find a 
common interest policy to choose? 
Reference was made to "rational" and "impartial" decision 
processes and while the latter is clear enough from the context, we 
need more elaboration of 'rational decision processes'. Does 
'rational' simply mean processes which result in the common interest 
being chosen, in which case it is redundant, or does it refer to some 
criteria governing the processes of deliberation? 
HEART: Thanks to Facilitator's questions and the analyses of Liberal 
and Solidarity I can see a lot of things coming together. Precise 
and Facilitator have asked for criteria. What sort of criteria would 
serve? Our general principle and the foundation of our democratic 
morality is teleological, i.e. based on our conception of I-self's 
good but what procedures can we use to know whether or to what extent 
we have succeeded in acting in accordance with this principle? 
The criteria for judging whether a TAG has pursued, found and 
chosen its common interest will be indications in one way or another 
of the quality of the interactions, interpersonal relations and 
communications processes within the group. Whereas Barry's want 
formulation and utilitarian ethics in general treat the wants, 
preferences and good of an individual as simply given our analysis 
portrays I-self as constantly reassessing her good and struggling to 
discover it. Every act of critical reflexion is a re-evaluation or 
re-discovery or perhaps even reconstruction of I-self's good. To 
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change the transparency of our reflexive monitoring is to change our 
conception of our good which is to change ourselves and our good. 
Although Solidarity's example of the six policies was illuminating 
it presented the policies as givens for A and B to choose from. It was 
almost as if the policies had an existence independent of the agents 
who conceived them. In fact policies are created, refined and 
modified by persons engaged in political deliberation. Once the 
members of a TAG enter into democratic dialogue to find their common 
interest there are no pre-given policies from which they must choose 
and there is no fixed relationship of a policy to a particular I-self's 
good which is independent of the process of deliberation. We must not 
forget that the members of the TAG are transformed - their character, 
their purposes, their good and their interests are changed in the 
process of democratic deliberation. In principle, i.e. neglecting 
time constraints and imperfections in their characters and communica-
tion skills, they need not settle for mere com~omises and bargained 
solutions: they can emerge from their dialogues with the conviction 
that they have indeed made the best decision possible. Even under 
less than ideal conditions they can share the conviction not only 
that a just decision was reached but that they have participated in 
a mutually beneficial process of self-development and authentic 
being-with-one-another. When this occurs there is no real difference 
between the policy which is best "for each!! of the members and that 
which is best for the members IItaken togetherll because their 
deliberation has transcended such a distinction. 
Crucial to our self understanding is the authenticity of our 
being-with-one-another. 7 When a TAG carries out its policy delibera-
tions in a fashion in which all members have an authentic being-with-
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one-another they have grounds to believe that they will create and 
grasp their common interest. 
What kinds of conditions support authentic being-with-one-another? 
In the most basic sense these are the conditions for truth seeking and 
fraternity; they are concerned with openness, honesty, mutual regard 
and trust. The connection of openness and honesty to truth seeking 
should be obvious but both are undermined if people are punished for 
the open and honest expression of views unpalatable to their punishers. 
Hence mutual regard and trust which are obviously connected to 
fraternity are also required to provide the security for openness 
and honesty. This is basically why I argue that the criteria we are 
seeking are concerned with interpersonal relations, communications 
and the context of the interaction among the members of the TAG. 
The questions the members of the TAG can put to themselves are: 
(1) Do I trust the other members of the TAG? 
(2) Do they trust me? 
\3) Am I open and honest in our deliberations? (If not, why not?) 
(4) Are others open and honest? (If not, why not?) 
(5) Do I feel that I have the respect of the others? 
(6) Do I respect the other members? 
(7) AmI concerned for the good of the other members? 
(8) Are others concerned for my good? 
FACILITATOR: The common interests of a TAG are the policies that represent 
equal consideration of each member's good. Common interests can only 
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be ascertained through a process of political deliberation and because 
there is no essence of I-self's good standing independently of her own 
critical reflexion the test for whether a TAG has or has not found its 
common interest must be nrocedural, i.e. in terms of the power relations, 
interpersonal relations and communications processes in the TAG. 
These have been articulated in terms of symmetrical power relations, 
authentic being-among-one~another and open, honest, undistorted, 
rational, etc., communications. And these procedural conditions 
define 'internal democracy'. 
PRECISE: I agree with the general approach being taken but I think our 
discussion of communicationa has been too sketchy. 
FACILITATOR: Then let us address communications and the conditions for 
democratic discourse at our next session. 
17. Communicative action 
COMMENTARY: Scholar initiates this session by comparing Heart's analysis 
to JUrgen Habermas study of communicative action. 8 We join Scholar in his 
presentation. 
SCHOLAR: Perhaps Habermas can give us a general perspective on these 
issues. In a chapter entitled "What Is Universal Pragmatics" he 
explores the general presuppositions of communicative action. For 
Habermas action aimed at reaching understanding is the most funda-
mental form of social action and strategic action such as conflict 
and competition are derived from this fundamental form. 9 
Habermas argues, " ••• that anyone acting communicatively must, 
in performing any speech action, raise universal validity claims 
and suppose that they can be vindicated ... ". He goes on to list 
four validity claims that any speaker cannot avoid raising: 
(1) intelligibility, i.e. the speaker must choose a comprehensible 
expression so that speaker and hearer can understand one another; 
(2) truth, i.e. the propositional content can be demonstrated to be 
true so the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker; 
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(3) sincerity, i.e. the speaker wants to express his intentions 
truthfully so the hearer can trust him; 
(4) rightness, i.e. the utterance is made with respect to a recog-
nized normative background so that the speaker and hearer can 
agree with one another. lO 
He writes, 
The goal of coming to an understanding (Verstgndigung) is to 
bring about an agreement (Einverstgndnis) that terminates 
in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understand-
ing, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one 
another. 11 
For Habermas, who sees the task of universal pragmatics as lito 
identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understand-
ing", the four validity claims are these universal conditions. 12 
Although Heart has a different purpose, namely to establish the 
communicative conditions for internal democracy within the TAG, it 
may be helpful to compare his analysis with Habermas'. Habermas 
mentions 'intelligibility' while Heart does not. No doubt Heart has 
presupposed the intelligibility condition which in a way is Habermas' 
point but we should make explicit mention of the intelligibility 
condition because we can readily imagine circumstances in which this 
condition is violated, e.g., if members lack a common language or if 
specialized jargon is used to befuddle, confuse or mystify. Habermas' 
sincerity criterion corresponds more or less to Heart's 'openness', 
'honesty' and 'trust', while 'rightness', i.e. the mutual recognition 
of a normative background is the general formulation which in our 
conception of a democratic TAG is manifested in the belief in the 
FPSC, the associated positions respecting authenticity, responsibility 
and autonomy and the specific criteria for discourse which Heart 
articulated. They have each stressed the importance of truth seeking. 
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Habermas has expressed the conditions for communication to occur 
whereas Heart has provided an elaboration of the normative background 
constitutive of internal democracy. 
Moreover Habermas points out the possibilities arising when the 
conditions for mutual understanding are lacking. These claims mayor 
may not be met and may be realized to different degrees. 
The typical states are in gray areas in between: on the 
one hand, incomprehension and misunderstanding, inten-
tional and involuntary untruthfulness, concealed and 
open discord; and, on the other, pre-existing or achieved 
consensus. Coming to an understanding is the process of 
bringing about an agreement on the presupposed basis of 
validity claims that can be mutually recognized. In 
everyday life we start from a background consensus per-
taining to those interpretations taken for granted 
among the participants. As soon as this consensus is 
shaken, and the presupposition that certain validity 
claims are satisfied (or could be vindicated) is sus-
pended, the task of mutual interpretation is to achieve 
a new definition of the situation which all participants 
can share. If their attempt fails, communicative action 
cannot be continued. One is then basically confronted 
with the alternatives of switching to strategic action, 
breaking off communication altogether, or recommencing 
action oriented to reaching understanding at a different 
level, the level of argumentative speech (for purposes 
of discursively examining the problematic validity 
claims which are now regarded as hypothetical).13 
Based on Habermas! analysis we can distinguish four alternative 
states for a TAG: 
(1) communicative action directed to mutual understanding; 
(2) argumentative speech used by members seeking understanding 
at another level after one or more of the validity claims has 
14 been challenged; 
(3) strategic action which is action directed to attaining the aims 
of a sub group of the TAG without mutual understanding of all 
members of the TAG; 
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(4) the breakdown of communication altogether, i.e. the end of the TAG. 
Heart captured the essence of the conditions for internal 
democracy as truth-seeking and fraternity. In practical terms the 
above analysis points to the need for communication skills to 
address (2) above but it also points to strategic action as the 
key indicator of an undemocratic TAG. 
ACTION-MAN: Would you please explain, briefly? 
SCHOLAR: In brief I am saying: 
(1) Strategic action is incompatible with authentic being-with-one-
another. Why? For all sorts of reasons but principally when 
I-selves fail to pursue mutual understanding they treat at 
least some members of the TAG instrumentally, i.e. as ready-
to-hand rather than as co-agents. 
(2) Authentic being-with-one-another is both a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for a TAG to construct and grasp its common 
interest. Why necessary? Because our conception of I-self's 
good involves authentic self-transformation.15 This in turn 
requires all members of the TAG to meet together, at times, and 
to engage in critical reflexion on their common predicament. 16 
This follows from our belief that no one can "know" a particular 
I-self's interest unless that particular I-self engages in 
critical reflexion; that I-self's interest is subject to the 
possibility of rapid change; and that interests have no existence 
independently of deliberative activity. Authentic being-with-one-
another fosters communal critical reflexion and communal critical 
reflection is in turn required for the highest degree of 
authenticity and resoluteness. 17 Only if individual and common 
interests are brought into harmony can individuals within a 
group achieve the greatest possible authenticity in their 
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projects. (This is a conceptual point.) 
Why sufficient? Because when the members have an 
authentic being-among-one-another their reflexive monitoring 
"lii11 become ever more transparent. Assuming that the TAG 
continues its activities over a long period of time then the 
members of the TAG will come increasingly close to realizing 
their common interest. lS 
(3) Therefore strategic action is contrary to the TAG achieving 
internal democracy. 
LIBERAL: I would like to hear more about strategic action and why it is 
so threatening to internal democracy but my concern about Scholar's 
argument concerning aQthentic being-with-one-another is that this 
position may have totalitarian consequences in that limitations on 
the scope or openness of the communications within the TAG are por-
trayed as undemocratic. I would not want us to take the view that 
there is to be only a single TAG and that members shall have no 
secrets from the TAG. 
FACILITATOR: Scholar has given us a lot to think about. I wonder if 
we should pursue this matter of strategic action as Liberal suggests 
and return to the concerns about the possibilities of totalitarianism 
at a later point. 
SCHOLAR: Note 2 to Habermas' "What Is Universal Pragmatics l1 distinguishes 
. t· t· d t t· t· 19 communlca lve ac lon an s ra eglc ac lone Within the category of 
strategic action he distinguishes 'openly strategic action', which 
I assume would include open conflict or competition from 'latently 
strategic action'; latently strategic action is subdivided into 
'manipulation' and 'systematically distorted communication'. 
He writes, 
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Whereas in systematically distorted communication at least 
one of the participants deceives himself about the fact 
that the basis of consensual action is only apparently 
being maintained, the manipulator deceives at least one 
of the other participants about his own strategic 
attitude, in which he deliberately behaves in a pseudo-
consensual manner. 20 
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ACTION-MAN: So in practical terms we are concerned about manipulation and 
systematically distorted communication because conflict or competition 
would be easy to detect and obviously contrary to the purpose of the 
TAG. 
SCHOLAR: Yes you may be right that we should focus on manipulation and 
systematically distorted communication although it is not apparent 
to me that competition or conflict is contrary, per se, to the first 
task of the TAG because there may be genuine disagreement over how 
to achieve an alteration in categorial power relations in the wider 
society in accordance with the FPSC. 
FACILITATOR: We did agree to assume no external constraints on the TAG 
as it pursues its second task. Perhaps we should agree to leave 
the problem of competition and conflict until we address the first 
task. 
PRECISE: Certainly we do not want to discuss the problem of the genesis 
of competition and conflict nor the issue of whether they are or 
are not avoidable at this stage. However we need to be clear about 
whether they are incompatible with internal democracy and if so what 
kinds of behaviour would be instances of competition and conflict. 
Therefore I do think we need to address conflict and competition 
with this limited focus. 
TELEOLOGIST: It seems to me that we can distinguish two kinds of conflict, 
a fundamental difference of view concerning the good and who is 
entitled to the good versus the question of the proper means to 
that good. To those who share our democratic conception of the 
good there is no question of strategic action which treats their 
fellows as either of no account or as mere means - this is contrary 
to the FPSC and is simply not on. However, because the second sort 
of conflict is always a possibility and is often unavoidable we need 
to have democratic means for resolving conflicts. I think people 
can disagree and can exercise power in support of their positions 
without treating others as of no account or as instruments in their 
strategic action. Perhaps Scholar has mixed two senses of strategic 
action - one in which there are all the suggestions of war and of 
planned trickery and the other as an umbrella category including 
conflict, competition, manipulation etc. 
I will forego an analysis of competition although the general 
distinction in this context is that 'conflict' involves struggle over 
what is to be done and 'competition' over who is to do it. For 
example, if two members contest a leadership position within a TAG, 
that is 'competition' whereas if they advocate different policies 
that is 'conflict'. It is easy to see how the two ideas become 
tangled in practice. Competition can be bad when it is intended to 
or results in one person's good being sacrificed to another's. 
Whether competition has harmful consequences depends on circumstances. 
I think it best, to avoid confusion, if we define 'strategic 
action' as action which is intended to treat other persons either 
as instruments or as of no account, i.e. not as co-agents. Accord-
ingly, only certain sorts of conflict and competition would be 
instances of strategic action. 
SCHOLAR: I accept your points and your suggestion. 
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ACTION-~L~: Yes, I am satisfied concerning conflict and competition. 
We need to get at intentions and also the openness of relations. 
Where conflict or competition is open and "above the board ll it can 
be examined and the agents confronted concerning intentions and 
consequences. However, by definition, 'manipulation' is an instance 
of strategic action (according to Teleologist) and, on Scholar's 
argument, contrary to internal democracy. It seems strange to 
classify systematically distorted communication as strategic action 
in that intention is not present. Anyway, 'systematically distorted 
communication' does not seem to tell us anything more than that there 
are members who do not understand their own circumstances and projects -
how else could they deceive themselves? 
PFEClSE: There are three points related to the analyses of Heart and 
Scholar that need mention. 
Before making these points I think we should note that another 
way of looking at undistorted communication is in terms of rationality, 
i.e. that distorted communication implies that relevant information is 
withheld or incorrect information used in the discussions of the TAG 
which subverts the rationality of the deliberation. However democracy 
has long been characterized as a method of settling issues through 
discussion and has presupposed the virtues of truth telling and 
t o lOt 21 ra ~ona ~ y. 
Now to the three points: 
(1) The representation of third party interests; 
Our analysis of interests has shown that A's overall interest 
t b t o d lAo 0 t 0 1 fl 0 22 canno e ascer a~ne un ess engages ~n cr~ ~Ca re ex~on. 
This raises a problem whenever a TAG tries to represent the interests 
of third parties. For example, if B is trying to represent A's 
interest in a TAG of which A is not a member there is a danger of 
distorted communication: B is caught between twin dangers - either 
sacrificing A's interest, or introducing distortions into the 
deliberation because B is unable to put A's interest into the dis-
cussion (in so far as it might reflect unique or special features 
of A's good) for the critical reflexion of the TAG. A's good will 
tend to be articulated as a fixed, concrete thing rather than as a 
constantly changing possibility revealed through her critical 
reflexion. It may well be possible to overcome or at least mollify 
these distortions but I think you can see that this is a matter of 
extreme importance for democratic theory. For example, the practice 
of binding delegates to a convention or legislature to vote for 
positions determined by their constituents, while motivated by the 
desire to uphold the interests of third parties, so severely distorts 
the communications at the convention as to render deliberation at 
that level impossible. 
\2) factions or caucus groups within the TAG; 
Rousseau has warned us of the dangers of factions and partial 
associations within a community,23 and yet liberal democrats have 
stressed freedom of association. However, if there are factions 
or caucus groups within the TAG, who deliberate in partial associ-
ations with a view to getting the TAG to take a particular policy, 
then we have strategic action and a violation of internal democracy. 
This is especially clear when the deliberations are secret. 
LIBERAL: Please excuse me for interrupting, Precise. While it is true 
that secret deliberations are prima facie evidence of manipulation 
and hence are undemocratic it is not necessarily the Case that 
meetings of sub-associations are undemocratic. The key consideration, 
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and this is illustrated by your example of binding delegates, is 
whether the sub-association precommits its members to a certain 
course of action prior to the deliberation of the TAG. If the members 
are precommitted to a particular policy or COurse of action the 
communications will be distorted in one way or another and the TAG 
no longer able to pursue the common interest. 
PRECISE: Thank you for clarifying that point, Liberal. It leads very 
nicely into my third point concerning 
(3) dissent, discipline and punishment. 
We have already agreed on the need for formal rules backed by 
coercive sanctions but we need to consider some conditions concern-
ing sanctions. I am sure you can see that the use of sanctions 
without the normal safeguards of procedural justice would tend to 
distort communications; more specifically there must be impartial 
hearings, laying of charges, right of the defendant to be present, 
to have access to all charges and evidence, to be represented by 
counsel, to cross-examine the evidence, etc. No democratic TAG 
would have rump groups administering sanctions or ostracizing 
members. Attention should also be given to ensuring, so far as 
possible, an equality among members with respect to the power to 
dissent or to coerce or punish others. 
Furthermore. although the TAG reqUires the power to compel the 
compliance of members to act in accordance with rules those members 
have made it ought never to use sanctions to prevent dissent. Any 
policy, rule or decision in a democratic TAG is, in principle, 
subject to reconsideration. Otherwise there would be artificial 
and unwarranted limitations to the transparency of the reflexive 
monitoring of the members. In a democratic TAG this right to dissent 
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must override concerns about efficacious implementation of decisions, 
rules or policies. If the implementation of a policy or decision 
would be jeopardized by the mere expression of dissent concerning 
the value of that policy or resolution it is highly unlikely to 
represent the common interest and accordingly should be reconsidered. 
FACILITATOR: I think we have a good picture of the many considerations 
that may be relevant to internal democracy. We appreciate the need 
for trust, truth, mutual respect and always regarding our fellows as 
co-agents. We are alert to the dangers of distortion and manipulation 
and while there is a great deal more that could be said we can leave 
this matter now. 
18. The general social conditions for democratic TAGs 
FACILITATOR: An undemocratic society is one in which the FPSC is not 
the basis for social co-operation. At this point we need to clarify 
in general terms what we mean by a democratic society. In Chapter IV 
we will elaborate on more specific criteria that can be applied to 
distinguish democratic from undemocratic societies. By a 'democratic 
society' we refer to a rather weak condition in that we are concerned 
with the principles and general pattern of social organization and 
not with isolated or exceptional deviations from those principles or 
patterns. Hence an undemocratic society is one which manifests 
fundamental violations of social justice. For example, a slave 
society or a society which provides differential benefits on the 
basis of race is undemocratic because it grossly violates the principle 
of equal consideration. The question which is the focus of our 
inquiry is whether it is possible for an internally democratic TAG 
to function within a society organized on undemocratic prinCiples. 
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If so, under what general conditions? 
It is important for us to understand why we are addressing these 
~uestions and how they relate to our practical concerns. Otherwise 
we may find ourselves in a long, inconclusive and frustrating in~uiry. 
If there are no conditions under which a TAG can operate democratically 
within a society organized on undemocratic principles then our hope 
for democratic social transformation is vain. However if there are 
conditions in undemocratic societies supportive of internal democracy 
in TAGs then we will be concerned with the general features of these 
conditions as a guide to our praxis. At this point we can reconsider 
the two basic tasks of the TAG to see if a priority can be established 
between them or perhaps whether there are principles for integrating 
the two. 
Our discussion of internal democracy suggests two broad sorts 
of social conditions in the wider society supportive of democratic 
TAGs: one is concerned with the formation of agents with a suitable 
degree of responsibility and autonomy; the other with social freedoms 
and powers relevant to organizing and operating TAGs. While ideally 
we would want the wider society to form fully autonomous agents this 
seems to be more than is strictly re~uired because individuals can 
be expected to develop more fully autonomous characters within the 
democratic TAG. However this is a very complex ~uestion in that we 
are dealing with matters of degree, probably along several dimensions. 
Different patterns of undemocratic principles in a society may make 
different demands on the level of responsibility, autonomy, communi-
cation skills, etc., demanded of members of the TAG. A rather 
depressing thought is that it is likely that the more the general 
society deviates from democratic principles, the greater the demands 
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placed on the character formation of potential members of a TAG, and 
the less likely that individuals meeting these high standards of 
responsibility, autonomy and communication skills will be formed. 
By social freedoms I am thinking of freedom of conscience, speech, 
association, of the press and so on. 
Do these very broad conditions make internal democracy possible? 
Can we be more precise in their articulation? 
LIBERAL: I think Facilitator has got us off to a good start in terms of 
the two broad sorts of social conditions supportive of democratic 
TAGs and I want to pick up on the first of these right now. I want 
not to get into a discussion of the precise degree of responsibility 
and autonomy required but rather to make clearer what this general 
condition calls for and so to articulate this condition in a different 
way. There is the particular matter of the education of children and 
young people but because this is the concern of Chapter V I will say 
no more now than that we will want our educational system to be as 
supportive of the development of autonomous agency as possible. 
However we should focus at this time on the general social conditions, 
other than formal education, that foster responsibility and autonomy. 
The crucial condition that I advocate is that the society needs 
to provide a region of "individuaIH stewardship and responsibility 
which I call a selfidual sphere. By the 'selfidual sphere' I mean 
a region of social life which is to be distinguished from the 
'institutional sphere' in that the evaluation, planning and implemen-
tation of action are left to the individual who is accountable to 
herself. In the institutional sphere evaluation, planning and 
implementation are collectively conducted and the accountability is 
generally held by some political body. I have used the term 'selfidual' 
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to refer to a region which is 'private' in one sense but not in the 
sense of 'private property'; which is self-regulated but not equiva-
lent to autonomous (we have focused on autonomy as describing the 
integrity of reflexive monitoring and while this is consistent 
with self-regulation, autonomy does not necessarily pick out 
individual as opposed to collective self-regulation); while 
'individual' captures part of what I want to say I do not suggest 
the selfish, possessive, atomistic individualism of laissez-faire 
liberal theory. Indeed rather than focusing on the individual being 
left a region in which he experiences no interference I prefer to 
emphasize that the individual needs a sphere for which he is person-
ally responsible and in control of accountability. The crucial con-
sideration is whether significant choice, decision and responsibility 
are left to the individual. 
Examples of matters in the selfidual sphere will tend to be 
culture specific and in advanced western capitalist countries may 
include matters such as choice of career, eating habits, clothing, 
sexual practices, location and decoration of the home, budgeting 
for personal goods and services, recreation and holidays. In con-
trasting the selfidual with the institutional sphere it is not the 
existence of institutional regulation per se which erodes the selfidual 
sphere; it is perfectly consistent with sexual practices, for example, 
being within the selfidual sphere for there to be institutional rules 
concerning sexual practices. If these institutional rules leave 
significant decisions and responsibilities in the hands of individuals 
then a selfidual sphere has been maintained regardless of the fact 
that there is a degree of institut~onal regulation. 
Why is a selfidual sphere necessary? In section 7 we discussed 
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the homeostatic tension between power and responsibility: the 
existence of a selfidual sphere is the guarantee of certain social 
freedoms and powers supportive of individual responsibility and 
autonomy. It is also reasonable that responsibility and autonomy 
require practice for their development and that in exercising responsi-
bilities I-self has the possibility of strengthening her powers for 
autonomous agency. While it is possible, in an undemocratic society, 
for the selfidual sphere to occur without other supportive conditions, 
e.g., there may be insufficient attention to the development of 
personal powers or a lack of assistance or resources available to 
the individual, this points out that the existence of a selfidual 
sphere is not sufficient for the development of responsibility and 
autonomy but it nevertheless appears necessary. 
This is the main argument for a selfidual sphere. Additionally 
individuals who experience some success within the selfidual sphere 
are likely to have the self-esteem and confidence to participate in 
a TAG. This suggests that an important principle for TAGs is to 
support a selfidual sphere and measures which will strengthen the 
efficacy of individual action within the selfidual sphere. Moreover 
to the extent that there is general public support for a selfidual 
sphere this can be used in arguments in favour of self-realization 
as a social value and specifically in support of the second task of 
the TAG, i.e. support for each individual to make the most authentic 
choices among the possibilities available. 
SOLIDARITY: Facilitator suggests that there are two general types of social 
conditions in the wider society supportive of internal democracy in the 
TAG: one concerned with the development of responsibility and autonomy; 
the other with social freedoms and powers. From this starting point 
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Liberal advocates a selfidual sphere - a proposal that baffles me. 
Liberal argues that a selfidual sphere is required to foster the 
development of responsibility and autonomy. Why should the whole 
development of responsibility and autonomy not be collective? In 
clarifying his technical term 'selfidual' Liberal conceded that it 
is not equivalent to a sphere of autonomy; he stressed individual 
stewardship and responsibility and not autonomy, which is not only 
compatible with collective agency, but, as both our experience with 
and discussions concerning democratic TAGs show, requires collective 
agency for its full development. 
Not only is a selfidual sphere not necessary but it could be 
positively harmful: it provides a "safe place" for individuals to 
withdraw from collective praxis and to spin out inconsequential 
a-social "projectsll. Row on earth does a selfidual sphere support 
the functioning of a TAG? I am sorry, Liberal, but your proposal 
seems to subvert the process of social transformation by draining 
off energy into individualistic activities. Do we not already have 
this selfidual sphere within our liberal capitalist IIpseudo democracy"? 
LIBERAL: To deal with your last point first, yes, we do already have a 
selfidual sphere and it is a good thing we do. The fact that we can 
meet together with the aim of transforming our society into something 
different is a credit to the rights and freedoms available to citizens 
in our society. While our society is not an authentic democracy, it 
is not a mere "pseudo democracyll. The rights of citizenship which 
are supportive of the functioning of TAGs to implement authentic 
democratic transformations are extremely important. I prefer to 
call our society a "constitutional democracytl because it makes avail-
able the rights and freedoms which we require for the internal 
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democracy of TAGs. 
I will not try to answer whether or why in an authentic democratic 
society there must be a selfidual sphere although I am predisposed to 
believe so but given our assumption of an undemocratic society, which 
we are trying to transform into an authentic democracy, the case for 
a selfidual sphere should be clear. 24 If there is no selfidual sphere 
then it follows that every aspect of individual responsibility will be 
governed by the state or the major institutions of the society. 
Solidarity asks, ltWhy cannot the whole development of responsibility 
and autonomy be collective?" Aside from a fundamental concern that 
I am opposed to a totalitarian state control over society and I 
believe this would be a consequence of Solidarity's position there 
is the fact that in granting collective control over all aspects of 
responsibility Solidarity at the same time grants undemocratic 
institutional control over every aspect of action. If there is no 
selfidual sphere within an undemocratic society there will be no 
place or space for individuals to begin remaking themselves according 
to principles at variance with those in their general society. 
SCHOLAR: I see that Solidarity is not yet convinced of the case for a 
selfidual sphere but I am convinced not only for the reasons Liberal 
gave but also because I think the selfidual sphere can be related to 
our earlier arguments for limitations on the sphere of social justice; 
and so I think that we could indeed justify a selfidual sphere as a 
constituent feature of an authentic democracy. I am also persuaded 
by Liberal's argument concerning the development of self-confidence 
and self-esteem. Moreover a selfidual sphere is supportive of the 
second task of our TAG, which is the realization of the good of all 
members within the facti cal possibilities available. In this respect 
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I disagree with Rousseau who argues that the lawgiver "must weaken 
the structure of man in order to fortify it". Rousseau says, "In 
a word each man must be stripped of his own powers, and given powers 
which are external to him, and which he cannot use without the help 
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of others." Perhaps Solidarity believes, as Rousseau before her, 
that only an agent lacking independent powers and resources can be a 
good citizen but this cannot be right as I will make clear. I also 
want to reinforce Liberal's point that an important social condition 
is the existence of powers and resources in support of the individual's 
efficacious conduct within the selfidual sphere. I hope to persuade 
Solidarity that we must strengthen, not weaken, the independent powers 
and autonomy of individuals. Is it plausible that an agent who is 
incapable of the independent exercise of power and responsibility, 
who "can do nothing whatever except through co-operation with others ll26 
can articulate her own good and pursue deliberations concerning her 
interests with her fellows? No. A person so stripped of rights and 
powers as Rousseau recommends could not participate in the determina-
tion of either her own good or the common interest. Hence the policy 
of weakening individual power and responsibility is antithetical to 
democracy. 
SOLIDARITY: Liberal and Scholar have thoroughly demolished my case and 
part of me wants graciously to concede to superior argument but 
another wants to hold out and I believe this is not because of pride 
but rather reflects some very deep-rooted commitments. It is no 
secret that I have long been a socialist and that I believe that 
public ownership and other socialist principles are necessary for 
equality and fraternity. While I cannot as yet articulate a clear 
objection to the arguments of Liberal and Scholar I am deeply concerned 
136 
that they may lead to some sort of reformed capitalism or at least a 
private enterprise system and I do not want to end up with capitalism 
or private enterprise. 
HEART: While it is legitimate to object to arguments on the basis of 
their consequences do we really know if Liberal's and Scholar's 
arguments lead to the conclusions Solidarity fears? We have found 
capitalism to be fundamentally antithetical to authentic democracy 
but we have yet to articulate an alternative social ideal. Therefore 
why not keep an open mind on where our deliberations may eventually 
lead and address the kinds of concerns Solidarity raises when we 
have concrete proposals? 
FACILITATOR: Yes. Also we really have answered our main question. We 
see that it is indeed possible for a democratic TAG to function 
within an undemocratic society if that society provides a selfidual 
sphere and certain rights and freedoms of association, organization 
and expression, i.e. if the society is a constitutional democracy. 
While we are at it we can answer the question of whether there is 
a priority order between our two tasks of (1) altering categorial 
power relations in the wider society in line with the FPSC and (2) 
fostering the good of each member in the here and now. In general 
there is no priority that can be established independently of specific 
conditions. The principle that makes sense is to focus on the major 
problems and opportunities facing the TAG, i.e. on responding to 
whatever helps or hurts most under specific conditions. For example, 
if a repressive totalitarian government threatens radically to curtail 
the freedom of action and powers of individuals and voluntary associ-
ations then task (1) should bethe highest priority; if members lack 
confidence or vision, are overcome with grief or depression or lack 
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personal powers for new stages of social change our emphasis should 
be on task (2). 
We are now ready to proceed to Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRINCIPLES FOR ORGANIZING A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
FACILITATOR: Our main concern in Chapter IV is with the first task of a 
TAG, the transformation of categorial power relations in the wider 
society, or alternatively with the modification of the basic structure 
of society in accordance with the FPSC. 1 While until now we have not 
explicitly said so I assume our time perspective is the mid-term, say 
one to three generations. 
PRECISE: What are the reasons for a one to three generation time 
perspective? 
FACILITATOR: If we are going to make major changes to the basic structure 
of society and do so through democratic processes then a shorter time 
period would be unrealistic. Because we reject a dictatorial imposi-
tion of social change, even in the name of "democracy", a shorter 
time period is ruled out. 2 However if the time span increases to 
much past two or three generations there are two major sorts of 
objections: it becomes increasingly difficult for our generation to 
understand and appreciate facts and considerations bearing on the 
possibilities or the range of desirable and feasible alternatives; 
more fundamentally there is an authoritarian presupposition behind 
such a programme. Because the values of autonomy and symmetrical 
categoria1 power relations should apply intergenerationally as well 
as intragenerationally it would be wrong for us to seek to organize 
the basic structure for remote generations. By basing our goal on 
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a two to three generation perspective we retain the possibility for 
those who are to live within the basic structure to participate in 
its determination. Therefore our agenda should now focus on the 
formulation of mid-term goals and objectives for the transformation 
of the basic structure of society. 
19. A strategy for democratic transformation 
ACTION-MAN: So a TAG has one task of transforming the basic structure 
of society over the mid-term and a second of promoting the good of 
its members in the present and immediate future. It is perhaps 
important to note that our two tasks, while distinct, are related. 
Facilitator's call for the articulation of mid-term goals and objec-
tives for social transformation in effect asks us to sharpen up and 
give some specificity to the first task of the TAG. Perhaps this 
can be done by connecting it more closely to the second. Indeed, 
if by some chance we find ourselves in one big TAG including everyone, 
would there be any difference between the two tasks? 
PRECISE: But that is impossible! There are far too many of us and we 
are too dispersed to meet together and deliberate concerning our 
individual and common interests; but a TAG provides processes for 
face-to-face deliberation. 3 
ACTION-MAN: Yes, one big TAG is impossible but hypothetically if we were 
in one TAG then the only issue would be internal democracy and our 
first task would collapse into our second which we would pursue in 
accordance with the principles we articulated in Chapter III concerning 
power relations and communications processes. While one big TAG is 
impossible is there something that achieves or comes close to achiev-
ing the same effects and results? 
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LIBERAL: The answer that is frequently given is that a constitutional 
democracy based on elected representatives in a parliamentary or 
congressional system is the best feasible alternative to an authentic 
democracy. What do you say to that? 
ACTION-~Uill: There are many positive features of constitutional democracy 
that should be retained, e.g. rights of free thought, expression and 
association, standing laws, popular suffrage, .•• , however the scope 
of democratic control is too restricted and the extent of citizen 
participation in political deliberation is too limited. Specifically, 
the employer/employee relation denies workers democratic control over 
the work-place and excessively constricts the autonomy of individual 
workers. Also too much power is vested in elected representatives 
and too little in the citizens, especially concerning legislation, 
broad policy objectives and the level and major priorities of the 
public budget; moreover this problem is related to the other in that, 
even within the public sector, the highly centralized differentiation 
of political authority generates a bureaucratic hierarchy incompatible 
with democratic control of the work-place. Finally the system of 
constitutional democracy does not provide for TAGs and for their 
integration within its basic structure of political deliberation, 
i.e. it permits TAGs as peripheral organizations to the main social 
and political functions without supporting their incorporation within 
the formal processes of political deliberation. There are many other 
criticisms of actual liberal capitalist societies that we could 
articulate but these are fundamental. 
LIBERAL: In what sense are they fundamental? Are these features of 
constitutional democracy in a liberal capitalist society necessary 
or are they merely contingent? I can see that the restriction of 
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legislation and policy determination to representatives is a defining 
feature of constitutional democracy and so these sorts of limitations 
simply go with the concept of 'constitutional democracy,.4 But why 
is the employer/employee relation a necessary feature of constitutional 
democracy and why cannot TAGs be built into the structure of official 
political representation? 
ACTION-MAN: In a constitutional democracy the vast majority of citizens 
do not participate, except possibly vicariously, in the determination 
of public policy. Indeed they will often have little idea of what 
the policies of their legislature are and so citizens generally will 
be unable to supervise or enforce the implementation of public policy. 
How then is public policy to be implemented? The answer is obvious -
by an employed civil service whose members take orders from the 
elected representatives. The political representatives are account-
able to the citizens as a whole at periodic elections. In between 
elections the representatives collectively hold the powers of 
dictators and within the logic of the system their manner of account-
ability to the citizens demands that they have the power to command 
their civil servants. Because their societies are populous (which 
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is the reason for representative rather than direct democracy) they 
generally require many civil servants. It can be shown that a 
bureaucratic hierarchy is the most efficient and generally acceptable 
way of directing large numbers of workers to carry out political orders. 5 
Therefore, within the public sector, the employer/employee relation 
is necessitated by the commitments to control of public sector workers 
by elected representatives and by the manner of accountability of the 
representatives to the citizens. 
Within the "private sector" the employer/employee relation is 
the logically necessary accompaniment of capitalist property relations. 
Therefore while any constitutional democracy necessarily has employer/ 
employee relations in the public sector, a liberal capitalist society 
will also have at least some employer/employee relations in the private 
6 
sector as well. 
Concerning the integration of TAGs into the basic structure of 
political deliberation this can be initiated within a constitutional 
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democracy, even of the liberal capitalist sort, and can be 'progressively 
developed but I believe that, at a certain point, the citizens, in the 
emerging TAG Network implied by this process, will want to remove the 
remaining constraints on the full realization of the FPSC and thus 
transform their limited constitutional democracy into a fully authentic 
democratic society. My grounds for this finding are based on a variety 
of considerations which should emerge in our discussions but, in brief, 
as the TAG Network emerges a stage will be reached where any minimally 
rational person will want to achieve an authentic form of democracy. 
FACILITATOR: Am I right in thinking that you were about to suggest a 
better approach than a constitutional representative democracy, 
Action-Man? 
ACTION-MAN: Yes, my basic idea is very simple. We should have every 
citizen in at least one TAG and all the TAGs connected, through 
representatives. into networks. Very roughly our goal is a network 
of TAGs - call it a 'Tag Network' which is organized to provide 
internal democratic relations to the members of each TAG and inter-
relations between TAGs characterized by symmetrical power relations 
and open and undistorted communications. 
However our idea is not yet feasible in such a simple form -
I think this will be apparent after we elaborate on the somewhat 
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more involved model that is workable. In this respect it may be 
helpful to distinguish three spheres in which political authority 
may be exercised, i.e., citizenship, work and culture. Corresponding 
to these three key dimensions of human activity we should have three 
basic types of TAGs, all integrated within a structure of political 
deliberation and decision: geographic units to represent common 
citizenships concerns, interests and rights; functional and work-
place units to represent workers as workers; cultural units to 
represent various ethnic, linguistic, religious, aesthetic and other 
cultural traditions and values. See diagram 7. 
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In our previous deliberations we developed a number of 
principles and findings to which our mid-term goal should conform. 
Of course the FPSC is the general formulation of our goal but we have 
also reached the following, more specific, conclusions: 
(1) we oppose domination/dependence relationships in politics 
7 (citizenship), work and culture; 
(2) we favour equal civil and political rights for all citizens 
and the assurance of social freedoms such as freedom of speech, 
8 
association, the press, etc.; 
(3) political deliberations should be conducted in circumstances 
of equal categorial power and authentic interpersonal relations;9 
(4) we favour a culturally pluralistic society in the sense that we 
support the autonomy of individuals and groups to assert or 
celebrate such cultural values as do not plainly contradict 
the FPSC;lO 
(5) f 1 1 - t 11 we avour a c ass ess SOC1e y; 
(6) we oppose the employer/employee relation because of the funda-
mental and unacceptable asymmetry in power relations it sets 
12 
over the work-place; 
(7) we reject meritocracy as the basis for the organization of 
- 1 t- 13 SOC1a co-opera 1on; 
(8) we oppose the imposition of social transformation by an elite 
t - d 14 or revolu 10nary vanguar ; 
(9) the TAGs (or other structures) in which citizen-workers 
deliberate concerning their good and interests should be 
internally democratic, i.e., there should be symmetrical power 
relations, authentic interpersonal relations and open, undistorted 
- t- 15 commun1ca 1ons; 
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(10) to the extent feasible, persons should participate in the 
representation of their own interests in face to face delibera-
tions within a TAG;16 
tIl) individual responsibility and autonomy should be fostered through 
a selfidual sphere;17 
(12) finally, there is the feasibility criterion that our mid-term 
goal must be realizable through transformation of our existing 
institutions and practices. 
Now these highlighted principles, as well as other findings from 
our previous deliberations, serve as constraints on the solution we 
seek. Our challenge is unlikely to be how to select one from among 
all the alternative possibilities that conform to these principles 
but rather how to find even one that meets or nearly meets these 
criteria. Moreover we must not be too hasty in rejecting ideas as 
impractical or we will probably be left with no goal at all. For 
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example in Chapter V of his book The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, 
C. B. Macpherson discusses two ideas that are very important: the use 
of computer and telecommunications technology to make possible direct 
democracy in a society of millions of citizens; and a pyramidal model 
of participatory democracy. With respect to the former he says that 
the idea does not pay sufficient attention to the need for someone to 
formulate the questions. 
No doubt something could be done with two-way television 
to draw more people into more active political discussion. 
And no doubt it is technically feasible to put in every 
living-room - or, to cover the whole population, beside 
every bed - a computer console with Yes/No buttons, or 
buttons for Agree/Disagree/Don't Know or for Strongly 
Approve/Mildly Approve/Don't Care/MildlY Disapprove/ 
Strongly Disapprove, or for preferential multiple choices. 
But it seems inevitable that some government body would 
have to decide what questions would be asked: this could 
scarcely be left to private bodies.18 
Concerning a pyramidal model of participatory democracy he 
elaborates it as a "direct democracy at the neighborhood or factory 
level - actual face-to-face discussion and decision by consensus, 
and election of delegates who would make up a council at the next 
more inclusive level, say a city borough or ward or township". 
Level by level, local, regional, national and transnational councils 
can thus be established to deal with matters appropriate to each 
level. 19 
Macpherson goes on to discuss the conditions under which this 
participatory model could work and he is more hopeful of its prospects 
than for the direct democracy through an electronic communications/ 
deliberation system. But I suggest that by combining these two ideas 
in an appropriate way and by an appropriate differentiation of the 
political control over work and culture we can formulate a mid-term 
goal which offers an authentically democratic transformation of our 
society. 
I would like to elaborate and clarify this idea which I call 
a 'TAG Network' at our next session. 
FACILITATOR: I appreciate the way Action-Man has highlighted key principles 
constraining our choice of mid-term goal. I wonder if we can use 
diagram 7 to give an even sharper focus on our major problem. To 
oversimplify a little, perhaps, we are seeking a system of social 
co-operation which combines (or reconciles) political accountability 
to all citizens on the basis of equality, worker autonomy and cultural 
pluralism. In our next session we can examine Action-Man's TAG 
Network idea as a possible solution to this problem. 
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20. The TAG Network 
ACTION-NAN: My plan for this topic is to articulate a general vision of 
the TAG Network in a fully authentic democratic society in which all 
agents are somehow in the IIcorrectH position. 20 After outlining the 
functioning of the TAG Network in this idealized and simplified 
circumstance we can address the ways in which new citizens, principally 
young people joining the work force, are initiated into full citizen-
ship and come to take their positions within the system of social 
co-operation. This leads to an analysis of the two basic ways of 
categorizing and organizing workers - the professional association 
and the workers! co-operative. 
At this point we can relax our assumptions that everything is 
IIcorrect" or right and consider the identification and resolution 
of problems, complaints and disagreements. The point of the whole 
discussion is to show that a TAG Network establishes a division of 
social actions into positions, assigns agents to those positions, 
allocates resources and powers and does so in accordance with the 
FPSC; moreover that there is a strategy for moving from a constitu-
tional democracy to an authentically democratic TAG Network. In 
following this programme we will have to skip over many details, 
problems and concerns. Let us see if we can keep our discussion 
to those issues that bear on the acceptability of the basic strategy 
and omit those that can be clarified during the refinement or 
implementation of the strategy. 
All workers will be in a work-related TAG and all citizens will 
belong to a neighbourhood TAG which is part of a geographically 
organized TAG Network containing political units as part of a 
centralized/decentralized system of political deliberation and 
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decision. The work-related TAGs will participate within the TAG 
Network in ways that will be clarified shortly. Citizens will also 
participate in self-chosen cultural TAGs. 
The principle guiding the organization of the TAG Network is 
to combine autonomy with political accountability. This principle 
is actualized by an appropriate combination of representation with 
communications. Each TAG selects its representative to the next level 
of the TAG Network and since this is a system based on accountability 
to the people and the pursuit of the good of everyone it is the TAG 
and not some central authority that determines the way in which 
representatives are chosen. Hence the TAG may use election, lot, 
rotation or any other method it considers will best present its 
interests or concerns at the next level. 21 The key task is for the 
TAG to determine its common interest and then find a representative 
who can re-present the concerns, needs and interests of the TAG at 
the next level. At each level there are representatives speaking 
for the TAG or branch that selected them at the more local level. 
SOLIDARITY: Your initial comments are puzzling in that you refer to a 
TAG Network in a fully authentic democratic society as if the TAG 
Network is our goal; and yet I have understood the TAG as a merely 
transition mechanism. 
ACTION-MAN: Because the TAG's second task is concerned with the good 
of its members in the here and now the TAG is not merely a transition 
mechanism but is an integral part of the structure of a democratic 
society. Moreover in my mid-term perspective the organization of 
the TAG Network is the means for democratic social transformation 
and the resulting TAG Network is the form of the basic structure 
of society that realizes our mid-term goals and objectives. If the 
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progressive development of a TAG Network makes our society more and 
more democratic, does it make sense suddenly to jettison it like a 
spent rocket on a space ship as we near our destination of a society 
based on the FPSC? 
PRECISE: How does the TAG Network differ from Macpherson's pyramidal 
system? 
ACTION-MAN: The TAG Network incorporates the pyramidal approach with 
these differences: 
(1) it provides a three track system of representation -
citizenship on a geographic basis, work on two bases I will 
elaborate shortly, and culture; 
(2) it places legislative authority in the hands of the citizens 
in a jurisdiction. 
At levels above the most local (where direct face-to-face 
democracy pertains), the representatives formulate possible policies, 
propose resolutions concerning legislation, budget and policy 
implementation, and debate them in their assemblies. These debates 
are broadcast to the citizens in the jurisdiction who use the tele-
communications system to approve or reject the resolutions. In this 
way we combine Macpherson's two ideas to achieve democratic partici-
pation and control. 
To be workable representatives must limit the range and complexity 
of issues put to the people for decision. This can be accomplished 
through the policy of making decisions at the most local level 
feasible. Therefore at the more central levels the decisions dis-
cussed should be only those affecting the whole jurisdiction and 
which cannot be justly determined at more local levels. Centralized 
paternalism, with the best of intentions, destroys participatory 
democracy. 
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PRECISE: Is the telecommunications system technically feasible now or 
is it a remote future possibility? 
ACTION-MAN: Yes, the technical problems have been solved. 22 
LIBERAL: What powers do the representatives have? 
ACTION-MAN: They are responsible for preparing plans, policies, budgets 
and legislation and for debating them in the assembly; they have such 
executive powers as the law provides; but they cannot vote and they 
23 do not rule. In a world in which communications are perfect, in 
which there are no conflicts between one region or level and another 
and in which representatives represent the interests of their 
constituents perfectly, we might give our representatives the power 
to make law - but it is more prudent to be sceptical of such a world 
and to have the citizens themselves make the laws directly.24 
FACILITATOR: Would you please elaborate on the principles or criteria 
for conducting the political deliberations, particularly concerning 
the power and responsibilities of the various parties? 
COMMENTARY: The following notes summarize Action-Man's presentation. 
Criteria for a Democratic Communication/Deliberation System 
To avoid misinterpretation let me set this discussion in a context: 
I will outline the powers and responsibilities of the parties within the 
citizenship sphere but you must keep in mind two other considerations 
which I address elsewhere. Firstly, while the citizenship sphere has 
the greater political authority, the spheres of work and cultural activity 
have substantial autonomy. Secondly, the principle of the maximum local 
autonomy compatible with social justice ensures that, with respect to 
cultural values and life styles, groups finding themselves in the minority 
in the society as a whole, can generally organize themselves to become the 
majority in some local jurisdiction and thereby protect themselves from 
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abuses of majoritarian power. Therefore the principle of decision by 
consensus or majority vote within any particular jurisdiction need not be 
oppressive to minorities. Nevertheless majoritarian power should not be 
recklessly employed. A sense of fraternity and authentic being-among-one-
another suggests the pursuit of common interests and not the sectoral 
interests of the majority. Exercise of majority power in the face of 
widespread and intense minority opposition can rarely be justified and 
then only when an urgent decision is demanded and consensus appears 
impossible. The abuse of majority power releases the minority from the 
moral obligation to support or adhere to the decision. 
In what follows I focus on the communications and deliberations 
within a given jurisdiction in the citizenship sphere. 25 
A. General 
1. Any new legislation, budget or policies which are to bind or directly 
affect the citizen in a particular jurisdiction: 
1.1 shall be presented to him with any relevant facts and 
t d f h " "d t" 26 argumen s pro an con or 1S conS1 era 10n; 
1.2 shall be determined by a direct vote of all citizens in 
the jurisdiction with a majority required to carry the 
bill or proposal. 
2. Any existing legislation can be reconsidered on the motion of a 
single representative for the jurisdiction and once so moved shall 
be treated as a new bill with respect to consideration and decision. 27 
B. Powers and Responsibilities of Representatives 
3. The representative shall: 
3.1 advocate the common interests and represent the concerns 
of the TAG or branch he represents; 
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3.2 report to his own TAG or branch the concerns and interests 
28 
of other groups; 
3.3 assist in the preparation of legislation, policy papers and 
budgets for the consideration of the citizens, participate 
in debate concerning the proposals presented to the citizenry, 
and carry out such executive functions as the laws prescribe. 29 
Note: If citizens veto a bill or budget then representatives may 
present alternative proposals that may be approved, or return to 
their constituencies to renew the process of decision and deliberation. 
4. The representative is entitled to change his mind as he becomes 
acquainted with various concerns and arguments and to propose and 
argue for proposals different from those endorsed by his TAG or 
branch. The TAG or branch need not and should not bind their delegate 
to a fixed line or position but should respect his autonomy and 
authenticity. These rights of the representative foster rather than 
undermine political accountability because citizens vote directly 
and control the selection of their representatives. On the other 
hand to bind the delegate to a fixed line would result in distorted 
communication and the irrationality of ignoring relevant information. 
c. Powers and Responsibilities of Citizens 
5. The citizen shall: 
5.1 attend meetings of his TAG and participate in the deliberations 
to establish common interests and to select representatives; 
5.2 keep himself informed regarding matters of concern to the TAG 
and the various jurisdictions representing his interests; 
5.3 carry a "fair share ll of the executive and representational 
duties of the TAG; 
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5.4 obey the laws and pay the taxes set by each jurisdiction 
representing him; 
5.5 vote on bills and proposals presented for his deliberation. 
6. The citizen is entitled to access, through the communication system, 
to all information available to his representatives or advisers. 
In this form of government citizens' participation will not be 
restricted to the election of their rule(Sand the citizens will not be 
ruled between general elections by their representatives. Indeed there 
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will be no general elections because citizens can continually alter their 
representation starting with the TAG and proceeding through all the branches 
of the TAG Network. Whereas in modern parliamentary IIdemocracies ti political 
'elites and party "machines" wield enormous power, in the TAG Network there 
is no "plum\! of political power and patronage associated with the highest 
levels of government and therefore political ~litism and manipulation by 
party machines can be greatly reduced or even eliminated. 
LIBERAL: Would you please explain how work and culture are integrated 
with the citizenship sphere in the overall network? 
ACTION-~Uili: That is a challenging task which I can only begin here. 
Clearly workers should have the right to represent their own interests 
through their own democratic organizations, and also citizens should 
be able to exercise certain broad policy controls over work in the 
public interest. However the idea that the citizenship sphere should 
represent the public interest and the workers' organization the 
workers' interests is too simple because the workers' organizations 
should have the responsibility for articulating and enforcing standards 
of work practice designed to achieve the public policy goals set by the 
citizenship jurisdictions. 
In the next two sessions we can discuss in some detail the 
integration between the citizenship and work branches of the TAG. 
In Chapters V and VI we discuss education and at that time we can 
touch on some of the ways in which culture is integrated with citizen-
ship and work. If you refer back to diagram 7 (p. 144) you will see 
that the region marked "E" is the intersection of the citizenship, 
work and culture spheres. I will not make too much of the spatial 
metaphor implied in the diagram but it does draw attention to the 
fact that while education can be viewed as a type of cultural activity 
it is also very much within the citizenship and work spheres, e.g. it 
is the job of teachers. 30 
One point I should mention here is that whenever public policy 
bearing on work or culture is debated in the citizenship assemblies 
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the representatives of the appropriate work or cultural organizations 
should be able to participate directly in the assemblies' deliberations. 
PRECISE: But that is multiple representation! 
ACTION-MAN: The power of decision rests with the citizens but they should 
be able to hear the arguments and considerations presented by workers' 
or cultural communities' representatives directly. 
FACILITATOR: We have the general idea of the TAG Network and are ready 
to address the political control of work in our next session. 
21. The political control of work 
ACTION-~Uili: What is the problem that calls for political control of work? 
In our authentic democracy we will all be both workers producing goods, 
services and resources for other citizens and consumers using goods, 
serviges and resources produced by others. To realize the FPSC the 
outcome of the complex processes of production, exchange and 
consumption must be good for each of us in our role of worker and 
of consumer. This problem cannot be reduced to a matter of incomes 
and prices: as workers we are concerned with the nature of our work 
activity, the conditions under which we perform our work and the 
income from our labour; as consumers we are concerned with the variety, 
quantity, quality and price of goods and services available to us. 
As a worker I-self needs: autonomy which translates into choice 
of profession and place of work, self-discipline, self-chosen direc-
tion and supervision, participation in the determination of all 
conditions of his work, the exercise of professional judgment in 
work; authenticity which translates into transparent understanding 
of work relations and undistorted communications and symmetrical 
power relations in the work-place; self-development which translates 
into opportunities to develop and apply his knowledge, understanding 
and expertise; welfare which translates into the right to work and 
earn income, to gain esteem and recognition through work; authentic-
being-with-colleagues which translates into democratic self-governance 
of co-operative activity and a general equality in responsibility. 
However, as a consumer, I-self needs access to goods, services and 
resources to advance his authentic project. As a consumer, I-self 
would oppose a hypothetical system of social co-operation in which 
seventy-five per cent of workers are university professors and there 
is a shortage of farmers and workers in transportation, construction 
and manufacturing. 
How is I-self to meet simultaneously his own needs as worker 
and as consumer? In a complex division of social actions, if citizens 
do whatever gives them satisfaction as workers it is implausible that 
they will meet their needs as consumers. Some kind of constraint has 
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to be placed on either work or consumption or both. How can this be 
done without violating I-self's autonomy or establishing a class 
relation-in which the interests of one class are met at the expense 
of those of another? Surely we must reject all the constraint being 
placed on consumers because this would result in producers manipulat-
ing and controlling consumers and trying to shape their tastes and 
life projects in order to increase the income, prestige or power of 
the workers. In general we should seek to minimize the control over 
consumers to that which is in the common interest of the community 
and not permit worker/producers to dictate consumer taste and choice. 
The principle should be that the entitlement to income arises from 
producing goods, services or resources that advance the politically 
determined common interest of the community or society, or which are 
freely purchased by consumers. 
I am free to work on my authentic project - to write a book 
no one wants to read, to paint a painting no one values, to produce 
vast numbers of trinkets nobody will buy but I am not free to earn 
an income from my work unless I perform a task that the political 
jurisdiction or some citizen wants to pay for. 
There are two significant findings that emerge from this 
discussion: 
ll) the community or society is justified in placing labour 
under political control; 
t2) the starting place for the planning of the division of labour 
and the allocation of social resources to production is the 
needs for consumption and use of the citizens as articulated 
in the TAG Network. 
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In discussions of political control one often hears of the 
'public/private enterprise' distinction but this is a rather muddled 
categorization. By 'public' is meant enterprises which are controlled 
by the political jurisdictions and whose goods, services and resources 
are available to all or to certain categories of persons subject to 
definite rules and regulations. But in an authentic democracy all 
enterprises which involve income flows will be under some form of 
political control. The term 'private' is of little value to us 
because in everyday usage it might apply to personally chosen 
activities of individuals, or intimate relations among individuals 
usages close to our term 'selfidual' - or to vast national or multi-
national corporations such as General Motors or Shell Oil, which are 
social institutions in every sense in which public enterprises are. 
I propose that we use 'public' to refer to those enterprises directly 
paid for by the society through taxes or revenues accruing to the 
community members or citizens in common and 'market' to refer to 
those enterprises holding franchises authorized by the political 
jurisdictions and whose revenues, and most importantly whose income 
levels of their workers, are dependent on sales of their product or 
service to customers or clients. Nevertheless political jurisdictions 
may, in their wisdom, provide grants or subsidies to market enterprises 
just as they may charge user fees for public enterprises. The market 
approach is to be preferred where there is great diversity in tastes 
or a sharp disagreement within the community on whether the product 
or service is of general value. 
LIBERAL: I am not clear why we need to have political control of the 
market enterprises. 
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ACTION-~Uili: There are a number of reasons. The community rationally 
desires a general control over production and consumption. For 
example, if the market enterprises were totally unregulated we might 
have a business marketing assassination kits, an industrial plant 
polluting air and water, a developer ruining the beauty and living 
standards of a community, a drug company whose lack of quality control 
represents a health menace. Although there will be disagreements 
about the specifics of what should be provided on the market under 
what conditions (e.g. pornography, prostitution or hand guns) there 
should be no dispute over the need for ~ control. Additionally 
is it not legitimate to protect workers against over-competition by 
limiting the number of franchises to particular fields? Or to protect 
consumers from too little competition or too limited a range of goods 
or services by making particular sorts of work opportunity available? 
There are also efficiency considerations: the citizens' needs can be 
the basis for rational planning of production. Moreover does not 
justice apply to the work-place and cannot the political jurisdictions 
establish rules and regulations to provide fair access or rotation to 
especially favoured jobs and some sorts of compensation or rotation 
for particularly disliked work? 
LIBERAL: Yes, I agree that some extent of political control of market 
enterprises is called for although I do not want to see a great 
bureaucracy set up to police these enterprises. 
ACTION-ML~: My point in distinguishing the public from the market enter-
prises is to clarify the two different approaches to work organization. 
In both cases the political representatives draft statements of 
franchises for the various enterprises to be approved by the citizens 
in the political jurisdiction. These franchises establish the rules 
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and regulations concerning the operation of public and market enter-
prises. In the case of the public enterprises workers' co-operatives 
will apply to fill contracts negotiated between the political juris-
diction and a workers' co-operative. 3l These contracts will provide 
for definite goods or services to be provided by the workers' 
co-operative in exchange for income for the workers. For the market 
franchises the political jurisdiction's involvement will generally be 
limited to authorizing a workers' co-operative to run an enterprise; 
income flows, volume of work, specific nature of jobs and other such 
matters will be a matter to be determined in free contracts between 
the workers' co-operative and its customers or clients. 32 
Having outlined the powers and duties of the political juris-
dictions I will consider the workers' co-operatives and the professional 
associations. The workers' co-operatives are self-governing associ-
ations of workers who plan, organize, manage, direct and perform the 
work according to the conditions spelled out in the franchise. The 
workers, who may belong to the same or different professional 
association(s), voluntarily belong to their co-operative. 33 Concerns 
of the professional association include the education and training of 
workers for a particular profession, standards for professional 
practice, in-service education and research to improve professional 
performance, assisting members to find suitable positions and 
representing the interests of the members of the profession regarding 
the drafting of policies and legislation for the consideration of the 
citizens. Representatives of the professional associations would 
participate in policy and legislation discussions at certain citizen-
ship jurisdictions within the TAG Network. 
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SOLIDARITY: Before you go on, Action-Man, I wonder if you could explain 
some of your ideas? I agree with the citizens approving legislation 
and budgets directly. If it is feasible it is a more democratic 
approach than having representatives make law. However, I have a 
number of concerns about your discussion of franchises, workers' 
co-operatives and professional associations. I do not like the idea 
of professions or the word 'professional' but my major objection is 
that your idea is getting too complicated. Why go into all this 
fragmentation of political authority? Surely the political juris-
dictions can control work directly without such devices as workers' 
co-operatives and professional associations. 
ACTION-MAN: I would be pleased for you to elaborate your ideas for 
simplifying the political control of work. 
SOLIDARITY: To begin with I would cut out your 'public' versus 'market' 
distinction and go entirely with a public sector. As you suggest 
the political jurisdiction will define the goods, services and 
resources needed and will design franchises - only I prefer to call 
them production units - to produce the desired output; then it will 
appoint managers to run the production units; the managers will hire 
employees and direct the production. 
The workers will be paid for their work and will be able to 
purchase the goods and services they choose. If consumers are 
dissatisfied with the range, quantity, quality or price of goods or 
services they can complain to the political jurisdiction; if workers 
are dissatisfied with their conditions of work, managers, supervisors 
or wages they can complain; and in each case the political jurisdiction, 
which the citizens control directly, has the authority to alter plans, 
reallocate resources, direct, discipline or replace managers, etc. 
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SCHOLAR: Solidarity's plan appears simpler but is it acceptable? Does 
it meet the criteria Action-Man articulated for the needs of workers? 
It seems to turn workers into employees of state enterprises run by a 
hierarchy of politicians, managers, supervisors and foremen and to 
control work through obedience to the orders passed down this hierarchy. 
As I understand Action-Man's proposal it is predicated on the abolition 
of the employer/employee relationship and of the hierarchy and bureau-
cracy that inescapably goes with it. Solidarity's plan leaves us with 
employers, employees, asymmetries of power within a hierarchy and the 
affront to professional autonomy that comes from following the boss's 
orders. 
SOLIDARITY: Scholar seems to be under the misapprehension that I favour 
authoritarian, insensitive and uncaring management and supervision 
but I do not. Has it been demonstrated that the employer/employee 
relationship per se is undemocratic? 
Many relationships are unsatisfactory but not all are. Within 
our society there are some situations in which employees exercise 
professional judgment, have a high degree of autonomy in their work, 
enjoy their work, appreciate the conditions under which they perform 
their duties, and find their managers and supervisors to be competent, 
caring, helpful and committed to democratic ideals. If it is possible 
to reconcile worker autonomy with employee status in some capitalist 
institutions, and it seems to be, surely there is no need to abolish 
the employer/employee relationship. Rather we should exercise the 
authority of the political jurisdictions to ensure that the employer 
functions of the state are conducted in accordance with the workers' 
interests. The abolition of the employer/employee relationship is 
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unnecessary to advance workers' interests and leads to complications 
that undermine political accountability. 
SCHOLAR: It seems that our dispute concerns means but that we are agreed 
on ends. It is also possible that we are interpreting 'employer/ 
employee relationship' somewhat differently. What is it that makes 
a relationship an employer/employee relationship? While there are 
many different features of the relationship arising implicitly through 
precedent or practice, or established in collective agreement, labour 
legislation or the contract of employment, its essence is that the 
employee shall perform such functions and duties as the employer 
assigns, directs or commands in exchange for benefits, wages or salary. 
The fact that limits are placed on what or how an employer may assign 
or command his employees or under which conditions does not alter the 
fact that the worker, while on duty, tUrns over to his employer the 
basic responsibility for directing his work, i.e. his social action. 
I argue that labour legislation, collective bargaining and other 
forms of political control over employers, unless they abolish the 
employer/employee relationship entirely, do not provide professional 
autonomy for workers. In our ordinary usage we understand that 
authority to direct the work of employees is constitutive of the 
meaning of I employer'. To say that !II am an employer but I do not 
have any employees" is to express a logical contradiction. To say 
that "X is an employer who lacks the authority to direct the work 
of his employees" is to utter nonsense because if X cannot direct Y's 
work then X is not Y's employer. Not all contracts involving the 
performance of work manifest an employer/employee relationship. 
A promises to deliver a tool shed to B in exchange for £x but this 
is not a contract of employment - not even if A builds the tool shed 
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himself. Moreover even where the contract stipulates that one party 
will actually perform the work this is not sufficient to make it a 
contract of employment. For example, I contract with my dentist 
for him to perform certain dental services for a fee according to 
a schedule. Is my dentist my employee? I pay him. I insist that 
he perform the work. Nevertheless we say that my dentist is a 
professional, not an employee, and I am a client, not an employer. 
The function of the employer is to direct the employee; the basis 
of the employer's authority is neither moral excellence nor 
professional expertise but his asymmetrical (in relation to the 
employee) control over resources. In Solidarity's analysis of the 
capitalist/worker relation she analysed this very asymmetry in power 
but she has yet to appreciate that this asymmetry is not resolved 
by making the state, even a "politically democratic" state, the 
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employer. It is even arguable whether the worker's lot will be 
generally improved if he is employed by a state which monopolizes 
all enterprises and governs and directs every worker in his job 
performance, i.e. it is conceivable that he would be better off under 
capitalism. 
There is one part of Solidarity's argument that, while possessing 
a surface plausibility, is gravely mistaken. I refer to her call for 
enlightened management and good personnel practices to reconcile the 
worker's professional autonomy with his employee status. Well, it 
cannot be done. Having professional autonomy is a different thing 
entirely from happening to have a benevolent employer who chooses to 
treat you well. The difference is in power and control. While a 
professional controls his own working life an employee enjoys such 
privileges as his employer chooses to grant. To illustrate this 
I want you to think about what is wrong with the following argument: 
The problem is not with slavery as an institution but 
with the brutal and inhuman treatment of slaves by some 
slave owners. The fact that some slaves are well 
treated, happy and have substantial autonomy in the 
direction of their work shows that slavery is not 
necessarily contrary to the interests of a slave as 
a worker.35 All we need to do is to establish a 
system of collective bargaining between slaves and 
slave owners that will equalize their power and ensure 
that there is democratic political control and super-
vision of the slave owners. 
As an alternative to the abolition of slavery this programme is 
daft. Although it might ameliorate the living conditions of slaves 
in the short run or lead to the eventual abolition of slavery in the 
long run we all agree that it is mad. 36 But what makes it mad? It 
simply ignores the most fundamental fact about slavery - the asymmetry 
in power between slave owner and slave. Just as "democratic!! political 
control of the slave owners in Athenian society did not make slavery 
democratic so too Hdemocratic tf political control of employers 
according to Solidarity's plan does not overcome the asymmetry between 
employer and employee. 
PRECISE: But the parallel does not hold: the slaves in Athens had no 
political rights but Solidarity's employees are citizens. 
TELEOLOGIST: Yes, and if Solidarity's citizens are content to remain 
employees that would surprise me as much as if "enfranchised slaves" 
would choose to remain slaves! (Again, would the minimally rational 
person agree to slavery?) 
SCHOLAR: My point is that it is not enough for workers to be well treated, 
listened to, respected etc. by kindly employers and managers; the 
workers need the authority, responsibility and power to manage, 
direct and operate their own work-place. 
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PRECISE: I am convinced that we need to abolish employer/employee rela-
tions and I generally agree with Action-ManIs plan. I disagree with 
Solidarity's idea of a single track political control not only because 
of its effects on working life but also because it may threaten the 
rights of minorities to express divergent beliefs and live alterna-
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tive life styles. I am not convinced concerning collective bargaining -
why can collective bargaining not be used as part of the strategy for 
abolishing the employer/employee relationship? Perhaps the discussion 
of professional associations will clarify the point. 
ACTION-l~\N: Yes, let us leave the issue of collective bargaining to 
another session although we clearly would not have collective 
bargaining in an authentic democracy because in the sense relevant 
to our discussion collective bargaining is a process for regulating, 
not abolishing, employer/employee relations. 
SOLIDARITY: I am coming around toward Action-Man's idea although I still 
have some concerns. Scholar has helped me to appreciate the basic 
problem inherent in the employer/employee relation, in principle, 
and if you can answer three questions I might well be convinced: 
(1) How are the workers' co-operatives to be managed? By 
rotating amateur managers? By Committee? By professionally 
trained managers? If the latter what is the relation of the 
manager to the workers' co-operative and to the political 
jurisdiction? 
(2) How can the public service be run without employees? 
(3) How can we ensure efficiency and quality in our major 
institutions if they are run by workers' co-operatives? 
How does this bear on political accountability? Consider 
the post office, railways, airports and most important of 
all our communication/deliberation system which simply must 
operate according to specifications? 
ACTION-MAN: You are asking, tlHow can we have political accountability 
without giving political bodies or officers the authority to direct 
and command at least the senior managers of large, complex and vital 
enterprises?" This is the great strength of the proposal - that it 
reconciles political accountability with worker autonomy. The 
citizen's representatives for each jurisdiction must focus on 
categorial power decisions, i.e. on defining the general nature of 
what is to be done and the conditions under which it is to be done, 
e.g. health, safety, justice, beauty. It is appropriate for this 
categorial authority to be expressed in standing laws, regulations 
and authorized budgets but not in specific direction or ad hoc 
commands. It is true that to realize the public interest policies 
the citizen must do more than pass laws and approve budgets and plans. 
However, because the citizens as a whole cannot carry out the specific 
interpretation and application of their policies they must establish 
a division of the political supervision. In a parliamentary or 
congressional system the people's representatives establish a 
hierarchical bureaucracy and then run it through directives and orders 
passed down from the top. But in a TAG Network this is unnecessary 
and undesirable. Instead, when it comes to interpreting and applying 
the common interest policies set by the people as a whole, we should 
follow the principle of autonomy - which is to say the democra tically 
decentralized division of political authority - and this is where the 
workers' co-operatives and the professional associations come in. 
SOLIDARITY: We are agreed that the citizens should have the authority to 
make law but if we turn over to workers' co-operatives and professional 
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associations the authority to interpret and apply the law what 
assurance do the people have that their laws are obeyed or their 
intended policies pursued? 
LIBERAL: We have already agreed that we require a system of law enforce-
ment and I assume that the basic approach using police and courts of 
law, lawyers and judges that pertains in a constitutional democracy 
would apply in our authentic democracy. If this is right the 
citizens can protect their sovereign authority through the law courts. 
Concerning "intended policies" there are generally many ways to pursue 
policies, follow a plan or act in accordance with the law. In this 
respect the representatives or other officers have no privileged 
access to the lItrue intentions" underlying the laws and policy 
decisions approved by the people and so there is no justification 
for having them interpreting and applying the policies, determined 
by the citizens, through orders or directives to managers of the 
major enterprises. This, I gather, is why Action-Man wants the 
decisions concerning interpretation and application of common interest 
policies, in respect of work, to rest with the workers themselves. 
ACTION-MAN: Yes, exactly. but I do want to address Solidarity's questions 
concerning managers and management. In preparing legislation, budgets 
and policy proposals for political deliberation the representatives 
will require the services of managers, researchers, secretaries, 
clerks, etc. but this w·ork can also be performed through workers I 
co-operatives - it does not require employees. For example a 
co-operative can be engaged to prepare draft franchises, carry out 
research regarding the franchises and to provide advice concerning 
negotiations with workers' co-operatives, relations with professional 
associations and action on tlconsumerll concerns. 
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What about the question of management within the workers' 
co-operative? If a workers' co-operative fails to meet the conditions 
of its franchise the political jurisdiction can cancel its franchise 
and replace it by another workers' co-operative. There is nothing 
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soft or fuzzy about this contract: it is "produce or lose the franchise". 
The workers have responsibility for the organization of their own work 
but they must meet the conditions of their franchise. Assuming that 
workers' co-operatives want to keep their franchises they are motivated 
to exercise the internal discipline required to meet their production 
or service standards. Accordingly they will require the authority to 
expel members who do not meet their obligations or who violate the 
regulations of their co-operative. The internal structure of a 
workers' co-operative is that of a TAG or of an interlocking network 
of TAGs. Hence it has internal democratic deliberation procedures. 
It is also faced with the constraints imposed by the political juris-
diction and professional associations. 
Given this context and these general conditions the role of 
managers should rest with the workers' co-operative as a whole. 
The members of the co-operative should be able to determine whether 
professional managers, rotating amateurs, committees or whatever are 
best for their circumstances. Provided that the co-operative achieves 
the standards in its franchise what business or concern need the 
political jurisdiction have other than it be the democratically 
determined decision of the workers? On this basis professional 
managers will not be employers but will only have and exercise such 
managerial authority as the democratically operated co-operative 
grants them; they belong to workers' co-operatives, not as employers 
or high status employees, but as co-professionals and colleagues. 
If managers' performance is unsatisfactory they can be replaced, as 
can any other worker whose performance is unsatisfactory, by a 
decision of the workers' co-operative. 37 
TELEOLOGIST: Basically workers achieve autonomy but lose security because 
in this system a poor performer may be turned on by his colleagues. 
HEART: No system can guarantee compassion but I think that there will be 
a compassionate concern for colleagues within the workers' 
co-operative and that the co-workers of a poor performer will encourage 
and assist him to meet the production standards. If their attempts 
fail he should be let go and encouraged to try again somewhere else, 
perhaps in a field or in circumstances more suited to him. In any 
case the worker's security is more firmly in his own hands than in 
systems, such as capitalism, where "good" performers are likely to 
be laid off during depressed markets. Finally, if he is let go he 
would not be consigned to the "reserve army of the unemployed!! but 
would be encouraged and assisted to take a position in some other 
enterprise or region or to be retrained for a different profession. 
Do you agree, Action-Man? 
ACTION-MAN: Most definitely_ 
SOLIDARITY: Of course I have some detailed concerns which we need not 
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pursue now but I am in favour of the TAG Network idea in general, 
provided the elaboration on the professional association is satisfactory. 
FACILITATOR: It appears that we agree on the general idea of the TAG 
Network and are now ready to address the issue of professional 
organization. 
22. Professional organization 
ACTION-MAN: I share Solidarity's preference for as simple a system for 
organizing and controlling work as is compatible with our democratic 
ideals: simplicity makes the system of social co-operation more under-
standable and hence more readily harnessed to achieve both individual 
and common interests of the members of the community. 
Because we agree on the need for the political jurisdictions 
of the TAG Network to exercise overall control over the division of 
labour, and for worker autonomy within that overall political control 
expressed, at least in part, by the workers' co-operative, we will 
need some other organization to make our system workable. 
PRECISE: "\Plhy? 
ACTION-~Ulli: How do workers get into a particular co-operative? How do 
professionals get trained? What control over professional qualifica-
tion and certification should there be? Who is to exercise it? 
The political jurisdiction cannot assign workers to co-operatives 
because we agreed this would be a voluntary arrangement. Furthermore 
workers' co-operatives have the authority to expel members and this 
would be incompatible with workers being assigned by the political 
jurisdictions or indeed by any other body. Although we want the 
membership of a worker in a particular co-operative to be a matter 
of mutual agreement both workers seeking positions and co-operatives 
seeking workers would benefit from an organization that could provide 
research and assistance to support and supplement the communication/ 
deliberation system. This would be convenient but not essential. 
171 
However when we consider the matter of certifying the qualifications 
of professionals we meet a function which demands a new institution. 
In the argument to follow I am going to assume that a profession 
involves substantial specialized knowledge, understanding, expertise 
or skill in addition to that possessed by a citizen with a good 
general education. 
PRECISE: In that case will there not be a great many unprofessional jobs 
and many workers who will not need professional qualifications? 
ACTION-V~: As long as you agree that there will be some professionals 
I can continue my argument and we can return to your question later. 
I am sure you agree that we need some control over professional 
qualifications and certification in the common interest. After all 
we do not want incompetent or unethical medical doctors, airline 
pilots or automative repairmen practising, do we? 
Well. the political jurisdictions are in no position to exercise 
this control because neither citizens nor their representatives 
generally possess the specialized knowledge, expertise. etc., to 
assess professional qualifications, at least on more complex issues. 
There will be circumstances in which a workers' co-operative 
may be well positioned to assess the professional qualifications of 
aspiring professiona\~e.g. a long standing lawyers' co-operative. 
However there will be many situations in which workers' co-operatives 
could not or ought not determine the professional certification of 
their members. Many co-operatives will have a mix of different 
professionS. among their workers. For example, a co-operative might 
consist of one manager, one accountant, one lawyer, ten engineers. 
ten secretaries, ..•. While co-workers can make many judgments about 
the work performance and relationships of their colleagues they have 
no more grasp of the intricacies of professional practice, outside 
their own field, than do lay citizens. 
Moreover new co-operatives can form at any time. Suppose a 
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group got together to apply for a medical clinic franchise: as a 
workers' co-operative they vouch for each other's qualifications, 
which might be anything at all. This type of self-bestowed certifi-
cation is worthless. 
By similar sorts of arguments we can demonstrate that neither 
political jurisdictions nor workers' co-operatives are in a position 
to control the professional education of future professionals. 
The professional association is the institution that can and 
should control both the professional education and the certification 
of qualification for professional practice. What is a professional 
association? It is an organization of practitioners in a certain 
field or occupation which has certain rights and powers and exercises 
certain functions, principally control over certification, professional 
education and standards of good practice for its members who have 
rights of autonomous practice. I will glide over a number of complex 
questions concerning the ways of categorizing professions and estab-
lishing boundaries between them: for example, is teaching a profession? 
Is university teaching a different profession from primary school 
teaching? Are teachers of different subjects in the same or different 
professions? Can a person belong to more than one profession? 
However professions may be defined, a professional association 
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is an actual organization, which in its structure, internal function-
ing and relationships to other institutions embodies a particular, 
historically determined categorization of the division of social labour. 
The members of this organization are practitioners carrying out certain 
specialized functions within their system of social co-operation. 
There are a number of grounds for believing that they are collectively 
in the best position to determine the criteria for competence and good 
practice within their field. Provided that it has an appropriate 
organization of its internal operations and suitable rights and powers, 
the professional association can and should exercise control over the 
professional education and certification of its members. Briefly, 
the grounds are: the practitioners have more experience concerning 
their practice than any other group; they have generally received 
education and training designed to prepare them for their practice; 
they generally have public trust and confidence in their capabilities 
as practitioners. 
PRECISE: ~fhat if they do not? 
ACTION-I~: If my last point turns out to be false a case might be made 
for placing the authority over education and certification in the 
hands of some other institution. However it caPJlot justifiably be 
left indefinitely with an institution other than the professional 
association because the reason for denying the practitioners control 
is that the public lacks confidence in them, i.e. they are considered 
incompetent or unethical; but if the institution that does exercise 
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this control continues to turn out incompetent or unethical 
practitioners then it is incompetent in the exercise of its authority 
and does not deserve to retain it. On the other hand if this institu-
tion rectifies the problem of competence and ethical practice then this 
argument against the practitioners exercising control no longer applies. 
While I can only touch on the question of appropriate organization 
of the internal operations of a professional association it will need 
to carry out programmes of research and in-service education to improve 
practices, have some systematic approaches to articulating good practice, 
have mechanisms to monitor practice and deal firmly with instances of 
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unprofessional conduct to demonstrate it deserves its authority to 
control the education and certification of its members. 
SCHOLAR: Action-Man's analysis raises some fascinating philosophical 
issues. His arguments are not too tight in places because he bases 
so much of his case on tendencies and his assessments of probabilities. 
However this is not my concern because as Aristotle says, nOur dis-
cussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-
matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all 
d " " n 38 lSCUSSlons, .... Nevertheless there are two interconnected points 
that do concern me: we are left with a problem of self-bestowed 
certification; there is a failure to justify grounding the applicable 
authority in practice. If it is unacceptable for workers' co-operatives 
to certify professionals because a self-bestowed certification is 
worthless, how can it be acceptable for practitioners to certify 
themselves through the professional association? 
Concerning the second point, do we not often criticize practice? 
If practice is to be the basis of certification then how can good 
practice be distinguished from poor, or competence from incompetence? 
As I understand Action-Man's idea of the professional association the 
judgments concerning good practice and competence are made collectively, 
i.e. by some kind of consensus of the practitioners. But is this 
adequate? If a profession is generally characterized by good practice 
and competent performance then I am sure that consensus of the 
practitioners will identify good practice. Equally so, if a 
profession is characterized by poor practices or incompetence the 
consensus of practitioners will fail to identify good practice! 
For example, suppose that in a certain community most second-hand car 
dealers are crooks who swindle and deceive their customers. Would 
these practitioners establish the criteria for good practice? It is 
more likely that they would de-certify the minority of honest dealers. 
Are you willing to grant these second-hand car dealers professional 
self-governance? Consensus may correspond with good practice on 
occasion but it is not consensus that makes practices good or bad, 
competent or incompetent, ethical or unethical. When people deliberate 
concerning good practice they are (or ought to be) pursuing some objec-
tive criteria and not merely reporting their opinions. Moreover, 
defining good practice in terms of a consensus of practitioners is 
too conservative a policy and could retard the rate of improvement 
in practice. 
What are the policy implications of my concerns? In addition 
to practitioners there should be lay and expert representatives on· 
the boards of bodies with the powers to control professional education 
and to determine certification. Let me illustrate some of the problems 
in Action-Man's analysis with the example of school teachers. In many 
jurisdictions university teachers control the education of school 
teachers in training. Because many of the university teachers do 
not (or have not for a long time) practised school teaching they lack 
the experience to ground their assessments of good practice but in a 
different sense they are practitioners - in that they teach school 
teachers in training - and therefore they have the best claim to 
control the education of school teachers~ So there seems to be some 
indeterminacy concerning the application of 'practitioner'. Common 
sense suggests that we are better served to have the control of the 
education of school teachers shared among lay citizens, school teachers 
and the university teachers who train school teachers. It is easy to 
generalize this finding for other professions. 
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Lay representatives are required to represent the public interest, 
practitioners to express the insights and interests only they can, and 
experts to bring to bear specialized knowledge unavailable to 
practitioners and lay members. In any field systematic research into 
the conditions and requirements for good practice can provide valid 
and useful information for professional improvement. People who do 
this kind of research or who are very well versed in its findings are 
the experts I refer to. 
TELEOLOGIST: Scholar's criticisms should prove helpful in clarifying this 
part of the discussion. However I think she missed the point concern-
ing self-bestowed qualifications. At the time when a professional 
association certifies a particular candidate that candidate is not 
a member and so there is no problem of nyou certify me and I will 
certify youll • 
ACTION-¥~N: May I add something before you continue, Teleologist? I 
want to pick up on your point about historical continuity and connect 
it to the initiation of young people into full citizenship and work 
because the professional association has a crucial function in this 
regard. In an authentic democracy the education of children and young 
people will have two main aims: a general education developing know-
ledge, understanding and skills for social, cultural and political 
participation and, most importantly the democratic character, i.e. 
responsibility, autonomy, authenticity, self-esteem, etc.; a 
professional education which will develop knowledge, expertise and 
skill relevant to further training in a wide range of professions, 
and specific training to attain the qualifications to practise at 
least one. 
I see this trai~ing for a specific profession as the 
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responsibility of the professional association. For the young 
citizen initiation into a profession begins with his specialized 
professional education and a milestone is reached when he is 
certified to practise. There is a very important issue here concern-
ing the control over professional education and certification and the 
way this social policy affects personal autonomy. During his period 
of apprenticeship and initial professional education the trainee is 
not granted the same authority as practitioners; his work experience 
is under the supervision of certified practitioners. How do we 
justify the subordinate status of the trainee? 
PRECISE: He lacks the knowledge, skill, experience or competence of the 
certified professional. 
ACTION-MAN: Yes and perhaps additionally he has yet to internalize the 
norms and ethical principles of the profession, which include a 
concern for the client's interests, a capacity for sound judgment 
and a disposition toward autonomous practice. Our understanding of 
I-self's good is the basis of our commitment to autonomous practice 
by workers: this is why we choose professional rather than employee 
status. During his period of apprenticeship and professional educa-
tion prior to certification the trainee is equipped with the capability 
for autonomous practice. If his training and education are successful 
he will be capable of distinguishing good practice from bad and of 
producing competent performance. He and his certified colleagues 
comprise the only group that can claim both the ethical and the 
technical authority to control training and certification. Moreover, 
because we oppose a group of mere functionaries carrying out the 
specialized aspects of professional education according to the 
standards set by the practitioners, the professional association 
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should arrange to provide the teachers for these specialized aspects 
from among its own membership. Also, assuming they have sufficient 
pedagogical skill, practitioners' experience and understanding will 
tend to make them the most effective teachers. 
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To connect this argument to individual worker autonomy: when 
control over education and certification rests with the professional 
association the trainee knows that his subordinate status is temporary 
and, if successful, he will join a self-governing, collegial community 
of professionals. However, if this control rests with some other 
institution then the principle of autonomy is violated and authoritarian 
principles are at work: rather than the unequal status of the trainee 
professional being temporary - to be ended when he becomes initiated 
into the profession - it is permanent, and all his life he is fated 
to work subject to political or "expert!! authority incompatible with 
professional autonomy. 
FACILITATOR: Thank you, Action-Man, I believe that Teleologist has some 
other points concerning Scholar's arguments. 
TELEOLOGIST: Scholar is concerned about the primacy of practice and about 
!lobjectivity" concerning good practice. I agree that consensus does 
not make practices good or bad but this argument is a straw-man 
because there is no reason to suppose that a professional association 
would be arbitrary or irrational in its deliberations. 
Perhaps we need to go back to first principles. Good practice 
is good for someone. For whom? If we think of work involving the 
worker, the worker's colleagues, the client and the general public 
then we can say that good practice will be good for the worker 
himself, the worker's colleagues, the client and the general public. 
The workers' co-operative represents the interests of co-workers and 
the political jurisdictions, through general legislation and the 
terms and conditions of franchise approvals, those of citizens and 
. 39 third partles. What about the client, particularly the individual 
client? How can the individual's interests be represented in dealings 
with professionals? It is most important that the legislation and 
policies of the political jurisdiction ensure that a client/professional 
relationship pertains and that citizens do not have llprofessional ll 
services imposed on them. Hence we insist on a freely negotiated 
relationship between client and professional. Given the foregoing 
safeguards there is one additional protection needed by the client -
the assurance that the professional is both competent and ethical, 
i.e. that he understands good practice and that he acts in his client's 
interests. Action-Man argues, and I agree, that the professional 
association, through its control over the education and certification 
of professional workers and its capacity to monitor and improve 
practice, is uniquely capable of providing this assurance. Hence the 
professional association, in conjunction with the other institutions 
of an authentic democracy, fosters an equal consideration of the good 
of everyone, i.e. it fosters the realization of our fundamental 
principle of social co-operation and justice. 
Then Scholar directs us to a more fundamental problem - that of 
grounding the assessment of good practice in practice itself. She 
suggests that there is a circular justification in going with "what 
works". Is basing good practice on practitioners' judgments of what 
works really circular? Not according to our analysis of reflexive 
monitoring in section 7: we agreed that rules, principles or criteria 
for evaluating any particular action must be grounded in I-self's 
authentic project. In terms of the project structure to say that 
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certain practices "work li is to claim that they represent efficacious 
praxis towards the aims of one's project and even when we do not 
explicitly articulate our aims, flit works" is our assessment that 
our project, or a particular part of it, is proceeding satisfactorily. 
While this assessment is not necessarily the same thing as authenticity, 
the determination that one's project is or is not authentic involves 
an nit worksll judgment as well. The concern with efficacy, i.e. with 
practices that work, is a basic feature of the authentic project. 
Rence the grounding in practice is in accordance with our finding, 
in section 7, that the basis for evaluation is I-self's authentic 
project. 
Moreover, any practices which people have followed for some time 
have passed a feasibility test - it may not be extremely stringent -
but there are nevertheless any number of theories, principles, notions 
and ideas about practice that have never passed the test of w·orking 
or, if they once worked, they no longer do. Importantly the judgment 
of workability is both lay and professional: chiropractors and neuro-
surgeons have clients who choose to use their services and who have a 
certain degree of confidence in their practices. Rence prevailing 
practice involves multiple judgments of workability subject to ongoing 
tests and criticism. Although practice is always imperfect and con-
tinually requires revision the only sound policy is to determine 
standards for good practice through a consensus of practitioners. 
If these practitioners deliberate within their own TAG Network under 
conditions of symmetrical power relations and undistorted communication, 
i.e. if the professional association is internally democratic, a con-
sensus of practitioners offers the best chance of identifying good 
practice and this consensus will embody a suitable degree of 
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agnosticism concerning indeterminate matters that will foster research 
and innovation. Modifying and transforming existing practices rather 
than trying to institute new practices Ilfrom scratch!! based on ideal 
theoretical models accords with our general strategy for social change. 
Scholar's arguments concerning lay and expert representation have 
a certain plausibility for liberal capitalist systems but are not 
appropriate for an authentic democracy. Right now we are concerned 
not with professional control within our existing system of social 
relations but within the TAG Network which provides for citizen control 
in a number of ways. Perhaps Action-Man will summarize these for us. 
ACTION-MAN: The legislation, targets for training new professionals and 
the allocation of public funds to the professional association are 
approved by the political jurisdictions. However it is important 
for professional associations to have the right to prepare draft 
legislation and policy proposals and to address the citizens directly 
concerning them. In other words the professional associations are 
part of the TAG Network and "plug into l1 particular political juris-
dictions. The performance of a particular unit, e.g. a school, is 
subject to political control through the performance standards in 
the franchise establishing the unit. Teleologist has already men-
tioned the workers' co-operatives and the legislation concerning 
client rights. Incidentally professional status is much more suppor-
tive of client rights than is employee status as we will see in 
Chapter V. 
Within the TAG Network, the ends, purposes and interests of 
citizens and clients will not fall under professional control but 
it is precisely because, and in so far as, the professional association 
can exercise assessment and control of professional practice which is 
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beyond the capacity of the client, political jurisdiction or workers' 
co-operative, that this institution serves the common interest. 
TELEOLOGIST: Also Scholar was overly pessimistic concerning the possi-
bilities for improving practice. Consider her example of the second-
hand car dealers - a pretty sorry lot to be granted professional self-
governance. Nevertheless let us see how this group fares within the 
TAG Network. A dealer has to gain and keep a franchise and so has a 
motivation to provide good service. He faces excessive regulation 
(for him) through legislation and the franchises unless there is 
public trust and confidence in his profession. Even a crook and a 
swindler will want to have high standards, including ethics, of train-
ing and qualification for new entrants because this will build public 
confidence and tend to make clients less wary of his sharp deals. 
Therefore, over time, we can expect ever higher proportions of 
competent and ethical practitioners. 
I agree with Scholar that systematic research into professional 
practice can provide insights and information to improve professional 
practice. The question is, should this research be performed as part 
of the professional development activity of the practitioners and 
under the auspices of the professional association or is it to be 
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done by experts and specialists apart from the professional association? 
The answer, although it is at odds with our present social relations, 
should be obvious. Unless the professional association controls and 
directs this activity we will have either: a deprofessionalized work 
force of worker functionaries, who do not know what they are about, 
counterposed to a body of Ilexpertsll who do not practise the occupation 
but claim to be able to assess good practice in it; or a conflict 
between a professional body of vTOrkers who lack resources for systematic 
research, and a body of researchers isolated from both practice and 
practitioners. The former is a form of class system in which the 
"experts!! have greater prestige and resources than the functionaries, 
while the latter represents a waste of social powers and resources. 
Hence we must have a professional association which controls its own 
research activity and resources. 40 
SCHOLAR: I am convinced. 
SOLIDARITY: I am nearly convinced but I do not like the term 
'professional' - it suggests privilege. Why not simply call workers 
'workers' and their organization a 'labour union' or 'trade tL~ion'? 
ACTION-~1AN: I have no objection to calling workers 'workers' - I have 
been doing that but their association will not be a trade union 
because it will not engage in collective bargaining with employers, 
which is what trade unions do. Concerning privilege, unlike the term 
'capitalist' there is nothing within the concept of 'professional' 
which implies privilege. If we take medicine as a paradigm of a 
profession it is characterized by practitioner control over training 
and certification, autonomous practice and professional/client rather 
than employer/employee/customer relations. It is true that doctors 
have been a privileged occupational group but this is only in relation 
to employees. In our authentic democratic society all workers will be 
professionals - including salespersons, farmers, secretaries, plumbers 
and so on. Therefore professional status will not represent special 
privilege but a general equality for workers. 
PRECISE: But what about jobs that do not require special expertise, skill 
or knowledge beyond that possessed by any educated citizen? Someone 
has to sweep the streets, shovel snow and do various jobs that call 
for no specialised knowledge or skill and which frankly lack the 
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prestige of callings like medicine or law. How can you make a 
profession out of such jobs? It would be a farce~ 
ACTION-MAN: There will be such functions and we will not call them 
'professions'. It is undesirable for anyone to be assigned to such 
tasks as a career and by their very nature unnecessary. Because 
virtually anyone can do such tasks on a short-term basis and hardly 
anyone will want to make a life-time career of them they will be 
rotated around or done as part of our civic duty. Here we follow 
the principle of replication of function because we are committed to 
a general equality of esteem, responsibility and satisfaction. 
SOLIDARITY: We have yet to discuss whether child-care is work or how 
political control is exercised over parents. 
FACILITATOR: May we leave that question until Chapter V? 
SOLIDARITY: Fine. I am persuaded by the general idea of the TAG Network 
although I wish it were less complex. I am somewhat uneasy about the 
many unanswered questions, most importantly the issues of the internal 
functioning of the professional association. I want some assurance 
that it really will promote the improvement of practice and not drag 
down and constrain innOVators or become a lobby for sectoral interests. 
LIBERAL: Yes, the complexities are of the right sort, are they not? They 
reconcile worker autonomy and political accountability; citizens are 
spared the costs of an extensive bureaucracy and the threat of a 
"New Class ll domination through a managerial/supervisory meritocracy. 
Moreover I doubt if our future worker-citizens will find the 
TAG Network complicated or in any way difficult to understand. In 
every form of work and political activity our future citizen starts 
with a face-to-face group within which he actively participates. 
He can follO"lv all the deliberations that concern him and readily 
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trace every political decision affecting his life to a definite body 
and he will understand what he can do to influence these political 
decisions. Perhaps the TAG Network is difficult to understand for 
one looking out from some central perspective with an aim of trying 
to control or influence every citizen or the system as a whole. The 
three track system of official representation and the vast number of 
groups expressing interests or concerns of people in the areas of 
cultural and religious activity will make central direction accord-
ing to some blueprint envisaged by a political or spiritual elite 
umTorkable. Hence the TAG Network has a simplicity at the "grassroots!! 
level that strengthens democratic participation and a complexity from 
the central perspective that protects society from the dangers of 
totalitarianism. 
FACILITATOR: We have achieved some significant findings. In our next 
session we sketch out a transition strategy from constitutional to 
authentic democracy through organizing a TAG Network. 
23. The transition strategy from constitutional to authentic democracy 
ACTION-FlliN: Our target or vision is some form of TAG Network and our 
existing situation is a constitutional democracy, i.e. a society 
which provides a selfidual sphere and rights and freedoms of 
association, organization and expression. Essentially we want to 
make use of the possibilities available in our constitutional 
democracy to transform our society into an authentic democracy. In 
a nutshell our strategy involves simultaneous actions directed to: 
(I) organize TAGs in all significant spheres of life, such as the 
work-place, trade unions, the local community, political parties, 
the churches, ethnic and cultural communities, etc.; 
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(2) connect existing TAGs into communication networks operating 
on democratic principles; 
(3) use the combined economic and political power of the members of 
the TAG Networks to develop new and extend existing forms of 
co-operative activity in production, exchange and cultural 
activity; 
(4) gain control over aspects of the information and communications 
system of the society through political regulation of public 
networks and systems and/or the co-operative ownership of 
television and radio channels, newspapers, publishing houses, 
information storage and retrieval systems and the like; 
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(5) gain increasing political control over the system of nation 
states and use this control to implement reforms in law, the 
structural organization of political life, property, human rights, 
the allocation of social resources and so on; 
(6) carry out systematic educational activity to prepare people to 
participate as autonomous agents in the democratic transformation 
of their society, to be good citizens, to enjoy life and to 
realize their own authentic projects. 
COMMENTARY: In fact the TAG elaborated the six points outlined above in 
detail but I do not report that part of their deliberations because it is 
peripheral to our theme of educational evaluation. However I do follow 
up on the sixth point concerning educational activity in Chapters V and VI. 
This chapter concludes with Facilitator's summation. 
FACILITATOR: The citizens of the authentic democracy organized as a TAG 
Network have the power to transform the social activities of their 
society and the economic, cultural and social aims these activities 
are designed to further; to make all the laws binding citizens in 
their various jurisdictions; to establish all rights and powers 
including the civil, human and political rights of individuals and 
property rights, e.g. rights to practise various professions; to 
make rules concerning the organization of work and cultural and 
educational activity. They establish the division of social actions. 
the assignment of individuals to positions and their access to 
resources and social powers. Therefore categorial power is 
exercised within the TAG Network and because this categorial power 
is held and exercised equally by all citizens we have an authentic 
democratic society - a society in which future transformations are 
determined by the people. 
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C HAP T E R V 
EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY 
24. Basic aims 
FACILITATOR: Let us take time to recapitulate. We agree that principles 
for educational evaluation should be grounded in some conception of 
the good for human beings and we have taken and justified a position 
on this in terms of two related ideas - I-self's good and the FPSC. 
With these two basic ideas and the analyses of the project structure, 
authenticity, autonomy, reflexive monitoring, social co-operation, 
categorial power, social transformation, TAGs, TAG Networks, etc., 
we should be ready to begin the articulation of princi~Cs for 
educational evaluation. Of the four main criteria of I-self's good 
clearly 'self-development' is most directly related to 'education'. 
PRECISE: Before we begin I think we should define 'education' and review 
our concept of 'self-development'. 
HEART: 'Self-development' refers to developing or strengthening powers 
and capacities to understand self/world, to monitor reflexively 
one's actions and project and to plan, organize and implement actions 
as part of one's authentic project. How is this concept related to 
or distinguished from that of 'education'? 
'Education', in the sense important to us, refers to a process 
of learning involving the acquisition of dispositions, attitudes, 
skills, lcrrowledge and understanding; generally, although not 
necessarily, through somewhat systematic approaches. 
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Many scholars offer persuasive definitions of education 1-Thich 
incorporate particular normative positions they support. We are 
better to remain faithful to the everyday idea of education and use 
the normative principles that we have justified as the basis for our 
evaluation of educational processes rather than trying to define 
. 1 
unacceptable educational practices out of eXlstence. 
Now what follows from our commitments to I-self's good, the 
FPSC and our analyses concerning justice and democracy? 
Clearly democratic social life makes challenging demands regard-
ing the character, dispositions, virtues, communication skills, know-
ledge and understandings of each citizen. Democratic social institu-
tions are not "people-proof" but depend upon responsible,moral and 
intelligent action by the citizens. Moreover, consider the tasks of 
transforming incompletely democratic or undemocratic institutions -
this makes these demands even more challenging. Therefore the task 
of education for democracy is crucial. 
SCHOLAR: I hope you do not consider education to be a merely instrumental 
means to social justice. 
HEART: Surely education should have two types of functions and two corres-
ponding sorts of justifications. The education of a particular 
individual should instrumentally foster the good and interests of 
other citizens - the FPSC directs us to take a position concerning 
the character, dispositions, virtues, attitudes, knowledge, skills 
and understandings we should develop in students to promote the 
common interests of all citizens. 
LIBER.4..L: "Character shaping" has dangerous authoritarian implications. 
For example, Bereiter challenges the right of society to educate 
children - to the extent that 'to educate' suggests the inculcation 
of knowledge, beliefs, values, habits and personal traits. He 
opposes the imposition, through public education, of particular values 
resulting in the shaping of the child's character or her formation as 
a whole person. He writes, "Education, therefore, in so far as it 
deals with these characteristics of a person should be provided only 
in the form of options for people who are old enough to choose how 
2 they want to change themselves. 1I Bereiter holds that the only 
justified kind of teaching is skills training because it is non-
authoritarian. 
HEART: Bereiter is right to alert us to the authoritarian dangers in 
character formation through public education and we should keep his 
warnings in mind when we address the political control over education 
but even Bereiter concedes that some approach to character formation 
is unavoidable, as indeed our analysis of social structuration shows. 3 
I am not saying that teachers or public education officials should 
have a blank cheque authorizing them to shape children's characters 
as they see fit or that they should be directed to mould the person-
ali ties of students according to the dictates of parliaments or 
legislatures. Those are horrifying ideas. However, is education 
that consciously and deliberately develops those features of 
character that go with just and democratic social co-operation wrong? 
Is it really, in Bereiter's words, "a terrible affront to individual 
libertylt?4 
LIBERAL: Provided public authority is not used to impose particular 
conceptions of morality or the good life through education and is 
restricted to the promotion of core values necessary for justice 
and democracy we should support public educational activity directed 
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to the development of the child's character, dispositions, virtues, etc. 
But what does HE.~T say concerning the other type of function 
education is to serve? 
HEART: The other function is to advance the self-development of each 
student in a way that supports her self-realization in both the 
present and the future. This dimension of education must be 
personalized, it must: connect to the personal meaning systems of 
the student; help her to a more authentic grasp of her project; 
develop the personal powers she needs to advance toward her own 
visions; do all this in a way that respects the quality of her lived 
experience in the here and now. 
LIBERAL: I am sure that we all agree with both functions - indeed we have 
determined two broad aims for education: 
(I) the self-development of each individual in accordance with 
her own authentic project; 
(2) the formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, 
knowledge, understandings and skills for democratic citizenship. 
HEART: I am pleased that ~ agree but let us not think that everyone will 
readily consent to these two broad aims. It is unfortunately true 
that meritocratic values have deeply penetrated our society and 
especially our educational institutions. 5 In endorsing these two 
basic aims we are at the same time rejecting and opposing education 
that serves a selective function for a meritocratic social order. 
Apologists for selective education come in many shades and hues and 
they variously define 'desert' in terms of the appropriation of 
particular cultural traditions, social class, wealth, intelligence, 
leadership ability, •.•. However they all advocate restricting or 
ending the access of some students at some point within the educa-
tional programme on some basis of tldesert". As grounds for selection, 
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intelligence, family wealth and social class are each unacceptable 
to us. Selective education is contrary to both our aims. As a 
!lgood" for I-self, education should be equally accessible to all 
citizens. Secondly, the character, dispositions, powers, etc., of 
democratic citizenship are needed in all citizens. 
111any questions are still left open concerning more specific 
aims, processes and relationships but it is important to stress our 
two basic aims and our fundamental opposition to selective education 
and meritocratic values. 
SOLIDARITY: Therefore the opposition to education for democracy will 
largely come from the proponents of meritocracy as a principle for 
organizing the basic structure of society. 
HEART: No doubt one source of opposition to education for democracy 
comes from "up front" advocates of meritocracy but we can demon-
strate the unacceptability of their thesis quite readily and. defeat 
their ideological position through rational argument. However there 
are other positions which are more difficult to deal with - for 
example, the argument that llstandards" are built into subjects or 
disciplines; this produces selective education and justifies it on 
the grounds that the standards are simply given and nothing can be 
done to make the discipline or subject accessible to the less able 
students. There are also some religious traditions which may find 
our position regarding man's good unacceptable but there is nothin~ 
in religion per se that contradicts our principle that man's good 
6 is a sufficient basis for educational evaluation. Our position 
regarding cultural pluralism commits us to ensure that the adherents 
of these traditions have the opportunity to pursue their commitments 
and celebrate their beliefs within their cultural communities but 
to the extent that their values contradict the FPSC they should not 
be recognized within the organizing principles for the basic structure 
of society or of its public educational system. 
PRECISE: But disciplines do have practices and standards built into them. 
TELEOLOGIST: Are not disciplines and subjects actually rather convenient 
shorthand expressions to describe certain cultural practices and 
traditions? And do teachers and others responsible for education 
not have to justify the subjects and disciplines used as resources 
in education? How can they do this except by reference to I-self's 
good? 
ACTION-¥~: What practical problems result from the many cases in which 
teachers or academics create a mystique that covers up the true 
justification for the discipline? 
TELEOLOGIST: The main danger is that the teacher fails to connect the 
educational activity to the authentic project of the student because 
the discipline is seen as self-justifying. 
PRECISE: Do even very young children have authentic projects? 
TELEOLOGIST: An awareness of project emerges over time from an initially 
fairly undifferentiated care structure present at birth. 
PRECISE: Precisely what do we mean by 'project' here? 
TELEOLOGIST: By 'project' we mean the structure of care and responsibility 
bound up with a continuous, meaningful flow of actions connecting a 
future vision to I-self's present predicament.? While at a pre-school 
level the child demonstrates in her play the crucial sense of engage-
ment and destiny that goes with having a project and in her joys, 
fears and anxieties she shows that the issue of authenticity, while 
not articulate, is present to her. 
To advance the student's good, education must support her 
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self-realization in the here and now; must foster her understanding 
and efficacious praxis concerning her present project. This does 
not ignore future needs because the project structure is inherently 
futural, going from a present situation to a future vision grasped 
in the present. Worthwhile educational activity helps the student 
see her project more truly and generally this requires that teachers 
be sensitive to the present understandings, self-definitions and 
"personal meaning systems ll of their students.8 
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This does not mean that the teacher should refrain from intro-
ducing her students to cultural traditions and academic material 
until they develop a "spontaneoustl interest in them. Such passivity 
would be irresponsible and inauthentic because it involves the teacher 
in ignoring crucial aspects of her students' predicaments. Neverthe-
less the cultural traditions and academic material have to be connected 
to the student's project and this is an immense challenge to the 
teacher. 
If her project is ignored, the student's needs are not met. Not 
only does she fail to develop needed powers and resources but her 
autonomy and self-esteem are undermined and she may develop a distaste 
for formal education that will cut her off from future opportunities. 
Self-development is more than gaining knowledge, skills, powers 
etc. for efficacious praxis on one's projects; it is above all con-
cerned with the truth of being. The truth that matters is the truth 
of our own existence, not that of a subject matter detached from human 
agency. 
PRECISE: You are saying that good education must reveal our existence as 
it really and truly is and must help us to see the distinction between 
I-self's way of being-in-the-world and that of things. But this does 
not seem to justify a focus on the student's unique project. 
TELEOLOGIST: It is truth, responsibility and caring rather than unique-
ness that generates the authenticity of a project. Hence the teacher 
must intervene without taking the student's care and responsibility 
from her; must see her student as a responsible agent and not as a 
recipient of teaching acts or a centre of various flbehaviours". We 
need liberal in the sense of 'liberating' education, in which the 
student is left with her own care structure, her own project and 
her own responsibilities but in her growing transparency of under-
standing and personal and social powers she becomes free, self-chosen 
and powerful. 
Because thought and action, theory and practice are integrated 
in our conception of the project we agree with John Dewey that 
education should arise genuinely from the experience and activity 
of the student. 9 
25. Elaborating educational aims 
FACILITATOR: From our analyses of man's good we have derived two basic 
aims of education. Because the social commitment underlying these 
aims is democratic we can say that, "The two basic aims of education 
for democracy are: 
(1) the self-development of each individual in accordance with 
her own authentic project; 
(2) the formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, 
knowledge, understandings and skills for democratic citizenship.1I 
For short we refer to the first as 'the existential aim' and the 
second as 'the social aim'. 
We have also seen that the existential aim implies that the 
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student's project and personal meanings must have a central place 
in the more specific elaboration of the aims and in the actual 
conduct of educational activity. In this session we inquire into 
the problem of giving greater specificity to educational aims. 
SOLID~~ITY: The logical next step is to set out goals, objectives and 
curriculum contents derived from our basic aims. Then we can 
establish detailed evaluative criteria. 
TELEOLOGIST: That seems a very natural approach but of course it raises 
the question of what procedures and considerations should be used 
in giving specificity to our aims. May I suggest an approach? 
I-self's good is the source of our.~;~tential aim and the FPSC is 
the source of our social aim. But what kind of an activity is 
educational evaluation? Is it not simply a form of reflexive 
monitoring, applied specifically to education? If our processes 
of evaluation are well conducted they will amount to critical 
reflexion focused on education. This suggests the kinds of things 
we need to keep in mind in performing an educational evaluation. 
Clearly our existential and social conception of the good have to 
be kept in view but equally we need to monitor: 
(A) the natural and social world of the participants, i.e. their 
situation; 
(B) the future visions of the participants; 
(C) the outcomes of the educational activity in both existential 
and social terms. 
These considerations can be shown to be important to educational 
evaluation by tracing through our analyses of reflexive monitoring, 
I-self's good and the FPSC. 
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SOLIDARITY: Those three considerations are quite obvious. Let us get on 
with setting our objectives and curriculum. 
TELEOLOGIST: If we follow through our discussion of procedure we will see 
that we should not be in the business of setting specific objectives 
and curriculum! rlease consider diagram 8. 
DIAGRAM 8 CONSIDERATIONS IN ELABORATING EDUCATIONAL AIMS 
Conception of the Good 
(A) Analysis of natural and 
social world 
(B) Vision 
(C) Educational outcomes 
(Gl) 
Aim (1) 
Existential 
(Sl) 
(VI) 
(01) 
, 
.. -... __ .. ~~~~ .... ~ ... ~-
I will give a gloss on each of these entries: 
Aim (2) 
Social 
(Gl) is the existential conception of man's good, i.e. I-self's good; 
(G2) is the social conception of man's good, i.e. the FPSC; 
(Sl) is the actual situation or predicament of the learner; 
(S2) is the common situation or predicament of a community or society; 
(VI) is the learner's vision in her authentic project; 
(V2) is a communally shared vision of a community or society for 
their social co-operation; 
\01) is the existential experience the learner has in relation to 
her vision; 
(02) is the achievement, within individuals, of the character, 
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dispositions, virtues, powers, knowledge, understandings and 
skills in relation to the communal vision. 
PRECISE: Can these considerations really be separated the way you suggest? 
TELEOLOGIST: In practice educational activity cannot be disentangled to 
reveal these dimensions as separate, independent strands. The student 
cannot detach her social character from her personal meanings and 
commitments and turn it over to her teacher to shape according to 
community standards. Please do not interpret diagram 8 as revealing 
sharp distinctions between discrete entries but rather consider it 
as identifying considerations that reveal profound dimensions, e.g., 
the existential and the social, that are inextricably joined. 
What needs stressing is that all these "entries" must be con-
sidered in educational evaluation. tlHorizontally", existential and 
social dimensions should be considered; lIverticallyll, the conception 
of the good, the analysis of the natural and social world and the 
vision. Moreover, there should be both horizontal and vertical 
coherence. As an example of horizontal coherence consider I-self's 
good and the FPSC; these two ideas are consistent, mutually supportive 
and can be understood as harmonious polar dimensions within a unified 
value system. 
HEART: Therefore the achievement of horizontal coherence between (Sl) and 
(S2) and between (VI) and (V2) is crucial; if it is not accomplished 
existential and social outcomes will tend to conflict. I think we 
should address the question of coherence between these various 
elements now. 
ACTION-MAN: Just before we do, it would help if we filled in the various 
entries of the diagram with our main findings. 
199 
f 
D IAGRAlYI 8.1 
Conception of 
the Good 
Aims 
SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN ELABORATING EDUCATIONAL AI~ffi 
I-self's good 
self-development in 
accordance with 
individual's authentic 
project 
the FPSC 
formation of the character, 
dispositions, virtues, powers, 
knowledge, and skills for 
democratic citizenship 
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(A) Analysis of 
natural and 
social i'iorld 
I-self's predicament 
analysis of social structuration, 
division of social actions, 
social freedoms, capitalism, 
classes, meritocracy, sexism, 
racism, telecommunications, ... 
(B) Vision I-self's vision 
(c) Outcomes I-self's experience 
TAG Network including pyramidal 
political jurisdictions, 
cultural TAGs, franchises, 
workers' co-ops., professional 
associations, ... 
achievement of democratic 
character, dispositions, etc. 
PRECISE: Where does the student's project fit? 
HEART: I-self's predicament, vision and experience together constitute 
her project. But what do the corresponding entries in the right 
column (i.e. lS2), (V2) and (02)) refer to? Simply, to the possibility 
of a community "project". If there is an actual community that actually 
carries out communal critical reflexion, reaches a common understand-
ing of the community situation, determines a shared vision and engages 
in collective social action we have the conditions for horizontal 
coherence. If this coherence cannot be achieved then there is no 
possibility of even articulating specific aims, objectives and 
curriculum on a satisfactory basis. If the participants in an 
educational system are unable to elaborate their educational programmes, 
whether in terms of objectives, curriculum, subjects, disciplines 
or whatever, in a manner that achieves both vertical and horizontal 
coherence, then there is a fundamental flaw in the way they have 
articulated their educational purposes, and therefore there will 
be no coherent criteria for evaluating the system of education on 
a basis agreed to by participants who are autonomous and authentic. 10 
What is involved in achieving horizontal coherence? Although 
this is a vast inquiry that we can only probe in a few places, at 
the most basic level we are concerned with various social relationships. 
Moreover the range of possible social relationships through which the 
partiCipants, principally students, teachers and parents, achieve or 
fail to achieve coherence will be largely determined by the political 
control exercised over educational activity_ Therefore, with respect 
to our agenda, relationships within, and political control over, 
education, are rationally prior to learning objectives, curriculum 
and pedagogy. 
By 'rationally prior' I mean that if we want to evaluate, 
manage or change an educational system, school or classroom the 
sensible course is to elaborate our two basic aims for education in 
terms of the appropriate kinds of relationships among teachers, 
parents, students, other institutions and the overall system of 
political control before articulating learning objectives, curriculum 
and pedagogy. 
Clearly this principle has implications for educational practice 
but equally it bears on the way educational theory should be formulated. 
Indeed a great deal of educational theory is fundamentally misconceived 
because it violates this principle. 
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~P~CISE: It might help if you clarified what you mean by curriculum and 
pedagogy. Also is it not possible that an understanding of curriculum 
and pedagogy might help us to determine appropriate relationships and 
political control? 
HEART: There is a certain tradition in American educational thought of 
proceeding from aims to objectives to curriculum contents. ll This 
is supposed to establish the "what" of educational activity with 
pedagogy concerned with the "hown , i.e. with the means for teaching 
whatever you are trying to teach. There is a danger in the distinc-
tion between curriculum and pedagogy producing a too sharp separation 
of ends and means although this varies according to different perspec-
tives on curriculum and pedagogy. 
Concerning your question, an understanding of curriculum and 
pedagogy is helpful to the degree that we address various categories 
cyclically rather than sequentially but to the extent that there is 
a sequential order it is politics, power and communications before 
curriculum and pedagogy. 
With respect to principles or theory there are four main reasons 
supporting this finding: 
~l) By proceeding from our basic aims to objectives, curriculum, 
pedagogy, evaluation or some similar sequence, categorial 
power and many of the key actors in the educational drama are 
left completely out of account. The political relationships 
and the system of political control cannot appear within this 
schema. ~edagogy is concerned with teacher/student relationships 
but no pedagogy can put those relationships into a social and 
political context unless that context is already given. ~edagogy 
cannot generate a socio-political context but a set of social and 
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political principles for relationships within education can 
generate the framework for a pedagogy. 
\2) Assuming that inquiries into curriculum and pedagogy are 
relevant and useful at some point and to some degree, which we 
surely do, the most efficient approach is to work out the position 
on relationships and political control first so that the inquiries 
into curriculum and pedagogy are carried out by the appropriate 
parties ~~d their findings directed where they will be most 
helpful. 
(3) If the community is to use the actual predicaments and authentic 
projects of its members in articulating educational aims they 
must address relationships and political control temporally 
prior to determining their aims. This is because the actual 
relationships among the parties and the actual system of political 
control are crucial aspects of their predicament, and because the 
visionary aspects of their projects must embody some transforma-
tion of these actual features. Objectives, as elaborations of 
aims, must also be determined after consideration of relationships 
and governance; and curriculum, which I prefer to think of as a 
selection of cultural resources to support educational activity, 
must also be decided later. 12 
(4) Decisions about curricula, subjects, disciplines, courses of 
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study, etc. involve judgments, evaluations and selections concern-
ing culture; the rationality of these judgments, etc. must be 
defined procedurally, i.e. in part, in terms of the kinds of 
considerations raised in sections 16 and 17 regarding communica-
tions. Curricular decisions will be arbitrary if made independently 
of some justifiable set of relationships and system of political 
control whereas principles for relationships and political control 
can be derived from our analyses of I-self's good, social 
co-operation, etc. and do not require the prior determination 
of principles for curriculum. 
ACTION-~UN: Could you give us an example of rational versus arbitrary 
judgments about culture and how they relate to curriculum? 
HE_~T: 'Rationality' suggests systematic ways of thinking that apply to 
all of us, leading us to objective, necessary and normatively 
. t I· 13 approprla e conc USlons. Rationality can take us a certain distance 
irrespectively of our position within a particular system of social 
relations and irrespectively of the nature of those relations, e.g. 
the FPSC expresses a rational vision for persons living within all 
or at least a very wide range of different circumstances. Neverthe-
less there is an extremely limited length to the journey in terms of 
specifying educational aims and processes, that rationality can take 
us before we must take detailed features of our circumstances into 
account. Take language as an example. Rationally we agree that our 
community needs a common language, but given the many choices is 
there a rational procedure for deciding which of many possible 
languages should be privileged? More precisely is there a rational 
way to make this sort of decision independently of the relations and 
interactions of the members of the community? 
Decisions about curriculum, e.g. whether and in what specific 
form mathematics, sciences, social studies, the arts, literature, 
etc. are taught, like those concerning language, involve 'cultural 
arbitraries', i.e. there are ~ right answers applying to all 
circumstances. This does not mean such decisions are unimportant, 
for they can be crucial. It means that their correctness and 
204 
205 
rationality depends on the procedures used and on the communication 
processes and power relations connecting those affected by the decisions. 
So far we have discussed an inquiry into principles. However a 
particular educational system may use the sequence of aims, objectives, 
etc. as the actual process of political and administrative decision-
making. Within its jurisdiction it operates as if there is one set 
of aims, one formulation of objectives, one curriculum, etc. and after 
centrally formulating this programme it imposes it on communities with 
diverse circumstances. In this case in addition to the foregoing 
arguments there is a fifth objection concerning the inherently 
authoritarian, centralizing and irrational form which political and 
administrative control takes. The decision procedure is authoritarian 
because the good, interests and autonomy of those affected have been 
violated, and irrational because information relevant to the decision 
has been disregarded and the decision-makers are incompetent to make 
the sorts of decision they make. 
SOLIDARITY: Why will relevant information necessarily be disregarded? 
Why are the decision-makers necessarily incompetent to make these 
decisions? 
HEART: The authentic projects of the students and members of the community 
are relevant to these sorts of decisions. Since ex hypothesi, the 
communities have diverse circumstances the authentic projects of the 
members of the various communities are different and it is unreason-
able that common aims, objectives and curriculum can appropriately 
recognize the diversity in authentic projects. Because the central 
body imposes these features on local communities communications 
between levels will be distorted and inauthentic, leading to relevant 
information being withheld. Moreover, because of the vast scope of 
central decision-making there will simply be too much "datal! required 
to represent everyone's interests for this data to be understood by 
central decision-makers even if they could somehow gain access to it. 
Hence central decision-makers cannot have the ability or competence 
to make such decisions in accordance with the good, interests and 
autonomy of all those affected. 
SOLIDARITY: A very interesting argument but its validity is a matter of 
degree, is it not? For example I am going to suggest an elaboration 
of aims, mostly under the social aims heading of diagram 8. 
Concerning the democratic character, our citizen is to be 
autonomous, authentic, truthful, courageous \in carrying out her 
responsibilities and defending her autonomy) and obligated by commit-
ments to the FPSC or similar principles, i.e. justice, compassion, 
fraternity, respect for others as persons, ••.• She will require the 
powers and capacities for critical reflexion, for planning and 
organizing personal and shared projects, for participation within 
TAGs and the TAG Network and for work. Accordingly she will need a 
number of types of literacy concerning speech, print, audio and 
visual media; a vast amount and range of knowledge to follow the 
political deliberations; research skills to utilize the communication 
system and to pursue particular concerns; specialized knowledge, skill 
and experience to qualify for and practice a profession. 
Are you saying that we cannot elaborate aims in this fashion 
without first establishing a position on political control over and 
relationships among the participants? 
HEART: I agree that it is a matter of degree, and incidentally, I basically 
agree with your elaboration of the aims. (Other members also nod 
agreement.) Your elaboration is at a general level and is implicitly 
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based upon a number of principles concerning political control and 
relationships which are inherent in our commitments to I-self's good 
and the FPSC. 
ACTION-~lliN: It would help if you give an example of elaborating relation-
ships and political control. 
HEART: If you recall our problem of getting coherence between the 
existential and the social dimensions of our projects it follows 
that this can only be done if the educational processes involve 
communal critical reflexion. The student must have a vision of her 
participation within a communal programme of social transformation 
and she can only have this if the processes of education develop 
shared understandings of a common predicament, mutual good and 
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collective future vision. If the process by which our student-to-
be-citizen articulates her vision is entirely private and individualistic 
how can she connect her objectives for family life, work and citizenship 
to the social praxis that is to achieve them? If she never engages 
in social action concerning these irreducibly social and political 
aspects of her project then her project is inauthentic and her vision 
a mere fantasy; but to act to realize her authentic self she needs the 
commitment of others to the same sort of vision. 
LIBERAL: This is a dilemma. If educational activity fails to develop 
these shared understandings and visions young citizens cannot develop 
fully authentic projects. However, these shared visions can be pursued 
only by acknowledging that education has a public political purpose, 
which thereby exposes children to the risks of political manipUlation 
and indoctrination by teachers and educational authorities. 
HEART: You support the pursuit of shared understandings and visions 
provided students are safeguarded against manipulation, indoctrination, 
distorted communications and undue pressures to conform. 
LIBERAL: Yes. 
HE~~T: In many schools the relationships and system of political control 
would prevent it but a TAG is an organization which accomplishes what 
we want. 
When we discussed common interests and communications we 
developed criteria for relationships within a TAG which foster I-self's 
grasp of an authentic project that is authentically connected to other 
I-selves each grasping their authentic project. Under such conditions 
there is no indoctrination, manipulation, deception or systematically 
distorted communication. 14 
While its concerns include more than educational activity, the 
TAG's missions are compatible with the conditions Liberal supports 
and we have prima facie grounds for thinking a TAG-like organization 
of educational activity would be appropriate. If education satisfying 
Liberal's conditions is more difficult to accomplish than an internally 
democratic TAG this must arise from either the political control over 
education or from some feature of teacher/student relationships. In 
the TAG there is no stable asymmetry in the communications and authority 
relationships connecting the participants whereas teacher/student 
relationships are asymmetrical. But is this asymmetry necessarily 
incompatible with TAG-like relationships and communications? 
I have only touched on the kind of elaboration that is needed but 
is it clear that our agenda must focus on relationships and governance? 
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FACILITATOR: We agree and in our next session we can inquire into educational 
relationships in greater detail. 
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26. Interests and relationships in education 
We join our TAG well into this topic with Facilitator summing up 
the earlier discussion. 
FACILITATOR: Our first finding is that the nature of the asymmetry in 
the teacher/student relationship cannot be specified independently 
of other social relations. Scholar pointed out that our commitment 
to the TAG Network conception of authentic democracy lands us with 
a number of relationships - political jurisdictions, professional 
associations and workers' co-operatives - but our discussion in 
Chapter IV neglected the family, a matter which must be included 
in the analysis of educational relationships. 
Then Heart drew our attention to the IIdouble interest probleml!: 
on the one hand educational activity is to be evaluated and justified 
by its contribution to I-self's good and the FPSC, i.e. to our basic 
existential and social aims; on the other it cannot occur without 
/ f' " th f th "t 15 reproducing trans_ormlng e cultural resources 0 e communl y. 
HEART: In the process of cultural reproduction preferences are made 
between cultures, for example, in terms of language, dialect, valued 
traditions, music, stories, myths, manners, etc. Educational activity 
cannot even be conducted without exercising such choices because 
these elements of culture provide the resources for educational 
processes. However at least a great many of these selections will 
necessarily be, in a certain sense, arbitrary with respect to our 
basic existential and social aims for education. 
PRECISE: In what sense? 
HEART: Consider a community of mostly Italian-speaking families in a 
predominantly English-speaking nation. The children of these families 
go to school and are instructed in a certain language. Which language? 
Should it be the Italian of the community of the English of the 
nation? Some of each? This is an example of a 'cultural arbitrary ,.16 
Does it make any difference to the chances of the student realizing 
her own good or developing the character, dispositions, etc., for 
democratic citizenship whether she grows up speaking English or 
Italian? The preference for English or Italian is culturally 
arbitrary until we bring in the cultural history of the participants. 
However, for people with a cultural history, i.e. all actual agents, 
the choice of cultural arbitrary is very important. 
In our example, if the children are educated in English then 
the Italian community is culturally transformed. It is likely that 
communications and interactions between younger and older generations 
will be less frequent and significant, fraternity will decline and 
traditions and celebrations important to the older generations will 
17 fade away. 
Therefore our system of political control over and relationships 
within education must provide acceptable processes for making these 
sorts of decisions. 
FACILITATOR: Heart has pointed out the need to recognize the rights of 
minorities to an appropriate control over decisions about cultural 
arbitraries. 
It is also necessary to recognize the rights of educational 
workers. If professional teachers are to be engaged then our system 
of political control must recognize their interests as workers, e.g. 
in professional autonomy and resources to advance their good and 
welfare. 
We distinguish three main stages of education. While all 
educational activity has both an existential and a social dimension 
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the stages are categorized according to their social function: 
(a) the first is the general citizenship level which begins in 
infancy and continues through childhood until the student 
has developed the character, powers, attitudes, knowledge 
and skills to participate as a citizen in the political 
deliberations of the TAG Network; 
(b) next comes professional education which develops dispositions, 
knowledge, understanding and skills for work, and concludes 
with the student qualified as a professional worker; 
(c) finally there is postprofessional education which is directed 
to the life-long self-development of the learner. 
We agree that the most appropriate order for analysing these 
stages is from postprofessional to professional to general citizen-
ship because we start with the most simple and end with the most 
complex. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=~~~~~!~~~ 
By 'postprofessional' we do not mean all education that occurs 
after initial certification to practise a profession. Professional 
associations may require certain types of in-service education or 
may require certain courses of study for specialist certificates 
and these requirements fall under the professional stage of education. 
The postprofessional stage includes all studies autonomously chosen 
by certificated professionals whether for their general interest, 
e.g. foreign languages, navigation, philosophy, gardening, or as 
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18 part of the voluntary aspect of their professional in-service education. 
For the postprofessional stage 'freedom' is the watchword. 
Basically teacher and student have a market relationship; the teacher 
has cultural resources which the student wants and the student has 
money or entitlements which the teacher wants. Who should decide 
the aims, objectives, curriculum, methodology and system of evaluation 
at this stage? These matters are for the mutual determination of 
teacher and student. If they cannot agree they have no educational 
relationship. Like all market relationships within the TAG Network 
the teacher/student relationship is subject to general political 
control through law and the franchises under which the professional 
teacher practises. The purpose of this control is to maintain the 
public interest regarding social justice, health, safety, etc. In 
addition the professional association provides protection to the 
stUdent concerning the qualifications and competence of the teacher. 
Because the student at this stage is an autonomous citizen 
there are no valid arguments for paternalistic controls over the 
teacher/student relationship; its only necessary asymmetry relates 
to the different resources teacher and student exchange and not to 
any fundamental power that one has over the other. The teacher 
serves as agent for the student and only the student and so the 
proper embodiment of their relationship is a contract for services. 
However this relationship becomes more complicated when we 
have third parties. While no third party has a right to impose 
an educational relationship at the postprofessional stage, a 
tripartite relationship may be established by mutual consent. 
For example, a research council, workers' co-operative, cultural 
community or political jurisdiction may provide financial or other 
resources to support postprofessional education on the condition 
that its interests are pursued. While a great deal could be said 
about good practice in tripartite relationships the only point 
required for our analysis is that tripartite relationships can be 
19 
mutually beneficial. 
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Professional Education 
====================== 
There is nothing in the teacher/student relationship at the pas"-
professional stage to prevent TAG-like relationships and communica-
tions. Is this true at the ;professional level? What differences 
in relationships are required for professional education? 
SCHOLAR: At the professional level the teacher has a double agency; she 
has responsibility to the profession and to the student. In the 
education of surgeons, teachers, airline pilots and other pro-
fessionals the community has delegated to the appropriate professional 
association the responsibility for ensuring that practitioners are 
both ethical and competent. Accordingly professional education is 
a public rather than private enterprise. 
SOLIDARITY: Is double agency desirable? Feasible? Or should not the 
teacher's primary concern be for the public interest? 
SCHOLAR: vIi thin the limits set by the public interest the choice of 
profession should rest with the student; indeed it is the first 
significant autonomous choice of the young citizen. Moreover the 
period of professional education is of enormous importance to the 
self-definition, self-esteem and overall good of the student. 
'imether she "succeeds" and goes on to enter her chosen profession 
or "failsll and has to readjust her career plans, self-definition 
and life project, she needs teachers who are deeply concerned for 
her interests and who feel responsible to her. However, if the 
teachers are responsible only to the profession then the students 
are treated merely instrumentally, which is undesirable. 
If the relationship is transparent to both parties the student 
knows the teacher has a double agency but she wants genuinely to 
meet the standards of the profession herself - no conflict of 
interest here; the teacher wants her student to meet the standards 
but she insists that only if her student truly meets them vTill she 
pass - no conflict of interest here. In principle the double agency 
of professional education is feasible. 
Nevertheless there are severe problems when the division of 
pedagogic work is highly fragmented. So far we have spoken of the 
teacher and the student. Often, however, there are many teachers 
sharing responsibility for the professional education of many 
students. Consider, for example, a fipure" mathematics teacher 
providing instruction for future engineers, actuaries, physicists 
and statisticians. Does this teacher understand and acknowledge 
her agency concerning these professions? Or does she think of herself 
as agent for a subject or discipline? ~Jhen professional education is 
viciously abstracted from professional practice its teachers lose 
sight of the persons whose good the activity is to foster: the 
consequences are reification, mystification and elitism - all 
contrary to the interests of students, profession and public. 
FACILITATOR: It follows that we must prevent excessive specialization 
and fragmentation of professional education. In Scholar's example 
of the pure mathematics teacher the standards of mathematics required 
for engineers, actuaries, physicists and statisticians may be different 
depending upon the demands of practice in these various professions. 
Accordingly control over standards must rest with the professional 
association and not ,,,i th specialist teachers unconnected \,ri th or 
incompetent concerning the standards of professional practice. 
The governance of professional education is more complicated 
than for the postprofessional stage. At the professional level: the 
control of curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation rests with the pro-
fessional associations; the political control is shared between the 
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professional associations and the political jurisdictions with the 
former responsible for education and certification and the latter 
for budget, overall targets for training and enrolment in the 
profession and legislation; the teacher has a double agency toward 
both student and professional association. 
Because the teacher/student relationship is self-chosen by the 
parties to it, and the constraints imposed by the system of political 
control on teachers and students are compatible with their common 
commitment to the profession, TAG-like relationships and communica-
tions are both possible and desirable in professional education. 
Wnile we would now like to address the general citizenship 
stage of education we are unable to do this until we have determined 
our position on the status of the family, which is our topic for the 
next session. 
27. Trusteeship and the family 
FACILITATOR: There are three special issues raised by the general citizen-
ship stage: 
(1) the young child is unable to represent her own interests; 
(2) the implications for the community of the decisions and 
practices concerning cultural reproduction are more acute 
at this stage than at the professional and postprofessional 
levels; 
(3) this is the stage where the basic character, dispositions, 
powers, l~owledge and skills for participation in democratic 
social life are formed and developed. 
Because the student1s interests must be represented in the 
educational process the fact of immaturity requires that we establish 
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a trustee to represent the child's interests from infancy until she 
achieves her own agency. !Ife conclude that generally this trusteeship 
should reside with the child's parents. (2) and (3) are the basis 
for the claim of the community to exercise a measure of political 
control over the general citizenship stage of education. Our dis-
cussion has focused on justifying a particular status for the family 
arising from the trusteeship function and reconciling parental and 
community control over this stage of education. 
We got into a few difficulties over the definition of 'family' 
and whether the traditional family is to be preferred over the 
nuclear family, the single parent family, the "musical chairs family" 
(Le. serial polygamy) and various other alternatives. ~fe define 
'family' as "a primary social group consisting of parents and their 
offspringu • 20 Our case for parental trusteeship is founded on the 
need for an enduring relationship of love and care between the 
trustee and the dependent child. Any well prepared citizen can 
represent the very general common interests of all children but only 
one "lvho has an intimate and continuing relationship with a particular 
child can represent the unique features of that child's interests. 21 
The child needs this enduring relationship of love and care to 
strengthen her sense of self-esteem, to foster her growth towards 
autonomy and to represent her interests. 
'i'le reject any division of custodial and trusteeship functions 
between parents and some formal institutional body.22 For example, 
if parents have the responsibility for caring for the child but some 
other body has educational trusteeship responsibilities the child's 
development towards autonomy is subverted: knowing that those adults 
she most loves and trusts do not have the power and authority to 
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represent her interests in significant spheres of her good undermines 
her security, her self-esteem and her confidence that she will be 
23 
able to manage autonomy as an adult. What are her prospects 
for initiation into powerful, authentic autonomy when her most 
enduring model of adulthood is the loving but weak, heteron~ous 
functionary? 24 
There appear to be no alternative candidates to the family for 
this trusteeship function: 
(a) the workers' co-operatives can provide no assurance of 
enduring personal relationships; 
(b) neither the political jurisdictions nor the professional 
associations are suited to the provision of personal love 
and care; 
(c) communal approaches to child rearing can only be both desirable 
and feasible as extensions of rather than alternatives to the 
f "1 25 am~ y. 
In brief, informal comm~~al approaches to child rearing provide 
insufficient stability and security to the child whereas formal 
institutional approaches cannot simultaneously respect both the needs 
of children and the autonomy of workers. The family is a special 
institution which under ideal circumstances can accommodate both 
love and justice; it generates its commitment to the care and interests 
of children through the social recognition that the sexual union of 
man and woman to produce a child creates both the obligation of and 
the authority for trusteeship concerning that child. This commitment 
is in addition to those arising from "natural feelings!!, if any, or 
the imaginative reconstruction of the life projects of the parents 
during pregnancy and birth. As long as parents can control the 
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decision to have a child the trusteeship obligations of parenthood -
great as they are - are autonomously incurred. 26 Clearly adoptive 
parents can be held to their obligations as firmly and justly as 
natural ones. 
While, as a general rule, parents are the appropriate trustees 
for their children's interests, there should be provisions. through 
courts of law, to review and possibly remove the trusteeship function 
from particular parents where the continuation of the relationship 
is clearly contrary to the child's interests. This must be a course 
of last resort because the alteration of the trustee(s) is damaging 
in itself and can be justified only to prevent a greater harm. 
I have tried to sum up our discussion of the family and trustee-
ship as a basis for addressing the appropriate relationships among 
parents, political jurisdictions, teachers' co-operatives and 
professional associations concerning general citizenship education. 
HEART: And you have caught the main points very well although I think 
we are less agnostic about the traditional family than your summary 
suggests. By 'traditional family' I mean the stable marriage of 
husband and wife, the children, ru~d the ne~vork of grandparents, 
uncles, aunts, cousins and so on. This family structure can be 
further supported by co-operative relations among neighbours and 
a fraternal community. The traditional family performs the trustee-
ship function better than any other form of family life. For 
example, the single parent is unlikely to provide as stable a home 
because she or he may establish a marriage relationship with a new 
partner. In any case parental responsibilities borne alone may be 
extremely onerous. Children may benefit from having trustees and 
27 
models of each sex. Similar arguments can be developed concerning 
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serial polygamy and other alternatives. 
This is a sensitive subject because so many of us have 
experienced divorce, carry out our trusteeship responsibilities as 
single parents, have homosexual or bisexual relationships and so 
forth. It is not my intention to moralize about these matters and 
it would be a mistake to feel guilty or get defensive about them. 
Liberal capitalism has been an extremely corrosive and destructive 
environment for the traditional family and so we need to arrange our 
other social and political institutions so that they give much stronger 
support to the traditional family.28 Nevertheless there will always 
be situations where other forms of family life are either re~uired 
or are more suitable in specific circumstances. In these cases our 
system of social support should be flexible enough to meet the 
interests of the parties to alternative arrangements. 
Two other advantages of the traditional family are: it supports 
intergenerational solidarity; it is strategically more sound to stick 
with a proven, traditional institution, other factors being equal, 
than with an innovative untried one. 
On the understanding that we aim to terminate the IIprivileges!t 
of families to be~ueath and inherit unlimited wealth and/or entitle-
meniEwe support the continuation of the traditional family as a basic 
institution in our vision of a democratic society. 
FACILITATOR: From your nods I see that we agree with Heart's comments. 
We have yet to establish how resources are to be provided to children 
and whether parenting is a professional occupation. 
SOLIDARITY: Our intention in denying families the right to be~ueath and 
inherit wealth is to establish e~uality of consideration for children. 
Noreover we see the care and trusteeship responsibilities regarding 
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children as extremely important contributions to the community, as 
public, not private, concerns in an authentic democracy. It would 
be unjust and inappropriate to require parents to make financial 
sacrifices in addition to their contributions of time and energy. 
Therefore the community should provide an entitlement to children 
of resources to cover the full costs of life and education to an 
appropriate level and the parents should exercise the administration 
of these resources during the period of their trusteeship.29 
There should be public provision of benefits to mothers to 
cover loss of earnings from professional work during the period of 
maternity leave. A system of publicly supported nursery care for 
young children until the age of five or six is beneficial for 
children; parents who provide this care themselves should receive 
the per child amount of public resources that would otherwise have 
gone to professional child care workers. Without going into details, 
the general principle is to provide the highest quality of care for 
children without placing excessive burdens on their parents. 
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FACILITATOR: That completes our general position on the status of the 
family. At our next session Scholar is prepared to articulate a 
position on the political control of general citizenship education. 
Parents have a crucial social function but qua parents they do not 
have professional status - their function does not involve collective 
self-governance or specialized knowledge and skill. 30 Nevertheless, 
because the tasks and responsibilities of parental trusteeship involve 
public service and the public interest, they should have community 
support. 
28. Democratic political control of education 
SCHOLAR: The purpose of the trusteeship responsibility of parents is 
to represent the child's interests until she becomes an autonomous 
citizen. Accordingly parents should have general supervision over 
the education of their child from infancy to the completion of the 
general citizenship stage - subject to the requirement that they 
enrol her in a public school in their local community. By 'public' 
I mean a school in the public sector, under the control of the 
political jurisdictions and financed through public expenditure. 3l 
The authority of the more centralized citizenship jurisdictions 
should be limited to ensuring basic procedural conditions concerning 
human rights, which are embodied in law, and establishing a general 
equality of opportunity, principally through equalizing gross 
resources available to different communities. 
The specific terms of the franchise establishing public schools 
should be under the control of the most local jurisdiction containing 
the school within its geographic boundaries. A crucial function of 
local authorities relating to school evaluation is the determination 
of evaluative criteria for the school, i.e. the outcomes the community 
wants its schools to achieve. These evaluative criteria, incorporated 
within franchises for the public schools, embody the objectives, 
standards and choices of cultural arbitraries of the local community 
and provide political direction to the teachers' co-operatives (i.e. 
workers' co-operatives providing educational services). 
Should the teachers' co-operative fail to meet these standards 
the local jurisdiction can terminate their contract and establish a 
contract with a new co-operative. This is the extreme case: generally 
the evaluative criteria provide the basis for ongoing discussions 
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between the local jurisdiction and the co-operative in which the 
co-operative articulates resource requirements and problems with 
the evaluative criteria and the jurisdiction expresses concerns 
with the educational services. The co-operative can pinpoint sources 
of inadequacies in services and use its own powers of support and 
discipline concerning individual teachers to rectify problems. 
PRECISE: So in this system professional teachers will have autonomous 
control over the internal operation of the school provided they 
accomplish the standards set by the local political jurisdiction. 
However, if they fail to achieve the standards they could all be 
out of work - the good as well as the poor performers. 
SCHOLAR: The price professionals must pay for professional autonomy is 
the exercise of collective discipline over the quality of work, in 
this case teaching. It is in the public interest for co-operatives 
which are unwilling or unable to exercise this discipline to be 
disbanded and replaced by others which are. As for the dismissed 
or disbanded members being out of work, they can either seek work 
in a different setting or undergo retraining for a different 
profession. 
The positive features of this approach are the elimination of 
an extensive network of supervisors and bureaucrats and a basis for 
accountability which is just, simple and effective. 
PRECISE: How detailed and specific do these evaluative criteria have to 
be? What if there is a disagreement between the co-operative and 
the local jurisdiction over whether the evaluative criteria have 
been met? Should the courts be involved in such cases? 
In some jurisdictions teachers have struggled long and hard 
to gain a degree of security of tenure protecting them from arbitrary 
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dismissal. They would not lightly toss away those gains, would 
they? 
SCHOLAR: The courts would limit their involvement to procedural justice, 
ensuring fair and ade~uate presentation of argument &~d evidence on 
both sides, specifically the workers' co-operative must be able to 
present its case directly to the whole community. However the 
substantive decision rests with the political jurisdiction through 
the deliberation of the entire community. This is a far cry from 
our present system of decision by a handful of representatives 
assisted by their hired advisers and supervisors. In our system 
teachers will be protected from arbitrary dismissal and in addition 
will be guaranteed the rights to professional practice and autonomy. 
The degree of specificity of the evaluative criteria is set by 
the need for mutual understanding between the community and the 
teachers' co-operative. They might be statements of this sort, 
"That the children: be happy at school; be interested in their lessons 
and activities; make good progress in reading, mathematics, science, 
social studies, . . . . , develop the knowledge, understandings, skills 
and dispositions for democratic participation in their community 
and society, ... ". As the dialogue between the professional teachers 
and the community continues some of the statements may become ~uite 
precise but in general their function is to mark off aspects of the 
mutual understanding emerging through ongoing discussion. 
SOLIDARITY: ~'That does it mean to be protected from I arbitrary dismissal'? 
Suppose the local community takes exception to the treatment of some 
parts of the curriculum, e.g. too much emphasis on world and too 
little on local history and geography. Can the local community 
replace its present social studies lor history and geography) teachers 
"i'Ti th new ones? 
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SCHOL.~: If the local community could select out certain teachers for 
dismissal they would have an employer/employee relationship with 
their teachers which implies a system of bureaucratic supervision, 
possibly counterposed by union representation to Ilensure due process". 
If the professional teachers are to have self-governance and the 
rights of professional practice then the local community cannot 
have the authority to dismiss teachers selectively. 
Instead the local community should articulate the changes it 
wants in the curriculum to the representatives of the teachers' 
co-operative indicating it is prepared to end their franchise if 
the situation is not rectified. The teachers! co-operative would 
then have to dismiss the offending teachers if they continue to 
flout the collective obligations of the co-operative. 
LIBERAL: Generally professional teachers will have educational concerns 
that are more cosmopolitan than those expressed within a particular 
local community. By making the teachers' co-operative accountable 
to a local community do we not give a far too parochial basis to 
the political control of education? 
SCHOLF~: Yes, historically teachers have tended to promote national or 
cosmopolitan perspectives and have played a big part in the assimila-
tion of minority cultural traditions within a dominant culture. 
The dilemma is, tlHow can the local community have the power to 
protect itself from domination by a homogeneous national or elitist 
cosmopolitan culture whilst teachers are allowed, and indeed encouraged, 
to initiate their students into national and transnational culture, 
and to foster critical reflexion on local as well as national 
traditions and practices?1! Perhaps if we return to this difficult 
t o 1 t °11 1 to 32 ques lon a er someone Wl propose a so u lone 
Ivleanwhile I vTOuld like to say more about parental authority. 
Because they control the choice of community in which their children 
will live, parents exercise significant control concerning which 
school their children will attend. As members of their local 
community they participate in the political control of their child's 
school. They can provide such additional educational experiences 
concerning language, culture, travel or sport as they choose - subject 
to the general political regulation of such activities and services. 
Our basic principle concerning culture is both democratic and 
conservative - in the best sense of each: any cultural tradition 
that is acceptable to the political community of citizens is not 
to be eliminated through majoritarian, professional or bureaucratic 
control of education. For example, our Italian community in a 
predominantly English-speaking country will have political control 
over its own cultural reproduction. This community may decide that 
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all its children will learn English, that the language of instruction 
will be English or Italian or a matter of parental choice; may decide 
on the status of Italian history and cultural studies in the curri-
culum and in general may determine the cultural arbitraries for the 
community. The only practices and traditions that the more centralized 
jurisdictions can legitimately impose on local communities are matters 
of social justice embodied in law. For example a particular culture 
may practise human sacrifice which would be illegal in an authentic 
democracy. Hence centralized jurisdictions may pass laws prohibiting 
teaching or instruction supportive of human sacrifice. On a similar 
basis racist and sexist practices and instruction would be forbidden. 
Moreover schools should be required to provide positive information 
about the operation of the TAG Network and other features of social 
life as part of a law requiring publication of information concerning 
the laws and institutions of society. What I want to rule out is the 
imposition of cultural arbitraries on local communities. By leaving 
the control of decisions regarding cultural arbitraries in the hands 
of local political jurisdictions we respect the autonomy, self-esteem 
and ethnic origins of all citizens; citizens freely choose their own 
cultural arbitraries rather than have them imposed by experts or 
majorities of large but diverse populations. 33 
PP8CISE: If parents are to have such extensive control over the education 
of their children why are they compelled to enrol them in a public 
school? Inasmuch as general control over matters such as human rights 
and social justice can be built into market sector franchises why 
should general citizenship education not be in the market rather 
than the public sector? 
SCHOLAR: Actually there are a number of reasons for insisting on the 
enrolment of children in a public school. Political control over 
cultural reproduction cannot be achieved in the market sector. By 
insisting that the general citizenship stage of educ~tion be conducted 
in a publicly funded, publicly controlled school we minimize or 
prevent differences in parental wealth or educational achievement 
being converted into differences in educational opportunities for 
children. 
Even more importantly our student on her way to becoming an 
autonomous citizen must find her authentic project which is to be 
the basis of her education. This she cannot do without a vision 
of her future society but this vision is inconceivable without an 
understanding of the intended praxis of the student, her schoolmates, 
her community and members of the wider society. Because the student 
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is in a public school, the members of her community have had to take 
their position on this future vision in formulating the evaluative 
criteria for the school franchise. Assisted by her professional 
teachers, the student is in a position to assess this vision and 
her place in it. 
It would be inconsistent with our conception of the market sector 
to make this stage of education a market service and at the same time 
insist that parents enrol their children in some school; in a true 
market situation the buyer can refuse the sale. Nor does it make 
sense to have a mixture of public and market school~. Either children 
must be enrolled in school, in which case the public school is 
required, or it is a matter of parental choice and market schools 
are appropriate. 
Education is a crucial activity in the transformation of society; 
to treat it as a market commodity is to undermine democratic social 
transformation. The fraternity, social solidarity and communal 
critical reflexion of a public school is potentially a far superior 
preparation for future political participation within the TAG Network 
than a deschooled or market schooled experience. Whereas the norma-
tive and political implications of education in a public school 
within the TAG Network will be transparent to the members of the 
community through their political deliberations and evaluative 
responsibilities these implications will tend to be concealed - but 
not absent - in a market approach. Provided the educational process 
in the public school makes its ow~ cultural and political commitments 
increasingly tr~~sparent to students as they advance through their 
studies, and it must do this to respect the authentic project of 
each student, public school students will be well prepared for 
political participation. 
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LIBEP~L: So the school has a particular stance toward social transforma-
tion and cultural reproduction which is HUp front" and transparent 
to the students. Or is it a highly rational approach to indoctrina-
tion? This seems to turn on the autonomy of teachers and students 
to distance themselves from the values and commitments of their own 
community, to engage in critical reflexion concerning them and 
perhaps to take a different position. -Vii th political control so 
firmly in the hands of the local jurisdiction there may be a conflict 
of interest vrith the teacher acting in accordance with the authentic 
projects of her students but offending the local political juris-
diction by failing to support some of their values or commitments, 
or vice versa. Yet this problem is not to be overcome by simply 
shifting the political control to a more centralized level, where it 
could still occur. 
While we can count on a certain amount of good will from the 
political jurisdictions in encouraging critical reflexion on the 
practices and commitments of the community I want to see some 
appropriate institutional provisions. In this respect we can also 
address our earlier dilemma about the tension between local determina-
tion of cultural arbitraries and student interests in a wider, more 
cosmopolitan perspective. Specifically, during the period of general 
citizenship education, there should be safeguards to protect teachers 
against an excessively parochial control by local jurisdictions. 
Students have a right to information on the workings of the wider 
society and on cultural traditions other than their own. \nJhile we 
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can support the right of the local jurisdiction to establish criteria 
for the positive achievements they seek regarding cultural reproduction 
they should not have the authority to forbid teachers to expose children 
to other cultures, traditions, perspectives and ideas. Moreover 
no teacher can be compelled to mislead a student, distort the 
truth, carry out instruction contrary to a student's interest or 
refrain from instruction in a student's interest - whatever the 
impact on cultural reproduction. How are these rights and protections 
to be guaranteed? The more centralized jurisdictions need to make 
laws to this effect; the teachers' professional association should 
have the authority to monitor schools in this respect and to 
represent teachers who may be placed under pressure to act contrary 
to the interests of their students; finally the courts should 
adjudicate disputes over such matters between the local political 
jurisdiction and the teachers I professional association or 
co-operative. 
On a related matter, is it appropriate for the student to go 
straight from an immature not yet citizen whose general education 
is controlled by parents and political jurisdictions to a 
professional-in-training? We should consider giving the student 
an entitlement of about three to four years of general citizenship 
education after she has been released from parent trusteeship. 
Before proceeding to professional education and work she should have 
a period of education under her own agency in which the emphasis is 
on a broad, cosmopolitan experience and critical reflexion on 
cultural, social and political life from self-chosen perspectives. 
Ideally, she should leave her own community, do some travelling, 
and study in educational institutions which open up new vistas, 
visions and possibilities. 
PP£CISE: Do you mean a type of liberal arts college or university? 
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LIBERAL: Yes, the function of a liberal arts college is similar to what 
I propose. 
How should these colleges be controlled? Political jurisdictions 
at a number of levels can offer franchises to be filled by teachers' 
co-operatives. The franchises should establish only the most general 
procedural regulations with the more specific evaluative criteria to 
be determined by mutual agreement of the teachers' co-operative and 
the students' union, a body which students join on being admitted 
to the college. Hence a function similar to that of the local 
political jurisdiction during the trusteeship stage is performed by 
the students themselves, through their union, at this stage. How 
are these institutions to be financed? Through the equal entitle-
ments to educational resources which each student carries. 
However there are differences between this proposal and the 
present uni versi ty system. life would have stricter public control 
of admissions policies in the interest of social justice than many 
universities now have. The market value of a degree, if degrees are 
granted, will be minimal because of the near universality of the 
experience. The purpose of this stage of education is not the 
gaining of marketable skills but the powers of critical reflexion 
and political and cultural participation. The more geographically 
extensive the TAG lTetwork the more fully this stage of education 
can be cosmopolitan and transnational and yet equally accessible 
34 to all. 
PRECISE: This stage of c.itiJ.cn5";, ~ducation could go on simultaneously 
with professional training, could it not? 
LIBERAL: 'l'hat is an option although the two forms of education must be 
provided by separate institutions because professional education is 
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to be controlled by the professional associations and the final, 
autonomous stage of general citizenship education by the students' 
union and teachers' co-operative. Also, if the two forms go on 
simultaneously, there is a risk that too much of the student's time 
may be consumed in professional studies to the neglect of the 
autonomous stage of her general citizenship education. Additionally, 
knowledge, understanding and experience gained during the autonomous 
stage may affect decisions concerning the student's professional 
career. Therefore it is generally better for professional education 
to follow the autonomous stage of general education. 
SOLIDARITY: Scholar has justified our rejecting private schools but why 
not have the public schools controlled by centralized political 
jurisdictions with provision for consultation with the local levels? 
SCHOLJh~: If cultural arbitraries are determined at the central level it 
becomes a wia~er take all lottery and this is threatening to 
minorities. It is better for cultural and political differences in 
the community to be sorted out politically rather than to impose 
artificial agreement through education. Centralized political 
deliberation in such matters undermines autonomy and authenticity 
by reducing citizens' sense of efficacy and power and by leaving 
!!losersllno way out whereas local determination gives individuals 
more choice. If individuals caD~ot accept the majority view in 
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their local community they can "vote I'd th their feet!! by moving or 
even organizing a new community. The more centralized the political 
control over culture and education the less significant this individual 
freedom becomes. 
Additionally local control gives the greatest transparency to 
the political process and spares us the bureaucratic structures that 
go with central control. 
SOLID)~ITY: All right but I thiDl~ Liberal's points are also valid. Do 
you not think we need the safeguards Liberal outlined to protect 
children and teachers from an overly parochial perspective? 
SCHOLP~: Yes I do and I also agree with Liberal's points about an 
autonomous stage of general citizenship education in which the 
student represents her own interests. 
FACILITATOR: lie appear to agree 1<Ti th the SCholar/Liberal analysis. 
29. Grading students and asymmetries in educational discourse 
v'le join the SET during their deliberations. 
FACILITATOR: In this session our main aim is to see if TAG-like relation-
ships and communications are possible during the general citizenship 
stage and if so under what conditions. 
life find that the teacher has a double agency although of a 
more complex kind than at the professional stage: she is agent for 
the student and for the culture of society; but because there is no 
single institution or jurisdiction which represents all the 
cow~unities within the TAG Network and because our society is multi-
cultural the teacher is caught be~~een conflicting cultural ideals. 
1fe have found no resolution to this problem which would not involve 
consequences worse than the problem. The problem can be managed, 
although not abolished, if the relationships among the various 
cultural communities are just and fraternal, if the teachers' 
professional association and the courts are supportive of teachers 
caught in these conflicts, and if teachers are sensitive and skilled 
in dealing with such matters. 
life recognize an asymmetry in teacher/student relationships 
arising from immense differences in intellectual powers, cultural 
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resources and social experience and these differences, which should 
be progressively reduced as the student advances through her studies, 
?roduce authority relationships, but the final court with respect to 
academic matters must be truth and reason and not formal authority.35 
As Liberal says we must not assume that the teacher or some other 
authority has a privileged access to truth and reason but conduct 
education as a rational and compassionate activity, respecting the 
interests, rights and insights of each participant just as in the 
TAG. Educational activity must foster the student's self-determination 
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of what is true, good, rational and just if the student is to strengthen 
and develop her own powers of autonomous and authentic inquiry and 
. 36 
reflexlon. It would be contrary to her interests and to the FPSC 
if teachers imposed fixed or given results and interpretations of 
the deliberations and inquiries of the student, for this conflicts 
with her autonomous application of the foregoing criteria. 
If teachers, bureaucrats, political authorities or others have 
recourse to sanctions to force or pressure students to reach 
particular interpretations, judgments and conclusions then truth 
and reason succumb to authoritarian power and a pervasive and des-
tructive asymmetry dominates educational relationships, an asymmetry 
contrary to the student's good and the ultimate interests of the 
community in an authentic being-among-one-another. Clearly measures 
must be taken to protect students from sanctions such as violence, 
bullying, ridicule or ostracization; sanctions which can be used to 
limit the expression of divergent views, judgments or interpretations. 
We also mentioned grading or evaluating students but this requires 
much more discussion. On the one hand grading and evaluation can 
provide feedback essential to the student's learning but on the other, 
they are the weapons 'par excellence' for exercising authoritarian 
power over the student. Therefore we should focus on the issue of 
control over the evaluation and marking of the educational progress 
and attainment of students. Who should have the authority to control 
evaluation? 
HEL~T: At the postprofessional level grading is negotiated between student 
and teacher; at the professional level it is controlled by the pro-
fessional association. What about the general citizenship level? 
We have agreed to subdivide this level into two stages - let us call 
them I pre-autonomous , and 'autonomous'. At the autonomous stage the 
student is trying to acquire powers and resources for a critical 
grasp of her predicament, with special emphasis on culture, society 
and politics. Who has the right and competence to assess her efforts 
in this respect? Teachers are in a position to assess progress in 
their subject or discipline but evaluation pertinent to this stage 
of education depends not only on progress in the discipline but on 
the relevance of the course of studies to the student's authentic 
project and her own history. Therefore an appropriate basis for 
evaluation at this stage, as at the postprofessional level, is the 
mutual determination of student and teacher. 
At the pre-autonomous stage the most fundamental difference 
is that the parent represents the student's interests. Ifhile there 
is less emphasis on critical inquiry than at the autonomous stage, 
this feature is still important, and the development of responsibility 
and autonomy have central significance. Rence the appropriate differ-
ence in control over the evaluation of the student's progress is 
achieved by replacing the student by her parent trustee, so that at 
the pre-autonomous stage this control is shared by parent and teacher. 
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SOLIDARITY: How are the community's interests to be represented? 
HEART: The community exercises control over the selection of curriculum 
and cultural resources for the student's education. If the community 
has any claim to evaluate the student at all, then they have the 
authority to determine whether the student has developed the 
character, dispositions, powers, knowledge, skills, attitudes, 
understandings, etc. for citizenship. And if they have this authority 
they can !lfaill! a student and deny her citizenship rights. Are we 
prepared to give the community this authority, the authority to deny 
an adult the right to speak in political assemblies, to vote and to 
work, not for any crimes, but on the basis of her school grades? 
FACILITATOR: We agree that this would be a dangerous and unaccevtable 
policy. 
HEART: If we are not prepared to grant the community the authority to 
evaluate the student concerning the central character, powers, etc. 
of democratic citizenship how can we justify giving them an authority 
to evaluate concerning matters which are relatively peripheral to 
the purposes and aims of pre-autonomous education? 
It is for the student to assess the value of the resources 
selected for her by the comm~nity and to use them in accordance with 
her authentic project. If the community has the authority to 
evaluate the student's "masterytl of the community's cultural resources 
there is an inversion of responsibility and the cultural arbitraries -
imposed through community sanctions and coercion - take on a fixed, 
reified character. 
In our example of the Italian community, Maria, a student at 
the pre-autonomous stage, may hate Italian culture and language, 
may prefer English and vow to leave the Italian community as soon a~ 
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she can. She has the right to come to this assessment and her 
community has no right to judge her assessments under the guise 
of lIevaluating her educational progress". 
FACILITATOR: I know that some of you want to discuss external examinations 
and their destructive effects but we have already shown that the 
control over the evaluation of student progress should be shared: 
between student and teacher at the autonomous stage; between parent 
and teacher at the pre-autonomous level. 
Where these conditions, in addition to the others we previously 
discussed, are present, general citizenship education can be carried 
on with TAG-like relationships and communications. 
There will be an opportunity to raise the issue of external 
controls over student evaluation in our next session when we develop 
a general analysis of educational relationships and governance. 
30. Gene~al evaluation of education: authentic democracy or 
liberal capitalism? 
FACILITATOR: In this session we conduct a general evaluation of two 
systems for governing educational activity and relations - liberal 
capitalism and the TAG Network articulation of authentic democracy. 
There are of course many other basic types of political control that 
we could consider but these two are especially important to us 
because we live in a liberal capitalist society and the TAG Network 
is our mid-term goal for social transformation. 
This evaluation involves a comparison of the capacity of each 
of the systems to provide the basic structures and categorial power 
relations supportive of the participants realizing the two basic 
aims of education for democracy. The key participants are students, 
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teachers, parents and citizens in the students' community. 
I think it is more important for us to be comprehensive and 
at least touch on the main points rather than get bogged down in 
details. 
Whereas the TAG Network is an idea, which can only be investi-
gated conceptually, liberal capitalism is an actual system which can 
be studied by empirical methods. However what is really interesting 
about liberal capitalism, in this respect, is its necessary features, 
and so we should focus on conceptual analyses of liberal capitalism 
and related features to determine what effects on educational 
relationships and outcomes are necessarily associated with liberal 
capitalism. Nevertheless we should also be alert to consequences 
which, while not strictly necessary on a logical basis are probable, 
to be expected or can be predicted on theoretical grounds. 
vfhat are the criteria for our evaluation? 
TELEOLOGIST: Our two basic aims are: 
(1) the self-development of each individual in accordance with 
her own authentic project; 
(2) the formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, 
knowledge, understandings and skills for democratic citizenship. 
These two aims have been elaborated through diagrams 8 and 8.1 
and Solidarity's formulation. (See pp. 198-200.) There are two key 
ideas we can use in applying the matrix in diagram 8.1 as a procedural 
guide to evaluation; these are 'transparency' and 'coherence'. We 
have already analysed these terms. 'Transparency' refers to the 
truth, accuracy and completeness of our understanding. So we will 
compare the two systems concerning the extent to which they foster 
transparent understanding and coherence. Transparency is required 
for authenticity. 
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What about coherence? Existentially, if the learner cannot 
achieve vertical coherence she fails to have an authentic project -
because in an authentic project there is harmony and coherence 
between the predicament, the vision and the path (experience). 
Moreover there is a likely threat to the development of autonomous 
agency (because of the probable lack of congruence between under-
standing and action. Concerning the social dimension a lack of 
coherence means that the social relationships will fall short of 
the FPSC, L e. the actual results of social transformation "Ifill 
"miss the mark". 
We have also argued for horizontal coherence, Le. for having 
existential and social dimensions in harmony. 
PRECISE: Can you illustrate lack of horizontal coherence with a few 
examples? 
TELEOLOGIST: Raymond Williams describes various relationships of 
individuals to society through the categories 'member', 'subject', 
'servant', 'rebel', 'exile' and 'vagrant'. The meanings of these 
terms are reasonably self-explanatory. For example, 'member' 
describes an individual's positive identification with the society 
in which he lives whereas, 
The subject, at whatever violence to himself has to 
accept the way of life of his society, and his own 
indicated place in it, because there is no other way 
in which he can maintain himself at all; only by this 
kind of obedience can he eat, sleep, shelter, or 
escape being destroyed by others. It is not his way 
of life, in any sense that matters, but he must con-
form to it to survive .... 37 
In our terms the member achieves horizontal coherence whereas 
the subject does not. 
But how Can I-self achieve vertical coherence without horizontal 
coherence? This is not a rhetorical question but a genuine query. 
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Individuals can and do make some accommodations and adjustments 
to their own self-definition when they cannot achieve horizontal 
coherence and these may be as authentic as circumstances allow. 
For example Williams' 'rebel' captures the individual who retains 
a strong personal commitment to a certain scheme of social 
co-operation which places him in rebellion to his actual society.38 
Nevertheless the only totally satisfactory result is both vertical 
and horizontal coherence. 
Now to the actual evaluation: diagram 8.1 indicates the kinds 
of IIdata" that are needed to carry out a comprehensive evaluation 
of the quality of education for a particular learner, a classroom, 
a school or an educational system. 
COI~~NTARY: In fact the SET conducted interviews and discussions with 
students, teachers, parents and other members of the community and they 
found the matrices and the discussion of basic aims and educational 
relationships useful in guiding their data collection and in interpreting 
their findings. However their specific findings have little or no general 
interest. The issue of great interest, which is pursued in this inquiry, 
is, "What educational relations and outcomes occur because an educational 
system is under liberal capitalist political control? 
SCHOLAR: For our present -purposes there are t:b.ree key conceptual features 
f' l Ob 1 °t I" th t b 1 to 39 0_ 1 era capl a lsm a ear on our eVa ua lOn! 
(1) the existence of social classes; 
~2) the employer/employee relationship; 
(3) a meritocratic sector. 
The employer/employee relationship is a necessary consequence 
of the capitalist/worker nexus. Classes are also conceptually 
linked to capitalism. While one can conceive of a capitalist state 
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without a meritocratic basis for education I believe that the 
connection with meritocracy is conceptual for liberal capitalism. 
The liberal's commitment to social freedoms and equality before the 
law is incompatible with private ownership of state offices and 
positions. The liberal also rejects - even if only on feasibility 
grounds - an authentic democracy based on full citizen participation. 
Therefore, within the government sphere at least, liberals will tend 
to support a meritocracy. A second factor is that capitalism may 
require the idea of meritocracy to justify asymmetries in power and 
resources, i.e. these asymmetries are required to maintain capitalist 
property relations. But how are they to be justified in the face of 
the prima facie presupposition of equality of consideration? It 
seems that some notion of justice or desert is needed to provide 
"justification" for asymmetrical power relations and unequal access 
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to the society's "goods lt • The rights of private property ownership 
are in themselves insufficient justification because the liberal 
capitalist state is constantly put in the position of making political 
decisions that affect income flows to individuals, groups, sectors 
and regions. Therefore liberal capitalism is conceptually, i.e. 
unavoidably, associated with social classes, employer/employee 
relations and meritocracy. 
Let us consider the educational consequences of these inescapable 
commitments of liberal capitalism. The existence of social classes, 
for all practical purposes, forecloses the possibility of common 
aims for social transformation. For example capitalists and workers 
will tend to have different views about the abolition of employer/ 
employee relations and social classes, the upper middle class will 
tend to be more committed to meritocracy and so on. But if this is 
so there is no possibility of agreement, at least at a reasonably 
detailed level, on the elaboration of the basic social aim and, with 
respect to the social dimension, vertical coherence in educational 
aims cannot be achieved. Moreover we should expect the various 
participants to disagree on fundamental features of their common 
predicament and on their future vision. 
Tracing the full consequences of employer/employee relations 
on education is too complex to be pursued here. However, if teachers 
have an employee status this creates a conflict of agency making 
appropriate relationships with students and parents much more 
difficul t. I,Tore over be cause the employee role is incompa ti ble with 
professional status the benefits which a professional approach to 
teacher certification, the development of educational theory and the 
supervision of teaching practice, can offer, are lost. Consequently 
the quality of teaching will tend to be much poorer than under a system 
providing for professional rather than employee status. 
PP3CISE: But surely a liberal capitalist society is under no requirement 
that its teachers be employees rather than professionals. This would 
only be true if we defined 'liberal capitalism' as a society containing 
only employers or employees but this is contrary to our everyday under-
standing. 
FACILITATOR: The part of Scholar's argument concerning the employer/ 
employee relation has to be put hypothetically - if the status of 
teachers is as employees, then the quality of teaching effectiveness 
will be impaired. But what are the consequences of meritocratic 
commitments? 
SC3:01AR: J'lIeri tocracy can formulate an internally coherent vision of the 
social order in which agents take positions within the system of 
241 
242 
social co-operation and receive rewards and benefits in accordance 
with their lImerit". ~It is another matter whether those individuals 
defined as "unworthy" can achieve both vertical and horizontal 
coherence. How can they work out an authentic personal project 
and accept and identify with their social position and relations?) 
In order to support the meritocratic vision education must serve a 
selective function, i.e. systematic, frequent, "fairH and impartial 
grading and evaluation of students. But this vision is incompatible 
with the FPSC. 
Nevertheless liberals are not entirely opposed to ~galitarian 
values; they support the principle of equal consideration within 
the citizenship sphere and try to restrict the meritocratic principle 
to the division of labour. ·vlhile this may seem feasible in the 
economic and political spheres, what are its implications for 
education? Can education recognize a fundamental split between 
economic man and the citizen? Particularly during the general 
citizenship stage, educational activity cap-Ylot coherently recognize 
such a split. The student cannot authentically divide her project 
into two spheres, i.e., education for citizenship in accordance 
with the FPSC, and education for work in conformity with meritocratic 
values, because these imply contradictory self-definitions and 
perceptions. This conclusion follows at least for those students 
who are stamped as lIunworthyll for high status within the division 
~ b 40 Ool la our. Either the educational activity is directed toward 
our two democratic aims or it is orientated toward some different 
principle such as meritocratic selection or it is simply incoherent. 
Because liberal capitalism is committed to conflicting principles 
for citizenship and work it cannot provide a coherent basis for the 
elaboration of educational aims. 
FACILITATOR: This does not mean that it is impossible for the participants 
in an educational system to elaborate the two basic aims of education 
for democracy into more specific objectives and activities, in a 
coherent way, simply because they live in a liberal capitalist 
society. However the social outcomes they seek will be opposed to 
liberal capitalism. For example the graduates of their schools will 
not enter the work force prepared to accept employee status; they 
will not tolerate the limited participation in civic life that 
pertains to most citizens in a constitutional democracy. In brief 
these young citizens who have been educated for democracy will be 
committed to the abolition of capitalist relations and the organiza-
tion of an authentic democratic society. 
SOLIDARITY: Therefore people who are committed to the maintenance of 
liberal capitalism will try to prevent schools and educational systems 
from offering educational programmes based on a coherent elaboration 
of the existential and social aims of education for democracy. 
Whereas Scholar noted social classes, employer/employee 
relations and meritocratic commitments as being conceptually connected 
to liberal capitalism I want to identify three somewhat weaker 
affinities. Liberal capitalism is: 
(1) tlcongeniaP to authoritarian evaluation of students because 
such evaluation supports its meritocratic commitments; 
(2) "antipathetic" to communal critical reflexion directed tow'ard 
shared understandings and common visions for social transfor-
mation, indeed the language of !!communal critical reflexion ... tI 
sounds subversive, radical and objectionable vri thin the ethos 
of liberal capitalism; and this is because it suggests the 
abolition of the capitalist and meritocratic features of 
liberal capitalism; 
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(3) antipathetic to teacher professionalism. 
PRECISE: V[hy should liberal capitalism be antipathetic to teacher 
professionalism? And what does antipathetic mean in this context? 
SOLIDARITY: By 'antipathetic' I mean that while there is no logically 
necessary denial of professionalism, it is II natural" and "expected H • 
Teacher professionalism would likely support critical inquiry 
within schools because the power of politicians and special interest 
groups to restrict free inquiry would be greatly reduced. But 
unrestrained critical reflexion within the public schools threatens 
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to expose the inadequacies of liberal capitalism and foster democratic 
social transformation. Therefore we expect that proponents of liberal 
capitalism will oppose teacher professionalism. In this regard there 
is an interesting empirical fact that supports this analysis: it is 
nearly always the case that the political and bureaucratic control 
over teachers is greatest within the secondary level of general 
citizenship education and least at the university post-graduate level. 
This effectively constrains free inquiry in the educational system 
until after the basic selection for the division of labour has been 
completed and restricts this inquiry to a tiny minority, generally 
engaged in specialized studies. This is precisely what one would 
expect if those controlling education want to prevent or at least 
discourage communal critical reflexion on liberal capitalism as a 
system of social co-operation. 
Similarly by speaking of the tlcongenialityll of liberal capitalism 
toward authoritarian evaluation of school children and other students 
I mean that this is the policy one would expect of persons committed 
to liberal capitalist values - it is sound policy for them. 
Now the congeniality toward authoritarian evaluation arises 
both from the commitment to meritocratic selection and the antipathy 
to communal critical reflexion. Obviously the processes for deter-
mining the general criteria of evaluation by local community juris-
dictions and the specific criteria for evaluating particular students 
by agreements reached between teachers and students or teachers and 
parents makes the whole educational process more transparent and 
fosters responsibility and autonomy in the participants. All this 
expedites communal critical reflexion. 
LIBERAL: But it can be argued, plausibly if not validly, that the 
objection to communal critical reflexion is based on protecting 
children from indoctrination and manipulation. 
SOLIDARITY: However if advocates for liberal capitalism are genuinely 
opposed to indoctrination and manipulation they should be totally 
opposed to authoritarian evaluation of students, which is a way of 
coercively imposing concealed valuations and agendas. 
Within actual liberal capitalist societies using state power 
and regulation to prevent communal critical reflexion, the argument 
about protecting students from indoctrination and manipulation can 
be shown to be ideological because this same state power imposes 
authoritarian evaluation schemes on the public educational systems. 4l 
Contrary to its liberal rhetoric about individual tlvalue autonomyll 
the liberal capitalist state imposes authoritarian values through 
its authoritarian control over the basis of evaluations. Let me 
stress this is categorial control that the state exercises; it need 
not instruct its bureaucratic officials or teachers concerning the 
details but need only impose certain general distributions of relative 
success and failure on the student bOdy.42 
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FACILITATOR: Liberal capitalism cannot provide a coherent basis for 
elaborating deJ:J.Ocratic aims for education and is antipathetic to 
good education in a number of respects. What about the TAG Nerwork? 
Can it be shown that the TAG Network can provide a better quality 
of education? 
TELEOLOGIST: The TAG Network proclaims its commitment to democratic 
social transformation and establishes structures and processes 
-'" t . l' t· 3\ fl' . d 'd t b .t:.' ~os erlng communa crl lC re eXlon, In eeu oes so a a num er o~ 
different levels. Hence common interests are worked out at each 
level of the TAG Network and the conflicts are reconciled through 
continued deliberation in the various branches, so that each 
individual is able to achieve a substantial degree of harmony 
be~veen her individual interests and the common interests of the 
various communities within the TAG Network to which she belongs. 
Moreover, at each level and in each sphere, the internal democracy 
of the TAGs supports a reconciliation of existential and social 
considerations. In general the categorial control imposed over 
education by a TAG Network promotes communal critical reflexion, 
transparency and the capability of the participants to develop a 
coherent elaboration of the two basic aims of education for democracy. 
SCHOLAR: And additionally the TAG Network: provides a satisfactory 
approach to cultural arbitraries; establishes professional organiza-
tion of teaching which tends to improve the quality of teaching 
practice; incorporates appropriate agency relationships between 
teachers, students, parents and others; presents teachers to 
children as models of autonomous citizens rather than hetero~ous 
functionaries; removes the authoritarian imposition of grading, 
examinations and evaluations; and establishes the categorial 
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conditions for teachers to connect their instructional activity to 
the personal meanings and authentic projects of their students. 
FACILITATOR: Very clearly the quality of education would be much improved 
if we can establish TAG Network rather than liberal capitalist 
control over the educational system. But this seems like an immensely 
difficult task. 
SOLIDARITY: It looks like good education will have to await a social 
revolution that abolishes capitalism. 
TELEOLOGIST: Not at all! T'he constitutional democratic features of 
liberal capitalism provide the ~ossibilities for organizing a TAG 
Network control over education. Despite the antipathies of liberal 
capitalism tmvards local community control over the cultural 
arbitraries used as educational resources, towards professional 
status for teachers and towards co-operative franchises the 
possibility remains of organizing a mini-TAG Network controlling 
the educational system within liberal capitalism. Now if this 
programme eventually leads to the social transformation from liberal 
capitalism to authentic democracy, so much the better~ 
CO:r.OONTARY: The SET picks up on Teleologist' s idea of organizing a 
Ilmini-TAG Network ll controlling educational activity within liberal 
capitalism and they call this structure lithe educational commonwealth". 
The educational commonwealth consists of the TPA, the local community 
jurisdictions exercising local political control over educational 
franchises, the teachers' co-operatives linked to the local community 
jurisdictions through the franchises, and the nation-state to the extent 
that it can be organized to provide legislative, judicial and financial 
support, i.e. to create broad categorial conditions supportive of the 
educational commonwealth, guarantees of social justice and appropriate 
social freedoms and resources. 
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Regarding their original task of evaluating their school the SET 
have articulated the two basic aims of education for democracy and the 
matrix for elaborating these aims \diagrams 8 and 8.1). Moreover the 
analysis and critique of liberal cayitalism and the TAG Network as 
alternative approaches to the categorial control of education, reported 
in this section, provides a general evaluation which is pertinent at a 
fundamental level to all more specific evaluations of schools and 
educational systems in liberal capitalist societies. 
Some of the assertions made in this chapter, especially concerning 
the virtues of a TAG Network control of education may appear unconvincing 
or insufficiently justified. In Chapter VI the thesis analyses an 
educational commonwealth based on the principles of the TAG Network and 
in doing so puts many of the assertions made in this chapter on a more 
justifiable foundation. I specifically argue for the educational common-
wealth as the appropriate approach to the categorial control over 
education. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TEACHER PROFESSIONALISM AND THE 
EDUCATIONAL COMMONWEALTH 
COMMENTARY: In Chapter IV the dialogues make the case for a TAG Network 
organization of the basic structure of society, including pyramidal 
political jurisdictions, workers' co-operatives and professional associ-
ations. Then, in Chapter V, it is argued that liberal capitalism cannot 
provide a satisfactory basis for the political control over education. 
However, the possibility was raised of organizing an "educational common-
wealth", based on TAG Network principles within an existing liberal 
capitalist society. In Chapter VI the principles and findings developed 
in earlier chapters are applied to the problem of organizing, developing 
and maintaining an educational commonwealth that can provide a coherent 
elaboration of the basic aims of education for democracy. However this 
chapter does more than apply the earlier principles and findings - it 
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raises and explores important issues for the philosophy of education, 
especially concerning educational theory and canonical research; and the 
analysis of collective bargaining alternatives is important for the policies 
of education. 
The dialogues discuss: why a teachers' association with a strong 
professional capability should be organized prior to implementing certain 
other key transformations; the major functions of teachers' professional 
associations; how collective bargaining can be used to accomplish community 
political control, educational franchises and teachers' co-operatives; 
internal democracy within the teachers' professional association; 
communications and co-ordination within the educational commonwealth; 
relations between the educational commonwealth and the nation-state. 
However there are some preliminary comments to be made concerning 
the type of inquiry this chapter pursues. Because I discuss strategies 
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and the structure of institutions within an educational commonwealth it 
may be assumed that this is merely the application of the previously 
developed principles. However once it is appreciated that static 
principles for the political control over education are fundamentally 
incompatible with the transformation from liberal capitalism to authentic 
democracy then it becomes reasonable to conceive principles for educational 
governance and control as strategies. 
Nevertheless this chapter focuses on a number of matters in a more 
detailed way than the earlier chapters - it is more concerned with the 
immediate future and it stresses those institutions that are most crucial 
in the immediate future. Nevertheless its method is basically 
philosophical, just as conceptual analysis does not cease to become 
philosophical when it narrows its breadth and scope to focus on specific 
concepts within education. 
31. The teachers' professional association 
ACTION-MAN: Our present concern is the organization of an educational 
commonwealth embodying democratic community control, educational 
franchises, teachers' co-operatives and teachers' professional 
associations within our liberal capitalist society. While the 
organization of this commonwealth can go on simultaneously with 
other forms of social action in different spheres of social activity 
within this one objective there are certain stages which should have 
priority, specifically the teachers' professional association should 
be organized first. Assuming, as we realistically should, that an 
educational commonwealth will be organized "from below" rather than 
mandated by the nation-state, the sequence is to: transform existing 
teachers' unions and organizations into professional associations 
with fully developed professional programmes; combine local community 
organization and a new approach to collective bargaining between 
teachers' associations and local educational authorities to convert 
the employer/employee relation pertaining to education into a 
franchise/workers' co-operative relationship. 
PRECISE: Will you explain why we need to start with the transformation 
of teachers' organizations into professional associations? 
ACTION-MAN: While there are often many different paths to the same goal 
there are several grounds for starting with the professionalization 
of a teachers' association, which has the capacity to: develop the 
powers and dispositions of teachers for autonomous practice even 
while their conditions of employment are inimical to autonomy; 
provide a certification function respecting teachers' qualifications 
and other facilitative services to support the transition from 
employer/employee to franchise/co-operative organization. 
Teachers whose work status has been as heteron~ous functionaries 
will often be reluctant to accept or even totally opposed to bearing 
the responsibilities of personal and collective responsibility for 
the whole educational programme unless they have some sort of 
sanctuary or "psychosocial moratorium" wherein they can develop the 
shared vision, powers, self-esteem and confidence for professional 
1 
autonomy. C. A. Bowers rightly advocates a psychosocial moratorium 
on social and psychological forms of punishment often used by 
teachers to control students' behaviour and thought. However, it 
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is also vital for teachers to have a protected sanctuary where they 
can conduct inquiries into teaching practice and explore new methods 
and purposes of instruction free from threats or punishments by the 
political/bureaucratic hierarchy "supervising" them or the pressures 
arising from the existing relations and structuration of the school 
system. The teachers' professional association can provide a 
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different set of social relations and cUltural and educational 
resources to foster the development of dispositions, knowledge, skills 
and understandings for participation within an educational commonwealth 
which is being formed; it can offer moral and emotional support to 
teachers under stress during the lengthy transition period. 
If, for example, we try to institute franchises and teachers' 
co-operatives before developing the professional capabilities and 
functions of the teachers' association there are serious problems 
in addition to the likely resistance or limited commitment of teachers. 
How is the community to exercise political accountability concerning 
its schools? Lacking professional capabilities the teachers are 
unable to monitor teaching practice and to discipline themselves 
for breaches of ethics or professional competence. However, the 
community political jurisdiction cannot itself supervise teachers' 
professional performance without becoming the employer and stripping 
the teachers' co-operative of its responsibility, in conjunction with 
the professional association, for supervising the performance of its 
own members. 
FACILITATOR: Clearly the professional association has a crucial role in 
the educational commonwealth and this suggests devoting several 
sessions to an analysis of its main functions. 
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TELEOLOGIST: Presumably the analysis we have already done on the political 
control of work and professional organization within the TAG Network 
will be generally applicable to the teachers' professional association. 
Accordingly the key functions are certification and monitoring 
practice, pre-service education, in-service education, educational 
theory and research, policy development and legislative action. 
FACILITATOR: Yes, those are key functions but we are not simply applying 
the general analysis developed in sections 21 and 22 to education. 
We are also concerned with a transition strategy and so I suggest 
that we consider collective bargaining as part of this strategy after 
we have addressed the other key functions. 
32. Certification and teaching practice 
COMMENTARY: The SET makes extensive use of the analyses in section 22, 
particularly the finding that professional associations of practitioners 
. 2 
should have the sole authority to certify the qualifications of profess~onals. 
In the following dialogues the SET considers and rejects the possibility 
that education may be an exception to the general principles for the 
political control of work articulated in Chapter IV. 
SCHOLAR: Teaching is different from many types of work in that the 
workers do not produce goods or services (in the usual sense) but 
guide and facilitate the learning of other human beings. However, 
this difference only strengthens the case for professional status 
for teachers, client rights and protections for students and their 
parent trustees, and the type of community political control proposed 
in Chapter IV, because in educational activity human relationships 
are of the greatest importance. The social and political relation-
ships within schools and classrooms provide an implicit form of 
moral and political education: they set before students actual 
models of work, decision-making and human interaction and take an 
evaluative stance toward them, e.g. they express positions on what 
constitutes legitimate authority, how disagreements are settled, 
how interests are decided and pursued, how justice is to be 
interpreted, etc.; because these relationships are part of the social 
structure encountered by students, they have a formative effect on 
character, dispositions, powers and understandings. While a great 
deal more analysis is needed in this area it is plausible that 
teachers who have professional autonomy and such powers, dispositions 
and understandings as are compatible with and appropriate to it, will 
be more suitable models and more capable of fostering authenticity 
and autonomy in their students than heteron~ous functionaries. 
Practitioner control over certification plays an important part in 
the teacher's development of professional autonomy and in bringing 
about social structures and relationships within education that 
advance the self-development of students. 
PRECISE: A case is being made for practitioner control over certification 
but we have been awfully vague about the definition of 'practitioner'. 
Given that there is now an extensive functional differentiation of 
labour within the educational system, e.g. on the basis of the age 
of the student, subject or discipline, type of responsibility, ••• 
and assuming that only a small, representative body will actually 
exercise judgment concerning the certification of individual teachers 
do we not need to be much more specific concerning who is and who is 
not a practitioner? Are principals or heads practitioners? 
Superintendents? C~riculum consultants? University teachers of 
educational theory and practice? Educational researchers? Does 
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practitioner control over certification rule out extreme functional 
differentiation and demand that all practitioners within a particular 
profession carry out similar functions? We need greater clarity on 
these sorts of questions to understand what "practitioner control 
over certification" actually involves. 
HEART: These are very fundamental and iifficult questions. Please leave 
the question of functional differentiation on one side for now and 
bear with me while I develop my argument from an initially fuzzy 
definition of 'practitioner'. Assume that we already have a 
community of teachers and the problem is to decide whether a 
particular candidate, X, is or is not a teacher. How do we go 
about answering this sort of question? For our purposes it will 
not do to answer in terms of an "objective" or essentialist analysis 
of XIS functions because the question of which different functions 
"belong together" is precisely what is at issue. Conceptual analysis 
of the terms 'teacher' or 'teaching' is also unsatisfactory because 
we are concerned with a matter of social, political and educational 
policy and not mere linguistic usage. Indeed it would be surprising 
if there was any unique solution to the categorization of functions 
comprising a particular profession to be derived from essentialist 
3 
approaches. In fact, actual divisions of labour and actual classi-
fication of professions in legal and organizational terms have a 
history and generally a history that could have been "otherwise". 
Perhaps we can find some success by approaching the issue 
normatively. Why do we want practitioner control and what social 
principles and ideals underlie this objective? Our basic principle 
is the fundamental principle for social co-operation; more 
specifically we seek democratic self-governance of work and other 
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aspects of social interaction. In whatever way we may eventually 
define the boundaries of the teaching profession, or any other 
profession, and I am not suggesting that this definition is inconse-
quential, it must be compatible with and supportive of democratic 
self-governance. 
The principle of democratic self-governance has implications 
for the ways in which decisions about the membership of a profession 
are determined. From this principle we can derive three "theorems" 
that may assist us in clarifying the definition of practitioners. 4 
Theorem 1 
If X has the authority to make judgments about competent or 
ethical teaching practice, either in the form of general policies 
and regulations or of rulings and interpretations in particular cases, 
that are binding on other practitioners then X should be classified 
as a practitioner. 
Theorem 2 
If X is a practitioner then X should belong to the teachers' 
professional association and have an equal right with all other 
practitioners to: participate in deliberations about and to decide 
upon standards for good teaching practice, ethical conduct and the 
criteria for certification of teachers; decide which persons will 
have the authority to make judgments and rulings concerning specific 
cases. 
Theorem 3 
Decisions concerning the broad principles for the division of 
labour and other social actions within the teaching profession should 
be determined by a consensus (if possible) or by majority decision 
(if necessary) of the teachers' professional association. 5 
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Taken together these three theorems define legitimate authority 
concerning judgments about teaching practice in relational terms, 
which is consistent with our findings in Chapters III, IV and V 
concerning rational decision processes. For example, XIS authority 
cannot be grounded, ultimately, in his knowledge because this would 
be circular when pushed to its limits. Who certifies that X really 
has the sort of knowledge justifying his authority? Also, if it 
is argued that XIS authority in these matters arises from his 
position within a particular hierarchy of control this begs the 
question because what sort of justification would show that X ought 
to have that position? 
To illustrate these theorems consider the following cases: 
A is an official who has the authority to write reports regarding 
the competence and ethical conduct of teachers (the reports may be 
used in proceedings to decide certification, decertification or 
disciplinary action); B is an official who sits on a board which 
conducts inquiries into the practices and professional conduct of 
teachers and has the authority to make rulings concerning certifica-
tion and professional discipline; C is a person who participates in 
deliberations which determine policies, rules and regulations with 
respect to certification and professional discipline; D is a person 
who is not subject to the discipline of the professional teachers' 
association. According to theorems 1 and 2, A, B and C should belong 
to the teachers' professional association and D should not belong 
and should not have the right to exercise the types of authority 
that A, B and C do. D, who might be any member of the community 
except one who belongs to the teachers' professional association, 
has the right to express his views, make proposals and so on, 
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concerning education. Like every other citizen he has the right to 
participate, on an equal basis, in the determination of aims, objectives, 
cultural resources and evaluative criteria for the schools in his 
community. As a citizen he participates in a collective right to 
approve or reject the educational franchise and to decide whether 
the teachers' co-operative has satisfactorily achieved the evaluative 
criteria. So D has the right to a significant say in educational 
policy but no right to participate in decisions defining good practice 
and ethical conduct within and peculiar to the profession. 6 
PRECISE: But what is the justification for the theorems? 
HEART: The theorems follow from the FPSC, the principle of democratic 
self-governance and our commitment to autonomous agency. If A, B 
and C do not belong to the professional association then the principle 
of self-governance is violated and A, B and C stand in asymmetrical 
relations of categorial power to the other teachers. Likewise if D 
could have the right to participate in the internal operations of the 
profession without himself being subject to professional discipline 
this would be subject to the same criticism. 
PRECISE: It seems that even if they do belong to the teachers' professional 
association A and B have an asymmetrical power relationship with other 
teachers who lack their authority. 
HEART: Theorems 2 and 3 are relevant here. The professional teachers I 
association may create certain offices with special powers and 
authority and assign individuals to them; in doing so they establish 
asymmetries in certain specific forms of authority but this is not 
necessarily contrary to the FPSC because categorial power within the 
sphere of professional practice will be equal if every member has an 
equal say regarding the broad principles for the division of social 
actions within the association, including the formation and filling 
of these special offices and positions. If any person with a position 
of special responsibility, such as A or B, has his special authority 
concerning teaching practice decided democratically by the whole 
association through processes characterized by mutual respect and 
affection, open and undistorted communications and symmetrical power 
relations then we have an appropriate practitioner control over 
certification; whereas if such persons receive their authority from 
outside this democratic community of practitioners, e.g. from a 
state legislature or an employer it is not practitioner control 
but state or employer control. 
ACTION-MAN: A longstanding dispute in many teachers' organizations is 
whether principals (heads), inspectors, supervisors, superintendents 
and others who have authority with respect to competence and good 
practice should be admitted to membership in the same association 
as classroom teachers. It follows from this analysis that they 
definitely should - although their particular job descriptions may 
be radically altered and some of the incumbents replaced. 7 By 
maintaining such officers in, or initiating them into, the teachers' 
professional association, teachers achieve one condition for 
professional control over certification and practice. On the other 
hand the policy of barring persons in such positions from membership 
reinforces the strategy of industrial unionism and undermines the 
prospects for practitioners taking control of certification and 
teaching practice.8 
FACILITATOR: Basically the system through which decisions about certi-
fication, decertification and professional discipline are to be 
made should be controlled by a professional association which has 
internal democracy. 
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ACTION-MAN: We should stress that the teachers' professional association 
should have sole authority concerning the control of certification 
and teaching practice. Shared responsibility, e.g. among school 
teachers, university teachers or administrators and state officials 
is an ill-conceived policy. Such schemes, being contrary to our 
three theorems, do not provide practitioner control. In addition, 
lines of responsibility and accountability are unclear; in practice 
they entail a state bureaucracy involved in teacher certification; 
in view of the confused lines of responsibility it is difficult to 
see how citizens can exercise political control over their state 
officials in this sphere; and there is the persistent danger of a 
misuse of state political authority. 
The interesting question is why teachers have been so prone to 
accept or even seek this type of shared responsibility. 
TELEOLOGIST: Yes, there is a long history of teachers seeking professional 
control over certification but they have had no success in any juris-
diction so far as I know. 9 The basic approach which teachers have 
used is legislative proposals, backed by lobbying and other forms 
of political action, which aim for a change in the legal status of 
the teaching occupation mandated by parliament or other legislative 
bodies. 
SOLIDARITY: Not only has this approach been singularly unsuccessful but 
the teachers have also been remarkably long suffering and good 
tempered with the legislative bodies that have frustrated their 
efforts. They have not organized and struggled to achieve these 
professional rights with the same intensity and determination which 
they apply to the pursuit of economic welfare benefits. They have 
not applied sanctions to punish legislatures which have prevented 
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them from gaining control over certification or mounted serious 
programmes of political action to elect only those candidates who 
support professional status. The main reason for this is that 
teachers have not appreciated the significance of practitioner 
control over professional practice or understood the pressures and 
sanctions needed to achieve it. For example, until very recently 
I was opposed to professionalism myself. We must help teachers to 
appreciate how crucial professional control over certification is 
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and so generate the commitment and determination to win this objective. 
TELEOLOGIST: While commitment and determination are very important, 
Solidarity's analysis is too superficial in that it suggests that 
some "consciousness raising" and "rah! rah!" are sufficient. 
Teachers on her account have a much clearer understanding of their 
welfare than their professional interests. Why should this be so? 
I believe that a very big part of the problem arises from structural 
features within teachers' organizations, namely the lack of an 
infrastructure to administer a programme of initial certifieation 
and ongoing monitoring of practice; the inadequate development within 
these associations of a psychosocial moratorium supporting and nurtur-
ing the personal and professional transformation of teachers so that 
they can at least cope with a lengthy and otherwise traumatic revolu-
tion in working relationships. 
ACTION-MAN: What is to be done? 
TELEOLOGIST: We need to develop the professional infrastructure of the 
teachers' association before practitioners are granted legal authority 
to control certification and practice, that is: offer in-service 
edUcation, research and theory programmes according to the principle 
of a psychosocial moratorium for teachers; establish an "unofficial", 
i.e. not mandatory, system of certification and procedures for 
mOnitoring practice; when this system is in operation challenge and 
confront the legally mandated system whenever it is at odds with the 
professional system. IO 
FACILITATOR: Those are valuable ideas. Do you think it is time to address 
pre-service education? 
ACTION-MAN: Much of our general strategy for gaining professional control 
over certification and practice should apply to pre-service education; 
the main difference is that for the former our key protagonist is the 
political state whereas for the latter it is the universities and 
teacher training colleges. However professional control over pre-
service education will probably be easier to achieve than over 
certification and practice, particularly if we accomplish the latter 
first. Our strategy should not be directed to having teachers' unions 
take over pre-service education from universities and teacher training 
colleges because this would entail a violation of equal consideration 
of the interests of some practitioners, produce destructive conflict 
and, if successful, represent a terrible waste of existing resources; 
rather we should seek to bring all who participate in the control of 
the pre-service education of teachers within a united teaching pro-
fession. Because persons authorized to participate in the control of 
pre-service education must be capable of, and authorized to make, 
judgments about competent and ethical teaching practice we can 
justify our position through Heart's theorems. 
If we present our case to the teachers of teachers working in 
universities and colleges we can probably convince many of them and 
win their agreement and commitment. Those who refuse to participate 
in our justified programme of democratic professionalization can be 
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isolated and subjected to various sanctions. Once professionals 
gain legal control over certification one of these sanctions can be 
the refusal to accept the "professional" judgments of teachers or 
administrators who are not part of the professional community; this 
would seriously undermine their ability to attract teachers-in-
training. 
FACILITATOR: The strategy for gaining control over pre-service education 
is quite similar to that over certification and teaching practice 
although the latter is the more urgent priority. In analysing the 
strategic failures of teachers in the pursuit of control over 
certification and practice, Teleologist stressed the need for an 
adequate development of the infrastructure prior to gaining legal 
control over these matters. Perhaps we can address research and 
theory development, as part of this infrastructure, in our next 
session. 
COMMENTARY: Solidarity's explanation of teachers' lack of commitment to 
professionalism is too superficial whereas Teleologist's argument is more 
adequate. The reason is not primarily lack of professional concern but 
an inadequate support system and professional infrastructure. There is 
a type of dialectical relation at work here: the more the infrastructure 
is developed the more teachers will tend to take professional responsibility; 
the more they take professional responsibility the more they will develop 
the infrastructure. 
33. Educational theory and canonical research 
COMMENTARY: I will summarize most of the discussion concerning educational 
theory and research. Teleologist observes that one way of classifying 
educational research is with respect to its purpose. Two main purposes 
are relevant to our inquiry: research to assist the community in exercising 
its political accountability regarding aims, cultural arbitraries and 
evaluative criteria; research directed to the improvement of teaching 
practice and learning conditions. Solidarity expresses doubt over the 
possibility of making a sharp distinction between political and professional 
purposes for educational research. Liberal argues that while no sharp line 
can be drawn there is a distinction in emphasis and degree of generality. 
The political concern is primarily with what happens to its children 
whereas the professional emphasis is much more on ~ it is to be accom-
plished; which is not to say that the professional should be unconcerned 
with decisions about appropriate outcomes. Indeed professionals should 
participate in discussions within the community concerning aims and 
evaluative criteria. Moreover, in making professional decisions, teachers 
take positions with respect to moral, social and political ideals, and 
thereby exercise a restricted form of delegated political authority; but 
this does not deny the differences in emphasis and detail between 
professional and political purposes for research. 
The community can, on a franchise basis, engage researchers to 
assist it in evaluating the general educational outcomes in its schools, 
provided that the authority and activity of these researchers do not 
transgress the principles we are about to articulate for professional 
research. 
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Because the topic of educational theory and research arises in 
connection with the infrastructure of the teachers' professional association 
the SET focuses on professional research. 
Teleologist argues that the teachers' professional association requires 
a canonical theory concerning pedagogy, ethical and competent practice, and 
learning conditions. By 'canonical theory' she means a set of ideas, 
principles and standards that constitute a theoretical view about good 
practices in education, which is endorsed by the professional association. 
Professionals require canonical theory to make non-arbitrary, justifiable 
and fair judgments about professional education, certification, supervision 
of practice and professional discipline. Hence the principle of professional 
control over certification and practice commits us to the development of 
canonical theory. Other approaches to the political control of teaching, 
as long as they are also concerned with the good and interests of students, 
also require sound theory; but one of the great advantages of professional 
control rather than other approaches, such as bureaucratic supervision, 
for example, is the superior development of canonical theory. 
Nevertheless there are a number of fundamental difficulties facing 
the TPA (teachers' professional association). The ultimate grounding of 
educational theory is man's good and therefore those who pursue this 
inquiry should be committed to both truth and goodness. However, these 
commitments, even when elaborated or augmented in terms of some principles 
for rational deliberation, are not formulas that produce unique solutions 
to the search for canonical theory. This is true whether or not one 
takes a sceptical position regarding the ultimate possibilities for human 
knowledge of factual and normative matters - because, whatever our ultimate 
possibilities, we have only a limited time for investigation and delibera-
tion. For the foreseeable future man's knowledge and understanding will 
remain radically incomplete; it follows that any educational theory 
actually articulated will be incomplete and incorrect in some respects. 
Moreover, because practitioners will bring different experiences and 
patterns of knowledge into their deliberations, so that the various 
respects in which they are "in error" with respect to some "more correct" 
theory (as subsequently or "finally" determined) are different, there is 
the likelihood, if not certainty, of disagreements among practitioners 
who follow "rational ll decision procedures and are genuinely committed to 
truth, goodness and rationality. 
Liberal stresses the need for a substantial degree of scepticism 
about the possibilities of developing "true" or "valid" educational 
theory and for tolerance concerning different interpretations. The SET 
agrees with toleration and scepticism within certain limits. While any 
actual theory will be corrigible in the light of further experience or 
more deliberation, one theory is not generally as adequate as another. 
From our research activity we seek good grounds for making decisions and 
choices among competing theories to maximize our chances for improving 
practice - not certainty or infallibility. 
By 'canonical research' the SET means any systematic inquiry designed 
to throw light on canonical educational theory. 'Research' in this context 
does not necessarily refer to scientific or positivistic methods but to 
any approaches that might illuminate our understanding of educational 
11 
theory. 
As was discussed in section 25 a procedural conception of rationality 
can take us a certain distance in the resolution of disputes about 
educational theory. By 'procedural conception of rationality' we mean 
not only a commitment to truth, consistency, impartiality and man's good, 
but also to undistorted communications, mutual respect and affection, 
symmetrical power relations, anti-authoritarianism, etc. However, given 
the limitations discussed above, we are caught between conflicting forces: 
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on the one hand, to establish at least a core of canonical theory that 
will be the basis for collective control over professional practice; and, 
on the other, to support free and open inquiry and research designed to 
modify that canonical theory. However the development of new canonical 
theory cannot be pursued without criticizing and attempting to discredit 
12 the existing canonical theory. This means that a theory which is 
constantly subject to criticism and which may already be discredited in 
certain respects among some sections of the TPA has to serve as the basis 
for decisions about certification, professional discipline and decertifica-
tion ,as well as other matters). Teachers who may lose their rights to 
practise because of conduct contrary to canonical theory may complain of 
injustice when the theory is so subject to conflicting assessments. 
I agree with Solidarity's suggestion that canonical theory be 
established through a consensus of practitioners and also with Liberal 
that a mandatory 'core' versus a non-mandatory periphery distinction 
needs to be drawn within canonical theory. 
DIAGRAM 9 CORE CANONICAL THEORY 
i 
l 
EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
"Disputed Territory" 
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In Diagram 9 the rectangle represents the whole range of competing 
theories about educational practice; the outer circle portrays the 
canonical theory, established by consensus, which is the basis for both 
individual practice and professional policy concerning such matters as 
the organization of schools, curriculum development, the division of 
pedagogic work among teachers, etc.; the inner circle represents the 
mandatory core of canonical theory, violation of which is grounds for 
decertification or professional discipline. 
Liberal insists that 'violation of canonical theory' refers to 
practice and not to theoretical beliefs or assertions. Y is a teacher 
who disagrees with our most basic principle - that good education is good 
for man - and continues to assert his position in contradiction to the 
prinCiple endorsed by the TPA, both within the TPA and in public. 
Providing Y's teaching practice does not contravene this principle, we 
can justify his right to verbal challenges to the principle, using, for 
example, arguments similar to Mill in On Liberty.13 Y has the right to 
go on trying to change the canonical theory as long as his practice does 
not contravene it. 
We must however be careful to note that some articulations of theory 
are at the same time practices. The teacher who presents arguments to 
his class purporting to demonstrate the inherent superiority of some 
races in relation to others has engaged in the practice of racial 
discrimination. He cannot defend his action by arguing that it is simply 
a theoretical position. In the classroom, particularly with immature 
learners, it is a practice, and if the mandatory core forbids racial 
discrimination it is unacceptable. 
Canonical theory is the basis for educational policy within the 
educational commonwealth but the mandatory core goes further - it bears 
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directly on the right to practise the profession - therefore it requires 
greater certainty and a more complete consensus. The boundaries between 
mandatory, non-mandatory and disputed territory will constantly shift. 
A few examples may illustrate the distinctions. In disputed territory 
is the idea of teaching children to read English through an "initial 
teaching alphabet".14 Research may eventually vindicate, discredit or 
modify this idea but at this stage it is insufficiently established to 
be either the basis for curriculum design or grounds for professional 
discipline one way or another. For our SET the principle that good 
education must connect to the authentic project of the student belongs 
to the mandatory core. Practice contrary to this principle is justifiably 
subject to professional discipline, including decertification if the 
teacher is unwilling or unable to respect it. Contrast this with the 
idea that discovery methods of lea~ng are generally preferable to didactic 
instruction; this is a less fundamental and less certain principle, the 
validity of which is likely to vary with circumstances. It may occur 
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that the discovery learning principle or some modification of it is 
endorsed as non-mandatory canonical theory. This suggests that it would 
have a policy function affecting, perhaps, the architecture of schools, 
curriculum planning, learning materials, school journeys and the like but 
would not be a basis for "hard" decisions concerning teaching practice. 
If there is a reasonable likelihood that good education can occur with 
little or no use of discovery methods then it is unjustifiable to use 
violation of the discovery learning principle as grounds for professional 
discipline. 
As Liberal points out it is desirable to have a range of competing 
theories and practices and a free approach to communal critical reflexion 
concerning them. While certain practices must be forbidden in the interests 
of students and the public the profession must establish that there is 
a reasonable probability that such practices violate fundamental 
principles. We can go wrong by being either too lenient or too harsh 
and in either case there is injustice. However, as Heart says, even the 
core of canonical theory need not pass tests of the same stringency as 
are required in a court of criminal law. Indeed legal justice is an 
inappropriate model for the control over teaching practice. There is a 
large gap between '1proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that a teacher's 
practices are helow standard and the "reasonable probability" that the 
interests of students are undermined by them; it is the latter position, 
not the former, which is appropriate for control over teaching practice. 
If, however, the line is drawn at "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" then 
many poor and marginal teachers will glide safely through the gap to the 
detriment of students and the public interest. Nor should decertification 
be likened to criminal conviction because failure to meet the challenging 
requirements of professional teaching practice does not necessarily, or 
even probably, imply criminal culpability. If requiring that teachers 
measure up to demanding standards with respect to their students' interests 
and the public interest is unfair so is the requirement that tournament 
tennis players win their match as a condition of proceeding to the next 
match lor winning the trophy). Nonetheless, because matters of certifica-
tion and professional discipline are so significant for the careers of 
practitioners, the procedures must be fair and scrupulously followed; 
and the mandatory canonical theory, which is the basis for deciding such 
matters, must have as firm a justification as possible. 
How can this mandatory canonical theory be placed on a defensible 
foundation? I only touch on a number of points in this respect. There 
is the procedural principle, which has been stressed concerning a number 
270 
of different substantive issues, of symmetrical power relations, undistorted 
communications, and the democratic "climate" of the TPA. Clearly there must 
be a very strong consensus about core canonical theory because otherwise the 
deliberation has been inadequate or incomplete. However, a strong consensus 
is not sufficient, because a major allocation of time and resources to the 
development of canonical theory, on an ongoing basis, is also necessary. 
While the core will always be much less than the whole of canonical theory, 
it is only through a commitment to canonical research on a comprehensive 
basis and repeated redrawing of the boundaries between mandatory, non-
mandatory and disputed spheres of educational theory that the TPA can 
exercise responsible control over certification and teaching practice. 
A brief summary of the discussion on the division of labour between 
teachers and researchers follows. Because of the central significance of 
canonical research to professional control of certification and practice 
and because of our commitment to autonomous participation of practitioners 
in the central functions of their professional association every teacher 
should be involved in educational research activity. The minimum satis-
factory level of involvement in research should be as much as is necessary 
to enable the teacher to participate effectively in debates and discussions 
concerning mandatory canonical theory; a teacher incapable of this is 
unable to take a position on acceptable versus unacceptable teaching 
practices - such a teacher is destined to remain a functionary. Beyond 
this minimum level of involvement there can be great differences in the 
balance between teaching practice to reflect different circumstances or 
variations among the practitioners in dispositions, powers and interests. 
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Another basic finding is that the TPA must control canonical research 
and this assertion can be justified along the lines used to justify 
professional control over certification and practice. In turn this finding 
places certain limits on research specialization. Generally researchers 
specializing in canonical educational research should belong to the TPA. 
However there is also the possibility of specialist researchers, say in 
fields such as psychology or sociology, for example, setting up a research 
co-operative and conducting research through a franchise with the TPA. 
Both of these options ensure that researchers are responsible to the TPA 
and cannot exercise a dominating power over the teachers. 
Theorem 4 expresses in concise form my position regarding 
canonical research. 
Theorem 4 
If X is engaged in canonical research on a continuing basis then X 
should either be classified as a practitioner or be engaged through a 
mutually agreed market franchise with the TPA. 
By insisting that researchers such as X belong to the professional 
teaching community we establish a general symmetry of power relations, 
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ensure that researchers and other teachers can co-operate as co-participating 
autonomous agents in the development and application of canonical theory. 
Theorem 4 is also directed to ensuring that educational theory is grounded 
in practice. Taken together, the four theorems suggest that the general 
approach to the division of labour between research and other professional 
teaching activities should be decided by the profession as a whole. 15 
Finally Action-Man raises a number of organizational issues. 
ACTION-MAN: The conventional programmes of teacher education and the 
present organization of educational activity have tended to neglect 
the understandings, skills and dispositions needed for participation 
in canonical research. To overcome this teachers' organizations 
need to organize their in-service education programmes to develop 
these powers in their members. This task is essentially the 
development of "organic intellectuals" within the TPA. 
For Antonio Gramsci the distinction between traditional and 
organic intellectuals is essentially that the organic intellectuals 
are more organically connected to a fundamental social class grouping 
whereas the traditional intellectuals have a more detached relation-
ship to fundamental classes. 16 In this specific context I use 
'organic' to refer to intellectuals who have an intimate connection 
to teaching practice and 'traditional' to refer to the professional 
scholars, scientists, artists, etc., who develop and maintain the 
academic disciplines and produce new cultural products. Both 
traditional and organic intellectuals have the capacity for signifi-
cant participation in shaping community and societal ideas concerning 
what is possible, rational, true and good. 
Within teaching, canonical research must be continually 
connected and reconnected to the research, cultural and intellectual 
activity of traditional intellectuals and this is one task for the 
organic intellectuals of the TPA. Organic intellectuals within the 
TPA can be formed either by professional intellectuals immersing 
themselves in the activity of the TPA or by teacher practitioners 
themselves becoming directly engaged in canonical research. It is 
the latter process which should be the main focus although the two 
can be mutually supportive. 
Within the TPA there is a very important basis for research 
specialization. Many teachers' organizations now have, as sub-groups, 
specialist associations organized on the current division of teaching 
activity, i.e. by subjects, age or type of student, etc. Because they 
are based on the actual shared predicaments and interests of 
professional teachers, these associations within the TPA, are 
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excellent foci for research activity, curriculum development and 
in-service education. Where specialist associations exist they 
should be strengthened by additional resources and research capacities; 
where they do not teachers should seriously consider organizing them. 17 
And yet as long as specialist associations merely reflect an 
existing division and organization of pedagogic work and do not 
reflect ~ it with a view to taking responsibility for its trans-
formation, crucial canonical research may be inhibited by the structure 
of the specialist organization. For example, the prevailing subject 
organization of secondary schools, if used as the basis for organizing 
teacher research and development, has the limitation of having already 
taken a position on the subjects to be taught and is therefore not 
well placed to address the issue of what subjects should be in the 
curriculum. Accordingly consideration should be given to forms of 
organization which integrate research and theory development across 
different specialties and which support teacher examination of the 
basic division of pedagogic work. 
One approach to this is a council to which all specialist 
associations send representatives which can both integrate and 
co-ordinate research activity among specialist associations and 
pursue research projects which cut across or transcend the boundaries 
between specialist associations. 
FACILITATOR: Having established the need for in-service education to 
develop organic intellectuals and to teach research skills to 
practitioners, we should, in our next session, address in-service 
education. 
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34. In-service education 
COMMENTARY: In-service education is a matter of great importance to the 
TPA; unfortunately even a sketchy overview requires more discussion than 
our focus permits. Accordingly I focus on those points most relevant to 
the strategy for gaining TPA control over certification and practice. 
I begin by merely summarizing the position taken by the SET on two 
in-service issues: who should deliver in-service education programmes to 
teachers?; should mandatory in-service, as a condition of continued 
certification, be required? With respect to the first, the finding of 
section 26 is that all voluntary education of certificated professionals 
is categorized as 'postprofessional' and subject to the principle of 
shared control between stUdent and teacher, i.e. a freely negotiated 
arrangement. The prospects for freely negotiated relationships and for 
responsiveness to the great variety of individual perspectives and needs 
are enhanced by a multiplicity of different "suppliers!! of in-service 
education. Moreover, because it is generally both difficult and 
undesirable to draw a sharp boundary between in-service designed to 
improve teaching abilities and that directed to general self-development, 
a wide variety of different sources and types reinforces the individual 
autonomy of the teacher regarding his own self-development. Also, if the 
TPA tries to provide all types of in-service education it will likely be 
too t1 s tretched out" to focus adequately on certain forms crucial to the 
professionalization of teaching. 
It is sometimes argued that because of changes in educational theory, 
school subjects and academic disciplines, teachers in service should be 
required, as a condition of continuing certification, to take and pass 
certain courses. Does our analysis of canonical theory support this view? 
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only superficially. Is it plausible that a teacher who has mastered 
the canonical theory sufficiently to meet initial certification standards 
can only keep abreast of current canonical theory by taking certain 
prescribed courses? Assuming that the TPA has a strong programme of 
canonical research, there are many different ways for teachers to keep 
informed about education, e.g. reading, discussions with colleagues, 
participation in research, courses, seminars, workshops, teacher exchange, 
travel, •••. Certain teachers may neglect recent developments in theory 
and thus become incapable of meeting current standards of practice. Such 
cases should be identified by monitoring practice and where warranted 
mandatory in-service may be prescribed as a condition of continuing or 
renewed certification. But the general imposition of mandatory in-service 
is a violation of the professional teacher's personal responsibility for 
his own continuing education and a gross misuse of public and professional 
resources. Because the TPA should have sole responsibility for the control 
of certification and practice only the TPA should have the authority to 
decide cases in which mandatory in-service is required. Where these 
mandatory in-service schemes are applied by state certification boards 
we have a sham because state control does not result in a canonical theory 
to justify the mandatory courses. 18 
Having reviewed the TAG's position supporting multiple suppliers of 
in-service education and rejecting mandatory in-service courses except 
where directed to specific weaknesses in the practice of the teacher we 
now join Liberal as he articulates a position concerning the in-service 
priorities of the TPA. 
LIBERAL: There are three related foci for in-service organization within 
the TPA, at least for the short to mid-term: offering a particular 
type of political education; developing organic intellectuals, 
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including teaching research methods and skills; providing a psycho-
social moratorium for teachers. 
(1) Political education 
Many teachers lack a clear understanding of the politics of 
educational control, of the significance of practitioner control over 
certification and practice, of the case for a vast expansion of TPA 
resources directed to canonical theory and for their own participa-
tion in the development of this theory, etc., and of the ways in 
which the foregoing issues bear on their own work and experience in 
the classroom. If these teachers are to participate with their 
colleagues, as autonomous agents, in both political and educationa1/ 
cultural action to transform radically the political control over, and 
the relationships within, education, then they need these understand-
ings. Therefore, one emphasis for in-service education should be a 
form of political education which aims to foster an understanding of 
education in a social, cultural and political context and which is 
connected to educational practice, social praxis and political action. 
(2) Developing or~anic intellectuals; teaching research 
methods and skills 
Because the development of organic intellectuals and the pursuit 
of canonical theory have been so little understood and so long 
neglected it may take some time to learn how to go about them and 
much longer still before the TPA's professional infrastructure will 
be ready to exercise legal control over certification and practice. 
I do not pretend to know, in detail, how to proceed but some general 
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points are worth noting. How are teachers to find the time and energy 
for canonical research and in-service education in addition to the 
demanding tasks of classroom teaching? Obvious as the problem of 
time is, it has been generally neglected or under-emphasized by 
teachers' organizations. Systematic and determined efforts are 
required to secure release time and to organize in-service activities 
so that contributing teachers receive personal satisfaction from them. 
Teachers involved in research, criticism and policy require 
access to intellectual resources, e.g. professional libraries, contacts 
with traditional intellectuals and opportunities to share ideas and 
experiences with other organic intellectuals. The TPA should consider 
organizing workshops in which volunteer teacher practitioners work on 
projects related to the development of canonical theory. Traditional 
intellectuals can be invited as resource persons to assist in teaching 
research methods and skills. Eventually the TPA should have its own 
cadre of teachers of research methods and skills and possibly new 
conceptions of methodology will arise from their work. Another 
important organizational and motivational consideration is that 
teachers engaged in research need vehicles of expression, i.e. means 
for disseminating their findings to colleagues, e.g. through papers, 
journals, books, videotapes, slide/tape shows, movies, etc. 
(3) Providing a psychosocial moratorium 
We have already discussed the need for a psychosocial moratorium, 
or sanctuary, for teachers who are developing new powers and disposi-
tions for participation in the transformed relationships and govern-
19 
ance of the educational commonwealth. This suggests that the setting, 
organization and methodology of TPA research and in-service programmes 
should give due attention to affective and emotional as well as 
normative, cognitive and technical considerations. We must not 
assume a stereotypical view of teachers as fully Ilmature" persons 
whose only self-developmental needs are cognitive and technical. 
On the contrary, teachers wrestling with conflicting conceptions 
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of the aims and processes of education, of appropriate relationships 
with students, parents, colleagues and others, and of canonical 
theory are often vulnerable in terms of character and personality, 
subject to severe stress; in short they may be faced with a crisis 
of personality. To the extent that in-service programmes provide an 
empathetic, non-threatening and supportive environment many teachers 
can pass through the period of personality crisis with greater trans-
parency, enhanced powers and increased confidence, which together 
prepare them for autonomy and professional responsibility. 
There is a moral point here too. The programmes of political 
education and educational research will have the effect of opening 
up discrepancies between theory and practice, between ideal and actual, 
or, in the language of section 7, of intensifying the homeostatic 
tension between understanding and action. How is the teacher to 
respond authentically to his own more transparent understanding 
stimulated by TPA political education and research programmes? 
The answer, according to our analysis in section 7, is that the 
chances of authentic response are enhanced when there is the capacity 
and willingness to meet the special, urgent, personal needs for 
empathetic understanding, support, and specific new powers. If this 
element of sanctuary is lacking there will be serious "casualties ll -
teachers who are psychically defeated, made ill or disabled by the 
tensions and stresses confronting them. 
PRECISE: The psychological moratorium feature serves teachers' interests 
but is there not a problem with the TPA providing this sort of 
in-service? It is argued that the TPA should monitor practice and 
also operate in-service programmes that are non-threatening, 
supportive, etc. However if a teacher is under severe stress, having 
difficulties coping, etc., will he not be extremely reluctant to seek 
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assistance from the TPA if the information the TPA gains from its 
intervention can be used against him in professional discipline or 
decertification proceedings? 
LIBERAL: Yes, and your astute observation shows that the administrative 
and information systems for in-service and the supervision of teach-
ing practice should be entirely separate. The teacher must have 
absolute security that information he provides or professional 
inadequacies he may reveal during in-service programmes will be 
unavailable to persons monitoring teaching practice. However the 
TPA can manage both functions provided they are administered through 
separate and distinct branches honouring the confidentiality of 
in-service information. 
PRECISE: Fine. On another matter, is there not a fourth type of 
in-service that is extremely important, namely the dissemination 
of ideas, techniques and skills to improve classroom instruction? 
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TELEOLOGIST: There has always been a heavy demand for "nuts and bolts 
for Monday morning" and skills and techniques are very important 
but we surely do not want to teach skills and techniques as merely 
technical matters. The dissemination of technical expertise 
detached from the kind of existential and social considerations we 
have explored in our inquiry is unacceptable because it reinforces 
the conception of the teacher as a functionary and the student as 
ready-to-hand "stuff". So there is no justification for this fourth 
type of in-service if it refers to a merely technical approach but 
if it means skills and techniques that can be justified it is covered 
under the canonical research focus. 
FACILITATOR: We appear to agree on the three foci for in-service education 
and this completes our discussion of the infrastructure of the TPA. 
In our next session we address some crucial relations between 
teachers and local communities. 
COMMENTARY: I will skip the legislative action programme because the 
discussion in section 32 showed this to be of little immediate importance. 
However there was one important point made by Solidarity and that is that 
when the time for legislative action to grant professional status comes 
the argument can and should be put as a general social ideal rather than 
as a special case or a demand for privileged occupational status. 
35. Bargaining and community relations 
COMMENTARY: I will summarize the first part of the discussion on this 
topic. There was some re-consideration of the objective of abolishing 
the employer/employee relation and replacing it with franchise/co-operative 
relations. This reconsideration was stimulated by concerns over the 
opposition such a programme would encounter from persons committed to 
capitalism and/or centralized control of education, and by anticipated 
organizational difficulties. We join Scholar in his response to these 
concerns. 
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SCHOLAR: Yes, there are difficulties on both sides of the negotiating 
table. Many members of the community consider the business corporation 
to be ~ model for the school system and for many the "hard-nosed" 
bargaining strategies of the industrial unions are the ideal basis 
for organizational and negotiating activity. 
We should not make light of these problems. Precise has 
suggested that we reconsider the case for abolishing the employer/ 
employee relationship in view of the strength of opposition, the 
organizational difficulties and the costs of the programme. I want 
to respond to this request not by some sort of cost/benefit analysis -
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the opposition in some quarters will be fierce, the organizational 
difficulties formidable, and the costs in time, energy and resources, 
heavy - but by considering the alternative scenario, i.e. leaving 
employer/employee relations unchanged. I propose to do this by 
exploring four ideas and their interconnections: the industrial 
model of schooling; technological consciousness; the strategy of 
industrial unionism; and excellent teaching. 
(1) The industrial model of schooling 
Teleologist mentioned the period in the mid to late nineteenth 
century when the legislative programme of British teachers to gain 
practitioner control over certification was pursued and eventually 
failed. Throughout western Europe, North America and certain other 
jurisdictions this was also a period of development and expansion 
f bl · h 1· 20 Pu I 1 . t o pu ~c sc 00 ~ng. blic schoo ing deve oped accord~ng 0 a 
particular model, based on the industrial factories, and, with the 
failure of the professional alternative to receive legal status, 
this particular model became elaborated and more and more dominant. 
The blueprints for this model were supplied by educational 
administrators, industrial management experts and educational 
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researchers. The great strength of the industrial model was that 
it offered a way of bringing about widespread literacy and an improve-
ment in the general level of education through management, systematic 
curriculum development, IIscientific" research, pedagogical theory, 
comprehensive "objective tl evaluation and supervision according to 
the latest theories of industrial, corporate or office management. 
What about the teachers? They are to serve as skilled functionaries. 
In this approach there is no question of taking the time to develop a 
teaching force stamped by greatness or excellence; better to stick to 
a more modest, predictable and controllable objective. 
(2) Technological consciousness 
By 'technological consciousness' I mean a mode of thinking in 
which aims are either taken as settled or as free value choices, 
meanings as unproblematic, existential questions and spiritual 
matters of no account; a mode of "rational problem-solvingl1 of 
"common-sense ll problems in a context-free, a-historical manner. 
Technological consciousness is closely related to the rational and 
scientific traditions. Much within this tradition is admirable, 
useful and unexceptionable. What is of concern is a total conceptual 
scheme which rules out as 'primitive', 'superstitious', 'irrational', 
'old-fashioned' or 'meaningless' other important ways of thinking, 
being and relating. Here I ,focus on technological consciousness as 
a pervasive mode of thinking which has no place for wonder, deep 
reflexion on origins, aims, purposes, values and commitments; which 
reduces dialogue and conversation to the communication of information, 
i.e. omitting the probing and celebrating of existence. 
For C. A. Bowers technological consciousness serves as an 
ideology, i.e. as a frame of reference for understanding the world 
and which, in this case, conceals from the agent his "own constitutive 
role as a coproducer of reality". Moreover technological conscious-
ness assumes a subject/object dichotomy that we reject. 22 
Huston Smith has many criticisms of what he calls lithe modern 
western mind set" which are similar to Bowers'; Smith gives a good 
deal of attention to 'scientism', a programme designed to erode 
confidence in realities other than those science can handle. 23 
While in no way denying the power and utility of science he argues 
that science cannot deal with intrinsic and normative values, 
purposes, global and existential meanings, and quality, i.e. in the 
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sense of subjective experience. 24 The terms 'modern', 'secular' 
and 'scientific' point to what the modern western mind set emphasizes 
and 'traditional', 'religious' and 'humanistic' to what it neglects, 
. t . 25 reJec s or ~gnores. 
How are the industrial model of schooling and technological 
consciousness related? Is technological consciousness a product 
of industrial society? Or is technological consciousness a force 
in the emergence of industrialism? Bowers, Smith and Heidegger are 
each able to trace features of this conceptual scheme back to 
classical Greece and there is a very strong development in this 
direction by the Enlightenment - a term which itself presupposes 
this type of thought. I can only respond to this question super-
ficially - it is obvious that industrial schooling is compatible 
with technological consciousness in at least two senses: some version 
of industrial school is what one expects from planners and technocrats 
entangled in technological consciousness; for teachers and students 
who conduct their educational activity within industrial schools, the 
social structure of the school tends to establish technological 
consciousness as a lens through which the world is viewed - they will 
have difficulty in seeing technological consciousness as a Particular 
way of looking at the world, but rather will interpret their particular 
world view, in which 'industrial schooling' is equated to 'education', 
as lIeveryday reality" and "common sense". As long as the thought of 
social agents is bound within the limits of technological consciousness 
it can formulate no adequately profound critique of industrial schooling. 
Hence the liberation of children and teachers from the stultifying 
effects of industrial schooling can be advanced through the critique 
of technological consciousness. 
FACILITATOR: I am intrigued about how you plan to relate this discussion 
of industrial schooling and technological consciousness to industrial 
unionism and teaching excellence. 
SCHOLAR: From the very beginning industrialism has been associated with 
extremely damaging consequences and side effects, especially for 
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workers. Many different prescriptions for solving the problem, 
which is indeed articulated in divergent ways, have been debated. 
How can we have the advantages of technological development, scientific 
innovation and a highly specialized and complex division of labour 
without paying a price of excessive disruption, human suffering, 
poverty, worker alienation, ecological damage, destruction of 
traditional culture, forms of social interaction and support, etc.? 
Among all the competing programmes for addressing the workers' 
predicament in industrial capitalism I want to focus on one: 
(3) The strategy of industrial unionism 
Let me say at the outset that I am using 'industrial unionism' 
as a technical term; 'industrial' in my usage here identifies a 
particular approach to union activity. I am Iltightening up" on 
current usage although in a way consistent with the actual history 
of work relations. 
The 'strategy of industrial unionism' is defined as an 
accommodatory and regulatory stance toward the political control of 
work; it does not challenge capitalist property relations or the 
employer/employee relation but seeks to regulate and control 
industrial relations in the interest of the worker's health, safety 
and economic welfare. Its principal tactic is collective bargaining 
backed with industrial sanctions such as strike, slow down and work 
to rule. On the positive side this strategy has produced improvements 
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in the conditions of work and the economic benefits from labour. 
It is plausible that without the regulation achieved by industrial 
unions, i.e. leaving workers to face the capitalist labour market 
as individuals, workers would not be as materially well off as they 
now are. Clearly some form of collective union activity was and is 
called for. But this strategy fails to meet the workers' needs for 
self-development and self-realization. 
The salient features of the strategy of industrial unionism 
are: 
(i) the presupposition of continuing the employer/employee nexus 
indefinitely; 
(ii) posing the problem of the workers' interests entirely in 
economic terms; 
(iii) pursuing workers' interests almost exclusively through the 
regulation of industrial relations; 
(iv) ignoring the development of personal powers and individual 
autonomy and placing an excessive reliance on collective 
actions in which the general membership is 'mobilized' and 
organized heteron~ously; 
(v) pursuing standardization of the methods and conditions of work. 
This standardization of work undermines the worker's professional 
autonomy and generally fails to produce job satisfaction. 
PRECISE: Then why do unions pursue standardization? 
SCHOLAR: Given their overall stance of accommodation they have little 
choice. Because this strategy merely aims at the quasi-legal 
regulation of the employer's prerogatives then a precise articulation 
of terms and conditions is required to limit effectively the 
employer's discretion and freedom of action but this precise 
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articulation reduces or eliminates the range of alternative ways 
of both organizing and performing work, i.e. it produces standard-
ization. The only other course open to the union, as long as it 
leaves the employer/employee relation alone, is a consultative 
relation, i.e. leaving the employer his prerogative in the interests 
of flexibility and trying to persuade him to use it in the workers' 
interests. Which of these two approaches or which balance between 
them is preferable depends upon circumstances. However no variation 
or combination provides secure rights of professional practice. 
SOLIDARITY: But many unions following something pretty close to this 
strategy are ex~mely militant in support of their members' interests. 
In what sense are they taking an accommodatory stance? 
SCHOLAR: In the sense that they do not challenge the employer/employee 
relationship or capitalist property. Greed and militancy are not 
to be equated with a commitment to democratic social transformation 
and a radical reform of the political control of work. 
Moreover the strategy of industrial unionism, when applied to 
education, does not and cannot foster teaching excellence. At best 
it may protect teachers from the imposition, by employers, of 
conditions inimical to teaching excellence. Even this task it cannot 
perform as simply and effectively as the franchise/co-ope 
FACILITATOR: If you can tell us what you mean by 'teaching excellence' 
it may help us concerning our task of evaluating the school. 
(4) Excellent teaching 
SCHOLAR: I am not even going to try to define 'excellent teaching' 
in a comprehensive way here but only to make three points about it. 
Before I do I would like you to stop and consider your own experience; 
are there any teachers who stand out in your mind as excellent or 
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outstanding?27 I tried a little "experiment" thinking about teachers 
I have had whom I consider excellent and I have compared notes with 
friends and colleagues. There were some common features such as 
caring about their students, being fair and having a concern for 
standards but the three points I want to focus on here are these: 
\i) Excellent teachers are far superior to ordinary "run of the 
mill" teachers in stimulating learning and self-understanding. 28 
I am primarily concerned not with a quantitative measure but 
29 
with a qualitatively different order experienced by the student. 
(ii) Excellent teachers connect to the authentic projects or meaning 
systems of their students. Generally as a student I have a 
vivid image of the excellent teacher; I experience the 
educational process with this teacher personally: the instruction 
connects to my meanings, my commitments; I feel "in touch" with 
my own project. 
(iii) This connection to my personal meanings is accomplished through 
the character and personality of the teacher, who may be exciting 
and flamboyant or calm and collected or whatever. In stressing 
character and personality I am not positing an ideal personality 
type for a teacher. In my experience excellent teachers can have 
many different character and personality traits but they all make 
use of their own character and personality as a basic part of 
their teaching relationship with students. 
If I may burden the group with another principle I propose the 
following principle of teaching excellence (PTE): 
The excellent teacher connects his instruction to the 
authentic projects and personal meaning systems of 
his students; and does so through an authentic 0 
expression of his own character and personality. 3 
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I also want to stress that this is not all there is to teaching; 
the PTE is not the principle but ~ principle. There is, for example, 
the teacher's function in organizing the "natural" environment of 
his students so they can learn through direct encounters with their 
. t 31 env~ronmen • I believe that excellent teaching requires that the 
connection to personality be made through personality. 
However industrial schooling does not recognize this principle, 
and this is not a contingent fact or a merely empirical finding. 
PRECISE: May I interrupt? How are you applying the PTE? Does it apply 
to any teacher, e.g., the good ski instructor or driving instructor? 
Why does all good teaching have to have the powerful existential 
impact suggested by the PTE? 
TELEOLOGIST: If we think of education along a continuum from more or less 
mechanical facts and skills at one end to character formation at the 
other, Scholar is really addressing the "character" end. 
SCHOLAR: You can think of education in that way and I suppose there is 
a place for mechanical learning of some things but the PTE has a 
much wider application than Teleologist suggests. The ski instructor, 
in so far as he is an excellent teacher does connect with his students' 
personal meanings, etc. This principle is not restricted to the 
formation of character but applies wherever significant engagement, 
effort and application are called for from the student. In many 
cases the teaching may be excellent without the teacher making an 
effort to understand the personal projects of his students. For 
example when learners volunteer to study a particular field because 
it fits within their own projective understanding it makes the task 
of providing excellent teaching easier than otherwise. 
Nevertheless my major concern with excellent teaching is with 
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the general citizenship and professional stages of education. 
The justification for teaching excellence should be obvious -
it achieves the existential aim of education for democracy. 
FACILITATOR: You were at the point of relating industrial schooling to 
teaching excellence. 
SCHOLAR: Yes. Bowers describes technological consciousness as the 
ideology of the New Class. 32 Within the sphere of educational theory, 
technological consciousness is the ideology of industrial schooling, 
and this is still true when the metaphor shifts from the assembly 
line to the more current "soft" models of humane and "democratic ll 
personnel management. As long as the problem is posed in terms of 
organizing, motivating and supervising a workforce, a community or 
a body of students to achieve the goals and objectives of central 
planners and managers we are still within the ideology of techno-
logical consciousness. Technological consciousness cannot recognize 
the PTE because neither the student's authentic project nor the 
teacher's character and personality can be present as components 
in the deliberations of central planners and technocrats. To speak 
in terms of 'authentic projects', 'personal meaning systems', 
'character' and 'personality', from our perspective, is to imply 
outcomes that are unspecifiable in advance and uncontrollable by 
the technocrats. In so far as teaching excellence involves a 
capacity to establish authentic interpersonal relationships with 
students, to connect to the authentic projects of the students, 
and to do so through an authentic expression of the teacher's 
character and personality, it cannot be comprehended by technological 
consciousness which sees such ideas as quaint, fuzzy, irrational or 
meaningless and offers in their place "rational", "scientific" and 
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systematic schemas such as behavioural or performance objectives. 
The strategy of industrial unionism in its drive to standardize 
and control through specific and minute regulation extends the 
industrialization of the school and reduces the scope for free and 
creative expression of the teacher's character and personality; not 
that it can ever eliminate the personal dimension which manages to 
carry on some form of resistance to "the system!! and to assert 
values, meanings and commitments that transcend technological 
consciousness. 
My discussion of excellence in teaching is not to reinforce 
elitism or to suggest that excellent teaching must, in the nature 
of the matter, continue to be rare. I agree with Solidarity that 
changes in the education of teachers, the conditions in which they 
work and the governance of the profession can greatly improve the 
general level of teaching excellence. But all this depends upon 
the transformation of the system of industrial schooling into an 
educational commonwealth featuring the teachers' professional 
association and local franchise/co-ops embedded within a democratic 
TAG Network. The strategy of industrial unionism not only fails to 
advance this goal but it moves us in the wrong direction. Accord-
ingly the strategy of industrial unionism is contrary to the common 
interests of students, teachers and the community.33 
SOLIDARITY: I find it hard to believe that union activity is so contrary 
to the interests of workers. 
SCHOLAR: It is not union activity per se but the strategy of industrial 
unionism. We got into this discussion when we began a debate 
concerning a different strategy, that of pursuing the abolition of 
employer/employee relations and their replacement by franchises and 
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teachers' co-operatives. This is a type of union activity I endorse. 
It is because Precise raises concerns about the difficulties and 
costs of the professionalization strategy that I have tried to 
show the unacceptable costs of sticking to the apparently less 
risky, more conservative strategy of industrial unionism. 
PRECISE: Is there not something still to be said on the other side? 
Unions can be watchful about not overdoing standardization and can 
concentrate on getting more resources and improved conditions such 
as smaller classes, more preparation time, larger budgets for books, 
materials and equipment. They can even bargain for teacher autonomy 
concerning curriculum and pedagogy. 
SCHOLAR: You are pointing out that the general strategy of industrial 
unionism can be pursued with sensitivity and discretion and can 
result in improved teaching and learning conditions. I agree that 
a great deal can be said for such a course - but ultimately it fails. 
If teachers use bargaining to achieve the franchise/co-op they 
are not following the strategy of industrial unionism and if they 
pursue the strategy of industrial unionism they will fail to 
achieve the rights of professional practice.34 What Precise is 
now asking is whether nevertheless teachers are better served to 
forego the rights of professional practice in favour of a "deal" 
providing improved economic welfare and working conditions benefits. 
I doubt this very much. There are no plausible grounds for believing 
that teachers in a franchise/co-op arrangement would have inferior 
status with respect to economic welfare and working conditions 
than those who remain as employees. However, in so far as rights 
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of autonomous, professional practice are part of the working conditions 
of teachers and the learning conditions of students, the advantage is 
all on the side of the professional strategy. 
HEART: I am pleased that Scholar raised the matter of teaching excellence. 
This is very important to the self-realization of the teacher, not in 
a comparative sense, but in the sense that he measures up to his own 
standards. The dimension of self-realization cannot be collapsed 
into welfare; small classes, lots of preparation time and excellent 
materials do not translate directly into teaching excellence, and 
the teacher cannot be compensated for his failure to realize his 
own standards by an improvement in his wages and working conditions. 
He may accept such a "deal" but he, you and I know that it is a 
sell-out. 
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ACTION-MAN: I also reject the strategy of industrial unionism but I 
would appreciate greater clarity concerning the goal and general 
approach of the professional strategy. 
SCHOLAR: Assuming that the TPA has been organized with a strong 
professional infrastructure the objectives in the negotiations are 
straightforward: to have the local trustees or stewards become the 
representatives of a local political jurisdiction (in an eventual 
TAG Network); to eliminate the bureaucratic and supervisory hierarchy; 
to achieve a mutually acceptable articulation of an educational 
franchise; to fill the franchise with a teachers' co-operative 
formed from teachers, administrators and supervisors who have been 
employed in the jurisdiction. In the franchise the local jurisdiction 
establishes its criteria for evaluation, i.e. its general standards 
for the educational programmes in its schools. Finalizing the 
franchise through negotiation provides for both political and 
professional considerations to be reconciled. 
An obvious problem is the concerns for security of supervisory, 
administrative and teaching employees. Beware of vendettas against 
individuals! Even people of exceptional commitment to social justice 
at the societal level can be incredibly petty or even vicious at the 
personal level. As a general rule there should be no terminations 
but on the contrary an assurance of a position, at least initially, 
within the teachers' co-op. Any terminations or demotions should be 
postponed until after the new system is in place and then only within 
scrupulously followed procedures of professional supervision. 
While negotiations between the representatives of the teachers' 
union and those of the local community are proceeding it is also 
important for teachers to conduct discussions throughout the community 
because every community member has a great stake in the system of 
direct democratic participation we are seeking. 
COMMENTARY: While in particular circumstances industrial unionism may 
appear to be a better short-term tactic than the professional negotiations 
approach, in the long run the professional strategy is better. The 
advantages of the educational commonwealth that can be achieved with this 
strategy are worth the costs and the sacrifices. 
36. Democracy within the teachers' professional association 
FACILITATOR: As we near the end of this inquiry I think it is important 
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to note that we have become committed to radical and comprehensive 
transformations of social relations and structures, i.e. of a 
revolution. Accordingly there are dangers of abuse from revolutionaries 
as well as problems and difficulties arising from oppositional groups. 
In Chapter III we found that no democratic transformation of society 
will be achieved through the social and political action of an 
undemocratic vanguard. Because our analysis in this chapter has 
pointed to the teachers' professional association as a crucial 
institution in the process of organizing an educational commonwealth, 
the question of the internal democracy of the TPA takes on the 
greatest importance. 
Our mid-term goal is to establish an internally democratic 
TPA within an emerging educational commonwealth. In general, because 
the findings of Chapter III apply to the TPA, we need only highlight 
the key findings and then explore a few specific concerns. This 
limited treatment here does not imply that the issue of internal 
democracy is a minor matter. Our key principles are: 
(1) all members are accorded equal consideration and respect;35 
(2) policy discussions are conducted on the basis of symmetrical 
relations of social power and are aimed to achieve the common 
interests of the group;36 
(3) membership interactions are characterized by openness, honesty, 
37 
mutual regard and trust; 
(4) the organization has rules and sanctions to prevent or punish 
the members' use of strategic action against one another, e.g. 
factions or caucases which precommit themselves to particular 
courses of action with respect to other members; 38 
,5) disciplinary matters within the group are conducted through 
well defined processes of procedural justice; 39 
(6) the organization respects the selfidual sphere of its members 
and in its manner of conducting programmes and activities 
fosters their sense of self-esteem and the development of 
40 
their personal powers. 
LIBERAL: While we agree with these findings for the TAG should we assume 
that they apply to the TPA? The necessity for internal democracy 
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within the TAG arises from the TAG's commitment to democratic social 
transformation but teachers' organizations are generally committed 
to a much more limited programme to improve economic welfare, work-
ing conditions and aspects of professional practice. Granted that 
a teachers' organization may redefine itself as a TAG we have not 
shown that it ought to. Indeed, for an individual teacher committed 
to democratic transformation, it may well be that political action 
in other spheres than his teachers' organization may be more 
efficacious. In their historical development teachers' unions have 
not been committed to either of the two basic tasks of a TAG.4l 
In their practices many have long traditions of factional strife 
and strategic action which the participants consider to be part of 
"the game". Therefore the debate over these principles for internal 
democracy is not likely to be over whether they are necessary to 
achieve the missions of a TAG but rather why a teachers' organization 
should be committed to such tasks. 
SCHOLAR: If members of teachers' organizations want to work within a 
system of educational governance and relationships that fosters 
professional autonomy and teaching excellence then they have an 
interest, as teachers, in the internally democratic TPA. Without 
a TPA they lack the rights of professional practice; without internal 
democracy the TPA cannot justify its right to control certification 
and teaching practices, and is incapable of creating conditions 
supportive of teaching excellence. 
LIBERAL: One of the principles we affirm for the TAG is membership by 
consent. Does it follow that in organizing an internally democratic 
TPA we must reject the principles of the closed or union shop? It 
can be argued that the union shop provision is supportive of the 
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economic interests of workers in the here and now. 42 
ACTION-MAN: Within the TAG Network the worker chooses a particular 
profession and when he applies for certification he expresses his 
consent to join the professional community. If he says he wants to 
practise a profession without belonging to the professional associ-
ation then he is either seeking a social right whilst attempting to 
escape the provisions for public accountability, if his argument is 
couched as a general right to practise, without supervision, or he 
is challenging the authority of the professional association to 
supervise his practice. If the professional association is in other 
respects internally democratic then the requirement of membership in 
the professional association as a condition of practice is justified. 
The consent condition would be violated, however, if workers were 
compelled to practise a certain profession. 
However in liberal capitalism when workers or others (usually 
others) call for the "right to workll , without joining the union, they 
are not usually seeking the right to work without supervision but 
arguing that the employer should have the sole authority to supervise 
work. Nevertheless being compelled to belong to a union which lacks 
internal democracy can give the worker a sense of tyrannic subjection. 
Provided that the teachers' union is internally democratic the closed 
shop (ideally) or the union shop (second best) is in both the members' 
and the community's interests. 
FACILITATOR: We appear to have reached agreement on the necessity for 
internal democracy within the TPA. If we are satisfied to leave 
this discussion we may discuss the educational commonwealth's 
relations with the state next. 
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COMMENTARY: I will skip most of the rest of the discussion except for 
the following brief comments. One important point is that the form of 
networking and representation within the TPA should apply both 
geographical and functional principles; the geographic is needed for the 
programme of professional negotiations whereas the functional principle 
is important for certain types of canonical research. Secondly the rights 
of free expression and dissent are crucial for the rational development of 
canonical theory. This should go without saying but in the antagonistic 
relations of liberal capitalism there are sometimes pressures to limit 
the public expression of dissent by members of the TPA. In general this 
should be opposed and there must be no exceptions regarding the issues 
of canonical theory. 
37. The educational commonwealth and the state 
COMMENTARY: So far our discussion has rather neglected the role of the 
state. Having granted the local community a degree of political control 
over education through the local school franchise, how do we protect the 
teacher from excessive community control? By establishing an institution 
to institution rather than institution to individual relation of control 
with respect to the local jurisdiction, the teachers' co-operative makes 
the individual teacher less vulnerable. The TPA, by its authority to 
control the definition and interpretation of ethical and competent 
practice, is able to protect teachers from attempts by local jurisdictions, 
under the guise of rooting out misconduct and incompetence, to dismiss 
teachers for carrying out their professional duties with respect to 
critical reflexion and cosmopolitan culture. The state, through its 
legislative and judicial system, can represent the core values of the 
society as a whole in terms of social justice, civil and political rights, 
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social security, health, safety, etc. 
If this general division of social powers and responsibilities is 
to advance good education the state must not only carry out its vital 
tasks regarding the legal regulation of the overall system of social 
justice but it must also butt out of those areas which are the responsi-
bility of the community, the TPA and the teachers' co-operative. 
Specifically the state must not be in the business of certifying teachers, 
supervising teaching practice or controlling educational research. The 
state's involvement in the purposes and aims of education should be 
restricted to those which are fundamental to the core values of a 
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democratic society. If the state attempts to determine cultural arbitraries. 
particular conceptions of the good or manpower targets for its economic 
plans and implement these programmes through state political control over 
education, it forfeits its moral authority to act as arbitrator or 
"referee" in disputes between the community and the co-operative or the 
community and the TPA. Indeed once it uses majoritarian power to impose 
values other than the core values of the FPSC it forsakes its central task 
of promoting and enforcing the core values of social justice and pluralistic 
democracy. 
There is another task which is implied in the idea of a TAG Network, 
namely co-ordination and communications among the TPA, community organiza-
tions, labour unions and certain state agencies. Therefore it is necessary 
to establish co-ordinating structures that facilitate the emergence and 
the development of an educational commonwealth within a liberal capitalist 
society being transformed into an authentic democracy. A comprehensive 
discussion of the issues involved in the organiZation of the edUcational 
commonwealth, of the relations among its constituent institutions and of 
its protection from the action of hostile groups form an agenda for a 
different study which I do not pursue here. 
This chapter has argued for the organization of a TPA with a strong 
professional capability and has elaborated on the basic functions of a 
TPA of providing a psychosocial moratorium for teachers, supporting 
canonical research, offering in-service education and supervising teaching 
practice. I advocate that teachers and local communities abandon the 
strategy of industrial unionism and instead pursue the establishment 
of franchise/co-operative relations through collective negotiations. 
I have stressed that the proper concern of the nation-state or other 
central political jurisdictions regarding the governance of education 
is to ensure social justice and democracy. 
The goal of the educational commonwealth is predicated on the vision 
of a better man - but not an angel. There is no assumption that man is 
innately or "naturally" good, or that he is infinitely malleable or 
infinitely perfectible. These romantic or totalitarian assumptions are 
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too fragile and unrealistic to serve as foundations for educational and 
social theory. Therefore the educational commonwealth and the authentic 
democratic social order it presupposes provide checks and balances among 
parents, teachers, local communities, teachers' co-operatives, the teachers' 
professional associations and the central political jurisdictions. The 
resulting system of political control over education will foster the 
improvement of human character and the development of man's social and 
personal powers in accordance with his authentic project. The vision 
of an educational commonwealth is realistic and yet inspiring. 
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
In drawing this study to a close I high~ight the main findings and 
comment on their significance for educational practice, educational theory 
and the philosophy of education. Most of the findings have some bearing 
on the programmes and methodologies of educational theory and the 
philosophy of education but I have drawn special attention to a number 
of them in this regard. In highlighting the findings I do not repeat 
the qualifications and considerations in the text but they remain 
important for an accurate understanding of the thesis. 
(A) Foundations for Educational Evaluation 
The task set at the beginning of the thesis is to develop principles 
and a general approach to school evaluation, i.e., to understand the 
basic considerations involved in educational evaluation. 
It is argued that educational evaluation should be grounded in an 
explicit conception of man's good; these arguments not only direct the 
subsequent exposition of the thesis but also serve as criticisms of the 
vast body of literature about educational testing and evaluation which 
lacks this normative feature. 
'I-self', a concept of human agency derived from Heidegger's 'Dasein' 
is used to articulate the existential dimensions of man's good. The 
analysis of I-self reveals man's existential nature, i.e. the project 
structure of his caring relationship to the world, his active agency, 
etc. It is argued that any adequate educational or social theory must 
recognize the existential aspect. 
The criteria for I-self's good provide the basis for the existential 
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aim of education advocated. The justification for I-self's good is based 
on the kinds of judgments and assessments that are rational for persons to 
make when they reflect deeply and transparently on their circumstances. 
The concept of I-self's good is used throughout the thesis, in articulating 
principles for both social co-operation and educational evaluation. 
Because a merely individual articulation of man's good is insufficient 
the inquiry addresses social co-operation. I-self's good is coherently 
connected to the fundamental principle for social co-operation (FPSC) 
advocated. Rather than a mere summing of separate considerations there is 
an integration of ideas concerning the individual, society and educational 
policy at a fundamental level. 
The FPSC fills in the social "gap" left by the preliminary formulation 
of man's good in individual, existential terms. Given that human beings 
engage in critical reflexion together to find a mutually agreeable, 
mutually beneficial principle for social co-operation, i.e. openly, honestly, 
authentically, rationally, etc., the FPSC is that principle. Between them 
'I-self's good' and 'the FPSC' provide the foundations for the two basic 
aims of education: 
1. the self-development of each individual in accordance with his 
own authentic project; 
2. the formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, 
knowledge, understandings and skills for democratic citizenship_ 
Moreover, 'the FPSC' is used repeatedly in subsequent analyses of 
social co-operation, work, education and the basic approaches to the 
political control over education. 
Educational evaluation procedures should adhere to certain principles 
regarding the relationships between and among the participants. Among 
these is the requirement that the normative commitments and presuppositions 
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of the evaluation be transparent and explicit. However it is noted that 
within liberal capitalist societies the ethical and political valuations 
underlying evaluation practices tend to be concealed. l 
(B) Social Transformation 
Because the possibilities which human beings can actually choose 
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and implement are always limited by their circumstances and the pervasive 
effects of the basic structure of their society, I-self's good, the FPSC, 
and the basic educational aims derived from them would tend to express a 
utopian character, in the sense of being unrealistic or disconnected 
from current possibilities, unless the inquiry addresses the issues of 
existing possibilities, facticity and social structuration. It is the 
concept of social transformation which brings the visionary and the 
practical into coherent connection. However it also prompts a disagree-
ment with John Rawls' programme for social justice based on idealized 
agents in an "original position" establishing a basic social structure 
in perpetuity. Accordingly I argue for a conception of social justice 
which includes the equal distribution of categorial power among all 
actual citizens, i.e., of the power to shape the basic structure of society 
through an ongoing series of social transformations, generation after 
generation. 
The distinction between 'categorial power' and other forms of power 
such as 'authority' and 'social freedom' is a fundamental idea, which, 
although articulated in a different way, has been stimulated by Basil 
Bernstein's work. 2 The idea of categorial power allows the thesis to 
deal with principles for the basic structure of society using actual 
agents in the here and now rather than Rawls' imaginary agents in the 
original position; however it does not offer a programme for realizing 
social justice in a generation or two but rather a test for how close a 
society is to the realization of a just basic structure. The thesis 
argues that any organization of the basic structure of society that actual 
human agents who have equal categorial power actually agree to, under 
conditions of open, undistorted and rational deliberation, etc., is just. 
Having established that social justice is to be accomplished through 
ongoing social transformations, it is necessary to assess, at least in 
general terms, the current situation and this is done for liberal capitalist 
societies. The most important finding is that liberal capitalism provides 
certain vital democratic rights and freedoms but because it conceptually 
implies employer/employee relations, social classes and meritocracy it 
cannot realize a fully authentic democracy. 
However the goal of good education for everyone can only be reached 
within a society with a just basic structure, i.e., which is democratic 
and classless. The commitment to good education generates a prima facie 
case for the transformation of liberal capitalist societies into authentic 
democracies. 
The vehicle for accomplishing this transformation is the transforma-
tive action group (TAG). A TAG is an actual organization of actual human 
beings and it is guided by two basic tasks: 
(1) to transform categorial power relations in the wider society in 
accordance with the FPSC: 
(2) to foster the good of each member of the TAG in the here and now. 
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The TAG serves as a defensible form of institution for dealing with 
power relations in society. Power relations are inescapable and institutions 
are the forms through which the basic structure of a society manifests its 
limits and constraints on the power relations experienced by individuals 
and groups. Within the thesis the term 'TAG' serves two main functions: 
as an institutional device for bringing about a just and democratic society; 
and as a shorthand way to refer to a set of principles for democratic 
and just relations among persons within an actual face-to-face organiza-
tion. These principles are elaborated in terms of the interpersonal 
relations, communication processes and power relations of the members. 
(C) Democracy 
Chapter III is primarily concerned with the issue of internal 
democracy within a TAG although its first significant finding relates 
to both of its basic tasks. In the pursuit of democratic ends agents 
must use democratic means. It is argued that democratic social trans-
formation is not to be effected through the undemocratic imposition of 
a new social order. This finding involves the rejection of both the 
dictatorship of a "revolutionary vanguard" and "benevolent" state 
paternalism - even by a parliamentary or congressional majority. 
In an authentic democracy citizens are able to pursue their 
individual and common interests authentically, at a number of levels, 
with their co-citizens. However our analysis of 'interests' argues that 
interests are not simply !lout there" but are constructed and apprehended 
through deliberation. Furthermore groups only find their common interests 
when their deliberations are characterized by open and undistorted 
communications, symmetrical power relations, fraternal interactions, 
trust, mutual respect and a commitment to the search for truth and good-
ness through rational procedures. To create and maintain these conditions 
for internal democracy TAGs must exercise collective discipline backed by 
coercive sanctions. 
Within the wider society, certain conditions supportive of internal 
democracy for TAGs are: basic social freedoms concerning speech, the 
press, association, etc.; guarantees for a selfidual sphere in which 
individuals have substantial personal autonomy concerning significant 
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aspects of their life projects; an educational system that fosters 
autonomous agency and communal critical reflexion. 
(D) The TAG Network 
Chapter IV articulates a mid-term goal for the basic structure of 
society to improve the categorial conditions for human participation in 
and enjoyment of citizenship, work and culture. Constraining the formu-
lation of this goal are twelve specific principles including support for 
cultural pluralism and for individuals participating in the determination 
of the policies affecting them as citizens, workers and members of 
particular cultural communities, and rejection of social classes, 
meritocracy and employer/employee relations. 
Just as the TAG stands for both the institutional embodiment of 
internal democracy and the principles for conducting the affairs of 
face-to-face organizations, the TAG Network represents both the institution 
for realizing the mid-term goal for the basic structure of society and the 
particular principles which should guide social transformation. The main 
features of the TAG Network are: a pyramidal approach to political 
representation along three tracks - citizenship, work and culture; 
legislative authority exercised directly by citizens aided by a tele-
communications system; franchises, workers' co-operatives and professional 
associations. 
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The basic problem which the TAG Network addresses is the reconciliation 
of popular political accountability, worker autonomy and cultural 
pluralism. Each of these values is vital. However the capitalist/worker 
nexus, which is a particular manifestation of employer/employee relations, 
imposes undesirable limits on worker autonomy. Additionally the liberal 
capitalist approach is inconsistent with popular control over legislation. 
Our analysis shows that there is ~ satisfactory solution to the problem 
of reconciling these three values in a social system organized on 
liberal capitalist principles. This has several implications for 
researchers in the field of educational governance, i.e. the political 
control of education and in areas within this field such as teacher 
accountability. Does the researcher take cognizance of each of the three 
values? What assumptions or explicit postulates does he make concerning 
the basic structure of social relations? If, for example, he assumes 
that liberal capitalism should be the social context in which the issue 
of teacher accountability is to be situated how does he avoid muddle and 
confusion? 
The finding that professional status for workers, including teachers, 
is required for the just and democratic organization of the basic structure 
of society is argued at length. This should not be an original finding -
it is too basic, too obvious and too important to be original - and 
perhaps for these reasons it has not been considered worth mentioning. 
However, as George Polya once said concerning good teaching, it is often 
wise to emphasize the obvious. Regardless of the reasons it appears that 
the finding is original, at least in its emphasis and the way it is 
integrated with other social principles. 
The underlying idea for grounding good practice in the collegial 
judgments of practitioners can be found in Marx and Heidegger but I think 
that interesting and original use of this idea is achieved in discussing 
the political control of work. The ways in which practitioners are 
categorized within the social division of labour and the powers and 
authority they receive through the organization of the basic structure 
of society determine their possibilities for developing sound theory and 
for improving practice. The same conditions of internal democracy which 
we articulate in Chapter III respecting common interests and political 
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deliberation also apply to the sphere of work. This is basically why 
a single track system of political control, such as that advocated by 
Solidarity, in which workers are employees of the state, is unacceptable. 
I conclude that the TAG Network is a satisfactory mid-term solution 
to the problem of reconciling popular political accountability, worker 
autonomy and cultural pluralism; it is just and democratic. 
(E) The Political Control over Education 
I argue that public education should shape the character, virtues, 
dispositions, attitudes, etc., of children; but to be legitimate this 
deliberate public intervention must be restricted to the core values 
necessary for justice and democracy. The distinction between core values 
and cultural arbitraries is fundamental. Bereiter attempts to draw an 
important distinction but it should not be drawn on the basis of 
'character' versus 'skills' or 'education' versus 'training' but on that 
f I It al b 't ' 3 o core va ues versus cu ur ar 1 rar1es. 
However it is not enough to draw the correct distinction - one must 
propose some approach to political control and some structure of basic 
institutions to realize it. This is achieved within the proposed TAG 
Network by having the nation-state and/or other central level jurisdictions 
take responsibility for the enforcement and promotion of the core values. 
The actual teaching and the determination of learning objectives, curri-
culum, school organization, pedagogy and evaluation is left to the local 
jurisdictions, teachers' co-operatives and professional association. 
However the central bodies supervise these bodies with respect to social 
justice, i~.they intervene if and only if non-intervention would be 
contrary to justice. Generally an appropriate balance between community 
and cosmopolitan culture and between local autonomy and wider social 
justice should be achieved by this arrangement. 
One of the most damaging aspects of the inappropriate system of 
political control over education in liberal capitalism is the approach 
to testing, grading and evaluating students. The study argues that these 
processes arise from the meritocratic commitments of the system which are 
strongly pressed by the "New Class". But meritocratic values cannot be 
reconciled with education for democracy. For this as well as other 
reasons previously argued I conclude that with regard to "purely 
educational considerations fl and aside from its other social advantages, 
the TAG Network offers vastly superior categorial conditions for the 
conduct of educational activity. 
Here I briefly mention that the study makes a number of important 
recommendations with supporting arguments regarding the three basic 
stages of education, their different forms of political control and how 
these considerations relate to parental trusteeship and the status of 
the family. Concerning the autonomous stage of citizenship education 
and its "liberal arts" approach there has been a long tradition of 
scholarly opposition to mixing professional studies with the liberal arts 
programme and so there is nothing original about the finding. Neverthe-
less the type of justification offered in terms of the transfer of trustee-
ship from the parent to the student, the opportunity for the student to 
take a more detached perspective on the culture of his community and 
society, and, above all, the purpose of preparation for autonomous 
citizenship within a democratic society is more satisfactory than those 
generally offered, especially those which appeal to elitism, meritocratic 
values or to the intrinsic values of the activities in a reified fashion. 4 
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(F) The Educational Commonwealth and the Teachers' 
Professional Association 
Consistently with the argument for ongoing social transformation 
I argue that the way to accomplish a TAG Network system of governance 
of education is to organize, maintain and develop an "educational 
commonwealth", based on TAG Network principles, within liberal capitalist 
societies. This idea is explored and tested in Chapter VI. 
The first priority in establishing the educational commonwealth 
is the organization of a teachers' professional association (TPA) with 
a "strong professional capability!1. This capability is articulated in 
terms of: developing an effective canonical research capability; 
providing in-service programmes that educate and train organic intellec-
tuals among the teacher practitioners; establishing the organizational 
and administrative capability to monitor and supervise teaching practice 
in advance of the TPA gaining the legal authority with respect to control 
over certification and teaching practice; providing a "psychosocial 
moratorium!1 for teachers - a "safe place" where teachers can develop 
skills and powers for a future professional relationship and be protected 
from the counter pressures arising from their positions within the 
existing system of education. 
The analysis of the classification of practitioners with respect to 
a particular profession and the related inquiry into the division of 
labour within a profession are original and the implications are drawn 
concerning the supervision of teaching practice, the education of 
teachers and the conduct of educational research. It is argued that 
the FPSC implies democratic self-governance of work and this principle 
is elaborated through three theorems which taken together define 
legitimate authority regarding judgments about teaching practice. The 
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general finding is that the system through which decisions about 
certification, decertification and professional discipline are to be made 
should be controlled by a professional association which has internal 
democracy; specifically that the !f! should have the sole authority in 
this sphere. This is another finding at odds with the conventional view. 
Importantly, the argument for this finding, although sketchy, 
addresses the issue of authority relationships in education (and other 
fields of professional practice)at a fundamental level; it specifically 
rejects as circular any programme that grounds legitimate authority 
ultimately in a conception of knowledge which is detached from practice 
Moreover, the internally democratic community of practitioners provides 
the setting most congenial to the rational development of knowledge 
based on practice. This is a crucial issue which deserves attention 
from philosophers because it suggests that there is a much closer 
connection between epistemology and political philosophy than is commonly 
5, 6 
supposed. 
The analysis of canonical theory and research is pursued through 
the basic ideas of the primacy of practice and the necessity for 
democratic deliberation procedures. Indeed it picks up a connection which 
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has been stressed by both Richard Peters and John Dewey of the relationship 
between democracy and rationality.7 It also raisel a problem which has 
had little, if any, attention in the educational literature, namely the 
basic and inescapable tension in which the issues of due process for 
teachers, professional discipline and free inquiry in the development 
of canonical theory are situated. Against the backdrop of this problem 
the distinctions among 'mandatory core', 'core' and 'disputed territory' 
are highly significant. If these findings are anywhere near the mark it 
is important for educational researchers to appreciate this problem and 
recognize such distinctions in their work. 
The question of the risks, costs and benefits of pursuing the 
abolition of employer/employee relations through teacher unions shifting 
from the accommodatory stance of industrial unionism to a strategy involv-
ing collective negotiations and social and political action to convert 
these relations into franchise co-operative ones is discussed in some 
detail. It is argued that the strategy of industrial unionism cannot 
foster teaching excellence. This finding depends upon the principle 
that the excellent teacher connects his instruction to the personal 
meanings of his students and does so through an authentic expression of 
his own character and personality. I conclude that generally the 
professional strategy better serves the interests of students, teachers 
and community than that of industrial unionism - certainly over the long 
term. 
Other specific findings relate to matters such as the importance 
of specialist associations within the TPA, the rejection of mandatory 
in-service education as a general condition for continuing certification, 
the importance of internal democracy to the TPA - including the necessity 
for free inquiry and expression and the right to dissent in public, and 
the need for co-ordinating structures among the TPA, community organiza-
tions, labour unions and certain state agencies. 
(G) Educational Research and Theory 
Another finding with important implications for educational theory 
is that the basic existential and social aims of education should be 
elaborated in terms of the relationships between and among the participants 
prior to the formulation of learning objectives, curriculum designs, 
pedagogical principles and techniques for evaluation. An examination 
of the educational literature shows that this principle is honoured far 
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more in the breach (Freire, Gramsci and Bowers being conspicuous 
exceptions). I point out the authoritarian dangers in practice of those 
inquiries which ignore the social context, political control, power 
relationships and communication processes. Because I argue a prima facie case 
for thinking that theorizing in the ttmainstream" tradition, which does 
ignore or underplay the foregoing considerations, has authoritarian 
presuppositions, the thesis challenges researchers in the mainstream 
tradition to justify their research agendas and methods. 
Because the political relationships and communication processes 
relating educational researchers and teacher practitioners are so unsatis-
factory there is not the appropriate grounding of educational theory in 
teaching practice. Only when educational researchers join with teacher 
practitioners and other educational officers to build a united teaching 
profession with internal democracy will there be the categorial conditions 
for good practice in both teaching and educational research. 
Another point concerns the literature on personnel management and 
organization development which discusses workers' job satisfaction and 
organizational effectiveness in both educational, business and industrial 
settings. As a general rule this literature does not situate the discussion 
within the context of the basic structure of society and the categorial 
power relations of the participants. The critique of the "enlightened 
management" approach, which helps to establish the case for workers' 
co-operatives, franchises and professional associations, is obliquely a 
criticism of most of the research and theory in the field of personnel 
management and organizational effectiveness and a call to the researchers 
to address their subject in a more profound way. 
(n) The Philosophy of Education 
This inquiry uses philosophical methods in articulating a positive 
thesis concerning the appropriate foundation for educational evaluation 
and in criticizing the existing system of political control over education. 
But are the uses I make of 'institutions' and 'strategies' philosophical? 
If these analyses concerning the existing control over education are 
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correct then the only way to carry forward the argument about principles 
for evaluation is to articulate and justify a visionary set of institutions. 
Furthermore the idea of social justice conceived in terms of ongoing social 
transformation rather than a static social order is reached through 
philosophical analysis and in its turn generates the relevance of 
'strategies', as sets of prinCiples for social transformation. But how 
can a discussion of strategies be philosophical? Static principles are 
appropriate for static conceptions of social justice and educational aims 
whereas strategic principles are the proper analogue for dynamic ideas 
about these matters. 
I think that it is appropriate for philosophers of education to 
criticize the agendas and methods used in educational research. (I do 
not suggest that this is their sole or most important function.) In this 
regard the thesis makes an original contribution to the philosophy of 
education by its fundamental criticism of the agendas and research 
programmes of "mainstreaml1 educational theory. 
The study also challenges the practices of those philosophers of 
education who conduct their inquiries on the basis of assumed social 
institutions. Unfortunately, this is the common practice and even 
Richard Peters, who is much more aware of and sensitive to the issue 
of the social and political context, authority relationships, etc., 
than is typical, pursues an argument on equality in education on the 
assumption of the continuation of the class relations in contemporary 
capitalist societies. 8 The limits of possible and feasible results and 
processes within capitalism are quite different from those within an 
authentic democracy. For example, his argument that his conception of 
educational equality for children requires undesirable forms of state 
intervention is flawed by his assumption of the continuation of capitalism -
but this is precisely what is in dispute for at least some of the 
egalitarians he criticizes. 9 If the thesis is correct in this analysis 
it can no longer, if it ever was, be considered worthy of serious 
philosophy of education to leave the basic institutional framework and 
social context of education unexamined. 
(I) Summation 
In conclusion, I have followed an ancient tradition, going back to 
Plato's Republic, of tightly linking educational philosophy, social and 
political philosophy and a vision of the good for man. I have tried to 
achieve coherence, despite the wide scope of the thesis, through the 
connected ideas of I-self's authentic project, the grounding of practical 
and moral judgment in the existential predicament, the primacy of practice, 
and democratic communications and power relations. The broad compass of 
the thesis creates problems - I have often raised issues or sketched 
arguments that warrant considerably more discussion, and the reader 
faces challenges in following all the many branches of such a wide ranging 
argument (although it is hoped that the dialogic device somewhat eases 
this difficulty); however there are advantages too because I have been 
able to address major policy issues, e.g. curriculum control, teacher 
accountability, centralization/decentralization, teacher professionalism/ 
unionism, multi-culturalism, etc., in addition to the original concern of 
educational evaluation. These v~rious policy issues are situated within 
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an integrated context because the inquiry is grounded in our most fund a-
mental valuations of the true, the good and the just. 
I have been concerned to give a broad world map to guide inquiry 
, 
into education~evaluation and the political control over education in 
a way that reveals those other considerations which are most pertinent. 
This general impressionistic approach has its merits as has that of the 
map-maker concentrating on the detailed features of Bloomsbury. Yet in 
another sense I have been much more specific than is usual - concerning 
my presuppositions about the good for man and my vision for society -
making it easier for others to agree or disagree with them. To return 
to the beginning, the presuppositions of educational evaluation inevit-
ably raise moral and political issues that call for philosophical justi-
fication. This thesis has attempted to probe those issues. 
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HOMEOSTATIC TENSIONS 
Let us break in on these tensions at a particular point, say when 
autonomy reveals inauthentic features of I-self's project, e.g. diagram 
2.2 to explore the explanatory power of these concepts of homeostatic 
tension. Authenticity calls I-self through the homeostatic tension 
between understanding and action to alter her project. However, to 
carry out her new project she requires certain powers. If these are 
available and mobilized she proceeds to restore equilibrium by engaging 
in an authentic project; she is under way in the process of self-
realization. What if she lacks the appropriate powers? Among a number 
of possibilities three are particularly salient: 
\1) I-self re-defines her project as a 'tragic destiny' in which 
knowing she lacks the power to accomplish her vision, or not 
seeing any way to attain it, she remains faithful to her vision, 
spurns compromise, refuses to delude herself that her action is 
efficacious and is consoled in that while her praxis must fail 
she has kept her soul and her identity.l 
According to our interpretation the tragic destiny is not 
authentic because it lacks efficacy. For a particular person 
in a particular situation it may be the best choice available. 
Despite a certain admirable nobility in having the resolve to 
choose truth with suffering over compromise the tragic destiny 
is not the best choice conceivable. 
(2) I-self retreats from autonomy by disclaiming responsibility for 
what she has not the power to accomplish. As in (1) she cannot 
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avoid suffering as long as understanding and action are incongruent 
and so she flies away from autonomy until her understanding has 
been made congruent with her action through a reification of her 
consciousness. The self-deceptions inherent in this option can be 
functional in the preservation of life and the reduction of suffer-
ing but they also are stumbling blocks to gaining the missing power. 
This choice can eventually become, at best, a sort of pseudo 
authenticity, an "I'm all right Jack" approach to life, e.g. 
diagram 2.1; more typically it is a bearable existence - and a 
sell-out! 
(3) I-self redefines her project in terms of gaining the power she lacks. 
In doing so she may gain the powers for her project and get under 
way authentically; however she may also experience a displacement 
in which power becomes her aim, end and vision. Therefore this 
choice, which may work, also places her whole existence in peril. 
As a result she can utterly lose her self in the quest for power 
as an idol. 
These possibilities might be interpreted as choices sitting before 
individuals and, to a limited extent, they are, bearing in mind that 
specific features of the predicament may reduce or even rule out signi-
ficant choice. However, and more importantly, they also need to be 
interpreted as "theorytl to guide the transformative social action of 
collective groups seeking social arrangements which provide all 
individuals with authentic possibilities. 
The analysis of homeostatic tension might be misconstrued as a sort 
of introspective psychology or alternatively as some theory based on 
uncited research findings: it is neither. The theory has undoubtedly 
been affected by my reading of the research literature in psychology 
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and other fields but no particular citation comes to mind as basic. What 
has been significant are conversations and interactions with teachers and 
students over many years, particularly a tour of Australian schools in 
1974; observation of "focus groups" in Canada in which small groups of 
teachers and parents discussed and debated educational issues with intense 
involvement - often sharing personal experiences; and working with 
colleagues who have a commitment to personal growth and development. 
I believe it was during the Australian tour that I first noted that 
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radical changes in educational philosophy, teaching practice and personal 
commitments were brought about through a crisis of personal identity 
followed by a period (often lengthy) of self-transformation. In retrospect 
some of the crises were triggered by failures in or challenges to praxis, 
e.g. the teacher who after ten years' teaching experience went to a new 
system in a new country in which schools lacked the materials that were 
basic to her teaching method - this triggered a radical re-evaluation 
which continued for a decade tat least). Other crises were initiated 
by emptiness in the vision, e.g. the man who, in desperation, decided 
radically to change his teaching over a six-month period and quit if 
it did not work ('work' meaning that he would see his efforts connected 
to a worthy vision). Dwayne Huebner, of Teachers College Columbia, 
helped me to articulate a growing sense that "scientific psychology" 
seriously misrepresents and distorts psychic life. The striking 
similarities between these experiences and reports of religious conversion 
was the central idea which I have attempted to understand. 
I have not been looking for a theory to predict what people will 
do and which is to be confirmed by suitably "controlledft experiments 
but for schemata which agents concerned to understand and change social 
conditions will find revealing and useful. The psychological I1facts ll 
incorporated in the theory are available to readers through reflection 
on their own experiences. If the schemata on homeostatic tensions and 
the related analyses are helpful in the reflexive monitoring by some 
real agents they will have been justified. 
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APPENDIX B 
OBJECTIONS TO A PRELIMINARY FORMULATION OF A 
PRINCIPLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Given the principle, "social co-operation should 
be so organized that it advances the good of every 
person, considered equally and impartially". 
It may be objected that this principle of equality neglects or 
ignores individual differences. While some conceptions of equality are 
incompatible with an appropriate recognition of individual differences 
this objection does not hold concerning our principle, which does not 
advocate that all individuals have the same experiences, receive 
identical treatment or pursue the same projects but that they are all 
entitled to equal consideration of their good. 
Differential claims to the benefits of social co-operation have 
been rationalized on a number of bases: 
(a) differences in the role, position, status or function of persons 
within the system of social co-operation, e.g. doctor, politician, 
capitalist, worker; 
(b) differences in age, sex or race which mayor may not be correlated 
with positioning within the system of social co-operation; 
(c) allegedly intractable differences in features or character such 
as intelligence, courage, size, appearance or temperament; 
(d) differences in merit, desert or contribution; 
(e) personal preferences or needs. 
Now (a) already pre-supposes a particular system of social 
co-operation but no system of social co-operation can serve as its 
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own justification. Both the assignment of an individual to a position, 
function, role or status and the consequences to that individual require 
justification. Using (a) we can never get reasonable answers to questions 
such as, "On what basis is X a capitalist and Y a worker?" "Why should a 
doctor receive more social resources than a labourer?" Why should certain 
persons, groups or occupations have more power and resources than others?tI 
Concerning (d), 'merit', 'desert' or 'contribution' require grounding. 
How can a person's contribution to a system of social co-operation be 
assessed, in principle, independently of the outcomes the system is 
intended to produce? Like (a), (d) "puts the cart before the horse!!. 
For merit, contribution or desert to stand as objections to our principle, 
each must be grounded by some alternative conception of appropriate 
outcomes. 
With respect to (b), (c) and (e) what relevance could any of these 
differences have to the validity of our principle? Age, sex and certain 
other differences may well have a bearing on the particular ways in which 
persons pursue or experience their good but they do not provide a basis 
for preferring one person over another. To be I-self is to have a claim 
to I-self's good. Perhaps some would argue that being human comes in 
degrees and that differences such as those in (b), ~c) and (e) establish 
degrees of humanity. If so they will be required to offer a demonstration 
of this notion. A more likely interpretation is that these sorts of 
differences are used to rationalize arbitrary privileges which cannot 
be impartially justified. 
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THE JUSTIFICATION OF A LIMITED SPHERE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
At this point we want to make two main points: 
(A) that I-self's good requires that there be a sphere of social 
justice embodied in positive law; 
(B) that this sphere of social justice must be limited so that there 
is a region of social life embodying love and fraternity in which 
principles of social justice have no direct application. 
In brief our first task is to demonstrate that I-self's good calls 
for principles of social justice to be enacted into legal statutes which 
are applied through regular and impartial procedures of administration 
backed with coercive sanctions. With respect to welfare H. L. A. Hart 
articulates five truisms each providing a reason why, given survival as 
an aim, law and morals should include a specific content. " ••• without 
such a content laws and morals could not forward the minimum purpose of 
2 
survival which men have in associating with each other". A synopsis of 
his discussion of these truisms follows: 
(1) human vulnerability requires forbearances. which are usually 
formulated as prohibitions, that restrict the use of violence 
in killing or inflicting bodily harm, e.g. "Thou shalt not killlt; 
(2) approximate equality (in strength and power) of individual agents 
creates a necessity for a system of mutual forbearance and 
compromise; (Hart means that without the co-operation of others, 
no individual is sufficiently powerful to be secure from 
unrestrained aggression of others). 
(3) limited altruism - because people are neither angels nor devils a 
system of forbearances becomes both necessary and possible. For 
angels, rules requiring forbearances would not be necessary; for 
devils, "prepared to destroy, reckless of the cost to themselves, 
they would be impossible"; 
(4) limited resources - the fact that persons need food, clothes and 
shelter that are not ready-to-hand in limitless abundance but are 
scarce, have to be grown or won from nature or constructed by 
human labour provides a reason for at least a minimal form of 
property and hence for laws regulating the use of resources. 
Furthermore the division of labour creates a need for dynamic rules 
regulating transfer, exchange or sale of goods, services and resources. 
Because of the dynamic nature of these interactions promises need 
to be recognized as a source of obligations. People require con-
fidence in the future behaviour of others to ensure the predict-
ability necessary for co-operation; 
(5) limited understanding and strength of will - neither understanding 
of long-term interest, nor the strength or goodness of will which 
are required for people to obey laws, are shared by all men alike. 
"All are tempted at times to prefer their own immediate interests 
and, in the absence of a special organization for their detection 
and punishment, many would succumb to the temptation." While we 
may speculate to what extent agents growing up and working in just 
and supportive circumstances may in fact have a full understanding 
of their long-term interests and sufficient strength of will, 
prudence suggests that we do not underestimate the pervasiveness 
of temptations to break laws under the most varied forms of social 
organization. There are good grounds for agreeing with Hart that 
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not only does I-self benefit from just law but also from coercive 
sanctions to enforce compliance • 
••• except in very small closely-knit societies, sub-
mission to the system of restraints would be folly if 
there were no organization for those who would then 
try to obtain the advantages of the system without 
submitting to its obligations. 'Sanctions' are there-
fore required not as the normal motive for obedience, 
but as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily 
obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not. 
Hart says, 
••. what reason demands is voluntary co-operation in 
a coercive system, 
which is similar to C. D. Ovans' precept, "mutual coercion, 
mutuallyapPliedn • 3 
It is worth stressing that 'autonomy' does not mean independence: 
autonomy is compatible with mutual relations; . 
it is also compatible with constraint and even coercion. 
To be autonomous is to choose the basic principles and rules regulating 
one's life. As Hart's discussion shows it is rational for I-self to 
agree to a coercively enforced system of social justice and this agree-
ment can be made by autonomous decision. 
So far our arguments for positive legal enactment of principles of 
social justice have been based on welfare considerations but self-
realization also requires law. In order to realize his ownmost 
potentiality-for-being I-self requires the powers, freedoms and resources 
to monitor his ongoing flow of actions, to set goals and objectives, to 
make plans and to organize and implement these plans. While excessive 
constraint and minimal freedom are incompatible with self-realization 
many sorts of constraint on his own actions are no impediment to I-self's 
self-realization. 
On the other side, could I-self exist authentically without law? 
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Without law it is unlikely, following Hart, that there would be regular, 
public principles governing social co-operation. Such circumstances 
would undermine the scope of I-self's reflexive monitoring of actions; 
the lack of predictability in social relations would result in I-self's 
powers being weak and erratic. By the argument in section 7 this would 
reduce his stewardship and weaken his responsible agency; hence both his 
autonomy and authenticity would be subverted. 
In view of the advantages of a legally enacted system of social 
justice there may be superficial grounds for seeking indefinite expansion 
of the scope of social justice but this would be counter-productive for a 
number of reasons, only a few of which I will develop. 
There are aspects of social co-operation which are necessary for 
self-development and authentic being-with-others which cannot be fitted 
within the category of social justice. Our basic point here is that 
there are actions which persons should perform for their own good but 
which they shOUld not or cannot be compelled to perform. Imagine a 
society which has a perfect system of social justice but which lacks 
love, friendship and fraternity. Is such a society possible? If so 
could we have authentic being-with-others?; self-development?; a 
continuing society? By love and friendship we refer to relationships 
which are both personal and special but 'justice' suggests impartiality 
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and while impartiality is compatible with personal relationships it is 
incompatible with special relationships. Therefore it appears conceptually 
possible to have justice without love or friendship. The likelihood that 
it is impossible to have a just society without plentiful relations of 
love and friendship actually reinforces our point that while love and 
friendship are conceptually distinct from social justice, they are 
essential for any viable system of social co-operation. 
It is also likely that self-esteem and a sense of personal security 
cannot be ensured through a reliance on justice. The sense of self-esteem 
and personal security are developed through the unconditional \in the 
sense of negotiated conditions) love and fraternal support of other 
I-selves. Infants and children require love and care from one or more 
adults on a continuing basis. It does not appear possible to ensure 
that this continued commitment can be achieved through prinCiples of 
social justice. 
Another consideration is that our commitment to autonomy requires 
that I-self in fact determine the laws under which he chooses to be bound. 
To meet this condition he must be involved in constitutional deliberation, 
legislation and executive activity. Now it is clearly not feasible for 
each person to be involved in detailed legislation of all the rules 
governing the actions of all people in a social system involving many 
persons. Only if each I-self is involved in the deliberations concerning 
a limited range of laws, for the overall social system and for particular 
features crucial to his plans and interests can his autonomy be fostered. 
This programme is unlikely to be accomplished unless: 
(1) the system of legislation and administration of social justice is 
decentralized; 
(2) the system of social justice is a limited sphere within the social , 
order; 
(3) the laws and rules are simple and restricted in number. 
A last point is that each I-self needs a sphere of privacy, which 
we shall call a selfidual sphere and which is elaborated in section 19. 
This requires limitations on the scope of social justice to ensure that 
each I-self has stewardship with respect to a set of personally signifi-
cant responsibilities. It can be argued that it is precisely a system 
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of social justice which can ensure these spaces. I do not quarrel with 
this formulation but only wish to stress that this self-limiting feature 
is essential to social justice in an authentic democracy. 
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POSITIVIST THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Many theorists of distributive justice assume that or argue for 
the possibility of an "objective", "scientific", i.e. positivistic, 
determination of the value of human labour and/or of the products and 
resources exchanged in market interactions between sellers and buyers. 
In effect they argue that values can be determined independently of the 
processes of deliberation engaged in by human beings existentially 
exploring their good and interests. In this appendix I dispute this 
view and criticize the two main theories which, by purporting to solve 
the problem of exchange values in social co-operation try to place the 
determination of distributive justice on a positivistic footing. Then 
I sketch a general argument why any positivistic theory of distributive 
justice is unsatisfactory in principle. 
The two theories are the labour theory of value and the market theory 
of value. Prior to considering the labour theory of value we need to 
define 'labour'. We stipulate that labour is a dimension of work; to 
the extent that work produces goods, services or resources for social 
exchange, i.e. to the degree that the work is traded for goods, services, 
resources or money we call it 'labour'. In so far as work does not 
partake in social exchange it is not labour. For example, a painting 
or poem is the product of work but only becomes the product of labour 
4 if sold or traded. Wages are characterized by the exchange relationship 
which is the criterion we are claiming distinguishes 'labour' from 'work'. 
The labour theory of value asserts that the value of goods, services 
or resources is determined by the labour content or, in Marx's version, 
by the socially necessary amount of labour power for their production. 5 
Karl Marx's work has been among the most influential in the whole field 
of social theory. Marx did appreciate the importance of demand in the 
6 genesis of exchange values. However Marx's conception of 'labour' is 
much wider than ours. He writes: 
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man 
and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord 
states, regulates and controls the material reactions 
between himself and Nature •••• By thus acting on the 
external world and changing it, he at the same time changes 
his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and 
compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now 
dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour 
that remind us of the mere animal .... We pre-suppose 
labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human.? 
Hence 'labour' for Marx corresponds, more or less, to our concept of 
'social action,.8 
Our concern here is not to criticize Marx's theory of exchange value 
but rather a positivist account that asserts that exchange values are 
determined by labour (in our sense of "labour"). The difficulty with 
Marx's analysis is that while on the one hand he accounts for the 
determination of exchange values through the whole range of social actions 
that produce a given system of social co-operation on the other hand the 
term 'labour'will tend to be interpreted much more narrowly by most 
people who may see his theory as providing a basis for particular claims 
based on contribution. 
The labour theory of value draws our attention to the fact that the 
goods, services, resources and conditions for welfare, self-development, 
self-realization and authentic being-with-one-another are provided through 
labour. Labour explains how the things we prize are generally created 
and reveals aspects of their relative exchange values but it cannot 
provide the sole explanation of why we prize what we do. To explain 
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exchange value one must consider the intentions and motivations of those 
who wish to receive a particular commodity or item in exchange. Hence 
market theory or the theory of supply and demand is also relevant to the 
determination of exchange values. The market theory of value attempts to 
explain exchange values through an analysis of supply and demand and the 
degree of freedom or constraint of the market, or processes of exchange. 
How is supply, i.e. abundance or scarcity to be explained? Some 
things, e.g. precious metals and stones are scarce by nature but for the 
most part supply results from the social actions of human beings. To a 
substantial degree supply reflects conscious judgments about value. 
Particularly in capitalist markets labour and capital are shifted to 
where profit expectations are higher, resulting in supply altering in 
accordance with perceptions of exchange values. While exchange values 
are affected by the dynamic equilibrium between supply and demand it 
appears that 'demand' is the more fundamental idea in that supply 
decisions can be explained in terms of the valuations of potential 
purchasers and users. To a certain extent what we prize follows from 
contingent facts about llhuman nature" in so far as we are present-at-hand-
in-the-world, e.g. fresh air, clean water, nutritious food, shelter from 
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the elements etc. However most of our judgments of value arise through 
acquired tastes: through initiation into certain forms of life; through 
education; through the patterns of social co-operation which we produce 
through our social actions. 'Demand', at best, represents a one dimensional 
reduction of this range of evaluations. At worst, it conceals the fact 
that the preferences and evaluations of buyers in the market for the 
products of social co-operation are not given but are themselves produced 
in the system of social co-operation. 
But demand is not the independent variable some economists 
make it: 'supply and demand presuppose the existence of 
different classes and sections of classes which divide the 
total revenue of a society and consume it among themselves 
as revenue, and therefore, make up the demand created by 
revenue,.9 
Man's good and his interests are existentially revealed to him in 
the conduct of his individual and collective projects, a matter we discuss 
in sections 15 and 16. Because the "val ue ll of labour and other commodities 
cannot be determined independently of the existential revelation of good 
and interests, no merely positivistic account can "explain!! exchange 
values or form an adequate basis of a theory of distributive justice. 
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REPLICATION VERSUS DIFFERENTIATION IN 
THE DIVISION OF SOCIAL ACTIONS 
It is useful to assess some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of functional differentiation in relation to replication of function. 
We will begin by focusing on work and then introduce cultural and political 
action. The differentiation of function has the potential to: 
(a) develop a greater store of powers, particularly knowledge, 
expertise and skill, i.e. for the social collectivity, but not 
necessarily for each individual; 
(b) concentrate these powers on functions for which they are peculiarly 
appropriate; hence 
(c) carry out much more complex projects than would be possible through 
replication of function; hence 
(d) produce a greater Variety and quantity of goods, services and 
resources, i.e. accomplish a greater productivity of work; hence 
(e) continually upgrade the capacity of the mediating elements, i.e. 
resources, powers and language to support the realization of the 
good of everyone; this is only the positive side but, in addition: 
(f) people tend to know less and less about the work of most of their 
fellows; 
19) there is a tendency for the scale of operations to become much 
larger; 
(h) as a result of (f) and (g) the social actions of I-selves tend to 
become increasingly opaque to their understanding, i.e. I-selves 
become mystified by the mysterious features of their social action; 
hence 
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(i) reflexive monitoring of action is more difficult; more precisely, 
it is less likely that agents' evaluations of their social action 
will be sufficiently transparent and resolute to constitute critical 
reflexion; hence 
(j) I-self's self-realization is subverted; 
(k)because of (f) to (j) there will tend to be a decline in fraternity 
and an undermining of authentic being-with-one-another;lO hence 
(1) there will be tendencies towards relations of domination/dependence; 
(m) there will tend to be distortions in communications and discourse;ll 
(n) in addition to these sorts of concerns the web of interdependencies 
makes the whole system vulnerable to dysfunction or failure in one 
part of it, e.g. global crises in the economies of nations, the 
threats of nuclear destruction and pollution; when we turn to 
consider radical differentiation of function in the fields of 
political and cultural action then, 
(0) there is a tendency to make or apply rules and norms that serve 
only particular groups rather than all persons; 
(p) there is a propensity to use cultural activity, education and 
communication to mystify consciousness and to support relations 
of dOmination/dependence; 
(q) for reasons such as those in (f) to (p), agents in highly differ-
entiated systems of social co-operation will generally find that 
their realization of the good will be highly unequal and they will 
collectively have little control over the processes of social 
transformation. 
We conclude this appendix by noting that limitations have to be 
placed on the extent of functional differentiation ;f a system of social 
co-operation is to be in accordance with the FPSC. The challenge is how 
to blend replication and differentiation of function. 
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of potential income flows from the practice of law. Other social 
powers consist of their network of contacts and their financial and 
material resources. However, even if their social powers are quite 
equal, XiS personal powers may be much more supportive of his 
"success" as a lawyer than Y's; depending on the convertibility among 
different forms of power in their society X may be able to convert 
his advantage in personal powers into advantages in various social 
powers. To some degree, therefore, X controls his own social powers. 
Historically modern capitalism is marked by a high degree of 
convertibility among different types of property through its free 
market exchanges in which property is used to buy self-development 
which is converted into income flows that make possible the purchase 
of other forms of power; property in the form of capital is used to 
buy power as authority in the organization of work and economic 
activity; power as property is used to buy categorial power which is 
used to advance sectoral interests; •.•• Indeed Giddens argues that 
it is not private property which is distinctive to modern capitalism 
but its modes of convertibility which use money to convert property 
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rights into capital and commodifies labour power as the only 
"property" possessed by the wage-worker. ibid., p. 105. 
32. Red-headed C is born into a society which kills all red-haired 
infants and so his personal powers are destroyed by his social 
structure. D is raised in a community in which no one speaks to 
him, responds to his speech attempts, shows him any love or kindness, 
or acknowledges him other than providing food and shelter. If by 
some chance D manages to survive, who can say that D's personal 
powers are independent of the structure of social relations in which 
he is enmeshed? Even in typical rather than extreme cases is it not 
true that the effects of social structure on personal powers are 
profound? 
33. See discussion of the homeostatic tension between power and responsi-
bility on p. 52 and the elaboration in Appendix A. 
34. The main source of my ideas on categorial power has been Basil 
Bernstein's work on 'classification and framing' in relation to 
'power' and 'control' although I have elaborated the concept 
differently and have used different terminology. See B. Bernstein, 
Class. Codes and Control. Volume 3. Towards a Theory of Educational 
Transmissions, 2nd edition, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1975, 1977, 
particularly Chapter 5, and also Codes. Modalities and the Process of 
Cultural Reproduction: A Model, Department of Education of University 
of Lund, 1981. 
35. One only has categorial power if one can act otherwise. A slave who 
is content with slavery and "decides ll to leave it unchanged does not 
have categorial power unless he could, if he chose, participate in 
ending slavery and introducing a new social structure. 
36. This is pursued in Chapter III. 
37. This does not mean that cruelty, dishonesty, etc., will or can be 
abolished but only that there is no reason to believe that social 
co-operation cannot be so organized that for every individual there 
is the possibility of some authentic project without dishonesty, 
depravity and the like. 
38. There is an extensive literature on the revisionist theories of 
democracy which would take us off our course were we to elaborate 
on it. Two short general accounts of some of this literature are 
provided by Jack Lively and Carole Pateman. For example Pateman 
discusses the concern among a number of theorists for stability and 
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the fear that widespread citizen participation leads to totalitarianism. 
Both she and Lively report on theories that purport to show that rule 
by elites is inevitable, that the differentiation and specialization 
of labour is incompatible with participatory democracy, that apathy 
is good and so on. These authors provide references to the work of 
Berelson, Dahl, Eckstein,Michels, Mosca, Sartori and Schumpeter. 
Jack Lively, Democracy, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, 1980. 
Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, 1970. 
39. The idea of citizen is distinctly different from 'subject', i.e. 
a dominated agent, or the more neutral term 'member'. To be a 
citizen is to participate as an equal in the life and government 
of one's society. 
40. Heart also wants it understood that all adult members of society 
will be citizens. 
41. What about mentally ill or severely brain damaged persons? It is 
contrary to the FPSC to deny such persons equal consideration of 
their interests. I totally oppose programmes such as sterilization, 
frontal lobotomies, unwarranted incarceration or killing which do 
not provide due processes for the representation of the interests 
of these persons. Nevertheless there are cases where the person may 
require others, either temporarily or indefinitely, to represent his 
interests for him. In such cases a trustee should be appointed 
although it should go without saying that trusteeship decisions are 
matters of legal justice and not merely technical medical concerns. 
42. Each multi-generational society at any point in time is faced with 
the policy decision related to the interests of future generations. 
In practical terms those living together at any particular time 
generally lack the information to determine substantive policies for 
remote generations although there are obvious exceptions - it is in 
the interests of remote generations for this generation to prevent 
nuclear war, for instance. However questions related to the use of 
natural resources or the maintenance of historical sites are suited 
to a perspective of perhaps two or three generations at best. 
Therefore there seems little prospect for or point in a formula 
approach to intergenerational justice. The most precious legacy 
for future generations is to be born into a democratic, fraternal 
society. 
43. Rawls, Ope cit., pp. 284-293. Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in 
the Liberal State. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
1980, p. 107ff. 
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44. Where we use 'replication by function' and 'functional differentiation' 
Durkheim refers to 'mechanical solidarity' and 'organic solidarity' 
respectively. However Durkheim's terms have a different scope of 
application. Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: 
an analysis of the writings of Marx. Durkheim and Max Weber, 
Cambridge University Press, London, 1971, pp. 70-79. 
45. This is not a denial of the agency of the agents because their 
consciousness of their circumstances and their decisions and choices 
are potentially efficacious. 
46. With the exception of the temporary exclusion of children. 
47. Although compulsory retirement, simply on the grounds of age, is 
contrary to the rights of older persons to autonomous participation 
in their society. 
48. Midgley, Ope cit., pp. 326-331. 
49. I do not dispute that there are circumstances in which the privileging 
of one language over others can be defended, e.g. respecting legal 
documents in a given jurisdiction, but there are still issues of the 
scope of regulation of language use and the procedures, including 
participation, used to reach such decisions. Clearly any school 
curriculum cannot avoid reflecting particular selections from possible 
cultural resources; and in some ways these choices will be arbitrary, 
e.g. whether King Lear, or Macbeth, or both, or neither are to be 
taught. But by 'arbitrarily', in this context, I mean where the 
decision procedures are unjust or irrational with respect to the 
good of the student or the interests of the community. These issues 
are pursued in Chapter V. 
50. In general, actual historical class relations establish privileges 
and domination, at least within the main classes, although there is 
a theoretical possibility of advantages in respect of resources and 
powers being offset or counterbalanced by disadvantages in outcomes. 
51. The workers are 'relatively propertyless' in that they do not own 
the primary resources supporting their own work. 
52. It is sometimes argued that the rights to bequeath and inherit 
property are necessary for an appropriate status of the family. 
If the appropriate status of the family requires the inheritance 
of property then capitalism, which requires great numbers of workers 
lacking property in the means of production to fulfil its "free" 
labour contracts is indicted with destroying the status of the 
majority of families who have no significant wealth to bequeath. 
53. See note 31 of Chapter II. 
54. The issue of the structure and functioning of the state is a matter 
of great importance which we must skip in this study. However it 
is important that we do not uncritically assume notions. For 
example, to what extent is the state the organized expression of 
the society? An instrument for class oppression? A neutral 
arbitrator between classes and sectors? How significant are the 
vastly increased extent and penetration of state surveillance 
activities. See Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of 
Historical Materialism, Volume 1, Power. property and the state, 
Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1981, Chapter 9, especially pp. 214-221. 
55. Giddens stresses the importance of the emergence, in the Middle Ages, 
of corporate moveable property. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social 
Theory, Ope cit., pp. 38-40. 
56. The advocates of meritocracy cannot accept the principle of unbridled 
prerogatives for capitalist entrepreneurs because it offends against 
their sense of justice and generally damages their interests as a 
class; but equally there is no way for the comprehensive system of 
institutional justice that is ideally presupposed by meritocracy to 
co-exist with the private and asymmetrical ownership of the means 
of production because to subject private ownership to comprehensive 
public regulation, in accordance with a meritocratic conception of 
justice, is to obliterate any significance for private property. 
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For Gouldner, the New Class is emerging not only in the late 
capitalism of North America, Western Europe, and Japan but also in 
the third world of developing nations and in the USSR and its client 
states. While it is probably an exaggeration to describe the USSR 
as in no sense a workers' state, it nevertheless appears that a New 
Class, similar in many respects to Gouldner's characterization has 
emerged and wields enormous power and influence. The dynamics of 
this class's emergence to power are likely to include the privileged 
status of the Communist party, the party's leading role in ideological 
and intellectual work in the Soviet Union and the meritocratic 
principles governing admission to and promotion within the Communist 
party. Additionally in the USSR the New Class is the privileged 
class as there is no capitalist class. Alvin Gouldner, The Future 
of Intellectualsand the Rise of the New Class, Macmillan, London, 
1979, especially pp. 1-8. 
57. Rawls, Ope cit., p. 103. 
58. ibid., p. 104. 
59. ibid., p. 313. 
60. The problem here is an embarrassment of riches with so many studies 
demonstrating this relationship, e.g. Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude 
Passeron, Reproduction in Education. Society and Culture, Sage 
Publications, London, 1970 (French), 1977 (English translation), 
pp. 91-93. 
61. See Basil Bernstein's seminal work on restricted and elaborated 
codes of speech and on the differential receptivity of various 
different communication contexts and pedagogies in the school to 
children with different family and cultural backgrounds. Basil 
Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, Volume 1, Theoretical Studies 
towards a Sociology of Language, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
Second Edition, 1971, 1974, 1977, especially p. 76ff and pp. 170-187 , 
Volume 3, Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions, Routledge 
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& Kegan Paul, London, Revised Edition, 1975, 1977, especially pp. 22-32 
and note (a) on pp. 193-196. 
62. Pierre Bourdieu speaks of the generation of 'habitus', a sort of 
natural, taken for granted, orientation to particular cultural 
practices or in Bernstein's interpretation a "deep cultural grammar". 
He explains the inequalities in academic attainment of children from 
the different social classes as arising from the "distance" between 
the habitus the school tends to inculcate and that inculcated in 
previous educational experience and ultimately the family. 
Bourdieu and Passeron, Ope cit., especially pp. 71-74. 
63. This is the theme of Chapter IV. 
64. For Hegel the bureaucracy was to become a "universal class" but 
Marx saw the working class as the universal class, a class "which 
can only redeem itself by a total redemption of humanitytl. 
Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, 
Cambridge University Press, 1968, 1978, pp. 52-64, quote on p. 60. 
65. It is in the workers' interests to participate in democratic social 
transformations but it is also in their interests to end their own 
status as employees. i.e. as propertyless workers, as soon as 
possible. Hence in the process of democratizing social relations 
individual workers lose their membership in the working class without 
losing their social agency. Hence the collective agent which accom-
plishes social transformation is not a class but a transclass 
organization aiming to abolish classes. 
66. This double sense of trans formative action alerts us to the error 
in collapsing one's life into a I1selfless" pursuit of social 
revolution which neglects the dimensions of self-development and 
self-realization here and now. Such a course is doomed to failure 
because revolutionaries' capacity to imagine, plan and implement a 
new social order will always be limited by their own character 
formation and the type and quality of their own existence. We also 
reject a retreat into living only for oneself in the here and now. 
To withdraw from the struggle to transform the social conditions 
of our collective existence is to threaten the authenticity of one's 
life. We cannot avoid being-with-one-another. How can we simply 
accept social conditions that undermine the authenticity of our 
being-with-one-another without an act of self-deception? How 
authentic can our personal lives be when we have chosen to deceive 
ourselves in this fashion? 
67. All social agents have a great deal of practical knowledge about 
their social structure which they develop through their ongoing 
social activities but much of this practical knowledge is not 
discursively available to them, i.e. they are unable to analyse, 
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discuss or report it. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, Ope cit.~ 
p2-:5" 
68. In arguing that philosophical analysis is relevant I am not saying 
that scientific studies are not. For arguments on the unique contri-
bution of philosophical analysis see Peter Winch. The Idea of a Social 
Science, and its Relation to Philosophy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1958, especially pp. 1-24. 66-94. 
CHAPTER I I I 
1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, translator Maurice 
Cranston, Penguin, 1968, 1980, Book, Chapter 18, p. 147. 
2. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. The Second Treatise, 
Cambridge University Press, 1960, sections Ill, 138, 163, and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ope cit., Chapters 1 (p. 205), 4 (p. 112), 
5 (p. 115), 10 (p. 131), 18 (p. 147). 
3. Brian Barry, Political Argument, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
1965, 1970, pp. 179-181. 
4. Pat White, "Education, Democracy and the Public Interest" in 
The Philosophy of Education. R. S. Peters (editor), Oxford University 
Press, 1973, 1978, p. 219. 
5. Barry, Ope cit., p. 192. 
6. ibid., p. 195. 
7. See sections 6 and 7. 
8. Jlirgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, 
Heinemann, London, 1976 (German), 1979 (English Translation), 
especially pp. 1-68. 
9. ibid., p. 1. 
10. ibid., pp. 2-3. Note: the translator calls (1) "comprehensibility" 
and (3) "truthfulness". 
11. ibid., p. 3. 
12. ibid., p. 1. 
13. ibid., pp. 3-4. 
14. This represents an unstable state which will either return to (1) 
or degenerate into (3) or (4). 
15. This relates to the second task of the TAG and our major concern in 
this section. 
16. This is discussed specifically in an educational context in Scholar's 
speech on p. 226. 
17. 'Communal critical reflexion' refers to a group process of reflexive 
monitoring in which the agents are particularly authentic and resolute 
in their inquiry. 
18. To use a mathematical metaphor, the difference between their actions 
and their common interest will tend to approach zero as the TAG 
continues over time. These are also conceptual points. 
19. Habermas, Ope cit., pp. 208-210. 
20. ibid., p. 210. 
21. R. S. Peters, "Democratic Values and Educational Aims", Teachers' 
College Record, February, 1979, p. 468. 
22. There are of course all sorts of aspects of the good which apply to 
all I-selves and are basically the same but there are others which 
have a different expression for different individuals. For example 
the policy option of detonating nuclear bombs over New York is 
contrary to the interests of all New Yorkers whereas the provision 
of subsidized opera rather than lower taxes is not nearly so obvious. 
In the second case New Yorkers need a participative process to 
discover their interests. 
23. Rousseau, Ope cit., p. 73. 
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24. While the argument in the text focuses on the need for a selfidual 
sphere within a constitutional democracy (with certain undemocratic 
features), as an important structural feature supporting an ongoing 
series of social transformations to bring about authentic democracy, 
we could also argue a strong case for a selfidual sphere within a 
fully authentic democracy. The selfidual sphere strengthens I-self's 
powers to understand, articulate and defend her interests. This 
process must go on in the authentic democracy. But why would social 
agents want to replace the selfidual sphere that providedtlUs function 
and which has been progressively strengthened all through the period 
of transformation with a different structural feature? Of what sort? 
But these questions can wait. 
25. Rousseau, Ope cit., p. 85. 
26. ibid., p. 85. 
CHAPTER IV 
1. See Facilitator's summary on p. 99. The two tasks are also discussed 
in Chapter III. 
2. See Scholar's argument on pp. 105-107. Our rejection of the use of 
authoritarian or paternalistic methods for achieving authentic 
democracy is based on the assumption that the existing society is a 
constitutional democracy. However, within a despotism or a society 
otherwise lacking constitutional democratic institutions, authoritarian 
or dictatorial power grabs might be justified as the lesser of evils. 
3. See p. 101. 
4. Although the periodic or infrequent use of referenda to permit the 
people as a whole to decide certain issues is still considered a 
practice consistent with constitutional democracy. 
5. I am not using bureaucracy as a pejorative term but in a neutral 
sense as Ita system of administration based upon organization into 
bureaus, division of labour, a hierarchy of authority, etc.: 
designed to dispose of a large body of work in a routine mannerll. 
Collins English Dictionary, William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1979, 1980. 
6. Within capitalism it is possible to have contractual relationships 
which do not fit the employer/employee pattern, e.g. professional/ 
client relationships but capitalist property presupposes the 
propertyless worker employed by the capitalist. 
7. Discussed on p. 64. 
8. Discussed on pp. 83 and 131. 
9. Discussed on pp. 88-89. 
10. Discussed on pp. 90-91. 
11. Discussed on p. 91. 
12. Discussed on pp. 92 and 163-166. 
13. Discussed on pp. 93-95. 
14. Discussed on pp. 105-107. Note: There are Cases in which the action 
of a revolutionary vanguard ~ be justified as the lesser of evils 
but within a constitutional democracy there is no way for a vanguard 
dictatorially to advance authentic democracy. 
15. Discussed on pp. 107 and 118. 
16. Discussed on pp. 126-127. 
17. Discussed on pp. 131-136. 
18. C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democrac~, Oxford 
University Press, 1977, p. 95. 
19. Macpherson stops the process of representation at the national level. 
But why? How are we to exercise democratic control over what is now 
a world-wide system of social co-operation featuring significant 
interdependencies among nations? 
20. Action-Man means in a society which fully realizes our mid-term goal. 
However this does not imply that there will be no need of subsequent 
social transformation or that society will be perfect. 
21. However the procedures used by local communities to select represen-
tatives should be subject to judicial review of the courts established 
by more central jurisdictions. The principle guiding judicial review 
is that there should be local autonomy in the procedures for selecting 
representatives provided there is no violation of equal rights of 
citizenship and equal categorial power. In this respect lot or 
rotation is as acceptable as election whereas prohibiting persons 
from serving as representatives on unjust grounds such as race or 
religion cannot be tolerated. 
22. For example the Telidon system piloted by the telephone corpora-
tion of the province of Manitoba in 1980 uses the home television set 
to display information which is centrally stored but under the control 
of the ~ who employs a variation of a library recall system to 
display listings of all the stored information. While certain 
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research skills are required of the user these can be developed through 
a combination of general education, instructions and training accom-
panying the equipment, and practice. 
23. That is, they cannot vote as representatives but only as citizens, 
like everyone else. 
24. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ope cit., pp. 62, 69-70, 101. 
25. By 'jurisdiction' I mean 'level' in the pyramidal structure of local, 
district, regional, provincial, national, transnational or its variants. 
26. This can be done through television or radio, either 1l1ive ll or 
recorded. 
27. Except that a new bill does not become law until approved by a 
majority of the citizens while an old law remains law until rescinded 
by a majority. 
28. This is an extremely important dimension in fostering fraternal 
understanding on a wider basis and in overcoming excessively 
parochial perspectives. 
29. An example of an executive function is the negotiation with workers' 
co-operatives to fill public sector franchises. This is discussed in 
section 22. 
30. Might it not also be considered the "work" of students? 
31. By 'workers' co-operatives' in this context I also mean individuals 
and partnerships. Generally the co-operative would be used but very 
small operations could be handled by individuals. The partnership 
is simply a small co-operative. 
32. An interesting question is what would be the extent of restraint 
exercised by the citizenship jurisdictions. For example would 
workers be permitted to contract to exploit themselves by working 
an eighteen-hour day? 
Clearly the citizen jurisdictions have the authority to make 
and enforce regulations concerning health and safety. Perhaps 
business hours could be restricted to prevent unfair competition 
but care must be exercised to avoid paternalism. There are many 
issues at the detailed level that I have to skip here. 
33. In the analysis of workers' co-operatives and their relationships 
to community political structures I have benefited greatly from 
Pat White's article "Work-place Democracy and Political Education". 
This article stimulated me to prepare a paper for a seminar on 
political education and I found the discussion and criticism of 
Pat White and others very helpful. Pat White, "Work-place Democracy 
and Political Education", Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 1979. Other 
useful sources were: Roy Edgley, "Education, Work and Politics", 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, Ope cit., Vol. 14, No.1, 1980; 
Anthony Skillen, Ruling Illusions, Harvester Press, 1977, Chapter 
Two, "The Politics of Production". 
34. The domination of the worker is mentioned on p. 92. 
35. Conceptually is it not possible for a particular slave to have as 
much or more autonomy in the direction of his work as a" given 
employee? 
36. Although it would more likely prolong slavery. 
37. Demotions or expulsions of workers would be subject to rights of 
due process which should be administered through bodies established 
by the professional associations, or, depending upon the grounds, 
by the regular law courts. 
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38. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translator David Ross, Oxford, 
The World's Classics, Oxford University Press, 1925, 1980, p. 2. 
39. Clearly there can be conflicts between these interests and therefore 
it is important to have processes for representing and reconciling 
the interests of the various parties. 
40. This argument which is completely contrary to the prevailing views 
on the matter is argued in greater detail in Chapter VI, section 33. 
CHAPTER V 
1. See, for example, Richard Peters' early writings in which he argues 
that education is (conceptually) concerned with the development of 
desirable qualities in people. He no longer holds this position. 
Paul H. Hirst and Richard S. Peters, The Logic of Education, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, pp. 19-25. 
2. Carl Bereiter, Must We Educate?, Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 8. 
3. ibid., p. 9. 
4. ibid., p. 39. 
5. Meritocracy is discussed in Chapter II, pp. 92-95. An interesting 
speculation is to what extent scholars and teachers have been 
pressured to take meritocratic positions as a defence posture in the 
face of the categorial power relations in the wider society and the 
attempts of governmental bodies to exercise political control over 
them. 
6. For example, in the Bible it says, "I came that they might have 
life and have it abundantly", New American Bible, Standard Bible, 
Study Edition, Philadelphia and New York, A. J. Holman & Company, 
John 10 : 10. 
7. I-self's authentic project is discussed on p. 44 and following. 
8. Flanders' study of teachers' perceptions of their classroom practice 
picks out the centrality of what he calls "personal meaning systems ll • 
He writes," .•• the teacher-student relationship is most productive 
when the teacher has worked his or her material into a personal 
meaning system and when the teacher can connect that with the 
student's meaning system". Tony Flanders, Summary Report: 
Professional Development Study, Vancouver, British Columbia Teachers' 
Federation, 1980, p. A-20. 
9. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, excerpts reported in William 
K. Frankena, Ope cit., p. 67. 
However, as we discussed previously, this does not imply a 
passive or merely facilitative role for the teacher, whose task, 
on the contrary, is to start from the stUdent's actual predicament 
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and help her to connect her situation to a worthy and feasible 
vision of the future, all the time recognizing in the educational 
relationships that the student is an active agent, an actor engaged 
in transformation of self/world. 
10. This argument requires more elaboration than I can give it here. 
A sketch is: lack of coherence translates into conflicts between 
individual and society, or to failures of personal integration, 
or to failures in social integration, or to some combination of 
these; autonomous and authentic agents would not agree to this. 
11. William Pinar (editor), Curriculum Theorizing - The Reconceptua1ists, 
Berkeley, McCutchan, 1975; see especially the historical material on 
pp. 15-86. 
12. This is true even if one rejects the whole aims schema as Ray Elliott 
does in arguing for 'consequences' as a more fundamental category 
than 'aims'. I do not dispute this point but because I argue that 
the ultimate grounding of educational activity is not transcendent 
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or immanent aims but I-self's concrete predicament and authentic 
project, my use of educational aims is not open to Elliott's criticism. 
Source: Ray Elliott's M.A. seminar in aims of education, autumn, 1980. 
13. D. Pole, "The Concept of Reason" in R. F. Dearden, P .• H. Hirst and 
R. S. Peters (editors) Education and the Development of Reason, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 151. 
14. See sections 16 and 17. 
15. 'Reproduction' and 'transformation' in this context refer to the 
same thing, the diachronic alteration of the cultural resources and 
mediating elements of the community: 'reproduction' emphasizes the 
continuity and 'transformation' the difference over time. Of 
course all change involves both difference and sameness. 
16. My source for the idea of a 'cultural arbitrary'is Pierre Bourdieu 
although I am not sure that I have interpreted the idea in the same 
way he has. Bourdieu and Passeron, Ope cit., p. 5ff. 
17. There may also be negative consequences for the younger generation 
if they see themselves as coming from an inferior culture that is 
not worth maintaining. While language is a central feature of 
culture there are many other aspects which bear on the authenticity 
of being-with-one-another and the self-esteem of the community's 
members, e.g. religion, art, literature, music, sport, ways of 
teaching science. 
18. I am not concerned here with matters such as driver education, 
flying instruction and the like, which may be required as a condition 
for a licence to engage in certain activities: such matters can be 
handled by political jurisdictions entering into contracts with 
workers' co-operatives consisting of qualified trainers who can 
train and license drivers, pilots or others who seek authorization 
to drive, fly or whatever, not as a profession but for their own 
convenience or pleasure. 
19. For example, it is important that the terms and conditions be 
transparent to all parties. If a teacher receives funds from a 
foundation on the condition that she influence students to pursue 
research in certain fields, and this condition is concealed from 
the students, the teacher is guilty of unethical practice and 
betrays the student's trust. Other points could be made as well. 
20. Collins English Dictionary, Ope cit. 
21. Section 16 discusses the limitations on any representation of third 
party interests. 
22. It would be possible for the child's parents to divide these 
responsbilities or even for the child to have two sets of parents, 
one with trusteeship over education and the other with trusteeship 
over other matters. These are possible but have bizarre implications 
resulting in either radical changes in the structure of the family or 
requiring the educational trustees to be cut off from much of the 
child's life. There appear to be no advantages in dividing the 
trusteeship among different sets of equally intimate and loving 
parents. Therefore our concern in the following argument is to show 
that the division of custodial and trusteeship functions between 
parent/guardian(s) on the one hand and a formal institution on the 
other is contrary to the child's interests. 
23. This argument presupposes the importance of modelling for child 
development, i.e. on learning through identification and imitation. 
I do not believe this finding will be challenged by students of 
child development but I do not offer empirical evidence on it. 
24. I say 'heteronymous' because the parents lack autonomous control 
over a significant aspect of their stewardship and care. If this 
seems to beg the question concerning appropriate stewardship for 
parents, my point is that in exercising custodial care for the child, 
the responsible parent cannot avoid care and concern for the child's 
good, i.e. the child's interests necessarily comprise a significant 
part of the parent's project. 
25. If a communal arrangement provides adults the freedom to come and 
go then the only assurance of a continuing personal relationship of 
love and care for the child is for her to be attached to one or more 
definite adults and not to the commune. 
26. Modern science and medicine have made it generally possible for 
parents to control the decision to have or not have children. At 
times or in circumstances where this does not hold there is a con-
flict between the autonomy of parents and the interests of children. 
I will not speCUlate on how to resolve this issue because my concern 
is with the general organization of social co-operation and as a 
matter of social justice parents clearly ought to have the right to 
control the decision over whether to have a child. 
27. I forego employing empirical evidence concerning the effects on 
children of non-traditional family arrangements, particularly single-
parent families, because some of these effects arise from an unjust 
flow of income to these families rather than from the family 
relationship per see 
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28. See, for example, the work of Urie Bromfenbrenner concerning social 
changes in work, transportation, education, etc., and their effects 
on the family. Urie Bromfenbrenner, liThe Origins of Alienation", 
Scientific American, August, 1978, and "Who Needs Parent Education? II , 
Teachers' College Record, May, 1978. 
29. This support is not a mere supplement to parental income to meet 
the needs of the parent, but an amount sufficient for the total 
costs of child care and education. 
30. However in their citizenship responsibilities concerning the 
educational programme of their local community school they do 
exercise a form of collective self-governance regarding the education 
of their children. 
31. The British use 'public school' to refer to a type of private school 
and 'state school' to refer to a kind of common or public school. 
'State school' is an unsatisfactory term for our common, community 
school in an authentic democracy because it suggests that sovereign 
political authority for school governance rests with the nation-state 
whereas we consider the nation-state to represent merely a particular 
level in the TAG Network and to have extremely limited jurisdiction 
regarding education. The British 'public school' usage is a peculiar 
historical aberration which we disregard in favour of using 'public' 
to connect to our precise interpretation of public versus market 
sectors. 
32. This is addressed on p. 228. 
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33. There remains the problem that individuals who are in the minority 
within a particular community may nevertheless have cultural arbitraries 
imposed on them. What can be done to prevent or soften this sort of 
imposition? One hopes for a substantial degree of fraternity within 
the local community and where this pertains local majorities will 
tend to be tolerant of minority values. Where this is not the case 
the nation-state or other central level citizenship jurisdictions 
can protect individuals with respect to basic social freedoms -
although this prOVision must not be used effectively to remove the 
right of the local community to determine cultural arbitraries. 
Finally individuals can make the best use of the range of cultural 
arbitraries actually provided by exercising their rights to choose 
the community in which they will live. 
34. It might be objected that on this formulation the education will 
only be cosmopolitan, etc. if both stUdents and teachers actually 
want this, otherwise it could still be parochial. 
Indeed I have argued for two criteria: mutual determination 
of the evaluative criteria by the students' union and the teachers' 
co-operative; and a broad, cosmopolitan, critical educational 
experience; but these two criteria may sometimes conflict. The 
overriding principle in cases of conflict must be that of mutual 
determination. If the pre-autonomous stage has been successful 
the students will be in a position to represent their own interests. 
This does not imply that they will not make mistakes but generally 
it is better, at this stage, for students to make mistakes 
autonomously than to be forced to make the "correctll decision. 
There is more that can be said on this: for example, students could 
be compelled to leave their home community; students do not have a 
veto but only an equal say, so it does not follow that they can 
unilaterally choose a parochial education. However we do not want 
to get into detail on such matters here. 
35. See, for example, Richard Peters, Ethics and Education, London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966, p. 250ff. 
36. I am grateful for Graham Haydon's seminar paper that distinguishes 
'self-determination' from 'autonomy'. 
37. Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution, Westport, Connecticut, 
Greenwood Press, 1961, 1975. 
38. ibid. 
39. See pp. 92-93. 
40. This is a comprehensive judgment; it is not simply that the student 
has a particular shortcoming such as being a slow runner, an 
unimaginative painter or a poor speller but a general inaptitude for 
school activities tends to come across as IIgenerally unworthy ~ 
person". 
41. In this usage 'ideological' refers to a position which conceals its 
true purpose and values, either intentionally or unintentionally. 
42. The use of the 'normal curve' as a general policy imposed on school 
or classroom grading and evaluation illustrates this categorial 
control very well. Power is exercised at the 'macro' level which 
ensures that the whole system serves a selective function. Within 
this system the discretion of teachers is a "pseudo autonomyll 
because they have a selective system imposed upon them. 
CHAPTER VI 
1. I am indebted to C. A. Bowers for the concept of a 'psychosocial 
moratorium' and Bowers credits Erik H. Erikson's Identity and the 
Life Cycle as his source. For Erikson the need for a psychosocial 
moratorium coincides with adolescence and represents a transition 
period between the last stages of childhood and the early stages 
of adulthood where loyalties and commitments to social roles must 
be solidified. Erikson is quoted: 
The period can be viewed as a psychosocial moratorium 
during which the individual through free role experi-
mentation may find a niche in some section of his 
society, a niche which is firmly defined and yet seems 
to be uniquely made for him. In finding it the young 
adult gains an assured sense of inner continuity and 
357 
social sameness which will bridge what he ~ as a 
child and what he is about to become, and will recon-
cile his conception of himself and his community's 
recognition of him. 
Bowers argues that the idea of a psychosocial moratorium can be 
applied not only to adolescence but to the educational process as 
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a whole. C. A. Bowers, Cultural Literacy for Freedom: An Existential 
Perspective on Teaching. Curriculum. and School Policy, Elan Publishers, 
Eugene, Oregon, 1974, pp. 87-88. 
2. The reader may find it helpful at this point to review the arguments 
in section 22 against workers' co-operatives or political juris-
dictions controlling certification judgments. 
3. By 'essentialist' I mean methods directed to solutions which are 
independent of the judgments and choices of the actual participants. 
4. The term 'theorem' may seem a little odd in a philosophical inquiry. 
However the theorems which are presented are not assumptions or pre-
suppositions but rather prinCiples which are derived from even more 
basic principles. Therefore I think the mathematical metaphor 
suggested by the term 'theorem' accurately portrays its function in 
the thesis. 
5. Although these theorems are framed in terms of the teachers' 
professional association the principles are believed to apply 
generally to any occupational group or profession. 
6. For the general justification of this position see Action-Man's 
argument on pp. 168-169. 
7. It may be asked why some of the incumbents might be replaced. 
According to Theorem 3 the basic nature of these positions should 
be decided by the profession as a whole. ~Vhen this is done some 
incumbents may be ill-suited to performing the functions of their 
positions. 
8. 'Industrial unionism' is discussed in section 35. 
9. See, for example, the Parry study concerning the history of attempts, 
beginning in 1846, of teachers in England and Wales to achieve 
professional status. Parry, Noel and Jose, "The Teachers and 
Professionalism: The Failure of an Occupational Strategy in M. Flude 
and J. Ahier, editors, Educability, Schools and Ideology, John Wiley 
& Sons, Toronto, 1974. 
10. Teachers' organizations have so far tended to play only half this 
game: they defend teachers against violations of due process by 
supervisors and employers and criticize employers for poor personnel 
practices; they tend to ignore poor practices and unqualified or 
incompetent practitioners. However these latter sorts of abuses 
must also be criticized because teachers will probably reqUire broad 
public support to achieve professional status and this is unlikely 
as long as their organizational behaviour is overbalanced towards 
protection of teachers to the neglect of the public interest in 
competent and ethical teaching. 
11. See, for example, Egon Guba's monograph on educational evaluation 
in which he distinguishes naturalistic inquiry from more conven-
tional, e.g. positivistic, forms. He notes fourteen ways in which 
these forms of inquiry may differ: philosophical base; inquiry 
paradigm; purpose, stance; framework/design; style, reality manifold; 
value structure; setting; context; conditions; treatment; scope; 
methods. Egon G. Guba, Toward a Methodology of Naturalistic Inquiry 
in Educational Evaluation, Center for the Study of Evaluation, UCLA 
Graduate School of Education, University of California, Los Angeles, 
1978, especially pp. 1-30. 
12. Consider Thomas Kuhn's analysis concerning the development, criticism 
and revision of scientific theory. I believe this analysis applies 
in the relevant respects to educational theory. Thomas S. Kuhn, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, University of 
Chicago Press, 1962, 1970. 
13. J. S. Mill, On Liberty i~~Utilitarianism, Liberty and Considerations 
on Representative Government, H. B. Acton (editor), London, J. M. 
Dent & Sons Ltd., 1972, p. 78ff. 
14. See, for example, Downing, John, The Initial Teaching Alphabet 
Explained and Illustrated, London, Cassell, 1965. 
15. Specialist researchers in fields such as, for example, psychology, 
sociology, economics, ••• can be offered short term contracts, on a 
franchise basis, to perform particular research projects. This type 
of researcher need not belong to the TPA provided the TPA exercises 
democratic political control over the determination of the franchise. 
16. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, editor and 
translator Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence & 
Wishart, London, 1971, 1978, pp. 5-23. 
17. Most national teachers' organizations can provide information on 
such structures. The British Columbia Teachers' Federation has a 
well developed network of specialist associations. Address: 
BCTF, 105-2235 Burrard Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6J 3H9. 
18. Note: the definition of 'canonical theory' on p. 265 precludes state 
imposition of canonical theory. The procedures used in the develop-
ment of canonical theory are rational and democratic and not 
authoritarian. 
19. See pp. 251-252. 
20. A process that continued into the 1960s. 
21. See William Pinar, Ope cit., for a discussion of the history of this 
process and some of the leading figures in it. 
22. C. A. Bowers, "Ideological Continuities in Technicism, Liberalism 
and Educationtl in Teachers' College Record, Volume 81, No.3, 
Spring, 1980, pp. 304-305. 
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23. Huston Smith, "Excluded Knowledge: A Critique of the Modern Western 
Mind Set", Teachers' College Record, February 1979, Volume 80, No.3, 
p. 429. 
24. ibid., pp. 423-427. 
25. ibid., pp. 421-422. 
26. Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950, Penguin Books, 1958, 
1963, e.g. pp. 32-36. 
27. The reader should take time out here to recall and to think. 
28. Which is not the same thing as producing high test marks. 
29. Solidarity disputes this point arguing that there is a continuous 
variation in teaching ability. She may be right from the perspective 
of a detached scientific observer but Scholar is trying to report 
the existential experience of the student, as he himself feels it. 
30. One thinks of Martin Buber's writings on dialogic communications. 
Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, Collins Fount Paperback, 1947, 
1979, pp. 25-27. 
31. Piaget's work, for instance. 
32. C. A. Bowers, "Ideological Continuities in Technicism, Liberalism, 
and Education", Teachers' College Record, Volume 81, No.3, Spring 
1980, pp. 302ff. 
33. I believe that this finding can be generalized to other professions. 
34. This is a conceptual point - see the definition of industrial 
unionism on p. 285. 
35. See section 14. 
36. See sections 14 and 16. 
37. See section 16. 
38. See section 17. 
39. See section 17. 
40. See section 18. This is also connected to the discussion of a 
psychosocial moratorium. 
41. See p. 99. 
42. 'Closed shop' refers to the condition that only union members can 
be hired by the employer whereas 'union shop' means that any worker 
hired by the employer must, as a condition of continued employment, 
join the union. 
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FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES FOR 
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
1. See the argument starting with Facilitator's speech on p. 243 
and ending with Solidarity's speech on p. 245. 
2. See note 34 of Chapter II. 
3. See pp. 190-191. 
4. Arguments to the effect that one has to be initiated into certain 
practices or activities to be able to assess them are fine with 
respect to any particular student but they cannot serve as adequate 
justifications for choosing one set of practices over another. 
5. See pp. 255-257. 
6. Habermas is one scholar who sees this close connection between 
political relationships and the conditions of knowledge. 
7. See, for example, R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, Ope cit., p. 298. 
8. ibid., pp. 131-142. 
9. ibid., pp. 139-140. 
APPENDIX A 
1. See Lucien Goldmann, Ope cit., pp. 46-51. Goldmann accuses Heidegger 
of precisely this - of defining 'authenticity' as a tragic destiny. 
APPENDIX C 
2. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961, 
p. 189. Other references in this section are to pp. 188-193. 
3. C. D. Ovans was general secretary of the British Columbia Teachers' 
Federation from 1945 until 1973. 
APPENDIX D 
4. While everyday usage does not tend to draw such a tight distinction 
we need to distinguish two different but related ideas. Our 
definition is not entirely arbitrary because the Collins English 
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Dictionary, Ope cit., in its first definition for 'labour' gives 
IIproductive work, esp. physical toil done for wages ll • 
5. See John Lock~>Two Treatises of Government, The Second Treatise, 
Ope cit., Chapter V for one of the earliest systematic expositions 
of the tabcu,,1" theo'i o·f vah ... Q._ 
6. Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, Ope cit.,p. 48. 
7. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, pp. 177-178, quoted in Shlomo Alvineri, 
The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge University 
Press, 1968, 1978, p. 81. 
8. 'Social action' is discussed on p. 67. 
9. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, Ope cit., p. 48. 
The inner quote is from K. Marx, Capital, Volume 3, p. 191. 
APPENDIX. E 
10. This is not to say that there will necessarily be a decline in 
fraternity but to prevent this decline at least certain key activities 
need to be conducted according to the principle of replication of 
function. 
11. See section 17 for a discussion of distorted communications. Because 
excessive specialization reduces shared experience it undermines the 
trust and mutual understanding that go with open, undistorted 
communications. 
362 
ACKERMAN, Bruce 
ACTON, H. B. 
ARENDT, Hannah 
ARISTOTLE 
ATKIN, ;J. Myron 
AVINERI, Shlomo 
AYER, A. ;J. 
BARROW, Robin 
BARRY, Brian 
BATESON, Gregory 
BENN, S. I. and 
PETERS, R. S. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Social ;Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, 
London, Yale University Press, 1980. 
Kant's Moral Philosophy, London, The Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1970. 
The Human Condition, Chicago, London, University 
of Chicago Press, 1958. 
On Revolution, Penguin Books, 1963, 1979. 
The Nicomachean Ethics or Ethics, trans. Ross, 
David, Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne, 
The World's Classics, Oxford University Press, 1980. 
The Politics, Penguin Classics, 1962. 
'The Government in the Classroom', Ninth Sir ;John 
Adams Lecture, London, University of London Institute 
of Education, 6 March 1980. 
Hegel's Theorv of the Modern State, London, New York, 
Melbourne. Cambridge University Press, 1972, 1974. 
The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, 
London, New York, Melbourne, Cambridge University 
Press, 1968. 
Language. Truth and Logic, Penguin Books, 1936, 1980. 
The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin Books, 1956. 
The Canadian Curriculum: A Personal View, London, 
OntariO, University of Western Ontario, 1979. 
The Liberal Theory of Justice, Oxford University 
Press, 1973. 
Political Argument, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1965, 1970. 
Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in 
Anthropology. Psychiatry. Evolution and Epistomology, 
London, Granada, 1973. 
Social Principles and the Democratic State, London, 
Boston, Sydney. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959. 
BENTHAM, Jeremy 
BEREITER, Carl 
BERGER, P. L. and 
LUCKMAN, T. 
BERNSTEIN, Basil 
BINNS, Peter 
BOURDIEU, Pierre and 
PASSERON, Jean-Claude 
BOWERS, C. A. 
BRIDGES, David 
BROMFENBRENNER, Urie 
A Fragment on Government and an Introduction 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1960. 
Must We Educate? New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1973. 
The Social Construction of Reality, Penguin, 
1966, 1975. 
Class. Codes and Control, Vol. 1 - Theoretical 
Studies towards a Sociology of Language, London, 
1971, 1977: Vol. 3 - Towards a Theory of 
Educational Transmissions, 2nd edition, 1975, 1977, 
Routledge ~ Kegan Paul. 
Codes. Modalities and the Process of Cultural 
Reproduction: A Model. Department of Education, 
University of Lund, 1980. 
'Anti Moralism', Radical Philosophy, Spring 1975. 
Reproduction in Education. Society and Culture, 
trans. Nice, R., London, Sage Publications, 1977. 
Cultural Literacy for Freedom: An Existential 
Perspective on Teaching, Eugene Oregon, Elan 
Publishers, 1974. 
'Ideological Continuities in Technicism, Liberalism, 
and Education', Teachers' College Record, Vol. 81, 
No.3, Spring 1980. Teachers College, Columbia 
University. 
'Some Reasons Why Curriculum Planning should not 
be left to the Experts', Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, Phil. of Educ. Society of Great Britain, 
Vol. 13, 1979. 
'The Origins of Alienation', Scientific American, 
August, 1978, New York. 
'Who Needs Parent Education?', Teachers' College 
Record, May, 1978. Teachers College, Columbia 
University. 
BROWN, Richard, (ed.) Knowledge. Education and Cultural Change - Papers 
in the Sociology of Education, London, Tavistock 
Publications, 1973. 
BUBER, Martin Between Man and Man. Collins Fount Paperback, 
1947, 1979. 
BUTTS, R. Freeman 'The Public Purpose of the Public School', Teachers' 
College Record, December 1973, Vol. 75, No.2. 
Teachers College, Columbia University. 
364 
CAMPBELL, T. D. 
CAMUS, Albert 
CARSON, A. Scott 
CASTANEDA, Carlos 
CHOMSKY, N oam 
CLARK, Stephen, R. L. 
COOPER, David E. 
CROSS, R. C. and. 
WOOZLEY, A. D. 
DEARDEN, R. F. 
'Equality of Opportunity' in Aristotelian Society 
Proceedings, London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., in 
Association with the Aristotelian Society 1974-5. 
The Rebel (trans. Knop~Alfred, Vintage Books, 1954. 
Control of the Curriculum and the Competence of 
Teachers, Ph.D. thesis, University of London 
Institute of Education, 1980. 
The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge, 
New York, Pocket Books, 1968. 
Reflections on Language, New York, Pantheon Books, 
Random House, 1975. 
Aristotle's Man, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. 
'Intentions and Indoctrination', Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 5, March 1975. 
Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary, 
London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1964. 
The Philosophy of Primary Edugation: An Introduction, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. 
Problems in Primary Education, London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1976. 
DEARDEN, R. F. (I) and 'Autonomy as an Educational Ideal' in Philosophers 
TELFER, E. ~II) DiscusS Education, Brown, S. C. (editor), London, 
Macmillan, 1975. 
DEARDEN, R. F., 
HIRST, P. H. and 
PETERS, R. S. 
(editors) Edugation and the Development of Reason, 
London, Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, 1974. 
DEPARTMEN! OF EDUCATION . 
AND SCIENCE WELSH The School CurrJ.culum, London, Her Majesty's 
OFFICE' Stationery Office, March 1981. 
DEWEY, John 
DONLEY, M. O. Jr. 
DOWNIE, R. S. and 
TELFER, E. 
DOWNING, John 
Democracy and Education, New York, Macmillan, 1916, 
1936. 
Power to the Teacher: How America's Teachers 
Became Militant, London, Indiana University Press, 
1976. 
Respect for Persons, London, George Allen & Unwin, 
Ltd., 1969. 
The Initial Teaching Alphabet Explained and 
Illustrated, London, Cassell, 1965. 
DOYLE, James (editor) 
DWORKIN, Ronald 
EDGLEY, Roy 
EISNER, Elliott W. 
ENTWISTLE, Harold 
FEINBERG, W al tar 
FLANDERS, Tony 
FLEW, Antony 
(editorial consultant) 
FLOYD, Ann (editor) 
FRANKENA, W. K. 
FREIRE, Paulo 
FRIEDMAN, Mil ton 
GARFORTH, F. W. 
GIDDENS, Anthony 
Educational Judgments - Papers in the Philosophy 
of Education, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 
Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, 1977, 1978. 
366 
'Education, Work and Politics', Journal of Philosophy 
of Education, Philosophy of Education Society of 
Great Britain, Vol. 14, No.1, 1980. Oxford, 
Carfax Publishing Company. 
The Educational Imagination: On the Design and 
Evaluation of School Programs, New York, 
Macmillan, 1979. 
Antonio Gramsci Conservative Schooling for radical 
politics, London, Boston and Henley, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1979. 
Reason and Rhetoric: the Intellectual Foundations 
of 20th Century Liberal Educational Policy, 
New York, London: Wiley, 1975. 
Summary Report: Professional Development Study, 
Vancouver, British Columbia Teachers' Federation, 
March, 1980. 
A Dictionary of Philosophy, London and Basingstoke, 
Pan Books Ltd. and the Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979. 
Cognitive Development in the School Years, Open 
University Press, 1979. 
Ethics, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1963. 
Philosophy of Education, New York, Macmillan, 1965. 
Cultural Action for Freedom, Cambridge (Mass.), 
Harvard Educational Review, 1970. 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Ramos, Myra, 
Bergman, New York, Herder & Herder, 1971. 
Pedagogy in Process, Sealbury Press, 1978. 
Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, London. The 
University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
John Stuart Mill's Theory of Education, Oxford, 
Martin Robertson & Company Ltd. 1979. 
Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis 
of Marx. Durkheim and Max Weber, Cambridge, London, 
New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney, 
Cambridge University Press, 1971. 
GIDDENS, Anthony 
GOBLE, Norman M. 
GOLDMANN,Lucien 
GOULDNER, Alvin 
GRAMSCI, Antonio 
GUBA, Egon G. 
HABERMAS, J11rgen 
HAMLYN, David W. 
RANDY, Charles 
HART, H. L. A. 
Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, 
Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, 
London and Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1979. 
The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, 
London, Melbourne, Sydney, Auckland, Johannesburg, 
Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1973, 1980. 
A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, 
Vol. 1 Power. property and the state, London and 
Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1981. 
New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive 
Critique of Interpretative Sociologies, London, 
Hutchinson, 1976. 
Half a Revolution, Ottawa, Canadian Teachers' 
Federation, 1977. 
Luk8.Qs and Heidegger: TOWards a New Philosophy, 
Boelbower, William Q. (trans.), London, Henley 
and Boston, Rou,tledge & Kagan Paul. 1973 (French), 
1977 (English). 
The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the 
New Class, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 
Ltd., 1979. 
Selections from Prison Notebooks, Hoare, Q. and 
Smith, G. N. (editors and translators), London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. 
Toward a Methodology of Naturalistic Inquiry in 
Educational EValuation, Los Angeles. Center for 
the Study of Evaluation, UCLA Graduate School of 
Education, University of California, 1978. 
Communication and the Evolution of Society, 
(trans.) McCarthy, Thomas. London, Heinemann, 
1976 (German), 1979 lEnglish translation). 
367 
Knowledge and Human Interests, (trans~Shapiro, J. J., 
Boston, Beacon Press, 1968 (German), 1972 tEnglish). 
Legitimation Crisis, (trans.)McCarthy, Thomas, 
London, Heinemann, 1973 (German), 1976 tEnglish 
translation). 
Theory of Knowledge, London, Macmillan, 1971. 
Understanding Organizations, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1976. 
The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961. 
HAWKINS, David 
HAYDON, Graham 
HEGEL, Georg W. F. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin 
HIRST, Paul 
HIRST, P. H. 
HIRST, P. H. and 
PETERS, R. S. 
HOBBES, Thomas 
HOLLINS, T. H. B. 
(editor) 
HOLLIS, Martin 
HOLT, John 
HONDERICH, Ted 
E:O'B, David 
The Informed Vision, New York, Agathon Press, 1974. 
The Science and Ethics of Equality, New York, 
Basic Books, 1977. 
'What it means to Teach', Teachers' College Record, 
September 1973, Vol. 75, No.1. Teachers College, 
Columbia University. 
'The Right to Education and Compulsory Schooling' , 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, March 1977. 
Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, T. M., London, 
Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1952. 
What is Called Thinking. trans. Gray, J. Glenn, 
New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London. 
Harper Colophon Books, Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1968. 
Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie, John and 
Robinson, Edward. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962, 
1980. 
An Introduction to Metaphysics, London, Yale 
University Press, 1959, 1976. 
On Law and Ideology, London and Basingstoke. 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979. 
Knowledge and the Curriculum, London, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1974. 
Logic of EdUcation, London and Henley, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1970. 
Leviathan, Glasgow, William Collins Sons, 1651, 
1962, 1976. 
Aims in Education. The Philosophic Approach, 
Manchester University Press, 1964, 1976. 
'The Pen and the Purse', Proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 
July 1971. 
How Children Fail, New York, Torotno, London, 
Pi tman Publishing. 1964. 
Three Essays on Political Violence, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1976. 
An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
Indianopolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1955. 
368 
JAMES, William 
JASPERS, Karl 
KANT, Immanuel 
KOLAKOWSKI, Leszek 
KORNER, Stephan 
KUHN, Thomas S. 
LACEY, A. R. 
LAWRENCE, Paul R. and 
LORSCH, Jay W. 
LINDSAY, A. D. 
LIVELY, Jack 
LOCKE, John 
LORTIE, Dan C. 
LUCAS, J. R. 
LUKES, Steven 
The Principles of Psychology, Vol. One, New York, 
Dover Publications Inc., 1950. 
Kant, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1957, 1962\English 
t;;;slation). 
Critique of Practical Reason land other works), 
trans. Abbott, T. K. 6th edition, 1909. 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1959. 
The Moral Law or Groundwork of the Metaphysic of 
Morals, Paton, H. J., trans. and analyst, 
Hutchinson & Co., 1948, 1978. 
Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origins. Growth 
and Dissolution. 
Vol. 1 - The Founders, 
Vol. 2 - The Golden Age, 
Vol. 3 - The Breakdown, 
Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne, Oxford 
University Press, 1981. 
Categorial Frameworks, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974. 
Kant, Penguin Books, 1955. 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, 
Chicago, London, University of Chicago Press, 1962, 
1970. 
A Dictionarv of Philosophy, London, Boston and 
Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976. 
Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action, 
Menlo Park, California"Addison-Wessley Publishing 
Company, 1969. 
The Modern Democratic State, New York. A Galaxy 
Book. Oxford University Press, 1943, 1962. 
Democracy, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975, 1980. 
Two Treatises of Government, New York and 
Scarborough, Ontario. Mentor Book. Cambridge 
University Press, New York 1960. 
School-Teacher: A Sociological Study, Chicago 
and London, University of Chicago Press, 1975. 
Democracy and Participation, Penguin Books, 1976. 
Power: A Radical View, London and Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974. 
369 
MACINTYRE, Alasdair 
MACPHERSON, C. B. 
A Short History of Ethics, London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1967, 1976. 
Burke, Oxford, Toronto, Melbourne, Oxford University 
Press, 1980. 
Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1973. 
The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, Oxford, 
New York, Toronto, Melbourne, Oxford University 
Press, 1977. 
(editor) Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions 
University of Toronto Press, 1978. 
370 
MACQUARRIE, John An Existentialist Theology, Penguin Books, 1955, 1980. 
McLELLAN, D. Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford University Press, 
1977. 
MARX, Karl Selected Writ~s in Sociology and Social Philosophy, 
trans. Bottomore, T. B., McGraw-Hill, 1956, 1964. 
MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Smith, Colin, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962. 
MIDGLEY, Mary Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature, London, 
Methuen, 1978, 1979. 
MILGRAM, Stanley 'The Dilemma of Obedience', Phi Delta Kappan, 
March 1976. 
MILL, John Stuart Utilitarianism. On Liberty. and Considerations 
on Representative Government, London, Melbourne, 
Toronto, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1972, 1980. 
MOORE, Terry W. Educational Theory: An Introduction, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. 
NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR Philosophical Redirection of Educational Research, 
THE STUDY OF EDUCATION 71st Yearbook 1972. 
NEW AMERICAN STANDARD BIBLE: Study Edition. Philadelphia and New York, 
A. J. Holman Company, 1975. 
NORMAN, Richard 
NOZICK, Robert 
OPEN UNIVERSITY, 
'Moral Philosophy Without Morality', Radical 
Philosophy 6, Winter 1973. 
Anarchy. State and Utopia, Oxford, Basic Books, 1974. 
Schooling7 and Society Course Team. The Curriculum 
~ Cultural Reproduction, Revision II, Block III, 
Units 18, 19, lO. The Open University Press 1977. 
OPPENHEIM, Felix 
OVANS, Charles D. 
PARRY, Noel and 
PARRY, Jose 
PASSMORE, John 
PATEMAN, Carole 
PENNOCK, J. R. and 
CHAPMAN, J. W. 
PETERS, Richard S. 
Political Concepts: A Reconstruction, Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1981. 
Behind the Looking Glass: Toward the Educating 
Society, Vancouver, Evergreen Press Ltd., 1978. 
Can the Teaching Profession Build a Better School 
System?, -Toronto, Gage Educational Publishing Ltd., 
1972. 
'The Teachers and Professionalism: The Failure of 
an Occupational Strategy', in Flude, M. and 
Ahier, J. (editors), Educability. Schools and 
Ideology, Toronto, John Wiley & Sons, 1974. 
The Philosophy of Teaching, London, Duckworth, 1980. 
'Criticising Empirical Theorists of Democracy: 
A Comment on Skinner', Political Theory, Vol. 2, 
No.2, May 1975. 
Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
'Political Obligation and Conceptual Analysis' in 
Philosophy. Politics and Society, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1979. 
(editors) Equality, New York, Atherton Press, 
1967. 
Authoritv. Responsibility and Education, London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1959, 1973. 
The Concept of Education, London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1967. 
'Democratic Values and Educational Aims', Teachers' 
College Record, February 1979. Teachers College, 
Columbia University. 
Education and the Education of Teachers, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. 
371 
Ethics and Education, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
1966. 
(editor) The Philosophy of Education, Oxford 
University Press, 1973. 
Psychology and Ethical Development, London, George 
Allen & Unwin, 1974. 
PIAGET , Jean 
PINAR,William (editor) 
PLAMENATZ, John 
PLATO 
POLANYI, Michael 
QUINTON, Anthony 
RAPHAEL, D. D. 
RAWLS, John 
ROGERS, Carl 
RORTY, Amelie 
Oksenberg (editor) 
The Language and Thought of the Child, New York, 
Harcourt Brace, 1932. 
Structuralism, trans. Maschler, C., New York, 
Harper Colophon, 1968 (French), 1970 (English) 
Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, 
Berkeley, McCutchan, 1975. 
Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some 
Important Social and Political Theories from 
Machiavelli to Marx, vols. 1 and 2, London, 
Longman Group Ltd., 1963, 1979. 
The Republic, Penguin Classics, trans. Lee, D., 
1955, 1974. 
Personal Knowledee: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, 1958, 1962. 
(editor) Political Philosophy, Oxford University 
Press, 1967, 1977. 
Problems of Political Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 
1970. 
A Theorv of Justice, Oxford, London, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1971. 
On PerSOnal Power, New York, Delacorte Press, 1977. 
The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
London, University of California Press, 1976. 
372 
ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques Emile, trans. Foxley, B., London, Dent, 1974. 
RYLE , Gilbert 
SANCHEZ, Ramon 
SARTRE, Jean-Paul 
SCHEFFLER, Israel 
SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur 
The Social Contract, trans. Cranston, M., Penguin 
Classics, 1968. 
The Concept of Mind, Penguin Books, 1949, 1978. 
Schooling AmeriCan Society: A Democratic Ideology, 
New York, Syracuse University Press, 1976. 
Being and Nothingness, trans. Barnes, Hazel, New 
York, Washington Square Press Pocket Books, 1956, 1977. 
Conditions of Knowledge, University of Chicago Press, 
1965, 1978. 
lIn Praise of Cognitive Emotions', Teachers' College 
Record, December 1977, Teachers College, Columbia 
University. 
On the Basis of Morality, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. 
SCHUMACHER, E. F. 
SHEROVER, C. M. 
\editor) 
SINGER, Peter 
A Guide for the Perplexed, Harper Colophon Books, 
Harper & Row, 1977. 
Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if 
People Mattered, London, Blond i Briggs, 1973. 
373 
The Development of the Democratic Idea, New York, 
Mentor Books, The New American Library Inc. 1974. 
Democracy and Disobedience, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1973. 
Practical Ethics, London, Cambridge University Press, 
1979. 
SKILLEN, Anthony Ruling Illusions: Philosophy and the Social Order, 
Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1977. 
SKINNER, Q. 'The Empirical Theorists of Democracy and their 
Critics: A Plague on both their houses', Political 
Theory, Vol. 1, No.3, August 1974. 
SMITH, Huston 'Excluded Knowledge: A Critique of the Modern 
Western Mind Set', Teachers' College Record, 
February 1979, Vol. 80, No.3, Teachers College, 
Columbia University_ 
SOCKETT, Hugh (editor) Accountability in the English Educational System, 
London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1980. 
STEINBERG, Jules Locke. Rousseau and the Idea of Consent, London, 
Greenwood Press, 1978. 
STENT, Gunther 
TUSSMAN, Joseph 
WARNOCK, S. J. 
WARNOCK, Mary 
WASSERSTROM, R. A. 
(editor) 
WEST, E. G. 
WHITE, John 
Paradoxes of Progress, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman 
& Co., 1978. 
Government and the Mind, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1977. 
The Object of Morality, London, Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1971. 
Ethics Since 1900, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 
1960, 1978. 
Schools of Thought, London, Faber, 1977. 
Todav's Moral Problems, London, Macmillan Publishing, 
1975, 1979. 
Education and the State, 2nd edition. Institute of 
Economic Affairs, Ontario, Canada, 1970. 
The Aims of Education Restated, London, Boston and 
Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. 
WHITE, John P. 
WHITE, Pat 
WHITEHEAD, Alfred N. 
WILLIAMS, Bernard 
WILLIAMS, Raymond 
WILSON, John 
WINCH, Peter 
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig 
'The End of the Compulsory Curriculum I, The 
Curriculum: The Doris Lee Lectures, University 
of London Institute of Education, 1975. 
'Work-place Democracy and Political Education' , 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, Philosophy 
of Education Society of Great Britain, 1979. 
The Aims of Education: and Other Essays, London, 
Benn, 1962. 
Morality - An Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge 
University Press, 1972. 
Communications, Penguin Books, 1962. 
Culture and Society 1780-1950, Penguin Books, 1958. 
The Long Revolution, Westport, Connecticut, 
Greenwood Press, 1961, 1975. 
'Education and Politics: A Reply to Martin Hollis', 
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society 
of Great Britain, July 1971. 
The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958. 
Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, 
G. E. M., Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953. 
YOUNG, Michael (editor) Knowledge and Control, London, Collier-Macmillan, 
1971. 
374 
